HelHO - HelHO:2026:8

A Oy requested information from the District Court regarding pending and concluded cases involving 39 named individuals in order to investigate their backgrounds. According to A Oy, the purpose of the request for information was journalistic use as defined in Section 27 of the Data Protection Act. The District Court denied the request, finding that the information was in fact being sought for another purpose. A Oy appealed the decision. B Oy, a media company for which A Oy served as a subcontractor, joined the appeal as an intervenor. The Helsinki Court of Appeal referred a question of precedent to the Supreme Court regarding the appropriate legal proceeding in which the matter concerning the request for information should be resolved. In its decision KKO 2026:50, the Supreme Court held that the issue concerned the publicity of court proceedings, which was to be resolved as a matter of law in accordance with the procedural provisions of the Act on the Publicity of Court Proceedings in General Courts.

Based on the grounds set forth in the ruling, the Court of Appeals held that B Oy did not have the right to intervenein the matter concerning its subcontractor’s request for information, nor was the investigation of the backgrounds of individuals who had applied for an entertainment program for the purpose of recruitment for the program considered, within the meaning of the Data Protection Act, exclusively for journalistic purposes as defined by the Data Protection Act. DECISION OF THE EAST UUSIMAA DISTRICT COURT, AUGUST 22, 2025 A Oy had requested information from the District Court regarding pending and concluded cases involving 39 named individuals in order to investigate their backgrounds. The party submitting the request for information had cited journalistic purposes as the basis for the request. The District Court had initially rejected the request for information by administrative decision.

After the requester appealed the decision, the Administrative Court remanded the case to the District Court for reconsideration, holding that the matter should not be resolved by an administrative decision, but rather as a judicial decision under the Act on the Publicity of Court Proceedings in General Courts. Upon reconsidering the matter, the District Court found that the request for information effectively concerned the District Court’s case file records and that the conditions for disclosing the requested personal data relating to criminal cases had to be assessed . The District Court found that no reason based on the public interest or specific interest had been presented for the disclosure of the information, that would outweigh the protection of the privacy and personal data of the individuals subject to the request. The District Court further found that the actual purpose of the request for information was to investigate the backgrounds of individuals who had applied for an entertainment program for the purpose of making casting decisions, rather than for journalistic purposes as defined by the Data Protection Act.

The request for information was denied. The case was decided in the District Court by Presiding Judge Timo Heikkinen. DECISION OF THE HELSINKI COURT OF APPEALS, SEPTEMBER 7, 2026 Proceedings in the Court of Appeals In its decision issued on January 23, 2026, the Court of Appeals referred a question of precedent regarding the order of proceedings in the case to the Supreme Court for resolution. In its decision KKO 2026:50, issued on June 30, 2026, the Supreme Court responded to the question of preliminary ruling. On August 31, 2026, the Court of Appeals granted A Oy leave to appeal. Appeal A Oy has demanded that the Eastern Uusimaa District Court be ordered to disclose to A Oy the information specified in the request for information, and that the Finnish State be ordered to reimburse A Oy for its litigation and party costs, including interest. A Oy acted as a subcontractor for B Oy’s business unit C in gathering information for the production of journalistic content.

C was a media outlet as defined by the Act on the Exercise of Freedom of Expression in Mass Communication (Freedom of Expression Act), and all of its program content and background materials were journalistic in nature and under the responsibility of the respective editor. The Freedom of the Press Act did not require any qualitative or other criteria regarding program content or the standard of journalism. The decisive factor was editorial responsibility for the content. Journalism encompassed both investigative journalism and entertainment programs. The Guidelines for Journalists applied to all program content on C’s TV channels. The request for information stated that the requested data would be used for the production of journalistic content and invoked the journalistic purpose provision under Section 27 of the Data Protection Act. The request for information also explained C’s programming activities and noted that the information was being requested to facilitate data collection by a subcontractor involved in the production of journalistic content.

Based on this information, the authority had no grounds to require the requester to provide a separate explanation of how the stated journalistic purpose was sufficient. The authority had no jurisdiction to assess in advance the adequacy of the journalistic purpose stated in the request for information and to reject the request based on that assessment. Such an assessment could constitute an unjustified restriction on freedom of speech and conflict with the prohibition on prior censorship guaranteed by Section 12(1) of the Constitution. Media companies independently assessed when investigative work was conducted for journalistic purposes, and they were independently responsible for ensuring that the data was processed for the stated purpose. In any case, the District Court had interpreted Section 27 of the Data Protection Act and the concept of “journalistic purpose” incorrectly and too narrowly.

A journalistic purpose may also encompass editorial work related to the preparation of journalistic content. In this case, investigating the backgrounds of the program’s participants and selecting participants based on that information were part of the program’s preparation and enabled editorial decisions to be made regarding who was selected for the program and what topics were covered in it. The background investigations were thus part of the journalistic process that led to the expression of information, opinions, and ideas to the public. The District Court had not properly balanced the fundamental rights. In balancing the protection of fundamental rights, the view protecting three fundamental rights—namely, the right to public access to information, freedom of speech, and freedom of enterprise—prevailed over the protection of a single fundamental right, namely the right to privacy. Furthermore, the decision violated the principle of equality if requests for information were treated differently by different district courts.

In addition to journalistic purposes, there were other specific interests in obtaining the information. Investigating the backgrounds of individuals participating in TV productions was linked to the company’s duty of care regarding sustainable operations, as this enabled the identification and prevention of risks such as discrimination and harassment, as well as other human rights impacts related to the productions. Background checks also helped protect viewers from harmful content and ensured that any criminal history could be properly assessed before the program aired, which was also significant in terms of protecting the participants’ privacy. Failure to obtain this information could pose a significant financial and reputational risk to television media outlets. Motion to Intervene In its application included in the appeal, B Oy requested that it be granted the status of an intervenor in the case.

The decision concerned a request for information that A Oy had made as a subcontractor on behalf of C, a business unit of B Oy. Submitting the request under review and other similar requests for information was an essential part of the journalistic activities of C and B Oy, and decisions regarding these requests therefore directly affected B Oy’s interests. The Court of Appeals’ Decision Reasons Motion to Intervene Pursuant to Section 8 of Chapter 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure, if a person who is not a party to the proceedings claims that the matter concerns his or her rights, and presents plausible grounds in support of their claim, they may participate in the proceedings as an intervenor on the side of either party. According to Supreme Court rulings, a person seeking to intervene must be able to demonstrate, on a prima facie basis, that the matter being heard in the proceedings concerns his or her rights and that he or she therefore has a legitimate legal interest in influencing the outcome of the proceedings as a third party.

The rulings have also emphasized whether the legal system offers other effective legal remedies through which the party seeking to intervene can protect their own rights and prevent irreparable harm. As an exception to the rule, the provision must in any case be interpreted narrowly. (Supreme Court 2008:30, paras. 2, 3, and 5; Supreme Court 2015:59, para. 22) According to legal literature, a matter may be considered to concern the intervener’s rights if the judgment could adversely affect his or her legal position. The intervenor’s interest must be legal in nature and such that it could be the subject of independent legal proceedings. Furthermore, the interest must have a concrete connection to the proceedings and their outcome. Such a connection exists, in particular, when the res judicata effect, evidentiary effect, or effect on the facts of the case extends to the intervenor. The mere precedent effect of the judgment, on the other hand, does not justify intervention.

(Lappalainen – Hupli, “Protection of a Third Party’s Interests in Legal Proceedings.” In Dan (ed.): Procedural Law. 6th, revised edition. Helsinki 2021. pp. 487–491) The Court of Appeal notes that B Oy can, in and of itself, be considered to have a concrete interest in the matter, since it has stated that it needs the same information to investigate the backgrounds of individuals being recruited for the program and could also submit a similar request for information itself. The decision in this case could therefore be significant for the company if it is held that a request for information made for that purpose does not fall within the scope of journalistic purposes, as the same legal assessment could affect the company’s ability to obtain similar information. The company’s status as a media operator and its connection to the program production in question could support the subcontractor’s view regarding the journalistic purpose of the information request; however, when assessing, the fact that the company’s participation in the proceedings could support the main party’s view or claim regarding journalistic purpose cannot be the sole basis for such intervention.

This case concerns a request for information made by the company’s subcontractor; it does not concern the company’s own right to receive information, and the decision rendered in this case is not legally binding on the company. Nor does this case address any issues of evidence or facts concerning the company that would have evidentiaryor factual implications; rather, the case specifically concerns the resolution of a legal issue—namely, whether the request for information made by the subcontractor falls within the scope of journalistic purposes. Any potential impact of the ruling on the company would thus arise solely from the fact that the legal interpretation adopted in this case could also become applicable to any subsequent request for information made by the company. The issue, therefore, concerns the precedent-setting effect rather than a direct legal effect on the company’s rights.

The precedent-setting effect alone does not constitute an acceptable interest in intervening. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals has taken into account in its assessment that the company did not file to intervene until the appellate stage, at which point the proceedings should be narrowed rather than expanded. Furthermore, considering the principle emphasized by the Supreme Court in its decision KKO 2008:30—namely, that the provision on intervention, as an exception, must be interpreted narrowly— the company’s interest cannot be considered a sufficient basis for intervention. The company therefore has no right to intervene. Main Issue The District Court’s decision sets forth the applicable provisions and other legal guidelines. In addition, the Court of Appeal notes the following. Under Article 85(1) of the General Data Protection Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council) , Member States must, by law, reconcile the right to the protection of personal data under this Regulation with the right to freedom of expression and information, including processing for journalistic purposes and for the purposes of academic, artistic, or literary expression.

applies Art. 85(1)

Pursuant to paragraph 2 of the same article, with regard to processing for journalistic purposes or for the purposes of academic, artistic, or literary expression, Member States shall provide for exemptions or derogations from Chapter II (Principles), Chapter III (Rights of the Data Subject), Chapter IV (Controller and Processor), Chapter V (Transfers of Personal Data to Third Countries or International Organizations), Chapter VI (Independent Supervisory Authorities), Chapter VII (Cooperation and Consistency), and Chapter IX (specific situations relating to data processing), where necessary to reconcile the right to the protection of personal data with the freedom of expression and information. Pursuant to Article 86 of the General Data Protection Regulation, public authorities oror private-law bodies, in the performance of a task carried out in the public interest, may disclose personal data contained in official documents held by public authorities or such bodies to a public authority or such a body in accordance within accordance with Union law or the legislation of a Member State, in order to reconcile the public access to official documents with the right to the protection of personal data under this Regulation.

applies Art. 86

In its judgment of March 7, 2024, in Case C-740/22, Endemol Shine Finland Oy, the Court of Justice of the European Union held that, although public access to official documents is in the public interest, which may, in principle, justify the disclosure of personal data, such disclosure must be reconciled with the fundamental rights to respect for private life and the protection of personal data. Given the particularly sensitive nature of information concerning criminal convictions and the serious interference with the privacy and protection of personal data of data subjects caused by the disclosure of such information, these fundamental rights have been deemed to carry greater weight than the general interest in the public access to official documents. For the same reason, freedom of the press cannot be interpreted to mean to justify the disclosure of personal data concerning criminal convictions to anyone who requests it.

(paragraphs 55 and 56) According to Section 1 of the Data Protection Act (1050/2018), the Act specifies and supplements the General Data Protection Regulation and its national application. According to Section 27 of the same Act, in order to safeguard freedom of expression and freedom of the press, the processing of personal data solely for journalistic purposes or for the purposes of academic, artistic, or literary expression, the General Data ProtectionArticle 5(1)(c)–(e), Articles 6 and 7, Articles 9 and 10, Article 11(2), Articles 12–22, Article 30, Article 34(1)–(3), Articles 35 and 36, Article 56, Article 58(2)(f), Articles 60–63, and Articles 65–67 of the General Data Protection Regulation do not apply. Neither the Data Protection Act nor the General Data Protection Regulation defines “journalistic purposes,” and the meaning of this term will be established through case law. The preparatory materials for the Data Protection Act refer to the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, in which the processing of personal data for journalistic purposes has been deemed to be an activity whose sole purpose is the communication of information, opinions, and ideas to the public.

applies Art. 11(2), Art. 34(1), Art. 58(2)(f), Art. 6, Art. 7, Art. 9, Art. 10, Art. 12, Art. 30, Art. 35, Art. 36, Art. 56, Art. 60, Art. 65

The preparatory materials further state that national law does not have the authority to clarify or define the terminology of the General Data Protection Regulation. (HE 9/2018 vp, p. 57) In its judgment of July 9, 2026, Case C-199/24, ND v. Legal Newsdesk Sweden AB, the Court of Justice of the European Union held that,that, in interpreting the “journalistic purpose” provision of the GDPR, the Court’s case law regarding the concept of journalism as used in Article 9 of Directive 95/46 may be applied. The judgment states that the concept of journalistic purposes must be interpreted broadly in order to take into account the importance of the right to freedom of expression in all democratic societies. However, this interpretation does not cover all forms of expression. The concept is based on activities intended to convey information, opinions, or ideas to the public through any means of communication.

applies Directive 95/46 Art. 9

Journalistic activity also requires the editing or processing of the information to be conveyed, which takes place on a regular or professional basis, or at a minimum, the making of the information available in accordance with editorial decisions. Factual claims must be verified with sufficient reliability, and the activity must comply with ethical rules and codes of conduct for journalists. Journalistic purposes may also include the processing of personal data necessary for publication, but such processing must be genuinely linked to journalistic expression. (paragraphs 61, 62, 64, and 66–77) The Court of Justice of the European Union has also held in the same judgment that the exception provided for inRegulation applies exclusively to the processing of personal data for journalistic, academic, artistic, and literary purposes. The framework of exceptions set forth in that provision is exhaustive, and the exceptions must be interpreted narrowly; a Member State may not, pursuant to Article 85(1), adopt exceptions to the provisions of the Data Protection Regulation on any other such as on the basis of another specific interest, if the processing of personal data is not intended for journalistic or academic, artistic, or literary expression.

applies Art. 85(1)

(ECJ July 9, 2026, C-199/24, paras. 38, 39, and 42–44.) The Court of Appeal notes, first of all, that it is not even alleged in this case that A Oy is a media outlet or that its activities are subject to the ethical rules and codes of conduct applicable to journalists. However, the decisive factor in assessing the case is not which entity processes the personal data, but rather the purpose for which such personal data is processed. The same entity may process personal data both for journalistic purposes and for other purposes. Nor is the nature of the publication or program resulting from the activity relevant to the assessment of the case. Furthermore, a journalistic purpose is not limited solely to the processing of personal data that occurs during the publication phase; rather, it may also extend, for example, to the gathering of information prior to publication. However, this does not mean that all processing of personal data related to the preparation of the program takes place for journalistic purposes.

The processing of personal data at issue here relates primarily to the selection of individuals to appear on a television program. Information regarding criminal matters is obtained to assess which individuals will be selected for the program. The immediate purpose of the processing is therefore not to express information, opinions, or thoughts to the public, nor is it the journalistic processing, verification, or editorial selection of information for the program’s content. Rather, the purpose is to assess the suitability of individuals for the program and to make a production-related selection regarding who will participate in the program. In this respect, the process is more akin to selecting individuals for a specific production than to journalistic fact-finding. A similar selection process could also apply to other individuals serving as background personnel for the program. The fact that the individuals who are the subject of the request for information might be specifically selected to appear on the program does not, in and of itself, make the process of selecting them a journalistic one.

Consequently, the fact that A Oy participates in the production of a television program is not decisive in assessing the matter. The assessment must be based on the specific purpose of the processing, and in this case, that purpose is the selection of individuals for the program, not the production of journalistic content. The Court of Appeal finds that A Oy’s processing of personal data does not take place solely for journalistic purposes as referred to in Section 27 of the Data Protection Act. The possibility mentioned in the appeal of discussing the criminal convictions of individuals selected for the program does not alter the assessment of the matter, since the primary and immediate purpose of obtaining the criminal convictions is to evaluate the applicants and select participants for the program from among them. Any subsequent journalistic use of criminal records is a separate and merely secondary possibility.

The Court of Appeal finds that A Oy’s request for information does not constitute the processing of personal data for journalistic purposes as defined in Section 27 of the Data Protection Act. Nor does A Oy, based on the specific interests it cited in its appeal, have the right to obtain the information it requested. With these additions, the Court of Appeals accepts the reasoning and conclusions of the District Court’s decision. Decision B Oy’s motion to intervene is dismissed. A Oy’s appeal is dismissed. The case was decided by: President Asko Välimaa Court of Appeals Judge Pia Sandvik Court of Appeals Judge Simo Kolehmainen Presiding Judge: Court of Appeals Presiding Judge Anu Virkki The decision is unanimous. The deadline for requesting leave to appeal and filing an appeal expires on November 6, 2026.