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Case Law · CJEU ·362/14 EN LLM context A cited markdown file you can paste into your AI assistant (ChatGPT, Claude, a RAG or project knowledge base) to ground it in this document. Contains: this document’s text, its sections with their topics, and the full text of every law provision it applies. Everything links back to its source on overview.legal — legal information, not advice.

Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner

C-362/14 (Schrems I)

CJEU
Summary

Invalidated Safe Harbor adequacy decision. National supervisory authorities can examine adequacy decisions.

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21 of 30 paragraphs apply legislation or carry a topic — see them in the full text ↓

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KB. Apply EUR-Lex Access to European Union law This document is an excerpt from the EUR-Lex website You are here EUROPA EUR-Lex home EUR-Lex - 62014CJ0362 - EN Help Print Menu EU law Treaties Treaties currently in force Founding Treaties Accession Treaties Other treaties and protocols Chronological overview Legal acts Consolidated texts International agreements Preparatory documents EFTA documents Lawmaking procedures Summaries of EU legislation Browse by EU institutions European Parliament European Council Council of the European Union European Commission Court of Justice of the European Union European Central Bank European Court of Auditors European Economic and Social Committee European Committee of the Regions Browse by EuroVoc EU case-law Case-law Reports of cases Directory of case-law Official Journal Access to the Official Journal Official Journal L series daily view Official Journal C series daily view Browse the Official Journal Legally binding printed editions Special edition National law and case-law National transposition National case-law JURE case-law Information Themes in focus EUR-Lex developments Statistics ELI register What is ELI ELI background Why implement ELI Countries implementing ELI Testimonials Implementing ELI Glossary EU budget online Quick search Use quotation marks to search for an "exact phrase". Append an asterisk ( * ) to a search term to find variations of it (transp * , 32019R * ). Use a question mark ( ? ) instead of a single character in your search term to find variations of it (ca ? e finds case, cane, care). Search tips Need more search options? Use the Advanced search Document 62014CJ0362 Help Print Text Document information Summary / Keywords Permanent link Download notice Save to My items Create an email alert Create an RSS alert ​ Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of

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TFEU from the High Court (Ireland), made by decision of

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Decision 2000/520 was adopted by the Commission on the basis of Article 25(6) of Directive 95/46.

applies Art. 25
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Recitals 2, 5 and 8 in the preamble to that decision are worded as follows: ‘(2) The Commission may find that a third country ensures an adequate level of protection. In that case personal data may be transferred from the Member States without additional guarantees being necessary. … (5) The adequate level of protection for the transfer of data from the Community to the United States recognised by this Decision, should be attained if organisations comply with the safe harbour privacy principles for the protection of personal data transferred from a Member State to the United States (hereinafter “the Principles”) and the frequently asked questions (hereinafter “the FAQs”) providing guidance for the implementation of the Principles issued by the Government of the United States on

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Articles 1 to 4 of Decision 2000/520 provide: ‘ Article 1

applies Art. 1
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The Member States and the Commission shall also inform each other of cases where the action of bodies responsible for ensuring compliance with the Principles implemented in accordance with the FAQs in the United States fails to secure such compliance.

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If the information collected under paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 provides evidence that any body responsible for ensuring compliance with the Principles implemented in accordance with the FAQs in the United States is not effectively fulfilling its role, the Commission shall inform the US Department of Commerce and, if necessary, present draft measures in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 31 of Directive 95/46/EC with a view to reversing or suspending the present Decision or limiting its scope. Article 4

applies Art. 4Art. 31
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This Decision may be adapted at any time in the light of experience with its implementation and/or if the level of protection provided by the Principles and the FAQs is overtaken by the requirements of US legislation. The Commission shall in any case evaluate the implementation of the present Decision on the basis of available information three years after its notification to the Member States and report any pertinent findings to the Committee established under Article 31 of Directive 95/46/EC, including any evidence that could affect the evaluation that the provisions set out in Article 1 of this Decision provide adequate protection within the meaning of Article 25 of Directive 95/46/EC and any evidence that the present Decision is being implemented in a discriminatory way.

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The Commission shall, if necessary, present draft measures in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 31 of Directive 95/46/EC.’

applies Art. 31
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Annex I to Decision 2000/520 is worded as follows: ‘Safe Harbour Privacy Principles issued by the US Department of Commerce on

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Annex II to Decision 2000/520 reads as follows: ‘Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) ... FAQ 6 — Self-Certification Q: How does an organisation self-certify that it adheres to the Safe Harbour Principles? A: Safe harbour benefits are assured from the date on which an organisation self-certifies to the Department of Commerce (or its designee) its adherence to the Principles in accordance with the guidance set forth below. To self-certify for the safe harbour, organisations can provide to the Department of Commerce (or its designee) a letter, signed by a corporate officer on behalf of the organisation that is joining the safe harbour, that contains at least the following information: 1. name of organisation, mailing address, e-mail address, telephone and fax numbers; 2. description of the activities of the organisation with respect to personal information received from the [European Union]; and 3. description of the organisation’s privacy policy for such personal information, including: (a) where the privacy policy is available for viewing by the public, (b) its effective date of implementation, (c) a contact office for the handling of complaints, access requests, and any other issues arising under the safe harbour, (d) the specific statutory body that has jurisdiction to hear any claims against the organisation regarding possible unfair or deceptive practices and violations of laws or regulations governing privacy (and that is listed in the annex to the Principles), (e) name of any privacy programmes in which the organisation is a member, (f) method of verification (e.g. in-house, third party) …, and (g) the independent recourse mechanism that is available to investigate unresolved complaints. Where the organisation wishes its safe harbour benefits to cover human resources information transferred from the [European Union] for use in the context of the employment relationship, it may do so where there is a statutory body with jurisdiction to hear claims against the organisation arising out of human resources information that is listed in the annex to the Principles. ... The Department (or its designee) will maintain a list of all organisations that file such letters, thereby assuring the availability of safe harbour benefits, and will update such list on the basis of annual letters and notifications received pursuant to FAQ 11. ... ... FAQ 11 — Dispute Resolution and Enforcement Q: How should the dispute resolution requirements of the Enforcement Principle be implemented, and how will an organisation’s persistent failure to comply with the Principles be handled? A: The Enforcement Principle sets out the requirements for safe harbour enforcement. How to meet the requirements of point (b) of the Principle is set out in the FAQ on verification (FAQ 7). This FAQ 11 addresses points (a) and (c), both of which require independent recourse mechanisms. These mechanisms may take different forms, but they must meet the Enforcement Principle’s requirements. Organisations may satisfy the requirements through the following: (1) compliance with private sector developed privacy programmes that incorporate the Safe Harbour Principles into their rules and that include effective enforcement mechanisms of the type described in the Enforcement Principle; (2) compliance with legal or regulatory supervisory authorities that provide for handling of individual complaints and dispute resolution; or (3) commitment to cooperate with data protection authorities located in the European Union or their authorised representatives. This list is intended to be illustrative and not limiting. The private sector may design other mechanisms to provide enforcement, so long as they meet the requirements of the Enforcement Principle and the FAQs. Please note that the Enforcement Principle’s requirements are additional to the requirements set forth in paragraph 3 of the introduction to the Principles that self-regulatory efforts must be enforceable under Article 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act or similar statute. Recourse Mechanisms Consumers should be encouraged to raise any complaints they may have with the relevant organisation before proceeding to independent recourse mechanisms. ... ... FTC Action The FTC has committed to reviewing on a priority basis referrals received from privacy self-regulatory organisations, such as BBBOnline and TRUSTe, and EU Member States alleging non-compliance with the Safe Harbour Principles to determine whether Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibiting unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce has been violated. ... …’

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Annex IV to Decision 2000/520 states: ‘Damages for Breaches of Privacy, Legal Authorisations and Mergers and Takeovers in US Law This responds to the request by the European Commission for clarification of US law with respect to (a) claims for damages for breaches of privacy, (b) “explicit authorisations” in US law for the use of personal information in a manner inconsistent with the safe harbour principles, and (c) the effect of mergers and takeovers on obligations undertaken pursuant to the safe harbour principles. ... B. Explicit Legal Authorisations The safe harbour principles contain an exception where statute, regulation or case-law create “conflicting obligations or explicit authorisations, provided that, in exercising any such authorisation, an organisation can demonstrate that its non-compliance with the principles is limited to the extent necessary to meet the overriding legitimate interests further[ed] by such authorisation”. Clearly, where US law imposes a conflicting obligation, US organisations whether in the safe harbour or not must comply with the law. As for explicit authorisations, while the safe harbour principles are intended to bridge the differences between the US and European regimes for privacy protection, we owe deference to the legislative prerogatives of our elected lawmakers. The limited exception from strict adherence to the safe harbour principles seeks to strike a balance to accommodate the legitimate interests on each side. The exception is limited to cases where there is an explicit authorisation. Therefore, as a threshold matter, the relevant statute, regulation or court decision must affirmatively authorise the particular conduct by safe harbour organisations ... In other words, the exception would not apply where the law is silent. In addition, the exception would apply only if the explicit authorisation conflicts with adherence to the safe harbour principles. Even then, the exception “is limited to the extent necessary to meet the overriding legitimate interests furthered by such authorisation”. By way of illustration, where the law simply authorises a company to provide personal information to government authorities, the exception would not apply. Conversely, where the law specifically authorises the company to provide personal information to government agencies without the individual’s consent, this would constitute an “explicit authorisation” to act in a manner that conflicts with the safe harbour principles. Alternatively, specific exceptions from affirmative requirements to provide notice and consent would fall within the exception (since it would be the equivalent of a specific authorisation to disclose the information without notice and consent). For example, a statute which authorises doctors to provide their patients’ medical records to health officials without the patients’ prior consent might permit an exception from the notice and choice principles. This authorisation would not permit a doctor to provide the same medical records to health maintenance organisations or commercial pharmaceutical research laboratories, which would be beyond the scope of the purposes authorised by the law and therefore beyond the scope of the exception ... The legal authority in question can be a “stand alone” authorisation to do specific things with personal information, but, as the examples below illustrate, it is likely to be an exception to a broader law which proscribes the collection, use, or disclosure of personal information. ...’ Communication COM(2013) 846 final

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On

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In point 1 of Communication COM(2013) 846 final, the Commission stated that ‘[c]ommercial exchanges are addressed by Decision [2000/520]’, adding that ‘[t]his Decision provides a legal basis for transfers of personal data from the [European Union] to companies established in the [United States] which have adhered to the Safe Harbour Privacy Principles’. In addition, the Commission underlined in point 1 the increasing relevance of personal data flows, owing in particular to the development of the digital economy which has indeed ‘led to exponential growth in the quantity, quality, diversity and nature of data processing activities’.

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In point 2 of that communication, the Commission observed that ‘concerns about the level of protection of personal data of [Union] citizens transferred to the [United States] under the Safe Harbour scheme have grown’ and that ‘[t]he voluntary and declaratory nature of the scheme has sharpened focus on its transparency and enforcement’.

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It further stated in point 2 that ‘[t]he personal data of [Union] citizens sent to the [United States] under the Safe Harbour may be accessed and further processed by US authorities in a way incompatible with the grounds on which the data was originally collected in the [European Union] and the purposes for which it was transferred to the [United States]’ and that ‘[a] majority of the US internet companies that appear to be more directly concerned by [the surveillance] programmes are certified under the Safe Harbour scheme’.

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The Commission concluded in point 3.2 that whilst, ‘[g]iven the weaknesses identified, the current implementation of Safe Harbour cannot be maintained, ... its revocation would[, however,] adversely affect the interests of member companies in the [European Union] and in the [United States]’. Finally, the Commission added in that point that it would ‘engage with the US authorities to discuss the shortcomings identified’. Communication COM(2013) 847 final

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On the same date,

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Point 1 of Communication COM(2013) 847 final explains that the functioning of Decision 2000/520 ‘relies on commitments and self-certification of adhering companies’, adding that ‘[s]igning up to these arrangements is voluntary, but the rules are binding for those who sign up’.

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In addition, it is apparent from point 2.2 of Communication COM(2013) 847 final that, as at

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The Commission stated in point 2.2 that ‘[a]ny gap in transparency or in enforcement on the US side results in responsibility being shifted to European data protection authorities and to the companies which use the scheme’.

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It is apparent, in particular, from points 3 to 5 and 8 of Communication COM(2013) 847 final that, in practice, a significant number of certified companies did not comply, or did not comply fully, with the safe harbour principles.

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In addition, the Commission stated in point 7 of Communication COM(2013) 847 final that ‘all companies involved in the PRISM programme [a large-scale intelligence collection programme], and which grant access to US authorities to data stored and processed in the [United States], appear to be Safe Harbour certified’ and that ‘[t]his has made the Safe Harbour scheme one of the conduits through which access is given to US intelligence authorities to collecting personal data initially processed in the [European Union]’. In that regard, the Commission noted in point 7.1 of that communication that ‘a number of legal bases under US law allow large-scale collection and processing of personal data that is stored or otherwise processed [by] companies based in the [United States]’ and that ‘[t]he large-scale nature of these programmes may result in data transferred under Safe Harbour being accessed and further processed by US authorities beyond what is strictly necessary and proportionate to the protection of national security as foreseen under the exception provided in [Decision 2000/520]’.

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In point 7.2 of Communication COM(2013) 847 final, headed ‘Limitations and redress possibilities’, the Commission noted that ‘safeguards that are provided under US law are mostly available to US citizens or legal residents’ and that, ‘[m]oreover, there are no opportunities for either EU or US data subjects to obtain access, rectification or erasure of data, or administrative or judicial redress with regard to collection and further processing of their personal data taking place under the US surveillance programmes’.

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According to point 8 of Communication COM(2013) 847 final, the certified companies included ‘[w]eb companies such as Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Apple, Yahoo’, which had ‘hundreds of millions of clients in Europe’ and transferred personal data to the United States for processing.

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Mr Schrems, an Austrian national residing in Austria, has been a user of the Facebook social network (‘Facebook’) since 2008.

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Any person residing in the European Union who wishes to use Facebook is required to conclude, at the time of his registration, a contract with Facebook Ireland, a subsidiary of Facebook Inc. which is itself established in the United States. Some or all of the personal data of Facebook Ireland’s users who reside in the European Union is transferred to servers belonging to Facebook Inc. that are located in the United States, where it undergoes processing.

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On

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June 2013 Mr Schrems made a complaint to the Commissioner by which he in essence asked the latter to exercise his statutory powers by prohibiting Facebook Ireland from transferring his personal data to the United States. He contended in his complaint that the law and practice in force in that country did not ensure adequate protection of the personal data held in its territory against the surveillance activities that were engaged in there by the public authorities. Mr Schrems referred in this regard to the revelations made by Edward Snowden concerning the activities of the United States intelligence services, in particular those of the National Security Agency (‘the NSA’).

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Since the Commissioner took the view that he was not required to investigate the matters raised by Mr Schrems in the complaint, he rejected it as unfounded. The Commissioner considered that there was no evidence that Mr Schrems’ personal data had been accessed by the NSA.

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