SCHWARZ V. BOCHUM, 17.10.2014 (“SCHWARZ”)

No sufficiently effective yet less invasive alternative exist as taking fingerprints/pictures is causes no physical or mental discomfort and the technology for the only alternative (iris scan) is not advance enough. (¶¶ 48-53).

In this respect, it is be borne in mind, on the one hand, that that action involves no more than the taking of prints of two fingers, which can, moreover, generally be seen by others, so that this is not an operation of an intimate nature. Nor does it cause any particular physical or mental discomfort to the person affected any more than when that person’s facial image is taken.

It is true that those fingerprints are to be taken in addition to the facial image. However, the combination of two operations designed to identify persons may not a priori be regarded as giving rise in itself to a greater threat to the rights recognised by Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter than if each of those two operations were to be considered in isolation.

Thus, as regards the case in the main proceedings, nothing in the case file submitted to the Court permits a finding that the fact that fingerprints and a facial image are taken at the same time would, by reason of that fact alone, give rise to greater interference with those rights.

On the other hand, it should also be noted that the only real alternative to the taking of fingerprints raised in the course of the proceedings before the Court is an iris scan. Nothing in the case file submitted to the Court suggests that the latter procedure would interfere less with the rights recognised by Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter than the taking of fingerprints.

Furthermore, with regard to the effectiveness of those two methods, it is common ground that iris-recognition technology is not yet as advanced as fingerprint-recognition technology. In addition, the procedure for iris recognition is currently significantly more expensive than the procedure for comparing fingerprints and is, for that reason, less suitable for general use.

In those circumstances, the Court has not been made aware of any measures which would be both sufficiently effective in helping to achieve the aim of protecting against the fraudulent use of passports and less of a threat to the rights recognised by Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter than the measures deriving from the method based on the use of fingerprints.