# Anonymization — legal context bundle

> Curated from overview.legal on 2026-08-22. Canonical page: https://overview.legal/topics/anonymization
> Sources are cited per item. Verify against the official texts before relying on them.

Processing anonymized data that cannot be re-identified

## Overview

## Legal Framework

Anonymization sits at the boundary of data protection law: data that is genuinely anonymous falls outside the GDPR entirely, while pseudonymized data remains fully subject to it. The distinction turns on whether a data subject can be re-identified, directly or indirectly, by any reasonably likely means. Article 4(5) GDPR defines pseudonymization as processing personal data so they can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional information, which must be kept separately and subject to technical and organizational measures. True anonymization, by contrast, renders re-identification impossible by any party, using any means reasonably likely to be used — a significantly higher threshold.

The AI Act reinforces these principles. Recital 69 requires providers to implement data minimization and data protection by design and by default throughout the AI system lifecycle, expressly naming anonymization and encryption as necessary measures. Recital 61 extends similar obligations to high-risk AI systems used in judicial and democratic contexts, where bias and opacity risks demand robust safeguards. The Digital Services Act, in Recital 98, similarly treats aggregated, publicly accessible data as a tool for systemic risk research — but only where individual re-identification is effectively precluded.

## Key Developments

The CJEU's Planet49 decision established a critical practical benchmark: cookie data linked to a registration number that can be cross-referenced with a user's name and address is personal data, not anonymous data. The mere theoretical possibility of linking identifiers to individuals suffices to bring data within the GDPR's scope. Dutch courts have applied similar reasoning. In the Stichting Benchmark GGZ case before the Rechtbank Midden-Nederland, the court scrutinized whether healthcare benchmark data could be considered sufficiently anonymized, focusing on the re-identification risk inherent in detailed treatment trajectory records.

The Gerechtshof 's-Hertogenbosch (paragraph 4.32) demonstrated the operational side of anonymization, ordering court clerks to produce anonymized copies of judgments and hearing records while preserving the substantive content — illustrating that anonymization must be functional, not merely cosmetic. Similarly, in the covert surveillance case against the Municipality of Delft, the court required black-lining of names, addresses, ages, and phone numbers of NTA employees and respondents, while preserving identifiable findings through labels such as "[NTA employee]" — showing courts expect granular, context-specific anonymization rather than blanket redaction.

Enforcement actions confirm the financial stakes. The Czech DPA fined Avast €13.9 million for disclosing data of approximately 100 million users that the company treated as anonymized but which proved re-identifiable. CNIL imposed €800,000 on Cegedim Santé for transferring customer data without adequate anonymization safeguards.

## Practical Guidance

- **Assess re-identification risk contextually, not abstractly.** Planet49 establishes that even indirect linkage through a registration number brings data within the GDPR. Map all reasonably available datasets and cross-referencing possibilities before claiming anonymity.

- **Separate and protect any key or mapping table.** Under Article 4(5), pseudonymized data remains personal data. If a re-identification key exists anywhere in the organization or with a processor, the data is not anonymous.

- **Apply anonymization by design in AI systems.** Recital 69 of the AI Act treats anonymization as a baseline measure, not an optional add-on. Providers must build it into training pipelines, model outputs, and feedback loops from the outset.

- **Preserve analytical utility through functional anonymization.** Courts expect redaction that maintains the substance of findings or conclusions while stripping identifiers — as the Delft court required with labeled placeholders like "[NTA employee]."

- **Document the anonymization methodology.** The Avast enforcement demonstrates that regulators will scrutinize the technical basis for any anonymity claim. Maintain records of the techniques applied, residual risk assessments, and the reasoning supporting the conclusion that re-identification is not reasonably likely.

## Case law

### NSS - 1 As 183/2023-62

*Source: Supreme Administrative Court, 2026-08-04 — https://overview.legal/posts/184683 — original: https://gdprhub.eu/index.php?title=NSS_-_1_As_183/2023-62*

Facts — OAKS Consulting s.r.o. (the company) provided consulting services concerning market access conditions for medicinal products and medical devices. Pursuant to the Czech Act on Free Access to Information, it requested information from the General Health Insurance Company of the Czech Republic concerning the treatment of patients with iron deficiency and related conditions for the period from 1 January 2010 to 31 October 2017. The request covered 183 types of diagnoses, 18 types of medical procedures, 96 DRG codes and 13 types of medications. The company stated that it wished to analyse how specific diagnoses were treated, the number of patients treated, and the frequency of related medical procedures, in order to compare clinical practice against the relevant theoretical background. The public health insurer rejected the request on the grounds that granting it would require the creation of new information. Following an appeal by the company, the Prague Municipal Court overturned the decision. The public health insurer provided then the company with five separate tables regarding the diagnoses, diagnoses in conjunction with medical procedures, the DRG codes and prescribed medications. It aggregated the parameters of the provided data as follows: five-year age groups, dates were given only at the monthly level, and healthcare providers were classified into broad geographic regions. However, it refused to add a unique random identifier which would allow linking the individual records and tables pertaining to the same patient. The public health insurer considered that providing the code would result in the disclosure of special categories of personal data. The company lodged a complaint with the Czech DPA (UOOU), which rejected it. The company filed another appeal with the Municipal Court of Prague, which dismissed the appeal. It ruled that the combination of factors such as gender, year of birth, the time and place of care, diagnoses, medications, and medical procedures could, with the addition of other information, lead to the identification of specific patients. According to the court, the random identifier would result in pseudonymisation rather than anonymisation, so the information would remain personal data pursuant to Article 4(1) GDPR. The Municipal Court also relied on modern technical capabilities for linking different sources and on the availability of a large volume of information in the media and on social media. It cited the CJEU’s decision in the Breyer case (C-582/14), according to which in order to determine whether a person is identifiable, account must be taken of all the means that could reasonably be used, both by the controller and by any other person, to identify that person. It did not follow the approach taken by the General Court in Case T-557/20 (SRB v. EDPS), which the company had cited. It ruled that the data were pseudonymised and that the requested information could not be disclosed in its entirety. The company filed a cassation appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court, arguing that the information had been anonymised. It alleged that the addition of a random code with no independent meaning would not alter their anonymous nature. It claimed that the Municipal Court had not explained what specific additional information could be used to identify the patients and had relied on hypothetical scenarios. The company stated that it was objectively impossible to obtain such data through other requests in a detailed and non-aggregated form. It also argued that iron deficiency was not a rare disease, but was associated with a large number of patients and various conditions and that the data had undergone both randomisation and generalisation so the risk of identification was therefore low. Finally, the company emphasized that the tables without the random identifier could not be used effectively for the intended analysis. It further argued that the DPA and the Municipal Court had not adequately balanced the right of access to information against the right to the protection of personal data. The DPA argued that the random identifier constituted personal data when considered in conjunction with the health data to which it would be linked. It stated that the concept of personal data was not limited to information that directly identifies an individual nor did it require that all necessary additional information be held by the same entity. Replacing direct identifiers with a code did not anonymise the data, but made it pseudonymised. Moreover, it argued that certain categories contained a relatively small number of records and that combining them with other data could make it possible to select and identify a specific insured person and their treatment history. It further argued that, even if identifiability was relative, it should be assessed in relation to all potential information applicants and their ability to obtain contextual information. The Supreme Administrative Court stayed the proceedings in the case pending the CJEU’s decision in Case C-413/23 P (EDPS v. SRB). After the judgment was issued, the company argued that whether the data were pseudonymised or anonymised should be assessed in relation to the specific recipient of the data and the means that it could reasonably use. It stated that it did not have any means of re-identification and that only specific and practically available cross-referencing possibilities should be taken into account. Holding — The court relied on Case C-413/23 and noted that pseudonymised data under Article 4(5) GDPR does not automatically constitute personal data in relation to every person. Therefore, it examined whether the company had lawful means that could reasonably be expected to be used to identify the patients directly or indirectly. The court found that the tables, without the random identifier, did not allow for the identification of specific insured individuals. It held that the requested random identifier would link the records from the different tables and allow for the aggregation of information on the diagnoses, medical procedures, hospitalizations, and medications for the same patient during the eight-year period. Certain combinations of these data, along with age group, gender, and region, could be unique and allow for the identification of patients using information from public sources. It pointed out that although iron deficiency was a very common diagnosis and some tables contained a very large number of entries, other categories were not sufficiently generalised. According to the court, in certain cases, such as rare diseases, unusual treatment combinations, or particularly young or old age, knowing even a few details about a person could make it possible to identify the corresponding record. The risk was not negligible, given that information about a person’s age, gender, hospitalization, diagnosis, or treatment could be available in the media or on social media. Consequently, the court held that adding the random identifier, in conjunction with the data already provided, would make the dataset personal data in relation to the company under Article 4(1) GDPR, including health data falling under Article 9 GDPR. The court clarified that classifying the information as personal data was not sufficient in itself to reject the request. It noted that the right of access to the information must also be balanced against patients’ right to privacy through an assessment of suitability, necessity and proportionality. It determined that the decision not to provide the random identifier was appropriate for the protection of privacy, because without it, it was impossible to link the tables and identify individual patients. It was also deemed necessary because the company insisted on receiving that specific code along with the existing tables and there was no other procedure that would constitute a lesser infringement of its right to information. The court also recognized the public interest in accessing information related to the operation of the healthcare system, but ruled that this did not outweigh the need to protect the detailed health data of potentially hundreds of thousands of insured individuals. It concluded that the refusal to provide the code was therefore proportionate. The Supreme Administrative Court therefore upheld the Municipal Court’s ruling, but partially corrected its reasoning regarding the relative nature of identifiability and the need to conduct a proportionality review. It dismissed the appeal.

### OLG München - 36 U 1054/25 e

*Source: Higher Regional Court Munich, 2026-06-26 — https://overview.legal/posts/184545 — original: https://gdprhub.eu/index.php?title=OLG_München_-_36_U_1054/25_e*

Facts — The data subject had used a social media platform operated by the controller, an Irish company, since 2013. The controller provided “Business Tools” to third-party website operators and app providers. These tools enabled the controller to obtain data concerning how users interacted with third-party websites and apps, including information about page visits, purchases and advertisements clicked. In November 2023, the data subject requested that the controller recognize that the processing of his personal data was contrary to the parties’ contract, erase or anonymize the personal data, provide access to the personal data and pay compensation. The data subject subsequently brought an action before the Regional Court of Munich II, seeking a declaration that the parties’ user contract did not permit the processing, cessation of the processing of personal data collected through the Business Tools on third-party websites and apps, restriction of further processing, erasure or anonymization of previously collected data and at least €5,000 in non-material damages. The relevant data included direct and indirect identifiers, such as his name, contact details, IP address and internal identifiers, as well as website URLs, visit times, app names and information about his interactions with websites and apps. The Regional Court of Munich II dismissed the action, holding that the declaratory and erasure or anonymization claims were inadmissible, the cessation claims were legally unavailable and the damages claim had not been sufficiently substantiated. In relation to the damages claim, it found that the data subject had not identified specific third-party websites or apps through which his personal data had been processed. The data subject accordingly appealed to the Higher Regional Court of Munich. Holding — The Higher Regional Court of Munich partially upheld the appeal. First, the court held that the Controller processed the data subject’s personal data under Articles 4(1) and 4(2) GDPR by receiving data transmitted through its Business Tools, associating it with a user account and storing it. The data subject was not required to identify every website, app or individual transmission because the relevant information was principally within the controller’s knowledge and it was sufficiently probable that he had been affected. Second, referring to CJEU C‑40/17 concerning the broad interpretation of “controller”, the court held that the controller was a joint controller under Articles 4(7) and 26 GDPR for the collection and transmission of the personal data. It controlled the programming of the Business Tools and participated in determining the purposes and means of processing. Allocating certain obligations to third-party website and app operators did not remove its responsibility. Third, referring to CJEU C‑252/21, the court held that the controller had not established a lawful basis for the processing of the personal data. The processing was not justified by consent under Article 6(1)(a), contractual necessity under Article 6(1)(b), a legal obligation under Article 6(1)(c), a public-interest task under Article 6(1)(e), or legitimate interests under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR. Accordingly, the court held that the controller's processing infringed Articles 5(1)(a), 5(1)(b), 5(1)(c) and 6 GDPR. Relying on CJEU C‑655/23, the court granted an injunction against future unlawful processing under German law. It also ordered restriction pending erasure under Article 18(1)(b) and erasure under Article 17(1)(d) GDPR. The court upheld the dismissal of the separate declaratory claim and also rejected anonymization of the website and app interaction data. Finally, relying on BGH VI ZR 10/24, the court awarded €1,500 in non-material damages under Article 82(1) GDPR for the data subject’s loss of control over his personal data.

### SO Warszawa - III C 904/23

*Source: Regional Court in Warsaw, 2026-02-16 — https://overview.legal/posts/53100 — original: https://gdprhub.eu/index.php?title=SO_Warszawa_-_III_C_904/23*

Facts — The Financial Ombudsman’s office (the controller) sent a letter containing the name, the address, and the case reference number of a customer (the data subject) to 28,366 public institutions and entities registered on an official government platform in February 2021. The data subject demanded compensation for the unauthorised disclosure of his personal data from the controller in November 2021. The controller refused to accept liability for the incident. The supervisory authority issued the controller a reprimand in September 2022 for disclosure of personal data in violation of Article 6(1) GDPR. The data subject brought a lawsuit for damages under Article 82 GDPR before the Regional Court in Warsaw in August 2023. The data subject stated that they had experienced severe stress and lost the sense of security and control over their data as a result of the unauthorised disclosure of the letter. The controller argued it was not at fault for the incident as it was caused by a temporary IT system failure that the controller could not have foreseen. Holding — The Regional Court in Warsaw held that the controller was undoubtedly liable for the unauthorised disclosure of the data subject’s personal data pursuant to Article 82 GDPR: the controller was an administrator for the government platform and had not taken adequate measures to secure the data. Second, the court held that the data subject had suffered non-material damage in connection with the aforementioned incident. It took into account that the data had been disclosed to numerous entities. In addition, the deterioration of the data subject’s mental state was confirmed by a witness. The court awarded the data subject PLN 40,000 in damages. It considered the data subject’s claim of PLN 50,000 to be excessive in light of established case law.

### French Supreme Court upholds €8M CNIL fine against Apple for App Store ad tracking

*Source: Supreme Administrative Court, 2025-10-10 — https://overview.legal/posts/122852 — original: https://gdprhub.eu/index.php?title=CE_-_473833*

Facts — The DPA imposed an €8 million administrative fine on Apple (the controller) in 2022 (CNIL - SAN-2022-025). The DPA found that Apple used identifiers stored on users’ devices to enable personalized advertising in the App Store without first obtaining valid user consent, as required by Article 82 of the French Data Protection Act, which implements Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy Directive. Apple challenged the sanction before the Supreme Administrative Court (Conseil d’État), arguing that the DPA lacked jurisdiction, that the investigation violated Apple’s procedural rights, that the advertising-related processing did not fall within the scope of Article 82, and that the case should be referred to the Court of Justice of the EU. Apple also claimed that the fine was disproportionate. Holding — The court held that reading identifiers stored on user devices for the purpose of delivering personalised advertising constitutes access to information under Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy Directive, requiring the controller to obtain the user’s prior consent. It reasoned that since this operation was to implement personalized advertising it could not fall within the exemptions to the consent requirement. The court found that the national authority was competent because the controller’s establishment within the country contributed to the advertising operations in question. It did so by marketing devices pre-equipped with the App Store where personalized advertising appears and by providing Search Ads Specialists who helped monetize and optimize that advertising space. It also rejected the controller’s claim that the authority had violated its procedural rights, finding that the right to remain silent did not apply during CNIL investigations and that the authority had lawfully carried out the investigation providing sufficient opportunity for the controller to respond. Additionally, the court rejected Apple's request to reference the case to the Court of Justice of the EU stating that there wasn't any reasonable doubt Finally, it held that the €8 million fine was proportionate, noting the scale of the processing, the number of affected users, and the economic significance of the advertising activity.

### VB v Natsionalna agentsia za prihodite

*Source: CJEU, C-340/21, 2023-12-14 — https://overview.legal/posts/51485 — original: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62021CJ0340*

Data breach alone does not establish inadequate security measures. Burden on controller to prove adequacy.

### Judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber, Extended Composition) of 26 April 2023.#Single Resolution Board v European Data Protection Supervisor.#Protection of personal data – Procedure for granting compensation to shareholders and creditors following the resolution of a bank – Decision of the EDPS in which it found that the SRB failed to fulfil its obligations concerning the processing of personal data – Article 15(1)(d) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 – Concept of personal data – Article 3(1)

*Source: General Court, T-557/20, 2023-04-26 — https://overview.legal/posts/132290 — original: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62020TJ0557*

The Single Resolution Board (SRB) challenged a revised decision by the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) which found that the SRB failed to fulfil its obligations regarding the processing of personal data during a right-to-be-heard process for shareholders and creditors affected by the resolution of Banco Popular Español. The General Court addressed the scope of personal data and the right of access under Articles 3(1) and 15(1)(d) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725, focusing on whether certain information collected during the compensation procedure qualified as personal data. The court ultimately annulled the EDPS's decision, finding that the EDPS erred in its interpretation of the applicable provisions.

### CE - 449209

*Source: CE, 2022-01-28 — https://overview.legal/posts/122847 — original: https://gdprhub.eu/index.php?title=CE_-_449209*

Facts — On 7 December 2020, the French DPA (CNIL) imposed two fines totaling € 100 million on Google LLC and Google Ireland Ltd for violating Article 82 of the French Data Protection Act (which transposes the ePrivacy Directive). Google (1) had not obtained the user’s consent before depositing advertising cookies in the user’s terminal equipment, (2) had lacked to provide information, and (3) had not implemented a mechanism to refuse the cookies. Google did not agree with the CNIL’s decision and brought the issue before court. First, it claimed that, since there is cross-border processing, the Irish DPA (DPC) is the lead supervisory authority since Google’s main establishment in the EU is in Ireland, and the CNIL therefore did not have competence to rule on this matter according to the one-stop-shop mechanism. Second, it found the fine to be disproportionate. Hence, it requested the Council of State to annul the decision, and to refer two preliminary questions to the CJEU, asking: (1) whether the one-stop-shop mechanism provided for in Article 56 GDPR is excluded in the context of cross-border processing that falls within the scope of both the ePrivacy Directive and the GDPR, and (2) whether Article 15a ePrivacy Directive violates the right to data protection because does not provide an obligation, but rather an option, “for the competent national regulatory authorities to adopt measures to ensure effective cross-border cooperation in the enforcement of national laws adopted pursuant to the directive and to create harmonised conditions for the provision of services involving cross-border data flows”. Holding — The Council of State rejected Google’s appeal. First, according to the Council, the ePrivacy Directive, implemented in the French Data Protection Act, does not provide for the application of the one-stop-shop mechanism as mentioned in Article 56 GDPR. Although the requirements for consent are regulated by the GDPR the deposit of cookies is regulated by the ePrivacy Directive. Hence, even if cross-border processing takes place, the CNIL is competent to monitor compliance with the objectives of such Directive. The Council then notes that “it follows that, as regards the control of the operations of access and recording of information in the terminals of users in France of an electronic communications service, even if they are the result of cross-border processing, the measures to monitor the application of the provisions transposing the objectives of Directive 2002/58/EC fall within the competence conferred on the CNIL by the Law of 6 January 1978.” The Council stipulated that there is no need to refer preliminary questions to the CJEU, because it had no doubt as to whether the one-stop-shop mechanism should be excluded in the context of cookies. Second, the Council rejected Google’s argument that their right of defense had been infringed by the CNIL because they did not provide a prior formal notice, since it is not required to provide such a formal notice before imposing a sanction. Third, on the substance of the matter, the Council confirmed the three violations of Article 82 of the Data Protection Act: (1) not obtaining the user’s consent before depositing advertising cookies in the user’s terminal equipment, (2) not providing clear information on the deposit of cookies, and (3) not implementing a mechanism to refuse the cookies. Lastly, the Council stated that the fines were not disproportionate in light of the financial capacities of the “two” companies. It considered Google’s market share of more than 90% with (an estimated) 47 million users in France and the large profits that follow from the targeted online advertisement. Moreover, it stated that Google did not genuinely cooperated with the CNIL since it did not provide advertising revenues, and the breaches were serious.

### BUNDESVERBAND DER VERBRAUCHERZENTRALEN UND VERBRAUCHERVERBANDE —BERBRAUCHERZENTRALE BUNDESVERBAND V. PLANET49 GmbH (“PLANET49”)

*Source: CJEU, ECLI:EU:C:2019:801-119, 2019-10-01 — https://overview.legal/posts/6124 — original: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62017CJ0673&ref=6124*

Cookie data is personal data where the cookies likely to be placed on the terminal equipment of a user participating in the promotional lottery contained a number assigned to the registration data of that user (who must enter his/her name+address in the registration form.) By linking that number with that data, a connection between a person and the data stored by the cookies arises. Therefore, the data is not anonymous data. (¶45)

### Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen v Planet49 GmbH

*Source: CJEU, C-673/17, 2019-10-01 — https://overview.legal/posts/51473 — original: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62017CJ0673&ref=51473*

Pre-ticked checkboxes do not constitute valid consent. Consent must be active.

### CE - 451423

*Source: Supreme Administrative Court, 2022-06-27 — https://overview.legal/posts/108993 — original: https://gdprhub.eu/index.php?title=CE_-_451423*

Facts — The French DPA had received a complaint on 28 May 2018 regarding the lawfulness of processing by Amazon Europe Core ('Provider' or 'The company'). The French DPA had forwarded this complaint to the Luxembourg DPA under the 'one stop shop' mechanism of Article 56 GDPR. The luxembourg DPA started an investigation regarding Amazon's use of cookies and its compliance with the GDPR and the ePrivacy directive. However, the French DPA started its own investigation into Amazon's compliance with Article 82 of the French Data protection act, a national implementation of Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy directive. (directive 2002/58/EC). This investigation regarding Article 82 had resulted in decision SAN-2020-013. In this decision, the French DPA fined Amazon €35,000,000 for the failure to obtain prior consent and the failure to inform users of their rights with regards to the processing of their data, which was mandatory under Article 82 of the Data Protection Act. The DPA found that when a user visited the "Amazon.fr" site, a large number of cookies with advertising purposes were automatically placed on the data subjects computer. Because this type of cookie was not essential to the service provided by the controller, the DPA considered that the controller had not complied with the obligation to obtain the consent of Internet users before depositing the cookies. Amazon appealed this decision at the Conseil d'Etat, the French Supreme Administrative Court, and requested its annulment. Amazon also asked the Conseil to refer several questions to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling. Among other arguments, Amazon claimed that the French DPA had made an incorrect interpretation of the law regarding its competence and had disregarded its competence by imposing the contested sanction. The controller also stated that the involvement of the French DPA, when the Luxembourg DPA was already involved, constituted a violation of Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. According to this article, the same person may not be prosecuted more than once for the same acts. Holding — With regard to the application of the "one-stop shop" mechanism and the CNIL's jurisdiction: The Conseil ruled that the application and enforcement of the ePrivacy directive was the responsibility of national DPAs according to Article 15a of the directive. The "one-stop shop" mechanism did not apply in this case, even when there was a form of a cross-border processing. The Conseil also stated that the absence of a 'one-stop shop' mechanism did not imply any infringement of Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, because the DPA only ruled on breaches of national law transposing EU law in the contested decision, and not on GDPR related violations. The Conseil also assessed the compatibility of Article 3 of the French Data protection Act with the ePrivacy Directive. The Conseil determined that Directive 2002/58/EC did not prevent the French DPA to apply the French data protection Act (including Article 82). The Directive would therefore also not prevent the French DPA from penalising the controller for supposed violations of Article 82 of the French data protection Act. Therefore, the Conseil established that the French DPA could enforce the French data protection act against any person or legal entity responsible for the processing of data who had an establishment in France, irrespective of the location of the principal establishment of the responsible entity. This enforcement by the DPA would also not constitute violations of articles 49 (Freedom of establishment) or 56 (Freedom to provide services) of the TFEU. With regard to the sanction imposed by the CNIL: The Conseil deemed that the applicant was sufficiently informed regarding the scope of the DPA's investigations, the facts and the legal grounds on which the sanction was based. Moreover, the Conseil considered that the applicant was given sufficient time to present its defence. The Conseil also ruled that the involvement of the French DPA, while the Luxembourg DPA was the lead supervisory authority, was not enough to constitute a breach of the equality of arms principle. Amazon had argued that the involvement of the French DPA in the procedure had enabled the French DPA to gain access to privileged and confidential information and had used this information as a basis for its own decision. The Conseil determined that Amazon did not provide enough proof for this argument and stated that Amazon was not able to prove that was the procedure contrary to Article 15a(4) of Directive 2002/58/EC. On a possible violation of Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights: The Conseil explained, based on the CJEU's case law (Aklagaren v Akerberg Fransson C-617/10, Powszechny Zaklad Ubezpieczen na Zycie SA of C-617/17 and bpost SA v Belgian Competition Authority C-117/20), that the principle invoked by the applicant, that the same person may not be the subject of several proceeding in respect of the same facts, was not violated by the French DPA. The Conseil stated that the principle could only be enforced when criminal proceedings had been definitively terminated. This was in particular the case when a criminal penalty had become final. The Conseil held that Amazon was not found to be the subject of a final sanction issued by the Luxembourg DPA for the facts that had resulted in the €35,000,000 fine in the contested decision. The Conseil rejected the applicant's claim for a reference for a preliminary ruling on the matter. Regarding the application of French Data Protection Act by the French DPA, Amazon had argued that the legal framework regarding cookies was not stable and unclear at the time when proceedings against Amazon were started. The Conseil concluded that it had published guidelines detailing obligations for entities under the applicable law, and considered that the fact that other national supervisory authorities had taken divergent positions in interpreting the conditions and procedures applicable to the collection of user consent had no bearing on the application of the French Data Protection Act by the French DPA. On the proportionality of the sanction imposed: Taking into account the elements assessed by the French DPA to calculate the imposed fine, the Conseil ruled that the DPA had not imposed a disproportionate penalty on the controller. Consequently, the Conseil rejected the entirety of controller's claims.

### UI v Österreichische Post AG

*Source: CJEU, C-300/21, 2023-05-04 — https://overview.legal/posts/51483 — original: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62021CJ0300*

Right to compensation under GDPR Article 82 requires proof of actual damage.

## Guidance

### Art. 29 WP Guidelines on GDPR transparency requirements (WP260 rev.01)

*Source: EDPB, edpb-guidelines-on-transparency, 2025-11-21 — https://overview.legal/posts/38076 — original: https://www.edpb.europa.eu/system/files/2023-09/wp260rev01_en.pdf*

The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party issued these guidelines (WP260 rev.01), adopted on 29 November 2017 and last revised on 11 April 2018, to provide interpretive and practical guidance on the transparency requirements under the GDPR (Articles 12–14). The document addresses the form, timing, content, and modalities of information provided to data subjects, including issues such as plain language, layered privacy notices, information for children, and exceptions to the obligation to provide information. No fines or enforcement actions are imposed, as this is a guidance document rather than an enforcement decision.

### Opinion 28/2024 on certain data protection aspects related to the processing of personal data in the context of AI models

*Source: EDPB, opinion-282024-on-certain-data-protection-aspects-related-to-en, 2024-12-18 — https://overview.legal/posts/125697 — original: https://www.edpb.europa.eu/documents/opinion-of-the-board-art-64/opinion-282024-on-certain-data-protection-aspects-related-to_en*

Adopted 1 Opinion 28/2024 on certain data protection aspects related to the processing of personal data in the context of AI models Adopted on 17 December 2024 Adopted 2 Executive summary AI technologies create many opportunities and benefits across a wide range of sectors and social activities. By protecting the fundamental right to data protection, GDPR supports these opportunities and promotes other EU fundamental rights, including the right to freedom of thought, expression and information,…

### Report of the work undertaken by the supervisory authorities within the 101 Taskforce

*Source: EDPB, report-of-the-work-undertaken-by-the-supervisory-authorities-within-the-en, 2023-04-19 — https://overview.legal/posts/125859 — original: https://www.edpb.europa.eu/documents/task-force-report/report-of-the-work-undertaken-by-the-supervisory-authorities-within-the_en*

Final 1 Report of the work undertaken by the supervisory authorities within the 101 Task Force 28 March 2023 Final 2 Final 3 DISCLAIMER The EDPB created the 101 Task Force to promote cooperation and effective exchange of information between the Supervisory Authorities on this specific subject-matter, in accordance with Article 70(1)(u) GDPR. The positions presented in this document result from the coordination of the Supervisory Authorities taking part in the task force with a view to handling…

### Guidelines 01/2022 on data subject rights - Right of access

*Source: EDPB, edpb-guidelines-on-data-subject-rights---right-of-access, 2023-04-17 — https://overview.legal/posts/38055 — original: https://www.edpb.europa.eu/documents/guideline/guidelines-012022-on-data-subject-rights-right-of-access_en*

The right of access of data subjects is enshrined in Art. 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. It has been a part of the European data protection legal framework since its beginning and is now further developed by more specified and precise rules in Art. 15 GDPR.

### Guidelines 01/2020 on processing personal data in the context of connected vehicles and mobility related applications

*Source: EDPB, guidelines-012020-on-processing-personal-data-in-the-context-of-connected-en, 2021-03-09 — https://overview.legal/posts/126056 — original: https://www.edpb.europa.eu/documents/guideline/guidelines-012020-on-processing-personal-data-in-the-context-of-connected_en*

Adopted 1 Guidelines 0 1 / 2020 on processing personal data in the context of connected vehicles and mobility related applications Version 2 .0 Adopted on 9 March 2021 Adopted 2 Version h istory Version 2.0 9 March 2021 Adoption of the Guidelines after public consultation Version 1.0 2 8 January 2020 Adoption of the Guidelines for public consultation Adopted 3 Adopted 4 The European Data Protection Board Having regard to Article 70 (1 ) ( e) of the Regulation 2016/679/EU of the European…

### EDPB Document on response to the request from the European Commission for clarifications on the consistent application of the GDPR, focusing on health research

*Source: EDPB, edpb-document-on-response-to-the-request-from-the-european-commission-for-en, 2021-02-02 — https://overview.legal/posts/126069 — original: https://www.edpb.europa.eu/documents/other-guidance/edpb-document-on-response-to-the-request-from-the-european-commission-for_en*

EDPB Document on r esponse to the request from the European Commission for clarifications on the consistent application of the GDPR, focusing on health research Adopted on 2 February 2021 2 Adopted 3 Adopted The European Data Protection Board Having regard to Article 70.1.b of the Regulation 2016/679/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and…

### Guidelines 03/2020 on the processing of data concerning health for the purpose of scientific research in the context of the COVID-19 outbreak

*Source: EDPB, guidelines-032020-on-the-processing-of-data-concerning-health-for-the-purpose-en, 2020-04-21 — https://overview.legal/posts/126170 — original: https://www.edpb.europa.eu/documents/guideline/guidelines-032020-on-the-processing-of-data-concerning-health-for-the-purpose_en*

Adopted 1 Guidelines 03 /2020 on the processing of data concerning health for the purpose of scientific research in the context of the COVID - 19 outbreak Adopted on 21 April 2020 Adopted 2 Version history Version 1.1 30 April 2020 Minor corrections Version 1. 0 21 April 2020 Adoption of the Guidelines Adopted 3 Adopted 4 The European Data Protection Board Having regard to Article 70 (1) (e) of the Regulation 2016/679/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the…

### Guidelines 1/2020 on processing personal data in the context of connected vehicles and mobility related applications

*Source: EDPB, edpb-guidelines-on-processing-personal-data-in-the-context-of-connected-vehicles-and-mobility-rel, 2020-01-01 — https://overview.legal/posts/38135*

The EDPB adopted Guidelines 1/2020 to provide guidance on the application of the GDPR to the processing of personal data in connected vehicles and mobility-related applications. The guidelines address key issues including data minimisation, data protection by design and by default, transparency obligations, data subjects' rights, security, third-party data sharing, and international transfers, with practical case studies covering services provided by third parties, eCall, accidentology, anti-theft measures, and rental car information. The document does not impose fines but offers recommendations to help controllers and processors in the automotive ecosystem comply with their GDPR obligations.

## Enforcement decisions

### APDCAT sanctions Madremanya City Council for exposing applicants' sensitive data in tender

*Source: APDCAT (Catalonia), 2026-07-17 — https://overview.legal/posts/184715 — original: https://gdprhub.eu/index.php?title=APDCAT_(Catalonia)_-_PS-0036/2026*

Facts — On 8 May 2025, Madremanya City Council, acting as controller, published on its notice board two administrative acts concerning a tender procedure for the award of a social housing lease. The documents expressly disclosed the identities of the applicants. On 9 May 2025, the controller replaced the original documents with revised versions in which the applicants’ names and surnames were partially redacted, leaving only their initials visible. However, the redaction was performed manually and did not effectively conceal the information, as it remained possible to infer the length of the names and surnames and to identify some of their letters. In addition to the applicants’ identifying information, the documents disclosed detailed financial data, including the exact annual net income of each household. They also revealed information concerning particularly sensitive personal circumstances, including dependency, gender-based violence and addiction, which had been used to calculate the applicants’ respective scores. No adequate anonymisation or redaction measures had been implemented. In July and November 2025, the DPA requested that the controller provide specific information concerning certain aspects of the processing. The controller’s failure to respond or cooperate hindered the DPA’s ability to exercise its investigative powers. Holding — The DPA held that the controller violated Article 5(1)(c) GDPR by publishing personal data that were not necessary for the purpose pursued. The DPA acknowledged that publishing information about the procedure could serve the objective of administrative transparency. However, transparency did not justify disclosing identifying data together with detailed financial information and sensitive personal or family circumstances. The controller had to limit the processing to data that were necessary and proportionate to that objective and consider less intrusive alternatives. The DPA found that the controller’s subsequent redaction did not amount to effective anonymisation. Although most of the characters had been concealed, the applicants could still potentially be reidentified from their initials, the length of their names and surnames and other contextual information. This risk was particularly significant because the municipality had only 277 inhabitants. The controller should therefore have applied complete anonymisation or a pseudonymisation method preventing direct or indirect identification. The DPA also held that the controller violated Article 5(1)(f) GDPR and the duty of confidentiality under Article 5 LOPDGDD. The published documents disclosed the applicants’ exact household income, household composition and scores linked to circumstances such as dependency, addiction, gender-based violence, single-parent status and age. Although this information was relevant to assessing the applications, it was unnecessary to make it publicly accessible in a form linked to identifiable individuals. The DPA considered that the violations of the data-minimisation and confidentiality principles constituted a medial concurrence of infringements. The failure to anonymise the applicants’ identities was the necessary means through which their sensitive personal and family circumstances were disclosed. Nevertheless, the DPA formally declared separate violations of Articles 5(1)(c) and 5(1)(f) GDPR. Additionally, the DPA held that the controller violated Article 31 GDPR by failing to respond to two information requests. This failure breached the controller’s duty to cooperate with the supervisory authority and obstructed the exercise of the DPA’s investigative powers.

### KEPIDES: Insufficient technical and organisational measures to ensure information security

*Source: Cypriot Data Protection Commissioner, 2021-03-03 — https://overview.legal/posts/46695 — original: https://www.enforcementtracker.com/ETid-580*

The Cypriot DPA imposed a fine of EUR 6,000 against KEPIDES (real estate company). The controller had submitted a list of buyers of the properties it manages to a parliamentary committee. However, the controller had failed to anonymize the list, as a result of which the names of the data subjects were transmitted.

### EU DisinfoLab: Non-compliance with general data processing principles

*Source: Belgian Data Protection Authority (APD), 2022-01-27 — https://overview.legal/posts/47138 — original: https://www.enforcementtracker.com/ETid-1023*

The Belgian DPA has fined the NGO EU DisinfoLab EUR 2,700. In 2018, the NGO published an analysis to identify the possible political origin of tweets circulating on a particularly heated controversy in France, the 'Benalla affair.' For the analysis, the organization had processed the data of 55,000 Twitter accounts, of which more than 3,300 had been classified as political. The raw data obtained from this was then published without taking minimal security precautions, such as pseudonymizing the

### Italian DPA finds GDPR applies to US-based Character.AI service

*Source: Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy), 2026-07-03 — https://overview.legal/posts/108999 — original: https://gdprhub.eu/index.php?title=Garante_per_la_protezione_dei_dati_personali_(Italy)_-_487/2026*

Facts — Character Technologies, Inc (the controller) is a company established in the US that operates the site Character.AI. Character.AI is a generative AI service that allows users to create and interact through chat with virtual characters that already exist or are created at the moment. The controller made this available to data subjects in Italian, and had a specific version for children. The DPA initiated an ex-officio investigation in 2024. The DPA requested information related to the LLM models used by the controller, the provision of the service, and data transfers. The controller provided a DPIA, and stated that it introduced an age verification system that required data subjects to register their date of birth. In 2025, the controller announced it would prevent underage data subjects from accessing open chat rooms, and would begin processing personal data of data subjects in the EEA to post-train its generative AI systems. Holding — The DPA first clarified that the GDPR is applicable even if the controller was established outside of the EU, in accordance with Article 3(2) GDPR. The DPA took into account the fact that the service was available in Italy and in Italian, as well as the privacy policy also applying to EEA residents. Given that the controller did not have an establishment in the EU, the one-stop-shop mechanism did not apply and the DPA was competent. The DPA found a violation of Articles 12(1), 13(1) and (2), and 14(1) and (2) GDPR. The DPA considered that the controller had failed to meet its information obligations. In terms of the controller’s privacy policy, the DPA considered that the controller had not provided data subjects’ with clear information regarding its processing activities, data transfers, or data subjects’ right to object and opt out. In addition, the controller failed to designate a representative in the EU, and included misleading and inaccurate statements on the processing of personal data for purposes of post-training LLMs for the service. However, the DPA also took into consideration that the controller had updated its privacy policy to make its language clearer. In terms of its pre-training activities, the DPA stated that the controller had failed to provide adequate information and therefore violated Articles 14(1) and (2) GDPR. The DPA dismissed the controller’s argument that it did not have the obligation to provide this information due to the data being collected by third parties from open sources. The DPA stated that the controller had the obligation to verify whether personal data was present. In addition, the exemption under Article 14(5)(b) GDPR does not exempt the controller from having the obligation to implement appropriate measures to protect data subjects’ rights. However, the DPA did not find a violation of Articles 21(1) and (4). The DPA referred to the EDPB opinion on processing personal data in relation to AI systems. The EDPB recommended controllers to adopt measures for data subjects to exercise their rights, including providing the option to provide data subjects with the option to object unconditionally before the processing takes place. The DPA considered that this opinion went beyond the literal wording of Articles 14 and 21 GDPR. This interpretation could not, in the DPA’s view, be interpreted retroactively to the controller’s processing activities. The DPA found a violation of Articles 24(1) and 25(2) GDPR. The DPA considered that the controller had failed to implement adequate technical and organisational measures to verify data subjects’ age. During its investigations, the DPA found that the controller’s age verification systems were not effective, as they allowed data subjects’ to access the service even after self declaring to be younger than the minimum age limit set by the controller. The DPA also found that the accounts were set to public by default. Therefore, the controller had failed to implement appropriate measures to protect underage data subjects, even if the GDPR does not set a harmonised and binding standard in relation to age verification. The DPA also found a violation of Articles 5(2) and 35 GDPR. Under Article 5(2) GDPR, the controller has the obligation to proactively demonstrate compliance with the GDPR. The DPA stated that a key tool to do this is through data protection impact assessments (DPIAs). Controllers are obliged to carry out a DPIA under Article 35 GDPR if the processing is likely to result in a high to the rights and freedoms of data subjects. The controller failed to do a DPIA on time in relation to providing the service to underage data subjects, as well as in relation to its processing activities for the purpose of pre-training its LLM. The DPA stated that the controller should have done this before launching the service in 2022, as the processing activities had a presumed high risk to freedoms and rights of data subjects (e.g. the use of large scale processing or processing data of vulnerable data subjects). However, the DPA acknowledged that the controller progressively improved its compliance by doing a (late) DPIA and updating it. Finally, the DPA found a violation of Article 27(1) GDPR, as the controller belatedly designated a representative in the EU. The DPA stated that the exemption under Article 27(2) GDPR did not apply. The DPA fined the controller €158,000. The DPA also ordered the controller to bring its privacy policy and storage of personal data for purposes of pre-training its LLM into compliance with the GDPR. The DPA also ordered the controller to implement effective age verification mechanisms.

### Cluster S.r.l.: Non-compliance with general data processing principles

*Source: Italian Data Protection Authority (Garante), 2023-11-16 — https://overview.legal/posts/48280 — original: https://www.enforcementtracker.com/ETid-2165*

The Italian DPA imposed a fine of EUR 18,000 on Cluster S-r.l. A data subject had complained to the DPA because their son's health-related data and their own personal data had been published on the internet. The controller had organized a medical training event at which documents containing personal data of the data subject and their deceased son were forwarded to the participants without sufficient anonymization. Some documents were later published on the internet by a third party.

### Private individual: Insufficient legal basis for data processing

*Source: Italian Data Protection Authority (Garante), 2022-11-24 — https://overview.legal/posts/47752 — original: https://www.enforcementtracker.com/ETid-1637*

The Italian DPA has imposed a fine of EUR 1,000 on a private individual. Two individuals had filed a complaint with the DPA due to the fact that the controller had published personal data of them and their families in their dissertation. The individuals had participated in treatments conducted by the controller, but they had not consented to the publication of their data in the dissertation in an unanonymized form.

### Romanian Post National Company: Insufficient technical and organisational measures to ensure information security

*Source: Romanian National Supervisory Authority for Personal Data Processing (ANSPDCP), 2020-07-30 — https://overview.legal/posts/46474 — original: https://www.enforcementtracker.com/ETid-359*

Processing of personal data, namely the telephone numbers and e-mail addresses of 81 data subjects, by the Romanian Post as data controller, failing appropriate technical and organisational measures, such as pseudonymisation.

### Property Owner Community: Non-compliance with general data processing principles

*Source: Spanish Data Protection Authority (aepd), 2022-01-21 — https://overview.legal/posts/47123 — original: https://www.enforcementtracker.com/ETid-1008*

The Spanish DPA (AEPD) has fined a property owners' community EUR 1,200. A property manager had sent a copy of the general meeting minutes to the director of the security company 'CMM Seguridad'. The document the said document contains the names and addresses of residents, a list of defaulters and the accounts with all income and expenses of the community. According to the controller, the purpose of sending the minutes in question to the security company was to inform them about the members of t

## Recent developments

### EDPB komt met 3 nieuwe guidelines over scraping, anonimiseren en blockchain

*Source: Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens, 2026-07-15 — https://overview.legal/posts/108981 — original: https://autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/actueel/edpb-komt-met-3-nieuwe-guidelines-over-scraping-anonimiseren-en-blockchain*

De European Data Protection Board (EDPB) heeft 3 guidelines gepubliceerd. Het gaat om guidelines voor het scrapen (automatisch verzamelen) van data voor het trainen van generatieve artificiële intelligentie (AI), voor het anonimiseren van data en voor het gebruik van blockchaintechnologie.

### EDPB sheds light on anonymisation and web scraping for generative AI and adopts final version of guidelines on blockchain

*Source: European Data Protection Board, 2026-07-08 — https://overview.legal/posts/53905 — original: https://www.edpb.europa.eu/news/edpb-sheds-light-on-anonymisation-and-web-scraping-for-generative-ai-and-adopts-final-version_en*

Brussels, 8 July– During its latest plenary, the EDPB has adopted guidelines on anonymisation and guidelines on web scraping in the context of generative AI. In addition, the Board has adopted the final version of its guidelines on the processing of personal data through blockchain technologies.Understanding anonymous dataThe new EDPB guidelines bring clarity to the notion of anonymous data, taking also into account the ruling of the Court of Justice of the EU in the case C-413/23 P EDPS v SRB o

### De Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens publiceert richtlijnen voor anonimisering.

*Source: IAPP, 2023-02-24 — https://overview.legal/posts/51775*

De Spaanse autoriteit voor gegevensbescherming, de Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, heeft richtlijnen gepubliceerd over het anonimiseren van gegevens. Deze richtlijnen stellen dat een getrainde professional de anonimisering van een dataset met persoonlijke gegevens moet uitvoeren, en dat deze professional ook ervaring moet hebben met pogingen tot heridentificatie. Hoewel er altijd een "resterend risico" bestaat dat gegevens opnieuw geïdentificeerd kunnen worden, moet de verantwoordelijke voor de gegevensverwerking verantwoordelijkheid nemen voor het anonimiseringsproces en "geschikte maatregelen treffen om te zorgen voor naleving, rekening houdend met..."

### AEPD issues guidance for anonymization

*Source: IAPP, 2023-02-24 — https://overview.legal/posts/6238 — original: https://iapp.org/news/a/aepd-issues-guidance-for-anonymization#entry-3947*

> 
																						Spain’s data protection authority, the Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, published guidance for anonymizing data. The guidance called for a trained professional to handle the anonymization of a personal data set who also has experience in reidentification attacks. Even though “residual probability” of reidentification will always exist, a data controller must apply accountability to the anonymization process “with appropriate measures to ensure compliance taking i

### User:Nata

*Source: GDPRhub, 2026-07-08 — https://overview.legal/posts/53907 — original: https://gdprhub.eu/index.php?title=User:Nata*

I am Nathalie Pangalos, an Applied Data Science student at the Universitat Oberta de Catalunya (UOC), based in Tenerife, Spain. My focus is data protection and privacy engineering: pseudonymisation, re-identification risk, and anonymisation techniques, which I document in my portfolio. IAPP Student Member, currently preparing for the CIPP/EU certification. Signed up as Country Reporter for the Spanish channel in April 2026, covering AEPD and Spanish court decisions. Co..." New pageI am Nathalie

## Literature

### Anonymization in healthcare AI under GDPR: measurable privacy protection and global implications

*Source: International Data Privacy Law, 2026-02-19 — https://overview.legal/posts/132528 — original: https://doi.org/10.1093/idpl/ipag002*

Abstract Healthcare AI depends on high-dimensional, sensitive data from clinical records, imaging, genomics and wearables, creating heightened risks of identifiability that require rigorous anonymization. We present a practice-oriented approach to operationalize anonymization as measurable reductions in singling out, linkability, and inference under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), aligned with the European Union Artificial Intelligence Act (EU AI Act). The synthesis integrates reg

### Does de-identification require consent under the GDPR and English common law?

*Source: Journal of Data Protection Privacy, 2020-06-01 — https://overview.legal/posts/132522 — original: https://doi.org/10.69554/wzzy1745*

Data de-identification has many benefits in the context of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). One of the recurring questions is whether consent is required to anonymise or de-identify data. In this paper, the authors make the case that no consent is required for anonymisation or other forms of de-identification under the GDPR, although additional conditions have to be met where special category data is anonymised. Further, under the English equitable duty of confidentiality, consent

### POJAM OSOBNOG PODATKA U TUMAČENJU SUDA EUROPSKE UNIJE

*Source: Zbornik radova. Aktualnosti građanskog i trgovačkog zakonodavstva i pravne prakse, 2026-07-06 — https://overview.legal/posts/83510 — original: https://doi.org/10.47960/2744-2918.23.2026.281*

U radu se istražuje evolucija pojma osobnih podataka u kontekstu pseudonimizacije kroz analizu recentne sudske prakse i regulatornih smjernica. Središnji dio rada fokusiran je na presudu Suda Europske Unije u predmetu EDPS protiv SRB, kojom se potvrđuje kontinuitet relativnog poimanja pojma osobnog podatka u kontekstu provođenja postupka pseudonimizacije osobnih podataka. Hoće li se određeni podatak smatrati osobnim ovisi, tako, o tome tko podatak obrađuje i raspolaže li i kojim dodatnim informa

### If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it? Ten improvements for the upcoming tenth anniversary of the General Data Protection Regulation

*Source: Computer law & security review, 2026-01-23 — https://overview.legal/posts/53843 — original: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.clsr.2025.106251*

As the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) approaches its tenth anniversary, the European legislator is considering reforms thereto. This article offers a set of research-based suggestions for what such reforms could look like, based on two assumptions. First, that the GDPR is overall a solid piece of legislation that upholds the enduring objectives and principles of data protection law. Second, that any improvement cannot compromise the level of protection of fundamental rights currently

### The data subject’s right to access to information under GDPR and the right of the data controller to protect its know-how

*Source: Przegląd Prawniczy Uniwersytetu im. Adam Mickiewicza, 2023-12-30 — https://overview.legal/posts/132546 — original: https://doi.org/10.14746/ppuam.2023.15.09*

The data subject’s right to access information on data processing has a very broad meaning. Considering the latest developments in this field (mainly the CJEU ruling on Austrian posts and EDPB guidelines) one can draw the conclusion that the controller’s right to protect its confidential in-formation is limited and less valuable than the data subject’s rights. However, this may lead to unfair and unequal treatment of companies and data subjects. When looking at this right in a more systematic pe

## Related topics

- **Personal Data** — https://overview.legal/topics/persoonsgegevens
  Information relating to identified or identifiable natural persons
- **Processing** — https://overview.legal/topics/verwerking
  Any operation performed on personal data
- **Anonymization** — https://overview.legal/topics/anonimisering
  Irreversible removal of identifying information from data
- **Controllers** — https://overview.legal/topics/controllers
  Entities that determine purposes and means of processing
- **Security** — https://overview.legal/topics/beveiliging
  Technical and organizational measures to protect personal data
- **Identification** — https://overview.legal/topics/identificatie
  Methods and processes for identifying individuals

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