LVwG Vorarlberg - LVwG-352-2/2025-R12

Decision Date October 9, 2025 Index E3R E15202000 E3R E19400000 10/10 Data Protection L00208 Duty to Provide Information Reuse Vorarlberg L00200 Duty to Provide Information Reuse 10/10 Duty to Provide Information Standard 32016R0679 GDPR Art. 9 Para. 1 32016R0679 GDPR Art. 9 Para. 2 lit. 32016R0679 GDPR Art. 9 Para. 2 lit. g Data Protection Act §1 Para. 2 Duty to Provide Information Act Vorarlberg §4 Para. 1 Data Protection Act Art. 1 § 1 today Data Protection Act Art. 1 § 1 valid from January 1, 2014, last amended by Federal Law Gazette I No. 51/2012 Data Protection Act Art. 1 § 1 valid from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2013 Text In the name of the Republic! Ruling The Vorarlberg Administrative Court, through Judge Eva Ostermeier, has ruled on the appeal of M M, D, against the decision of the Vorarlberg State Government dated February 25, 2025, file number X, concerning the refusal to provide information under the Freedom of Information Act (AuskunftsG), as follows: Pursuant to Section 28, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Administrative Court Procedure Act (VwGVG), the appeal is dismissed and the contested decision is upheld. Pursuant to Section 28, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Administrative Court Procedure Act (VwGVG), the appeal is dismissed and the contested decision is upheld. Pursuant to Section 25a of the Administrative Court Act 1985 (VwGG), an appeal against this decision to the Administrative Court is inadmissible. Grounds 1.1. By email dated August 23, 2024, to the Vorarlberg State Press Office at the Office of the Vorarlberg State Government, the appellant requested the transmission of the PDF containing the locations of the election posters of the political parties, as provided for in Section 1c Paragraph 2 of the Political Parties Promotion Act (PFG) (pursuant to Section 1c Paragraph 1 PFG). By email dated August 23, 2024, to the Vorarlberg State Press Office at the Office of the Vorarlberg State Government, the complainant requested the transmission of the PDF containing the locations of the election posters of the political parties, as provided for in Section 1c, Paragraph 2 of the Political Parties Promotion Act (PFG). 1.2. By email dated August 29, 2024, the Vorarlberg State Press Office at the Office of the Vorarlberg State Government informed the complainant that the complainant's request could not be granted for data protection reasons. The information to be transmitted by the parties to the State Government contained personal data from which the political opinions of landowners could be inferred. Therefore, this data was classified as special categories of personal data pursuant to Article 9 of the GDPR, and transmission was inadmissible due to the lack of a legal basis for processing. 1.2. By email dated August 29, 2024, the Vorarlberg State Press Office, located within the Vorarlberg State Government, informed the complainant that the complainant's request could not be granted for data protection reasons. The information to be submitted by the parties to the State Government contained personal data from which the political opinions of landowners could be inferred. Therefore, this data was classified as special categories of personal data pursuant to Article 9 of the GDPR, and its transmission was inadmissible due to the lack of a legal basis for processing. 1.3. The complainant subsequently requested, by email dated August 29, 2024, a formal decision refusing to provide information pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. 1.4. In the now contested decision (refusing to provide information), the respondent authority, pursuant to Section 4, paragraphs 1 and 4 of the Information Act, refused to disclose the locations of election posters of the political parties requested by the appellant on August 23, 2024, and dismissed the request for information as unfounded. The respondent authority essentially reasoned that information could not be disclosed if a statutory duty of confidentiality precluded its disclosure. Obligations of confidentiality that would preclude the disclosure of information include, in particular, the duty of official secrecy and the fundamental right to the confidentiality of personal data. Both the map showing the locations of election posters and the addresses contained in their local descriptions would constitute personal data within the meaning of Section 1 of the Data Protection Act (DSG) and Article 4(1) of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Furthermore, this data falls under special categories of personal data pursuant to Article 9(1) GDPR, as it could reveal the political opinions of the property owners associated with the respective addresses. Even a suspected political opinion could have negative consequences for the data subject, which Article 9 GDPR aims to protect against. Article 9(1) GDPR provides for a general prohibition on the processing of special categories of personal data. Exceptions to this prohibition are listed in the exhaustive catalog pursuant to Article 9(2) GDPR. No such exception applies in this case. The respondent authority essentially reasoned that information could not be disclosed if a statutory duty of confidentiality precluded its release. Such duties of confidentiality included, in particular, the obligation of official secrecy and the fundamental right to the confidentiality of personal data. Both the map showing the locations of election posters and the addresses containing their local descriptions constituted personal data within the meaning of Section 1 of the Data Protection Act (DSG) and Article 4, paragraph 1 of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Furthermore, this data fell under special categories of personal data pursuant to Article 9, paragraph 1 of the GDPR, as it could reveal the political opinions of the property owners associated with the respective addresses. Even a suspected political opinion could have negative consequences for the data subject, which Article 9 of the GDPR aims to protect against. Article 9, paragraph 1 of the GDPR provides for a general prohibition on the processing of special categories of personal data. Exceptions to this processing prohibition are contained in the exhaustive list pursuant to Article 9, paragraph 2, GDPR. No such exception applies in the present case. A request for information concerning special categories of personal data does not grant the authority obligated to provide the information any discretion to balance the public interest in disclosure against the fundamental right to confidentiality of personal data. Even if a contrary view were held, in accordance with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) regarding Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the outcome, after a balancing of interests, would be that the interest in maintaining the confidentiality of special categories of personal data prevails, as the information requested by the data subject is not necessary for exercising freedom of expression. A request for information concerning special categories of personal data does not grant the authority obligated to provide the information any discretion to balance the public interest in disclosure against the fundamental right to confidentiality of personal data. Should a contrary view be held in this regard, then, in accordance with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) concerning Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), a balancing of interests should ultimately lead to the conclusion that the interest in maintaining the confidentiality of special categories of personal data outweighs the other party's interest, as the information requested by the applicant is not necessary for the exercise of freedom of expression. 2. The appellant has lodged a timely appeal against this decision. In this, he essentially argues (in part): “[…] 3. Grounds for Appeal The contested decision infringes the appellant’s subjective rights. This infringement arises in detail from the following reasons: 3.1. Facts On August 23, 2024, the appellant requested information from the Vorarlberg State Government (hereinafter: the authority or the respondent authority) via email (…) regarding the locations of the election posters and digital advertising displays for the state election on October 13, 2024 (Appendix 1), as soon as this information was available. As mentioned above, the political parties are legally obligated to provide the requested information to the State Government. During the election campaign, the appellant and other editors of the O newspaper photographically documented various poster locations to enable a comparison with the reported locations. For this purpose, complete disclosure of the location data transmitted by the parties to the State Government was essential. The respondent authority The authority informed the complainant by email on August 29, 2024, that it could not provide the requested information for data protection reasons. The complainant subsequently submitted a request for a formal decision pursuant to Section 4, Paragraph 4 of the Freedom of Information Act. The authority complied with this request by decision dated February 25, 2025. 3.2. Regarding the Authority's Data Protection Concerns In its reasoning, the respondent authority states that this location data constitutes a special category of personal data. It argues that this data cannot be disclosed, as doing so would allow inferences to be drawn about the political views of the landowners. Furthermore, the landowners have not consented to such data transfer. The respondent authority bases its argument primarily on the fundamental right to data protection under Section 1 of the Data Protection Act (DSG) and on Article 9(1) of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The respondent authority states that this location data constitutes a special category of personal data. It argues that this data cannot be disclosed, as doing so would allow inferences to be drawn about the political views of the landowners. Furthermore, the landowners have not consented to such data transfer. The respondent authority bases its argument primarily on the fundamental right to data protection under Section 1 of the DSG and on Article 9(1) of the GDPR. ...`` The respondent authority argues that it is irrelevant whether the political affiliation assigned to a person is accurate in order to fall under the processing prohibition of Article 9(1) GDPR. It refers to a ruling by the Federal Administrative Court from 2020 (BVwG 26.11.2020, W258 2217446-1). In that case, Austrian Post AG had attributed supposed political views to individuals and households and sold this information to advertisers. The decision was therefore based on the fact that the hypothetical and often inaccurate party affiliation of individuals had been unlawfully fabricated and processed by the data controller itself. However, the information requested in the present case does not contain such affiliations. Rather, the respondent authority fears that such affiliations could be made and bases its refusal to provide information on this suspicion. It attempts to argue for the general inadmissibility of the information transfer by referring to a possible data protection violation by the appellant. The blanket assertion that the requested poster locations involve particularly protected personal data is intended to prevent, a priori, assumptions about the political leanings of landowners that are prohibited under fundamental rights. The respondent authority argues that it is irrelevant whether the political classification of a person is accurate in order to fall under the processing prohibition of Article 9, paragraph 1, of the GDPR. It refers to a ruling by the Federal Administrative Court from 2020 (BVwG 26.11.2020, W258 2217446-1). In that case, Austrian Post AG had attributed supposed political stances to individuals and households and sold this information to advertisers. The decision was therefore based on the fact that the hypothetical and often inaccurate party affiliation of individuals had been unlawfully fabricated and processed by the data controller itself. However, the information requested in the present case does not contain such classifications. The authority in question fears that such inaccuracies could be made and bases its refusal to provide information on this suspicion. It attempts to argue for the general inadmissibility of disclosing the information by citing a potential data protection violation by the appellant. The blanket assertion that the requested poster locations involve particularly protected personal data is intended to prevent, a priori, assumptions about the political views of landowners that are prohibited under constitutional law. To underscore its position, the authority in question continually constructs hypothetical data protection aspects in its reasoning without having actually examined them in detail. For example, it assumes that disclosing the requested information—completely independent of the actual location of the election posters, the right of disposal over the properties in question, and the content of the campaign advertising—would tempt the applicant to obtain hundreds of landowners' information from the land register at their own expense in order to ultimately attribute a specific ideological stance to them. This attempt to refuse to provide even partially erroneous location data (see section 3.1.1, p. 6 at the bottom of the decision) by ascribing presumed ideological attributions to natural and legal persons who are sometimes not even specifically involved proves to be entirely unfounded and cannot legally support the decision. In its decision, the authority not only assumes a confidentiality interest in publicly visible facts—namely, that a specific poster is located at a specific place—but also makes the blanket assumption that the mere placement of election posters by landowners could "merely suggest" a close political relationship between the landowners and the authorities, thus justifying the refusal to provide information. Logically, this would also render the placement of an election poster or digital advertising display by a landowner inadmissible under data protection law, as it would place the landowner within the hypothetical, apparent political context constructed by the Office of the Vorarlberg State Government. It remains unclear which form of party affiliation the respondent authority would consider preferable if posters from multiple political parties were displayed on a single property. The respondent authority assumes a general, legal significance for the requested information, which it ultimately admits it has not examined in detail due to the alleged volume of data. Finally (point 3.2), the authority refers to a potential impairment of its other duties by conducting a comprehensive legal assessment of the information request, but without further justification and with the caveat that it does not actually intend to raise this issue. The requested information does not constitute specially protected data within the meaning of Article 9(1) GDPR. The mere location of a campaign poster or digital advertising display is insufficient to infer a close political affiliation of the property owner with a particular political party. The authority itself presents many arguments that, from the perspective of an objective observer, contradict this assumption: one being the possibility of leasing the land, another the placement of election advertising for a fee. The requested information does not constitute specially protected data within the meaning of Article 9(1) GDPR. The location of an election poster or digital advertising display alone is not sufficient grounds to conclude that the landowner has a close political ties to a particular party. The authority itself presents many arguments that, from the perspective of an objective observer, contradict this assumption: one being the possibility of leasing the land, another the placement of election advertising for a fee. If one were to follow the reasoning of the authority in question consistently, this would raise concerns under EU law regarding the reporting obligation of political parties pursuant to Section 1c of the Election Promotion Act (PFG), as the provision does not contain any measures and safeguards pursuant to Article 9(2)(g) GDPR. Last but not least, the parties themselves are not permitted to collect and process the requested data, as the law does not authorize this. If one were to follow the reasoning of the respondent authority consistently, this would raise concerns under EU law regarding the reporting obligation of electoral parties pursuant to Section 1(c) of the Election Act (PFG), since the provision contains no measures and safeguards as required by Article 9(2)(g) of the GDPR. Last but not least, the parties themselves are not permitted to collect and process the requested data, as the law does not authorize this. However, the arguments presented in the grounds for the decision remain vague and are, on the whole, incompatible with the legal situation. From the appellant's perspective, it is quite obvious that the refusal to provide information was not based on any serious legal concerns, but solely on political considerations – which, in turn, reinforces the public interest in the disclosure of the information. The arguments presented in the reasoning for the decision remain vague and are, on the whole, incompatible with the legal situation. The complainant has no intention whatsoever of using the requested information to arbitrarily attribute political views to individuals or legal entities—against which these individuals could take legal action under media law. However, it would be perfectly permissible, for example, to address the issue of a concentration of poster sites on properties owned by state-owned companies. The decision of the respondent authority prevents any such reporting. 3.3. Failure to Consider Partial Responses The respondent authority essentially failed to conduct an investigation. The decision makes no mention of whether even partial information—such as information about poster sites on public thoroughfares—should be disclosed. The respondent authority would have been obligated to do so even without a request from the complainant. For this reason alone, the contested decision is unlawful. General experience shows that election posters and digital advertising displays are placed in busy locations where they can be seen frequently by eligible voters. These places are primarily roads and other public traffic areas, which are mostly owned by local authorities – whose possible right to keep their political views secret will not be discussed in detail here. The fact that election posters are generally placed predominantly on public land, and that even according to the respondent authority's excessively broad position regarding data protection, there would be no objection to providing information about these locations, is not even addressed in the otherwise hypothetical arguments presented by the authority. 3.4. Insufficient consideration of the right to freedom of expression The appeal against the decision fails to conduct a serious balancing of the complainant's fundamental right under Article 10 of the ECHR with the allegedly conflicting rights of the landowners under Article 9(1) of the GDPR. ... While the authority in question examines the existence of exceptions under the GDPR in its decision, it fails to reconcile the data protection aspects "with the right to freedom of expression and information, including processing for journalistic purposes [...]" (Art. 85 para. 1 GDPR). Essentially, the authority disregards legal provisions such as the Freedom of Information Act, Art. 20 para. 4 of the Austrian Federal Constitutional Law (B-VG), and Art. 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), limiting itself to an isolated data protection perspective under the GDPR. In section 3.1.2.1, it argues that the Freedom of Information Act (PFG) does not provide for the transfer of data to individuals; in the following section, the authority excludes the Freedom of Information Act as a basis for data processing. Ultimately, the authority concludes that it is unaware of any other legal basis "that would make the disclosure of the locations of election posters requested by the information requester permissible." While the authority examines the existence of exceptions under the GDPR in its decision, it fails to reconcile the data protection aspects "with the right to freedom of expression and information, including processing for journalistic purposes [...]" (Article 85, paragraph 1, GDPR). Essentially, the authority disregards legal provisions such as the Freedom of Information Act, Article 20, paragraph 4, of the Austrian Federal Constitutional Law (B-VG), and Article 10, of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), limiting itself to an isolated data protection perspective under the GDPR. In section 3.1.2.1, it argues that the Freedom of Information Act does not provide for disclosure to individuals; in the following section, the authority excludes the Freedom of Information Act as a basis for data processing. Ultimately, the authority concludes that it is unaware of any further legal basis "that would make the disclosure of the locations of election posters requested by the applicant permissible." With the legally untenable assertion that the requested information constitutes particularly sensitive personal data under Article 9(1) GDPR, the authority attempts to absolve itself of the legally required balancing of rights under the right to information and the constitutional principle. It has thereby rendered its decision arbitrary and violated the applicant's right to freedom of expression under Article 10 ECHR. With the legally untenable assertion that the requested information constitutes particularly sensitive personal data under Article 9(1) GDPR, the authority attempts to absolve itself of the legally required balancing of rights under the right to information and the constitutional principle. It has thereby rendered its decision arbitrary and violated the applicant's right to freedom of expression under Article 10 ECHR. 5. On the Public Interest In the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, it has repeatedly been established in connection with requests for information under the Federal Freedom of Information Act and the substantively comparable freedom of information laws of the Länder that, particularly in the case of requests from so-called "public watchdogs," a legal balancing of the public interest on the one hand and the interests of affected third parties on the other is required when providing information (see VfSlg. 20446/2021 or VwGH 20.05.2015, Ra 2013/04/0139). In particular, it must be clarified whether, in the individual case, the public interest in disclosure outweighs the interests of third parties. However, even when the interests are equally weighted, information must be provided "in dubio pro libertate" (when in doubt, choose freedom). The respondent authority only carried out such a balancing in a rudimentary manner, merely stating that the appellant could also refute his intended reporting solely with numerical data from the authority regarding poster locations. This assertion will be discussed in more detail below. In the jurisprudence of the highest courts, in connection with requests for information under the Federal Freedom of Information Act and the substantively comparable freedom of information laws of the federal states, it has been repeatedly established that, particularly in the case of inquiries from so-called "public watchdogs," a legal balancing of the public interest on the one hand and the interests of affected third parties on the other is required when providing information (see VfSlg. 20446 from 2021, or VwGH 20.05.2015, Ra 2013/04/0139). In particular, it must be clarified whether, in the individual case, the public interest in disclosure outweighs the interests of affected third parties. However, even when the interests are equally weighted, information must be provided "in dubio pro libertate" (when in doubt, choose liberty). The respondent authority only carried out such a balancing in a rudimentary manner, merely stating that the appellant could also refute his intended reporting solely with numerical data from the authority regarding poster locations. This claim will be discussed in more detail below. From the complainant's perspective, the refusal to provide information was also carried out with the constitutionally prohibited aim of creating a "chilling effect" (cf. ECtHR Jersild v. Denmark, 23 September 1994 and Goodwin v. The United Kingdom, 27 March 1996) by imposing procedural deadlines and an appeal fee, thereby preventing politically unfavorable reporting on the subject matter in close temporal proximity to the state elections. From the complainant's perspective, the refusal to provide information was also carried out with the constitutionally prohibited aim of creating a "chilling effect" (cf. ECtHR Jersild v. Denmark, 23 September 1994 and Goodwin v. The United Kingdom, 27 March 1996). The United Kingdom, March 27, 1996) is to be used to create a politically unfavorable situation by imposing procedural deadlines and an appeal fee, thereby preventing politically unfavorable reporting on the subject matter of the requested information in close temporal proximity to the state elections. This impression is reinforced by the fact that the Vorarlberg state government, as the respondent authority, goes so far as to question the public interest in the disclosure of information in principle, given the control mechanisms stipulated in the Public Information Act (PFG) (point 3.1.3, p. 10). Ultimately, the argument goes, the processes underlying the request for information are already sufficiently scrutinized by state institutions. This pre-March era mentality could also be used to dismiss investigative reporting on any institution audited by the Court of Auditors. The authority fails to recognize that the public interest in the requested information is not limited to mere compliance with the provisions of the PFG or the economy, efficiency, and expediency of the underlying administrative action. Unlike state control bodies, the free press is not bound by the principle of legality. Rather, its role is to facilitate public debate—which is fundamental to a democratic society—by reporting on facts that are not only legally relevant but sometimes also exclusively political. The public interest in political processes is therefore not limited to simply reporting on the results of state self-regulation. The intended reporting also goes significantly beyond what can be expected from published audit results by the State Audit Office and the State Party Transparency Senate. That the respondent authority misinterprets the role of the media (and its representatives) within the overall system of the right to information is also evident in the repeated, implicit criticism in the justification for the decision that the appellant did not request information on the mere number of election posters erected, information which the authority would have been willing to provide. The appellant's interest deliberately extends beyond mere numerical reporting. As mentioned at the outset, he intends to compare the locations of the posters reported by the political parties with a photographic documentation of actual poster locations compiled by several editors of the newspaper O. The fact that the authority in question admitted in its decision that the reported locations do not always correspond to the actual locations underscores, in the complainant's view, the need for a public debate on the appropriateness and efficiency of the existing legal regulations. The locations of the posters also reveal, among other things, the geographical focus of the election campaign. It is certainly of public interest to know which party intends to target voters in which specific locations. Simply publishing the number of poster locations nationwide, in an administrative district, or in a municipality would not allow for verification of whether the poster limit at each location ("A maximum of three election posters or digital advertising displays, or two large posters or large digital advertising displays, may be used per location.", Section 1c, Paragraph 1, Sentence 2 of the Poster Advertising Act) has been observed. The poster locations also reveal, among other things, the geographical focus of the election campaign. It is certainly of public interest to know which party intends to target voters in which specific locations. Furthermore, simply publishing the number of poster locations nationwide, in an administrative district, or in a municipality would not allow for verification of whether the poster limit at each location ("A maximum of three election posters or digital advertising displays, or two large posters or large digital advertising displays, may be used per location.", Section 1c, Paragraph 1, Sentence 2 of the Poster Advertising Act) has been observed. It should be noted that information under the Freedom of Information Act is not only to be provided when there is a sufficiently substantiated public interest. Such an interest is merely to be considered by the authority in its balancing of interests. In the present case, however, the public interest in the requested information is inherent and overriding for the reasons stated above. Since this was not sufficiently considered by the authority in question, the contested decision is also arbitrary and unlawful for this reason. […] 3. The following facts are established: 3.1. The complainant works as an editor at Ö and requires the requested information for his journalistic work. 3.2. By email dated September 23, 2024, the complainant submitted the following request for information to the State Press Office of the Office of the Vorarlberg State Government: “Dear Sir or Madam, I would like to request the transmission of the PDF provided for in Section 1c Paragraph 2 of the Political Parties Promotion Act, containing the locations of the election posters of the political parties (pursuant to Section 1c Paragraph 1 of the Political Parties Promotion Act), as soon as it is available to the Office of the State Government. I would also like to request the transmission of the PDF provided for in Section 1c, Paragraph 2 of the Political Parties Promotion Act, containing the locations of the election posters of the political parties (pursuant to Section 1c, Paragraph 1 of the Political Parties Promotion Act), as soon as it is available to the Office of the State Government. Sincerely, Foreword (…) 3.3. By the contested decision, the respondent authority rejected the request for information dated September 23, 2024. 4. This fact is evident from the case file and is considered proven. It is also undisputed. 5. Legal basis: Pursuant to Section 1 Paragraph 1 of the Information Act, Provincial Law Gazette No. 17/1989, the bodies of the province, municipalities, municipal associations, and other public corporations regulated by provincial law are required to provide information on matters within their sphere of competence, unless otherwise specified below. Pursuant to Section 1, Paragraph 1, of the Information Act, Provincial Law Gazette No. 17 of 1989, the bodies of the province, municipalities, municipal associations, and other public corporations regulated by provincial law are required to provide information on matters within their sphere of competence, unless otherwise specified below. According to paragraph 2 of the aforementioned law, information is understood to mean statements of knowledge about matters that are known to the body obligated to provide information due to its official duties. According to Section 2, paragraph 1 of the Information Act (Official Gazette No. 17/1989), everyone has the right to request information orally, by telephone, telegram, in writing, or by fax. According to Section 2, paragraph 1 of the Information Act (Official Gazette No. 17/1989), everyone has the right to request information orally, by telephone, telegram, in writing, or by fax. According to Section 4 Paragraph 1 of the Information Access Act (AuskunftsG), Provincial Law Gazette No. 17/1989, as amended by Provincial Law Gazette No. 44/2013, information may not be disclosed if a statutory duty of confidentiality prevents its disclosure. According to Section 4, Paragraph 1, of the Information Access Act (AuskunftsG), Provincial Law Gazette No. 17 of 1989, as amended by Provincial Law Gazette No. 44 of 2013, information may not be disclosed if a statutory duty of confidentiality prevents its disclosure. According to paragraph 2 of the aforementioned law, information may only be provided to the extent that it does not significantly impair the performance of the body's other duties. Information may be refused if it is clearly requested frivolously, if providing the information would require extensive investigations or preparations, or if the requested information is otherwise directly accessible to the requester. According to paragraph 4 of the aforementioned law, the refusal to provide information must be communicated to the requester, stating the reason. At the request of the data subject, the refusal to provide information must be communicated in writing. Pursuant to paragraph 4 of the aforementioned law, the refusal to provide information must be communicated to the data subject, stating the reason. At the request of the data subject, the refusal to provide information must be communicated in writing. Pursuant to Section 1, paragraph 1 of the Data Protection Act 2000 (DSG), Federal Law Gazette I No. 165/1999, as amended by Federal Law Gazette I No. 51/2012, everyone has the right to the confidentiality of their personal data, particularly with regard to respect for their private and family life, insofar as there is a legitimate interest in doing so. The existence of such an interest is precluded if data, due to its general availability or because it cannot be traced back to the data subject, is not subject to a claim of confidentiality. According to Section 1, Paragraph 1 of the Data Protection Act 2000 (DSG), Federal Law Gazette Part 1, No. 165 of 1999, as amended by Federal Law Gazette Part 1, No. 51 of 2012, everyone has a right to the confidentiality of their personal data, particularly with regard to respect for their private and family life, insofar as a legitimate interest exists. The existence of such an interest is precluded if data, due to its general availability or because it cannot be traced back to the data subject, is not subject to a claim of confidentiality. According to Section 1, Paragraph 1 of the Data Protection Act 2000 (DSG), Federal Law Gazette Part 1, No. 165 of 1999, as amended by Federal Law Gazette Part 1, No. 51 of 2012, everyone has a right to the confidentiality of their personal data, insofar as there is a legitimate interest in doing so, particularly with regard to respect for their private and family life. According to Section 1, Paragraph 2 of this provision, restrictions on the right to confidentiality, insofar as the use of personal data is not in the vital interest of the data subject or with their consent, are only permissible to safeguard overriding legitimate interests of another party. In the case of interventions by a state authority, such restrictions are only permissible on the basis of laws that are necessary for the reasons stated in Article 8, Paragraph 2 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), Federal Law Gazette No. 210/1958. Such laws may only permit the use of data that is particularly sensitive by its nature to safeguard important public interests and must simultaneously establish appropriate safeguards for the protection of the data subjects' confidentiality interests. Even in the case of permissible restrictions, the interference with the fundamental right may only be carried out in the least intrusive manner necessary to achieve the objective. According to Section 1, Paragraph 2 of this provision, restrictions on the right to confidentiality, insofar as the use of personal data is not in the vital interest of the data subject or with their consent, are only permissible to protect overriding legitimate interests of another party. In the case of interference by a state authority, this is only permissible on the basis of laws that are necessary for the reasons stated in Article 8, Paragraph 2, of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), Federal Law Gazette No. 210 of 1958. Such laws may only permit the use of data that is particularly worthy of protection to safeguard important public interests and must simultaneously establish appropriate safeguards for the protection of the data subjects' confidentiality interests. Even in the case of permissible restrictions, the interference with the fundamental right may only be carried out in the least intrusive manner necessary to achieve the objective. ... Pursuant to Article 9(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation [hereinafter: GDPR]), OJ L 119 of 4.05.2016, the processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs or trade union membership, as well as the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data concerning a natural person’s sex life or sexual orientation, is prohibited. Pursuant to Article 9(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation [hereinafter: GDPR]), Official Journal L 119 of 4 May 2016, the processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, as well as the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health, or data concerning a natural person’s sex life or sexual orientation, is prohibited. ... According to paragraph 2 of the aforementioned legislation, paragraph 1 does not apply in the following cases: a) The data subject has explicitly consented to the processing of the personal data in question for one or more specified purposes, unless, under Union or Member State law, the prohibition in paragraph 1 cannot be overridden by the data subject's consent; b) processing is necessary for the controller or the data subject to exercise their rights and fulfill their obligations under employment law and social security and social protection law, insofar as this is permitted under Union or Member State law or a collective agreement under Member State law which provides suitable safeguards for the fundamental rights and interests of the data subject; c) processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person, and the data subject is physically or legally incapable of withdrawing their consent. give, d) processing is carried out on the basis of suitable safeguards by a politically, ideologically, religiously, or trade union-oriented foundation, association, or other non-profit organization within the scope of its legitimate activities and provided that the processing relates exclusively to members or former members of the organization or to persons who maintain regular contact with it in connection with its purpose, and the personal data are not disclosed externally without the consent of the data subjects, e) processing relates to personal data which the data subject has manifestly made public, f) processing is necessary for the establishment, exercise, or defense of legal claims or for actions of courts in the exercise of their judicial functions, g) processing is based on Union or Member State law which is proportionate to the objective pursued, respects the essence of the right to data protection, and includes appropriate and specific measures to safeguard the fundamental rights and interests of the data subjects.The processing is necessary for reasons of substantial public interest, h) processing is necessary for the purposes of preventive or occupational medicine, for the assessment of the worker's capacity to work, for medical diagnosis, the provision of health or social care or treatment, or for the management of health or social care schemes and services, based on Union or Member State law or a contract with a health professional and subject to the conditions and safeguards referred to in paragraph 3, i) processing is necessary for reasons of public interest in the area of public health, such as protection against serious cross-border threats to health or ensuring high standards of quality and safety in health care and in relation to medicinal products and medical devices, based on Union or Member State law which provides for appropriate and specific measures to safeguard the rights and freedoms of the data subject, in particular professional secrecy, or j) processing is necessary based on Union or Member State law which provides for appropriate and specific measures to safeguard the rights and freedoms of the data subject, in particular professional secrecy, or The processing is proportionate to the objective pursued, respects the essence of the right to data protection, and provides for appropriate and specific measures to safeguard the fundamental rights and interests of the data subject, and is necessary for archiving purposes in the public interest, for scientific or historical research purposes, or for statistical purposes in accordance with Article 89(1). According to Article 10(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), Federal Law Gazette No. 210/1958, as amended by Federal Law Gazette Part III No. 30/1998, everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right includes freedom of opinion and freedom to receive and impart information or ideas without interference by public authorities and regardless of frontiers. According to Article 10(1) of the ECHR, Federal Law Gazette No. 210 of 1958, as amended by Federal Law Gazette Part III No. 30 of 1998, everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right includes freedom of opinion and freedom to receive and impart information or ideas without interference by public authorities and regardless of national frontiers. 6. Legal Assessment: It should be noted at the outset that proceedings pending on September 1, 2025, under the Freedom of Information Act of the Federal Government and the Länder, due to the explicit provision in the Federal Constitutional Law, must continue under the previous legal framework (§ 151 para. 68 B-VG). Consequently, they do not "switch" to the new information disclosure procedure. The previous legal framework applies to these proceedings with regard to competence, substantive law, and procedural law. In particular, the previous constitutional framework (Art. 20 paras. 3 and 4 B-VG) also remains unchanged. Proceedings are considered pending on September 1, 2025, if a request for information has already been received by the body obligated to provide it before that date. The date of dispatch is irrelevant (for written requests for information) (Keisler, The New Freedom of Information Act in the series Law and Financing Practice of Municipalities [RFG], p. 93). It should be noted that proceedings pending on September 1, 2025, under the Freedom of Information Act of the Federal Government and the Länder, due to the explicit provision in the Federal Constitutional Law, must continue according to the previous legal situation (Section 151, Paragraph 68, B-VG). Consequently, they do not "switch" to the new information disclosure procedure. The previous legal situation applies to these proceedings with regard to competence, substantive law, and procedural law. In particular, the previous constitutional situation (Article 20, Paragraphs 3 and 4, B-VG) also remains unchanged. A proceeding is considered pending on September 1, 2025, if a request for information was received by the body obligated to provide the information before that date. The date of dispatch is irrelevant (for written requests for information) (Keisler, The New Freedom of Information Act in the series Law and Financing Practice of Municipalities [RFG], p. 93). The present request for information was submitted by the appellant via email on September 23, 2024, and is therefore to be pursued in accordance with the legal situation valid until September 1, 2025. 6.1. Information within the meaning of the federal and state freedom of information laws always concerns declarations of knowledge, the content of which consists exclusively of information that is already known to the administration at the time of the request and does not need to be obtained by the requested administrative unit for the purpose of fulfilling the obligation to provide information (Austrian Administrative Court [VwGH] September 13, 2016, Ra 2015/03/0038, paragraph 5). 6.1. Information within the meaning of the federal and state freedom of information laws always concerns declarations of knowledge, the content of which consists exclusively of information that is already known to the administration at the time of the request and does not need to be obtained by the requested administrative unit for the purpose of fulfilling the obligation to provide information (Austrian Administrative Court [VwGH] September 13, 2016, Ra 2015/03/0038, paragraph 5). 6.1. Each political party participating in an election must, pursuant to Section 1c, Paragraph 2 of the Political Parties Act (PFG), notify the state government of the locations to be used for election posters or digital advertising displays in a clearly identifiable, plan-based representation in PDF format, electronically. Each political party participating in an election must, pursuant to Section 1c, Paragraph 2 of the Political Parties Act (PFG), notify the state government of the locations to be used for election posters or digital advertising displays in a clearly identifiable, plan-based representation in PDF format, electronically. The appellant requested the transmission of the PDF files provided for in Section 1c, Paragraph 2 of the Political Parties Act (PFG) containing the locations of the election posters of the political parties. The appellant is thus requesting the disclosure of information as it is available to the authority obligated to provide this information. The appellant requested the transmission of the PDF files provided for in Section 1c, Paragraph 2 of the Political Parties Act (PFG) containing the locations of the election posters of the political parties. The appellant is thus requesting the disclosure of information as it is available to the authority obligated to provide this information. The appellant requested the transmission of the PDF files provided for in Section 1c, Paragraph 2 of the Political Parties Act (PFG) containing the locations of the election posters of the political parties. With regard to the information available to the respondent authority, the information must be provided in accordance with Section 1 of the Information Act, unless otherwise specified. With regard to the information available to the respondent authority, the information must be provided in accordance with Section 1 of the Information Act, unless otherwise specified. 6.2. Regarding the refusal of the requested information: Pursuant to Section 4 Paragraph 1 of the Information Act, information may not be provided if a statutory duty of confidentiality precludes its disclosure. Such statutory duties of confidentiality include both the official secrecy described in Article 20 Paragraph 3 of the Federal Constitutional Law and (independently) the duty to keep personal data confidential (Section 1 of the Data Protection Act, Article 1 Paragraph 2 of the GDPR) (Administrative Court of Austria, August 18, 2017, Ra 2015/04/0010). According to Section 4, Paragraph 1 of the Freedom of Information Act, information may not be disclosed if a statutory duty of confidentiality exists. This statutory duty of confidentiality includes both the official secrecy described in Article 20, Paragraph 3 of the Austrian Federal Constitutional Law (B-VG) and (independently) the duty to keep personal data confidential (Section 1 of the Data Protection Act (DSG), Article 1, Paragraph 2 of the GDPR) (Austrian Administrative Court [VwGH] 18.08.2017, Ra 2015/04/0010). The respondent authority essentially argued that the requested addresses of the election poster locations constituted both personal data within the meaning of Section 1 of the Data Protection Act (DSG) and Article 4, Paragraph 1 of the GDPR, as well as special categories of personal data within the meaning of Article 9, Paragraph 1 of the GDPR. Disclosing this data would infringe upon the protective purpose of Article 9(1) GDPR, as even a presumed political opinion could trigger the very negative consequences for the data subjects that this provision aims to protect against—namely, discrimination based on a (presumed) political opinion. No exception to the general prohibition on processing special categories of personal data is apparent. A request for information concerning special categories of personal data would not provide the authority obligated to provide the information with any leeway to balance the public interest in disclosure against the fundamental right to confidentiality of personal data. The respondent authority essentially argued that the requested addresses of the election poster locations constitute both personal data within the meaning of Section 1 of the Data Protection Act (DSG) and Article 4(1) of the GDPR, and special categories of personal data within the meaning of Article 9(1) of the GDPR. Disclosing this data would infringe upon the protective purpose of Article 9, paragraph 1, of the GDPR, since even a presumed political opinion could trigger the very negative consequences for the data subjects that this provision aims to protect them from—namely, discrimination based on a (presumed) political opinion. No exception to the general prohibition on processing special categories of personal data is apparent. A request for information concerning special categories of personal data would not provide the body obligated to provide the information with any leeway to balance the public interest in disclosure against the fundamental right to confidentiality of personal data. 6.2.1. Data Protection; Landowners' Interest in Data Confidentiality: The core of the fundamental right to data protection under Section 1, paragraph 1 of the GDPR is the respect for the legitimate confidentiality interests of data subjects. Holders of this fundamental right can be both natural and legal persons. The objective of data protection law is to guarantee the legal protection of the natural or legal person or group of persons whose data is being processed. The Data Protection Act (DSG) is solely focused on protecting data subjects. The core of the fundamental right to data protection, as enshrined in Article 1, Paragraph 1 of the DSG, is the respect for the legitimate confidentiality interests of those affected. Holders of this fundamental right can be both natural and legal persons. The aim of data protection law is to guarantee the legal protection of the natural or legal person or group of persons whose data is being processed. The DSG is solely focused on protecting data subjects. According to Section 1, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the German Federal Data Protection Act (BDSG), personal data does not automatically enjoy the fundamental right to confidentiality stipulated therein, but only if the data subject has a legitimate interest in its disclosure. However, even if such a legitimate interest exists, paragraph 2 of this section stipulates that confidentiality protection must be denied to safeguard the legitimate interests of another party. Therefore, in order to assess whether a request for information under the Freedom of Information Act conflicts with the overriding interests of a party and constitutionally enshrined principles of data protection confidentiality, specific factual findings are required to determine whether the data in question is personal data, what legitimate interests the data subject has in keeping this data confidential, and finally, whether and what legitimate interests the requesting party has in disclosing this data. Based on the facts thus established, it must then be assessed whether the conditions for the application of Section 1, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Data Protection Act (DSG) are met and, if this question is answered in the affirmative, whether the requesting party's interest in the requested information outweighs this interest in confidentiality (cf. in this context the Austrian Administrative Court decision of October 22, 2012, 2010/03/0099). According to Section 1, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the DSG, personal data does not automatically enjoy the fundamental right to confidentiality stipulated therein, but only if a legitimate interest of the data subject exists. However, even if such a legitimate interest exists, the protection of confidentiality must be denied in order to safeguard the legitimate interests of another party, according to the provisions of paragraph 2 of this section. In order to assess whether a request for information under the Freedom of Information Act conflicts with constitutionally enshrined principles of data protection confidentiality in the overriding interest of a party, specific factual findings are required as to whether the data subject of the request is of a personal nature, what legitimate interests this person has in keeping this data confidential, and finally, whether and what legitimate interests the requesting party has in disclosing this data. Based on the facts thus established, it must then be assessed whether the conditions of Section 1, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Data Protection Act are met and, if so, whether the requesting party's interest in the requested information outweighs this interest in confidentiality (see in this context the Austrian Administrative Court decision of October 22, 2012, 2010/03/0099). [The text abruptly ends here, so the context is unclear.] Both the map showing the locations of election posters and the addresses contained in their descriptions constitute personal data, which falls under the protection of Section 1 of the Austrian Data Protection Act (DSG) and – insofar as natural persons are concerned – is also subject to the scope of Article 4(1) of the GDPR (see Austrian Administrative Court [VwGH] 18.09.2023, Ra 2022/10/0133, regarding the disclosure of property addresses). The data subject's legitimate interest in maintaining the confidentiality of this relevant personal data is generally affirmed (see VfSlg 12.166/1989). Therefore, the disclosure or publication of this data by the respondent authority constitutes an infringement of the right to confidentiality or data protection under the GDPR, which can only be justified according to the criteria of Section 1(2) of the Austrian Data Protection Act (DSG) or Article 6 of the GDPR. It would therefore be necessary to examine whether the requesting party's interest in obtaining the requested information outweighs the data subject's interest in confidentiality. It would therefore be necessary to examine whether the requesting party's interest in obtaining the requested information outweighs the data subject's interest in confidentiality. Article 9(1) of the GDPR specifies special categories of personal data in addition to the personal data defined in Section 1 of the Austrian Data Protection Act (DSG) and Article 4(1) of the GDPR. These are data whose processing poses particularly high risks to the data subject with regard to the protection of their fundamental rights and freedoms. According to Article 9(1) of the GDPR, this includes the processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, as well as the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health, or data concerning a natural person's sex life or sexual orientation. Article 9(1) of the GDPR specifies special categories of personal data in addition to the personal data defined in Section 1 of the Austrian Data Protection Act (DSG) and Article 4(1) of the GDPR. This refers to data whose processing poses particularly high risks to the data subject with regard to the protection of their fundamental rights and freedoms. According to Article 9, paragraph 1, of the GDPR, this includes the processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, as well as the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health, or data concerning a natural person's sex life or sexual orientation. The GDPR does not provide a definition of the term "political opinions." Generally, the fundamental right to freedom of expression (including political opinions) is protected, in particular, by Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR), Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and Article 13 of the Austrian Basic Law (StGG). Specifically considered sensitive data includes membership lists of political parties, attendance lists of party conferences, signature lists for referendums, and the names of donors to political organizations. Overall, due to the protective purpose of the GDPR, the term "political opinion" must be interpreted broadly. In each individual case, it will depend on whether the specific processing reveals the political opinion of the data subject (see Jahnel, GDPR, Art. 9, para. 36). The GDPR does not provide a definition of the term "political opinion." Generally, the fundamental right to freedom of expression (including political opinions) is protected, in particular, by Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR), Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and Article 13 of the Austrian Basic Law (StGG). Particularly sensitive data includes membership lists of political parties, attendance lists of party conferences, signature lists for referendums, and the names of donors to political organizations. Overall, due to the protective purpose of the GDPR, the term "political opinion" must be interpreted broadly. In each individual case, it will depend on whether the specific processing reveals the political opinion of the data subject (see Jahnel, GDPR, Art. 9, para. 36). `` ] A political opinion is deemed to be discernible if "in view of the data concerned, the political opinion can be inferred with a reasonable degree of probability." The sensitive information does not need to be immediately and directly recognizable from the context. This should not go so far as to mean that every theoretical inference of sensitive information automatically leads to its classification as a special category of data; rather, the sensitive information must be discernible from the available data with sufficient certainty from an objective perspective. Whether the assessment is ultimately correct is irrelevant (cf. Jahnel, GDPR, Art. 9, para. 21). A political opinion is deemed to be discernible if "in view of the data concerned, the political opinion can be inferred with a reasonable degree of probability." The sensitive information does not need to be immediately and directly recognizable from the context. This should not go so far as to mean that every theoretical inference of sensitive information automatically leads to its classification as a special category of data; rather, the sensitive information must be discernible from the available data with sufficient certainty from an objective perspective. Whether the assessment made is ultimately correct is irrelevant (see Jahnel, GDPR, Article 9, para. 21). If political parties submit the locations of their election posters in the form of maps and addresses containing local descriptions, this constitutes special categories of personal data within the meaning of Article 9(1) GDPR, insofar as this data relates to natural persons. The political opinions of the respective property owners can be inferred with reasonable certainty from the transmitted information. It is generally not in line with common experience that a property owner would consent to the placement of an election poster of a party to which they do not have at least a positive political affinity. According to established case law, it is sufficient for the classification as information about political opinion if a corresponding conclusion can be drawn from the data or even just a corresponding presumption can be formed. Therefore, the processing of location data from political party election posters must be classified as the processing of special categories of personal data under Article 9 GDPR. When political parties submit the locations of their election posters, including maps and addresses, this data—insofar as it relates to natural persons—constitutes special categories of personal data within the meaning of Article 9(1) of the GDPR. The transmitted information allows for a reasonably certain inference about the political opinions of the respective property owners. It is generally unrealistic to expect a property owner to consent to the placement of an election poster for a party to which they do not have at least a positive political affinity. According to established case law, it is sufficient for the data to be classified as information about political opinion if a corresponding conclusion can be drawn or even just a corresponding presumption can be formed from it. Therefore, the processing of location data from political party election posters must be classified as the processing of special categories of personal data under Article 9 of the GDPR. Regarding the classification of data into different categories (ordinary data, special categories of data, or data relating to criminal offenses), it should be added that the controller's subjective intention may never be used as a permissible criterion. It is therefore irrelevant whether the controller intends to process sensitive data or not. This view is supported by the GDPR's objective of ensuring a high level of protection for data subjects (see Jahnel, GDPR, Art. 9, para. 14). It is therefore not relevant that the complainant, as stated in his complaint, does not intend to use the requested information to arbitrarily attribute political opinions to natural or legal persons. Regarding the classification of data into different categories (ordinary data, special categories of data, or data relating to criminal offenses), it should be added that the controller's subjective intention may never be used as a permissible criterion. It is therefore irrelevant whether the controller intends to process sensitive data or not. This view is supported by the GDPR's objective of ensuring a high level of protection for data subjects (see Jahnel, GDPR, Article 9, para. 14). It is therefore immaterial that the complainant, as stated in his complaint, does not intend to use the requested information to arbitrarily attribute political opinions to natural or legal persons. In summary, the requested data, insofar as the data subjects are natural persons, constitutes special categories of personal data within the meaning of Article 9(1) GDPR. The next step is to clarify under what circumstances these special categories of personal data may be processed. For special categories of personal data, Article 9(1) GDPR initially provides for a general prohibition on processing. Article 9(2) GDPR then lists an exhaustive catalog of ten exceptions to this prohibition (Jahnel, GDPR, Art. 9, para. 4). Recourse to Article 6(1) GDPR is not possible, as this would circumvent the stringent requirements of Article 9(2) GDPR. Compared to Article 6(1) GDPR, Article 9(2) GDPR notably lacks the grounds for processing based on "the legitimate interests of the controller or a third party" and "processing necessary for the performance of a contract," resulting in a more restrictive regime of permissibility (Kastelitz/Hötzendorfer/Tschohl in Knyrim, DatKomm, Article 9 GDPR, para. 30 [as of 07.05.2020, rdb.at]). For special categories of personal data, Article 9(1) GDPR initially provides for a general prohibition on processing. Article 9(2) GDPR then lists an exhaustive catalog of ten exceptions to this prohibition (Jahnel, GDPR, Article 9, para. 4). Recourse to Article 6(1) GDPR is not possible, as this would circumvent the high hurdles of Article 9(2) GDPR. Compared to Article 6(1) GDPR, Article 9(2) GDPR notably lacks the exceptions for "processing based on the legitimate interests of the controller or a third party" and "processing necessary for the performance of a contract," resulting in a more restrictive regime of permissibility (Kastelitz/Hötzendorfer/Tschohl in Knyrim, DatKomm, Article 9 GDPR, para. 30 [as of May 7, 2020, rdb.at]). In the present case, of the exceptions to be considered, only the exception of data that has been manifestly made public by the data subject himself pursuant to Article 9(2)(e) GDPR and the exception of substantial public interest pursuant to Article 9(2)(g) GDPR are relevant. These will be examined in more detail below. In the present case, of the exceptions to be considered, only the exception of data that has been manifestly made public by the data subject themselves, pursuant to Article 9(2)(e) GDPR, and the exception of substantial public interest, pursuant to Article 9(2)(g) GDPR, are relevant; these will be examined in more detail below. The prohibition on processing under Article 9(1) GDPR does not apply, pursuant to Article 9(2)(e) GDPR, if the data subject has "manifestly made public" special categories of personal data. By making sensitive data about themselves public, the data subject loses its absolute protection. The GDPR does not define the term "making public." This includes, at the very least, data freely accessible on the internet or disseminated via the media, as well as statements, press releases, or interviews made by the data subject with media representatives that are accessible to the public (see Jahnel, GDPR, Art. 9, para. 79f). Mere presence in public does not fall under the definition of publication in this sense. The disclosing nature of an act of will, namely making certain data accessible to an indefinite group of people, cannot be equated with simply moving about in public (Ehmann/Selmayr, General Data Protection Regulation, Art. 9, para. 41). According to Article 9, paragraph 2, letter e, the processing prohibition of Article 9, paragraph 1, GDPR does not apply if the data subject has "obviously made public" special categories of personal data. By making sensitive data about themselves public, the data subject loses its absolute protection. The GDPR does not define the term "making public." This includes, at the very least, data freely accessible on the internet or disseminated via the media, as well as statements, press releases, or interviews made by the data subject with media representatives that are accessible to the public (see Jahnel, GDPR, Article 9, paras. 79f). The mere "existence" in public space does not fall under the definition of publication in this sense. The disclosing nature of an act of will, namely making certain data accessible to an indefinite group of people, cannot be equated with simply moving about in public space (Ehmann/Selmayr, General Data Protection Regulation, Article 9, para. 41). In the present case, it is established that the property owners neither erected the election posters themselves nor created and submitted to the state government the corresponding map showing the locations of the election posters. The mere fact that the election posters were displayed in public space and thus, in principle, visible to everyone, does not lead to the conclusion that the property owners in question have manifestly made the sensitive data, which allows for a (presumed) inference about their political opinions, publicly available within the meaning of the GDPR. The exception for the processing of sensitive data under Article 9(2)(e) GDPR is therefore not applicable. In the present case, it is established that the property owners neither erected the election posters themselves nor created and submitted to the state government the corresponding map showing the locations of the election posters. The mere fact that the election posters were displayed in public spaces and thus, in principle, visible to everyone, does not imply that the property owners in question have manifestly made public sensitive data, which allows for (presumed) inferences about their political opinions, within the meaning of the GDPR. The exception for processing sensitive data under Article 9(2)(e) of the GDPR is therefore not applicable. It must now be examined whether the exception under Article 9(2)(g) of the GDPR applies and permits the processing of special categories of personal data in this case. It should be noted at the outset that Article 9(2)(g) GDPR does not constitute an independent exception, but rather an opening clause which, on the basis of national or Union law, makes it possible to provide for an exception to the prohibition on processing special categories of personal data, subject to several conditions: It must then be examined whether the exception in Article 9(2)(g) GDPR applies and permits the processing of special categories of personal data in the present case. It should be noted at the outset that Article 9(2)(g) of the GDPR does not constitute an independent exception, but rather an opening clause that allows, based on national or EU law, an exception to the prohibition on processing special categories of personal data to be provided for, subject to several conditions: – There must be a legal basis, – this must be proportionate to the objective pursued, – respect the essence of data protection law, and – provide appropriate and specific measures to safeguard the interests and fundamental rights of the data subject; – in addition, the processing must be necessary for reasons of substantial public interest (Jahnel, GDPR, Art. 9, para. 92). This processing must be necessary for reasons of substantial public interest (Jahnel, GDPR, Art. 9, para. 92). The requirements for the legal basis of infringements of the fundamental right to data protection are governed mutatis mutandis by the provisions of Section 1, Paragraph 2 of the Data Protection Act (DSG). According to the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, the collection and use of personal data by a state authority is permissible, due to the principle of legality, only on the basis of laws that are necessary for the reasons stated in Article 8, Paragraph 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and that regulate with sufficient precision, i.e., in a manner predictable for everyone, the conditions under which the collection or use of personal data is permissible for the performance of specific administrative tasks. The respective legislature must therefore provide for subject-specific regulations that specify and limit the cases of permissible infringements of the fundamental right to data protection (see VfSlg 16.369/2001, 18643/2008). The requirements for the legal basis of infringements of the fundamental right to data protection are governed mutatis mutandis by the provisions of Section 1, Paragraph 2 of the Data Protection Act (DSG). According to the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, the collection and use of personal data by a state authority is permissible, due to the principle of legality, only on the basis of laws that are necessary for the reasons stated in Article 8, paragraph 2, of the ECHR and that regulate with sufficient precision, i.e., in a manner predictable for everyone, the conditions under which the collection or use of personal data is permissible for the performance of specific administrative tasks. The respective legislature must therefore provide for a subject-specific regulation in such a way that the cases of permissible interference with the fundamental right to data protection are specified and limited (cf. VfSlg 16.369 from 2001, 18643 from 2008). The national law or other Union law that forms the legal basis for the processing of sensitive data must also be proportionate to the objective pursued. Accordingly, a proportionality assessment must be carried out, in which the infringement of the data subject's privacy must be weighed against the intended processing purposes. Furthermore, the essence of data protection law must be preserved. This is intended to prevent the right to data protection or privacy from being undermined by legislative measures based on this exception (Jahnel, GDPR, Art. 9, para. 94). This is intended to prevent the right to data protection and privacy from being undermined by legislative measures based on this exception (Jahnel, GDPR, Article 9, para. 94). In the present case, the only legal basis for processing the requested special categories of personal data is the Political Parties Funding Act and the Freedom of Information Act. Section 1c, paragraph 2 of the Political Parties Funding Act stipulates that the relevant (requested) information must be forwarded to the State Audit Office and the District Authority, as these two public bodies—along with the State Government—are responsible for auditing and monitoring compliance with legal provisions in the public interest of ensuring the lawful use of financial support granted to political parties. Further forwarding or processing is not permitted. Paragraph 1c, section 2 of the Freedom of Information Act (PFG) stipulates that the relevant (requested) information must be forwarded to the State Audit Office and the District Administrative Authority, as these two public bodies—along with the State Government—are responsible for auditing and monitoring compliance with legal provisions in the public interest of ensuring the lawful use of financial support granted to political parties. Further forwarding or processing is not permitted. Due to a lack of sufficient clarity, the Freedom of Information Act does not provide a suitable legal basis for processing special categories of personal data. According to the established jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, such infringements require a legal framework that—within the meaning of Article 8(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)—is necessary for the reasons stated therein and defines the conditions for such an infringement with sufficient precision and predictability for the data subject. The Freedom of Information Act does not contain such a subject-specific specification. Due to a lack of sufficient clarity, the Freedom of Information Act does not constitute a suitable legal basis for the processing of special categories of personal data. According to the established case law of the Constitutional Court, such infringements require a statutory regulation that—within the meaning of Article 8, paragraph 2, of the ECHR—is necessary for the reasons stated therein and defines the conditions for an infringement with sufficient precision and predictability for the data subject. The Freedom of Information Act does not contain such a subject-specific specification. No other legal basis is apparent that would allow the disclosure of the locations of election posters requested by the complainant to be permissible, which is why the exception in Article 9, paragraph 2, letter g, of the GDPR cannot be applied. No other legal basis is apparent that would allow the disclosure of the locations of election posters requested by the complainant to be permissible, which is why the exception in Article 9, paragraph 2, letter g, of the GDPR cannot be applied. The applicability of an exception for the processing of the requested data under Article 9(2) GDPR is not apparent in the present case. 6.2.2. Complainant's Interest in the Requested Information: The statutory duty of confidentiality, i.e., the interest of the property owners—insofar as they are natural persons—in maintaining the confidentiality of special categories of personal data, is countered by the complainant's asserted interest in obtaining the information, in particular the desire to compare the poster locations reported by the political parties with photographic documentation of actual poster locations compiled by several local editors and thereby determine the geographical focus of the election campaign. 6.2.2. Interest of the Complainant in the Requested Information: The statutory duty of confidentiality, i.e., the interest of the property owners—insofar as they are natural persons—in maintaining the confidentiality of special categories of personal data, is countered by the complainant's asserted interest in obtaining the information, in particular the desire to compare the poster locations reported by the political parties with photographic documentation of actual poster locations compiled by several local editors and to determine the geographical focus of the election advertising. That the complainant works as an editor at the Austrian Broadcasting Corporation (ORF) and thus fulfills the societal role of a "public watchdog" within the meaning of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Austrian Administrative Court (VwGH) on matters of freedom of expression and information is undisputed and forms the basis for the following balancing of interests. According to the case law of the ECtHR, Article 10(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) must be interpreted as including—under certain further conditions—a right of access to information (see, in this regard and for the following, ECtHR [Grand Chamber] 08.11.2016, Magyar Helsinki Bizottsag, 18030/11, in particular paragraphs 131 and 156 et seq.). The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has recognized such a right of access to information, protected by Article 10 of the ECHR, among other things, when the person concerned has a right to receive information under national law (as is the case with the right to information established in Section 1 of the Information Act, which is to be granted by ordinary law). A right of access to information also exists when access to information is instrumental for exercising the right to freedom of expression, in particular the freedom to receive and impart messages or ideas, and the refusal of access constitutes an interference with this right. According to the ECtHR's case law, Article 10(1) of the ECHR must be interpreted as including – under certain further conditions – a right of access to information (see, in this regard and for the following, ECtHR [Grand Chamber] 08.11.2016, Magyar Helsinki Bizottsag, 18030/11, in particular paragraphs 131 and 156 et seq.). The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has recognized such a right of access to information, protected by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), among other things, when the data subject has a right to receive information under national law (as is the case with the statutory right to information established in Section 1 of the Information Act). A right of access to information also exists when access to information is instrumental for exercising the right to freedom of expression, in particular the freedom to receive and impart messages or ideas, and the refusal of access constitutes an infringement of this right. ... The ECtHR cites the following criteria, which are essentially relevant for determining the scope of a right of access to information under Article 10 of the ECHR: - the purpose and objective of the information request (is the collection of information a relevant preparatory step for journalistic or other activities intended to create a forum for public debate or which constitute an essential element of such debate?), - the actual necessity of the information request for the exercise of freedom of expression, - the nature of the information requested (the information, data, or documents for which access is sought must generally pass the test of being in the public interest; the necessity of disclosure may exist if, among other things, disclosure ensures transparency regarding the conduct of official business and matters of interest to society as a whole), - the The role of the access requester (as a journalist, a "social watchdog," or a non-governmental organization whose activities relate to matters of public interest), – and finally, the existence of readily available information. The role of the requesting party (as a journalist, a "social watchdog," or a non-governmental organization whose activities relate to matters of public interest). – and finally, the existence of readily available information. The scope of the subjective right to information granted by the Freedom of Information Act – as well as the scope of any provisions restricting this right regarding the permissible refusal to provide information on grounds of confidentiality, significant impairment of the performance of other duties, and the frivolous nature of a request for information – must be interpreted in conformity with the Constitution, based on the constitutionally enshrined provision of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and in light of the relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). In the relevant context, therefore, with regard to the question of whether statutory confidentiality obligations (Article 9(1) GDPR) preclude the requested disclosure of information, a balancing of interests must be undertaken, taking into account Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This balancing must include an examination of whether any statutory confidentiality obligations comply with the substantive requirement of legality under Article 10(2) ECHR, i.e., whether they pursue a legitimate aim within the meaning of this provision, are necessary in a democratic society, and are ultimately proportionate. Therefore, in the relevant context, with regard to the question of whether statutory confidentiality obligations (Article 9(1) GDPR) preclude the requested disclosure of information, a balancing of interests must be undertaken, taking into account Article 10 ECHR. In the course of this balancing of interests, it must be examined, among other things, whether any statutory confidentiality obligations comply with the substantive legality requirement of Article 10, paragraph 2, of the ECHR, i.e., whether they pursue a legitimate aim within the meaning of this provision, are necessary in a democratic society, and are ultimately proportionate. In assessing the extent and manner in which information must be disclosed, it is essential—as is evident from the recent case law of the ECtHR cited above—to consider whether access to the requested information is instrumental for exercising the right to freedom of expression, in particular the freedom to receive and impart information or ideas. This must be examined in accordance with the criteria established by the ECtHR. When assessing the question of the extent and manner in which information must be disclosed, it is crucial—as is evident from the recent case law of the ECtHR cited above—to consider whether access to the requested information is instrumental for exercising the right to freedom of expression, especially the freedom to receive and impart information or ideas. Those provisions which, under federal and state freedom of information laws, allow a person obligated to provide information to refuse to disclose requested information must therefore be interpreted narrowly, particularly when a request for information is considered a relevant preparatory step for journalistic or other activities intended to create a forum for public debate, the requested information is in the public interest, and the requesting party has a "watchdog" role within the meaning of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (see Austrian Administrative Court [VwGH] 29 May 2018, Ra 2017/03/0083). (ECtHR, see VwGH 29.05.2018, Ra 2017/03/0083). The appellant states that the purpose of his request for information is to compare the locations of the posters reported by the political parties with a photographic documentation of actual poster locations compiled by several editors of the O. He further states that he wishes to deduce the geographical focus of the election campaign from the poster locations. He argues that it is of public interest to know which party intends to target voters most intensively in which specific locations. The appellant fails to convincingly demonstrate what public interest lies in the provision of the requested information regarding the correspondence between the reported poster locations and the list compiled by him or by employees of the O. While there is undoubtedly a public interest in ensuring that political parties use financial support in accordance with the law, this does not justify the request for information. This interest is already ensured by the provisions of the Political Parties Act (PFG), according to which the state government, the district authorities, and the state audit office are entrusted with monitoring compliance with the legal requirements. According to the legislative materials, Section 1c Paragraph 2 of the PFG serves in particular to monitor compliance with the quantitative restrictions on election posters. For this purpose, information received by the state government must be made available to the state audit office and the district authorities (BlgNr 82/2022 of the 31st Vorarlberg State Parliament, 5). Any violations must be reported to the State Party Transparency Senate. If the maximum permissible number of locations or election posters per location is exceeded, this results, according to Section 12 Paragraph 1 Letter b of the PFG, in the repayment of party funding amounting to up to 10% of the funding. The public interest in limiting the time and quantity of election advertising is therefore sufficiently safeguarded by the control mechanisms provided for in the PFG (Postal Advertising Act). The appellant fails to convincingly demonstrate what public interest lies in the disclosure of the requested information regarding the conformity of the reported poster locations with the list compiled by him or by employees of the [unspecified entity]. While there is undoubtedly a public interest in ensuring that political parties using financial support comply with the law, this interest is already guaranteed by the provisions of the PFG, according to which the state government, the district authorities, and the state audit office are entrusted with monitoring compliance with the legal requirements. According to the legislative materials, Section 1c, Paragraph 2 of the PFG serves in particular to monitor the quantity of election posters. For this purpose, the information received by the state government must be made available to the state audit office and the district authorities (BlgNr 82 of 2022, of the 31st Vorarlberg State Parliament, p. 5). Any violations must be reported to the State Party Transparency Senate. Exceeding the maximum permissible number of locations or election posters per location will result in the repayment of up to 10% of the party funding, according to Section 12, Paragraph 1, Letter b of the Political Parties Act (PFG). The public interest in limiting election advertising in terms of time and quantity is therefore adequately protected by the control mechanisms provided for in the PFG. The complainant's asserted interest in knowing the specific locations where a campaigning party intends to increase its efforts to reach voters with election posters does not constitute an overriding public interest. The placement of election advertising by parties falls within the scope of their strategic planning and primarily serves the targeted outreach to potential voters. Disclosing such location information would impair the parties' election campaign strategy without making a relevant contribution to the exercise of democratic oversight rights or to the transparency of political decision-making. Democratic oversight of political parties and their election campaigns is already ensured by legally mandated reporting obligations and publicly accessible information. Furthermore, the requested information—insofar as it concerns natural persons—constitutes special categories of personal data (see section 6.2.1 for details). Any infringement of the legally mandated duty of confidentiality (Article 9(1) GDPR) by the right to information under Article 10 ECHR must therefore be examined with particular rigor. Since the functioning of democratic oversight is already guaranteed by the existing reporting obligations, there is, in light of the grounds for requesting information outlined above, no overriding public interest in disclosing the parties' specific location data that would outweigh the data subjects' fundamental right to data protection. An infringement of the legally mandated duty of confidentiality (Article 9, paragraph 1, GDPR) by the right to information under Article 10, ECHR, must therefore be examined with particular rigor. Since the functioning of democratic oversight is already ensured by the stipulated reporting obligations, there is, in light of the stated grounds for disclosure, no overriding public interest in the disclosure of the parties' specific location data that would outweigh the data subjects' fundamental right to data protection. The decision was therefore rendered accordingly. 6.3. Regarding the argument of a possible partial response The appellant argued that the decision failed to examine at any point whether even partial information—for example, regarding poster locations on public thoroughfares, which are predominantly owned by local authorities—should have been disclosed. As explained above (section 6.2.1), it is established that the requested data – insofar as it relates to natural persons – constitutes special categories of personal data within the meaning of Article 9(1) GDPR, which are subject to enhanced protection and for which no exception applies. While the processed data relates to legal entities, it is indeed a personal data subject; however, its processing may be permissible under Section 1(2) of the GDPR if, upon balancing of interests, it is determined that the requesting party's interest in the information outweighs the data subjects' interest in confidentiality. However, their processing may be permissible in accordance with paragraph one, section 2, of the GDPR, provided that, within the framework of a balancing of interests, it is determined that the information interest of the requester outweighs the confidentiality interest of the data subjects. For the reasons set out below, it is unnecessary to conduct a balancing of interests – and thus to assess the admissibility of partially providing the requested data: As already explained in section 6.1, "information" encompasses declarations of knowledge about matters that are known to the body obligated to provide information due to its official duties. Providing information presupposes the actual existence and availability of the relevant information. In this context, the relevant commentary also refers to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on Article 10 ECHR ("ready and available"), see ECtHR 14 April 2009, 37374/05 (Társaság a Szabadságjogokért); ECtHR 8 November 2016, 18030/11 (Magyar Helsinki Bizottság). ECtHR 30 January 2020, 44920/09 (Studio Monitori et al.). As already explained in section 6.1, "information" encompasses statements of knowledge about matters that are known to the body obligated to provide information due to its official activities. The provision of information presupposes the actual existence and availability of the information in question. In this context, the relevant commentary also refers to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on Article 10, ECHR ("ready and available"), see ECtHR 14 April 2009, 37374/05 (Társaság a Szabadságjogokért); ECtHR 8 November 2016, 18030/11 (Magyar Helsinki Bizottság); ECtHR 30 January 2020, 44920/09 (Studio Monitori et al.). According to Section 1c Paragraph 2 of the Political Parties Act (PFG), political parties participating in elections are obligated to submit a map showing the locations of their election posters or digital advertising displays to the state government in PDF format. As the respondent authority stated in its rejection notice, in the context of the 2024 state elections, a total of nine political parties each submitted a maximum of 300 locations, resulting in a total of 2,700 addresses being disclosed. However, the state government has no information regarding which of these addresses belong to natural or legal persons. The relevant data is therefore neither known nor readily available and would first have to be collected. Furthermore, the respondent authority correctly pointed out that such an allocation would prevent the administration from properly fulfilling its other duties (see Section 4 Paragraph 2 of the Information Obligations Act). A partial response, in which the complainant would only be provided with the addresses attributable to legal entities, is therefore out of the question for this reason alone. According to Section 1c, Paragraph 2 of the Political Parties Act (PFG), the political party participating in the election is obligated to notify the state government of the locations of election posters or digital advertising displays in a plan view in PDF format. As the respondent authority stated in its rejection notice, in the context of the 2024 state election, a total of nine political parties each submitted a maximum of 300 locations, resulting in a total of 2,700 addresses being disclosed. However, the state government has no information on which of these addresses are attributable to natural or legal persons. The relevant data is therefore neither known nor readily available and would first have to be collected. Furthermore, the respondent authority correctly pointed out that such an allocation would prevent the administration from properly fulfilling its other tasks (see Section 4, Paragraph 2 of the Freedom of Information Act). A partial response, in which the complainant would only be provided with the addresses belonging to legal entities, is therefore out of the question for this reason alone. Regarding a further restriction of the requested data—for example, concerning the number of locations used by each campaigning party for election posters—it should be noted that, pursuant to Section 1a Paragraph 3 of the Political Parties Act (PFG), campaigning parties are already obligated to prepare an election campaign report detailing their campaign expenditures. This report must be submitted to the state government and published in the official gazette for the state of Vorarlberg. This election campaign report includes, among other things, the expenditures for election posters and digital advertising displays, as well as the number of locations used for each. This data is therefore already publicly available. Regarding a further restriction of the requested data—for example, concerning the number of locations used by each participating party for election posters—it should be noted that participating parties are already obligated under Section 1a, Paragraph 3 of the Political Parties Act (PFG) to prepare an election campaign report detailing their campaign expenditures. This report must be submitted to the state government and published in the official gazette for the state of Vorarlberg. This election campaign report includes, among other things, the expenditures for election posters and digital advertising displays, as well as the number of locations used for each. This data is therefore already publicly available. Furthermore, it should be noted that the complainant justified his request for information with the intention of comparing the reported locations with the locations of election posters he himself identified. In addition, the complainant wishes to know which party intends to focus its efforts on reaching voters at which specific locations. Restricting the disclosure of information to properties owned by legal entities would—even after a positive balancing of interests—not be suitable for carrying out the desired comparison or for providing a complete picture of the actual locations of the election posters. A limited partial response would therefore not satisfy the applicant's asserted interest in obtaining information. 7. The holding of an oral hearing was unnecessary pursuant to Section 24 Paragraph 4 of the Administrative Court Procedure Act (VwGVG) because the facts relevant to the decision are clear and unambiguous from the administrative act, and the proceedings concern exclusively legal questions for the resolution of which, according to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), an oral hearing is not required. Moreover, the appellant expressly waived his right to an oral hearing. 7. An oral hearing was deemed unnecessary pursuant to Section 24, Paragraph 4 of the Administrative Court Procedure Act (VwGVG) because the facts relevant to the decision are clear and unambiguous from the administrative act, and the proceedings concern exclusively legal questions for the resolution of which, according to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), an oral hearing is not required. Moreover, the appellant expressly waived his right to an oral hearing. 8. The appeal on points of law is inadmissible because no legal question within the meaning of Article 133, Paragraph 4 of the Federal Constitutional Law (B-VG) was to be decided that is of fundamental importance. The present decision neither deviates from the established case law of the Administrative Court nor is there a lack of case law from the Administrative Court on this matter. Furthermore, the existing case law of the Administrative Court on this issue cannot be considered inconsistent. Likewise, there are no other indications that the legal question to be resolved is of fundamental importance. The appeal is inadmissible because no legal question of fundamental importance within the meaning of Article 133, paragraph 4, of the Austrian Federal Constitutional Law (B-VG) was to be decided. The present decision neither deviates from the established case law of the Administrative Court nor is there a lack of case law from the Administrative Court on this matter. Furthermore, the existing case law of the Administrative Court on this issue cannot be considered inconsistent. Likewise, there are no other indications that the legal question to be resolved is of fundamental importance.