A Commercial Ceasefire: Why the EU-US Data Privacy Framework Cannot Survive Schrems III

The adequacy mechanism under GDPR Article 45 is structurally incapable of delivering legal certainty across divergent constitutional orders without a binding international treaty. Despite representing the most sophisticated transatlantic data transfer arrangement to date, the EU-US Data Privacy Framework remains a 'commercial ceasefire' built on executive discretion rather than structural reform and is likely to face invalidation in a future 'Schrems III'before the CJEU Grand Chamber. The paper begins by isolating the 'essential equivalence' standard established in Schrems I and Schrems II as the constitutional metric against which the Framework must be judged. It then analyses the architecture of the DPF, specifically Executive Order 14086's necessity and proportionality safeguards and the Data Protection Review Court, before examining the General Court's pragmatic endorsement of these mechanisms in Latombe v Commission (2025). Three unresolved deficits are identified. First, an independence deficit: the DPRC remains a creation of the executive branch lacking statutory permanence. Second, a proportionality mismatch: the US balancing standard for surveillance does not equate to the EU's strict necessity requirement. Third, a systemic conflict of laws: US processors complying with FISA Section 702 orders inevitably breach GDPR Articles 29 and 48. True legal certainty cannot be achieved through administrative patches, and only a binding international treaty can resolve the fundamental tension between US national security architecture and EU fundamental rights law.