# Compliance Independence — legal context bundle > Curated from overview.legal on 2026-08-22. Canonical page: https://overview.legal/topics/compliance-function-independence-impartiality > Sources are cited per item. Verify against the official texts before relying on them. DSA compliance functions require independence and impartiality to effectively monitor and enforce compliance. This topic is needed to address the specific requirements for maintaining compliance function independence from operational pressures and conflicts of interest. ## Overview ## Legal Framework Recital 59 of the Digital Services Act (DSA) establishes that out-of-court dispute settlement bodies must possess the requisite independence, means, and expertise to carry out their activities in a fair, swift, and cost-effective manner. Critically, this independence requirement extends beyond the institutional level to the natural persons charged with resolving disputes. Recital 59 expressly mandates that conflict-of-interest rules govern individual decision-makers to ensure impartiality throughout the dispute resolution process. This structural independence requirement operates alongside broader EU law principles concerning conflicts of interest in quasi-regulatory and compliance functions. Under Dutch procurement law, Article 2.87(1)(e) of the Aanbestedingswet 2012 (Aw 2012), read together with Article 1.10b Aw, provides a directly analogous framework: a contracting authority must exclude a candidate where a conflict of interest exists that cannot be effectively remedied. The same logic—separating compliance and decision-making functions from operational or commercial pressures—animates the DSA's independence requirements for internal complaint-handling and dispute resolution mechanisms. ## Key Developments The Gerechtshof Den Haag's decision of 30 June 2026 (cases 200.361.266/01, 200.361.440/01, and 200.361.896/01) illustrates how courts assess conflict-of-interest allegations in practice. The court examined whether a share transaction between entities under common municipal ownership constituted prohibited state aid and, consequently, a conflict of interest under Article 2.87(1)(e) Aw 2012 that should have led to exclusion from a procurement procedure. The court held that the claimant had not sufficiently demonstrated that the transaction involved unlawful state aid affecting the procurement's pricing, and therefore no conflict of interest requiring exclusion was established. The court's reasoning reinforces a demanding evidentiary threshold: a conflict of interest must be substantiated with concrete evidence demonstrating that the conflict actually influenced—or could reasonably have influenced—the decision-making process. Speculative or conclusory allegations of overlapping interests will not suffice. This aligns with the Xafax jurisprudence, which confines challenges to public contracts in appellate proceedings to cases of nullity under Article 3:40 BW on public policy grounds, narrowly circumscribing the circumstances in which conflicts of interest can invalidate contractual outcomes. The Dutch case law on mediation duties further underscores that the obligation to disclose conflicts of interest arises as a statutory obligation the moment a intermediary has any direct or indirect stake in the transaction's completion, shifting the burden to the principal to assess whether the conflict compromises optimal representation. ## Practical Guidance - **Structural separation**: Establish compliance and dispute resolution functions with reporting lines that bypass commercial and operational management, ensuring that staffing, budget, and performance evaluations for compliance personnel are insulated from business-side influence, consistent with the independence mandate in DSA Recital 59. - **Individual conflict-of-interest protocols**: Implement written conflict-of-interest declarations for every natural person involved in dispute resolution or compliance monitoring, requiring disclosure of any direct or indirect financial, familial, or professional interest in the outcome—mirroring the standard articulated in the mediation duty case law. - **Evidentiary documentation**: Maintain contemporaneous records demonstrating that identified conflicts were assessed and either remedied through recusal or mitigated through procedural safeguards, meeting the evidentiary threshold the Gerechtshof Den Haag requires for conflict-of-interest claims. - **Escalation and exclusion triggers**: Define clear criteria for when a conflict cannot be remedied and requires exclusion of the conflicted party or decision-maker, drawing on the Article 2.87(1)(e) Aw 2012 framework as an analog for when remediation is insufficient. - **Periodic independence audits**: Conduct regular reviews of the compliance function's structural and operational independence, documenting that the function possesses adequate resources and expertise as Recital 59 requires, and that no informal reporting dependencies have emerged that could compromise impartiality. ## Legislation (full text of key provisions) ### Recital 99 — independent compliance function for very large online platforms *Source: DSA, dsa-rec-99-en, 2022-10-19 — https://overview.legal/posts/95595* Given the complexity of the functioning of the systems deployed and the systemic risks they present to society, providers of very large online platforms and of very large online search engines should establish a compliance function, which should be independent from the operational functions of those providers. The head of the compliance function should report directly to the management of those providers, including for concerns of non-compliance with this Regulation. The compliance officers that are part of the compliance function should have the necessary qualifications, knowledge, experience and ability to operationalise measures and monitor the compliance with this Regulation within the organisation of the providers of very large online platform or of very large online search engine. Providers of very large online platforms and of very large online search engines should ensure that the compliance function is involved, properly and in a timely manner, in all issues which relate to this Regulation including in the risk assessment and mitigation strategy and specific measures, as well as assessing compliance, where applicable, with commitments made by those providers under the codes of conduct and crisis protocols they subscribe to. ### Recital 59 — certified out-of-court dispute settlement *Source: DSA, dsa-rec-59-en, 2022-10-19 — https://overview.legal/posts/95515* In addition, provision should be made for the possibility of engaging, in good faith, in the out-of-court dispute settlement of such disputes, including those that could not be resolved in a satisfactory manner through the internal complaint-handling systems, by certified bodies that have the requisite independence, means and expertise to carry out their activities in a fair, swift and cost-effective manner. The independence of the out-of-court dispute settlement bodies should be ensured also at the level of the natural persons in charge of resolving disputes, including through rules on conflict of interest. The fees charged by the out-of-court dispute settlement bodies should be reasonable, accessible, attractive, inexpensive for consumers and proportionate, and assessed on a case-by-case basis. Where an out-of-court dispute settlement body is certified by the competent Digital Services Coordinator, that certification should be valid in all Member States. Providers of online platforms should be able to refuse to engage in out-of-court dispute settlement procedures under this Regulation when the same dispute, in particular as regards the information concerned and the grounds for taking the contested decision, the effects of the decision and the grounds raised for contesting the decision, has already been resolved by or is already subject to an ongoing procedure before the competent court or before another competent out-of-court dispute settlement body. Recipients of the service should be able to choose between the internal complaint mechanism, an out-of-court dispute settlement and the possibility to initiate, at any stage, judicial proceedings. Since the outcome of the out-of-court dispute settlement procedure is not binding, the parties should not be prevented from initiating judicial proceedings in relation to the same dispute. The possibilities to contest decisions of providers of online platforms thus created should leave unaffected in all respects the possibility to seek judicial redress in accordance with the laws of the Member State concerned, and therefore should not affect the exercise of the right to an effective judicial remedy under Article 47 of the Charter. The provisions in this Regulation on out-of-court dispute settlement should not require Member States to establish such out-of-court settlement bodies. ## Recent developments ### Data Protection Officer or Chief Privacy Officer?The rise of the Data Protection Officer *Source: White Label Consultancy, 2022-01-04 — https://overview.legal/posts/6311 — original: https://whitelabelconsultancy.com/2022/01/chief-privacy-officer-or-data-protection-officer/#entry-16* > Do we need an Chief Privacy Officer, a Data Protection Officer, or do we need both?In the following article, I will examine the benefits of both roles, but I will also look at some of the challenges related to each of the roles and why these have impelled both Data Protection Officers and organisations to question what the ideal setup is for them. ## Related topics - **Scientific Panel Independence** — https://overview.legal/topics/scientific-panel-independence-impartiality A specific topic is needed to address the independence and impartiality requirements that are critical for scientific panels to maintain credibility and objecti - **Notified Body Independence** — https://overview.legal/topics/notified-body-independence-impartiality Notified bodies must maintain strict independence and impartiality standards, which are critical operational obligations that warrant a dedicated topic for deta - **Compliance Function Establishment and Role** — https://overview.legal/topics/compliance-function-establishment-role The DSA content specifically addresses compliance functions as organizational entities with defined roles, responsibilities, and governance structures. 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