# Legitimate Interest — legal context bundle

> Curated from overview.legal on 2026-10-13. Canonical page: https://overview.legal/topics/legitimate-interest
> Sources are cited per item. Verify against the official texts before relying on them.

Processing necessary for legitimate interests pursued by controller or third party

## Overview

## Legal Framework

The primary legal basis for legitimate interests processing is [Article 6(1)(f) GDPR](/laws/gdpr/art-6#par-1-pnt-f), which permits processing when it is "necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child." This provision creates a three-part balancing test: a legitimate interest must exist, the processing must be necessary for that interest, and the data subject's rights must not override it. Crucially, Article 6(1)(f) does not apply to processing by public authorities in the performance of their tasks.

Transparency obligations attach directly to this basis. Under [Article 13(1)(d)](/laws/gdpr/art-13#par-1-pnt-d), where data is collected from the subject, the controller must inform them of "the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party." Where data is not obtained from the subject, [Article 14(2)(b)](/laws/gdpr/art-14#par-2-pnt-b) imposes the same disclosure requirement.

## Key Developments

The CJEU has established that the legitimate interests basis imposes three cumulative conditions. In *Valsts policijas Rīgas reģiona pārvaldes Kārtības policijas pārvalde v. Rīgas pašvaldības SIA 'Rīgas satiksme'*, the Court held:

> "Article 7(f) of Directive 95/46 lays down three cumulative conditions so that the processing of personal data is lawful, namely, first, the pursuit of a legitimate interest by the data controller or by the third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed; second, the need to process personal data for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued; and third, that the fundamental rights and freedoms of the person concerned by the data protection do not take precedence."
> — [CJEU, *Rīgas satiksme* ¶28](/posts/5953#seg-28)

The Court also clarified that this provision creates a possibility, not an obligation — controllers have discretion whether to rely on it, but must satisfy all three limbs. In *RYNES*, the CJEU recognised that legitimate interests can include tangible, concrete concerns such as "the protection of the property, health and life of his family and himself," confirming that the concept extends beyond purely commercial interests.

Enforcement actions reinforce the necessity limb. The Italian Garante fined the Calabrian Regional Agency €50,000 over remote-work monitoring, illustrating that vague security justifications fail when less intrusive alternatives exist. The AEPD's intervention against the University of Navarra on vaccination-status collection further shows that legitimate interests cannot override data subject autonomy where consent is the more appropriate basis.

## Status of the Debate

This topic is actively contested in court. The three-part test from *Rīgas satiksme* provides the structural framework, but courts and DPAs diverge on how to calibrate the balancing limb — particularly the weight assigned to data subject rights relative to controller interests in employment, surveillance, and commercial profiling contexts. The EDPB's consent guidance signals that power imbalances (employment, public authority contexts) make legitimate interests harder to sustain, yet the precise boundary between legitimate-interests processing and required consent remains unsettled. What would resolve the open question is CJEU guidance on the proportionality assessment within the third limb — specifically, whether a categorical rule should exclude certain processing types (e.g., employee monitoring) from the legitimate interests basis, or whether the case-by-case approach should prevail.

## Practical Guidance

- **Document a three-part assessment before processing begins**: Identify the specific legitimate interest, demonstrate necessity (no less intrusive alternative), and record the balancing analysis weighing data subject rights against that interest.
- **Be specific in transparency notices**: Under [Article 13(1)(d)](/laws/gdpr/art-13#par-1-pnt-d) and [Article 14(2)(b)](/laws/gdpr/art-14#par-2-pnt-b), articulate the actual interest pursued — not a generic "business operations" statement — so data subjects can understand and, where applicable, object.
- **Avoid legitimate interests where power imbalances exist**: In employment and public-authority contexts, the EDPB's consent guidance and enforcement trends indicate that the balancing test will frequently fail; prefer consent, contract, or legal obligation bases.
- **Consider data subject expectations and vulnerability**: The express reference to children in Article 6(1)(f) signals that the balancing test must account for the data subject's position; processing involving minors or sensitive contexts carries a higher override risk.
- **Re-assess periodically**: The balancing test is not static — changes in processing scope, new case law, or shifts in data subject expectations can tip the balance, requiring renewed justification.

## Legislation (full text of key provisions)

### Lawfulness of processing

*Source: GDPR, gdpr-art-6-en, 2016-04-27 — https://overview.legal/posts/90255*

### Recital 47 — legitimate interests as processing legal basis

*Source: GDPR, gdpr-rec-47-en, 2016-04-27 — https://overview.legal/posts/91609*

The legitimate interests of a controller, including those of a controller to which the personal data may be disclosed, or of a third party, may provide a legal basis for processing, provided that the interests or the fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject are not overriding, taking into consideration the reasonable expectations of data subjects based on their relationship with the controller. Such legitimate interest could exist for example where there is a relevant and appropriate relationship between the data subject and the controller in situations such as where the data subject is a client or in the service of the controller. At any rate the existence of a legitimate interest would need careful assessment including whether a data subject can reasonably expect at the time and in the context of the collection of the personal data that processing for that purpose may take place. The interests and fundamental rights of the data subject could in particular override the interest of the data controller where personal data are processed in circumstances where data subjects do not reasonably expect further processing. Given that it is for the legislator to provide by law for the legal basis for public authorities to process personal data, that legal basis should not apply to the processing by public authorities in the performance of their tasks. The processing of personal data strictly necessary for the purposes of preventing fraud also constitutes a legitimate interest of the data controller concerned. The processing of personal data for direct marketing purposes may be regarded as carried out for a legitimate interest.

### Recital 69 — data subject right to object

*Source: GDPR, gdpr-rec-69-en, 2016-04-27 — https://overview.legal/posts/91653*

Where personal data might lawfully be processed because processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller, or on grounds of the legitimate interests of a controller or a third party, a data subject should, nevertheless, be entitled to object to the processing of any personal data relating to his or her particular situation. It should be for the controller to demonstrate that its compelling legitimate interest overrides the interests or the fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject.

### Recital 49 — network and information security processing

*Source: GDPR, gdpr-rec-49-en, 2016-04-27 — https://overview.legal/posts/91613*

The processing of personal data to the extent strictly necessary and proportionate for the purposes of ensuring network and information security, i.e. the ability of a network or an information system to resist, at a given level of confidence, accidental events or unlawful or malicious actions that compromise the availability, authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of stored or transmitted personal data, and the security of the related services offered by, or accessible via, those networks and systems, by public authorities, by computer emergency response teams (CERTs), computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs), by providers of electronic communications networks and services and by providers of security technologies and services, constitutes a legitimate interest of the data controller concerned. This could, for example, include preventing unauthorised access to electronic communications networks and malicious code distribution and stopping ‘denial of service’ attacks and damage to computer and electronic communication systems.

### Recital 111 — conditional personal data transfer exceptions

*Source: GDPR, gdpr-rec-111-en, 2016-04-27 — https://overview.legal/posts/91737*

Provisions should be made for the possibility for transfers in certain circumstances where the data subject has given his or her explicit consent, where the transfer is occasional and necessary in relation to a contract or a legal claim, regardless of whether in a judicial procedure or whether in an administrative or any out-of-court procedure, including procedures before regulatory bodies. Provision should also be made for the possibility for transfers where important grounds of public interest laid down by Union or Member State law so require or where the transfer is made from a register established by law and intended for consultation by the public or persons having a legitimate interest. In the latter case, such a transfer should not involve the entirety of the personal data or entire categories of the data contained in the register and, when the register is intended for consultation by persons having a legitimate interest, the transfer should be made only at the request of those persons or, if they are to be the recipients, taking into full account the interests and fundamental rights of the data subject.

### Recital 121 — lawful personal data processing for cybersecurity

*Source: NIS2, nis2-rec-121-en, 2022-12-14 — https://overview.legal/posts/96770*

The processing of personal data, to the extent necessary and proportionate for the purpose of ensuring security of network and information systems by essential and important entities, could be considered to be lawful on the basis that such processing complies with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject, in accordance with the requirements of Article 6(1), point (c), and Article 6(3) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679. Processing of personal data could also be necessary for legitimate interests pursued by essential and important entities, as well as providers of security technologies and services acting on behalf of those entities, pursuant to Article 6(1), point (f), of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, including where such processing is necessary for cybersecurity information-sharing arrangements or the voluntary notification of relevant information in accordance with this Directive. Measures related to the prevention, detection, identification, containment, analysis and response to incidents, measures to raise awareness in relation to specific cyber threats, exchange of information in the context of vulnerability remediation and coordinated vulnerability disclosure, the voluntary exchange of information about those incidents, and cyber threats and vulnerabilities, indicators of compromise, tactics, techniques and procedures, cybersecurity alerts and configuration tools could require the processing of certain categories of personal data, such as IP addresses, uniform resources locators (URLs), domain names, email addresses and, where they reveal personal data, time stamps. Processing of personal data by the competent authorities, the single points of contact and the CSIRTs, could constitute a legal obligation or be considered to be necessary for carrying out a task in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller pursuant to Article 6(1), point (c) or (e), and Article 6(3) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, or for pursuing a legitimate interest of the essential and important entities, as referred to in Article 6(1), point (f), of that Regulation. Furthermore, national law could lay down rules allowing the competent authorities, the single points of contact and the CSIRTs, to the extent that is necessary and proportionate for the purpose of ensuring the security of network and information systems of essential and important entities, to process special categories of personal data in accordance with Article 9 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, in particular by providing for suitable and specific measures to safeguard the fundamental rights and interests of natural persons, including technical limitations on the re-use of such data and the use of state-of-the-art security and privacy-preserving measures, such as pseudonymisation, or encryption where anonymisation may significantly affect the purpose pursued.

### Recital 52 — harmonised notice and action mechanisms

*Source: DSA, dsa-rec-52-en, 2022-10-19 — https://overview.legal/posts/95501*

The rules on such notice and action mechanisms should be harmonised at Union level, so as to provide for the timely, diligent and non-arbitrary processing of notices on the basis of rules that are uniform, transparent and clear and that provide for robust safeguards to protect the right and legitimate interests of all affected parties, in particular their fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter, irrespective of the Member State in which those parties are established or reside and of the field of law at issue. Those fundamental rights include but are not limited to: for the recipients of the service, the right to freedom of expression and of information, the right to respect for private and family life, the right to protection of personal data, the right to non-discrimination and the right to an effective remedy; for the service providers, the freedom to conduct a business, including the freedom of contract; for parties affected by illegal content, the right to human dignity, the rights of the child, the right to protection of property, including intellectual property, and the right to non-discrimination. Providers of hosting services should act upon notices in a timely manner, in particular by taking into account the type of illegal content being notified and the urgency of taking action. For instance, such providers can be expected to act without delay when allegedly illegal content involving a threat to life or safety of persons is being notified. The provider of hosting services should inform the individual or entity notifying the specific content without undue delay after taking a decision whether or not to act upon the notice.

### Recital 47 — Non-arbitrary intermediary rights-respecting restrictions

*Source: DSA, dsa-rec-47-en, 2022-10-19 — https://overview.legal/posts/95491*

When designing, applying and enforcing those restrictions, providers of intermediary services should act in a non-arbitrary and non-discriminatory manner and take into account the rights and legitimate interests of the recipients of the service, including fundamental rights as enshrined in the Charter. For example, providers of very large online platforms should in particular pay due regard to freedom of expression and of information, including media freedom and pluralism. All providers of intermediary services should also pay due regard to relevant international standards for the protection of human rights, such as the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.

### Recital 97 — researcher data access framework

*Source: DSA, dsa-rec-97-en, 2022-10-19 — https://overview.legal/posts/95591*

This Regulation therefore provides a framework for compelling access to data from very large online platforms and very large online search engines to vetted researchers affiliated to a research organisation within the meaning of Article 2 of Directive (EU) 2019/790, which may include, for the purpose of this Regulation, civil society organisations that are conducting scientific research with the primary goal of supporting their public interest mission. All requests for access to data under that framework should be proportionate and appropriately protect the rights and legitimate interests, including the protection of personal data, trade secrets and other confidential information, of the very large online platform or of the very large online search engine and any other parties concerned, including the recipients of the service. However, to ensure that the objective of this Regulation is achieved, consideration of the commercial interests of providers should not lead to a refusal to provide access to data necessary for the specific research objective pursuant to a request under this Regulation. In this regard, whilst without prejudice to Directive (EU) 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council (32), providers should ensure appropriate access for researchers, including, where necessary, by taking technical protections such as through data vaults. Data access requests could cover, for example, the number of views or, where relevant, other types of access to content by recipients of the service prior to its removal by the providers of very large online platforms or of very large online search engines.

### Recital 113 — non repetitive limited data transfers

*Source: GDPR, gdpr-rec-113-en, 2016-04-27 — https://overview.legal/posts/91741*

Transfers which can be qualified as not repetitive and that only concern a limited number of data subjects, could also be possible for the purposes of the compelling legitimate interests pursued by the controller, when those interests are not overridden by the interests or rights and freedoms of the data subject and when the controller has assessed all the circumstances surrounding the data transfer. The controller should give particular consideration to the nature of the personal data, the purpose and duration of the proposed processing operation or operations, as well as the situation in the country of origin, the third country and the country of final destination, and should provide suitable safeguards to protect fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons with regard to the processing of their personal data. Such transfers should be possible only in residual cases where none of the other grounds for transfer are applicable. For scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes, the legitimate expectations of society for an increase of knowledge should be taken into consideration. The controller should inform the supervisory authority and the data subject about the transfer.

## Case law

### CJEU: Data subjects may object to processing based on legitimate interests

*Source: CJEU, 2014-05-13 — https://overview.legal/posts/5963 — original: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62012CJ0131*

Right to object: A data subject has a right to object to the processing based on legitimate interest. Data controllers must suspend processing and conduct a review as soon as an objection is received. (¶¶ 75–76)

### CJEU - C‑209/23 - RRC Sports

*Source: Court of Justice of the European Union, 2026-07-16 — https://overview.legal/posts/144028 — original: https://gdprhub.eu/index.php?title=CJEU_-_C‑209/23_-_RRC_Sports*

Facts — Fédération internationale de football association (FIFA) is a Switzerland-based non-profit that acts as the global governing body for football. A large number of football clubs and national football associations are member of FIFA and bound by its regulations. In January FIFA published the FIFA Football Agent Regulations (FFAR). FFAR regulated the conduct of player’s agents. In particular, FFAR provided maximum limits to agents’ remuneration and prohibited specific types of contractual arrangements between clubs, agents, and agencies. In order to ensure compliance with these rules, Article 12 FFAR required agents to disclose certain information to FIFA. In particular, agents had to disclose: Information about any agreement with a client, other than a representation agreement; Information on any arrangement between agents to cooperate in the provision of their services, or to share the revenue or profits of their services; Information about their relationship with agencies, including the names of all of the agency’s employees. Additionally, FIFA would make the information available to a number of stakeholders including agents, players, and football clubs. Three applicants (an agent, a company acting as a players’ agent, and the Vice-President of a players’ agents’ associations) challenged FFAR in the Regional Court of Mainz (Germany). The Court referred four questions to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling. In essence, the Court asked the CJEU whether the FFAR was compatible with Articles 101 TFEU (prohibition on cartels), 102 TFEU (prohibition on abuse of a dominant position), 56 TFEU (freedom to provide services), and 6 GDPR (legal bases for processing personal data). With regards to Article 6 GDPR specifically, the referring court essentially asked whether there was a lawful basis under the GDPR for a collection of personal data, such as required under the FFAR’s mandatory disclosure rules. Advocate General Opinion — The referring question did not specify what legal basis had to be examined in order to assess the compatibility of FFAR disclosures with the GDPR. However, the AG opined that interest under Article 6(1)(f) was the relevant legal basis, based on the nature of the FFAR rules and on other information on the order for reference. Therefore, the AG focused on the legal basis of legitimate interest exclusively. The AG recalled that the mandatory disclosure under FFAR were compatible with the GDPR if they met three cumulative requirements: They genuinely pursued an interest worthy of protection; They were limited to what was strictly necessary to that end; They did not place an intolerable burden on the data subjects as regards their right to privacy and their financial interests. The AG opined that in the case at hand, the processing of personal data pursued an interest worthy of protection (that is, FIFA’s interest in ensuring that the conduct of agents was consistent with the core objective of the football transfer systems, and other objectives related to the good functioning of the player market). However, the AG was more cautious about the other two requirements. With regards to the requirement of necessity, the AG noted that FFAR required the collection of a substantial amount of personal data, including delicate data about agents’ remuneration and contractual agreements. Additionally, FIFA would not only receive the data but also make it available to stakeholders such as clubs, players, and player’s agents. The AG opined that such a broad collection and disclosure of personal data could, to some extent, exceed what was strictly necessary to pursue FIFA’s legitimate interest. In that regard, the AG stressed that FIFA should explain to the referring court why the collection and disclosure of the data were necessary, in relation to each type of information. With regards to the balancing of interests, the AG opined that agents operate within a regulatory framework and, therefore, have a reasonable expectation that FIFA would process their data as a regulatory body. In the AG’s view, this expectation could weight favorably on the balancing of legitimate interest. At the same time, the AG opined that the availability of agents’ personal data to both competitors and potential clients, could financially harm agents and erode trust in agent-client relationships. Holding — The CJEU held that processing based on Article 6(1)(f) GDPR is lawful only where three cumulative conditions are met. First, the controller or a third party must pursue a legitimate interest. Second, the processing must be necessary for that interest. Third, the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject must not override the legitimate interest pursued. Regarding the information agents were required to submit through the controller’s digital platform under Article 16 FFAR, the Court considered that ensuring compliance with the regulatory framework governing football agents could constitute a legitimate interest. This was conditional on the underlying obligations being compatible with EU and national law. The Court found that the information required under Article 16 FFAR appeared capable of identifying attempts to circumvent rules on representation, remuneration and conflicts of interest. The processing could therefore be adequate, relevant and limited to what was necessary. However, the referring court had to determine whether equally effective but less intrusive measures were available and assess any additional information requested through the platform whose precise scope was not defined in the regulations. The processing under Article 16 FFAR could therefore be compatible with Article 6(1)(f) GDPR, subject to verification by the referring court. Regarding Article 19 FFAR, the Court distinguished between the different categories of information disclosed by the controller. The publication of agents’ names and contact details, the identity of their clients, the duration and exclusivity of representation agreements and the services provided could pursue legitimate interests such as establishing professional and ethical standards, protecting clients from unethical conduct and improving transparency. Since the information concerned professional activities within a regulatory framework known to the persons involved, this processing could satisfy the balancing test under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR. By contrast, publishing detailed information about every transaction involving an agent, including the service fees paid, was not limited sufficiently. The Court held that agents and clients did not need access to detailed information about all transactions involving their competitors to comply with the regulations. The indiscriminate disclosure of this information therefore infringed the data minimisation principle under Article 5(1)(c) GDPR and was not necessary under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR. The Court also examined the publication of sanctions imposed on agents and clients. It accepted that publication could, in certain circumstances, deter misconduct, restore confidence in the market and allow persons harmed by an infringement to become aware of it. Nevertheless, Article 19 FFAR required the publication of every sanction without considering its seriousness, the harm caused, its relevance to market confidence or the time elapsed since the infringement. The regulation also did not provide for the information to cease being available after a defined period. The blanket publication obligation therefore did not appropriately balance the controller’s interests against the data subjects’ rights under Articles 7 and 8 CFR. Moreover, where a sanction contained personal data relating to criminal convictions or offences, Article 10 GDPR applied. In the absence of authorisation under EU or Member State law and supervision by a public authority, the controller could not process such data. The Court consequently held that Article 6(1)(f) GDPR precluded regulations adopted by an international sports federation insofar as they required the disclosure and publication of: every sanction imposed on agents or their clients; and detailed information concerning all transactions involving agents. The Court did not impose a fine or order any specific corrective measure. It provided an interpretation of EU law for the referring court, which remained responsible for resolving the underlying dispute and verifying the relevant factual and legal conditions.

### Koninklijke Nederlandse Lawn Tennisbond v Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens

*Source: Court of Justice of the European Union, C-621/22, 2024-10-04 — https://overview.legal/posts/132160 — original: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62022CJ0621*

The CJEU ruled on a preliminary reference from the Amsterdam District Court in proceedings between the Koninklijke Nederlandse Lawn Tennisbond (KNLTB) and the Dutch Data Protection Authority (Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens) concerning whether a sports federation may rely on Article 6(1)(f) GDPR to disclose members' personal data to sponsors for commercial purposes without their consent. The Court held that a controller's commercial interest can constitute a "legitimate interest" under Article 6(1)(f), but that sharing members' data with sponsors without consent is unlawful where members could not reasonably expect such processing, as the necessity and balancing tests are not satisfied. The underlying AP fine against KNLTB was imposed for violating GDPR rules in connection with this practice.

### Personvernnemnda (Norway) - 2018-14 (15/01355)

*Source: PVN, 2019-01-21 — https://overview.legal/posts/125646 — original: https://gdprhub.eu/index.php?title=Personvernnemnda_(Norway)_-_2018-14_(15/01355)*

Facts — In 2017, the Norwegian DPA Datatilsynet found that a company "Legelisten", running an anonymous review website of healthcare personnel, lacked a legal basis for processing and instructed them to allow said personnel to opt out of being listed and reviewed, in addition to several other instructions. Both the initial complainant and Legelisten responded to the DPA's decision with complaints. The DPA considered both complaints, but did not find any grounds to change their decision. Consequently, the case was submitted to the Norwegian Privacy Appeals Board, who considered comments from the initial complainant, Legelisten, the Norwegian Consumer Council, and the DPA. The Board focused their assessment on the lawfulness of processing of personal data on the website Legelisten.no. First, they considered the applicable law, as the GDPR had entered into force since the initial complaints dating back to 2012. They found that the GDPR would indeed apply. Holding — The Board reviewed several aspects relating to the case in question, summarised below. Controller responsibility — The Board agreed with the DPA's finding that Legelisten is the controller for all processing of personal data related to their site (as listed above), for both users and the healthcare personnel, because they in all these instances determine how the personal data will be processed (the purpose) and the means (technical platform, layout, which processors to use). The relationship to freedom of speach and processing for journalistic purposes — The Board agreed with the DPA's finding that there were no exemptions or derogations for processing carried out for journalistic purposes in this case. Legal grounds for processing personal data about the users — The DPA found that Legelisten lacked a legal basis for processing contact information (email address) of users submitting reviews, because they could not rely on consent as this was not found to have been provided voluntarily. The Board agreed that email addresses will often reveal the identity of a person and is, as such, personal data, and that information related to visits to or contact with specialist healthcare personnel, will reveal special category personal data and thus requires a legal ground for processing as per Article 9(2) GDPR, in addition to Article 6(1). However, the Board were split in their view of consent being a valid legal basis for processing in this specific case. The majority disagreed with the DPA and found that Legelisten could rely on consent for processing contact information of users, because they provided sufficient sufficient information in their terms and privacy notice, and required users to provide their consent through a clear affirmative act. The Board's decision here effectively reverted the DPA's initial decision item 8. Legal grounds for processing personal data about healthcare personnel — Processing of personal data about healthcare personnel on Legelisten relates to two categories: objective vs. subjective personal data. The Board noted that the relevant legal basis in both cases is Article 6(1)(f), legitimate interest, and made a thorough assessment relating to the three-part test (the purpose test, the necessity test and the balancing test). The Board first assessed the legal basis relating to the users' subjective reviews of healthcare personnel. In the balancing test, the Board were split in their views. First, the majority found that the subjective expressions of the individual patient in principle are expressions protected by the right of freedom of speech, cf. the Norwegian Constitution § 100 and the European Convention on Human Rights Article 10, and that most healthcare personnel on Legelisten can be seen as public figures, cf. the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party guidelines 225, number 2: «Does the data subject play a role in public life? Is the data subject a public figure?». Next, the majority emphasised that patients' subjective reviews of their experiences with healthcare personnel is of public interest and Legelisten's services contributes to safeguarding important consumer interests. Hence, they concluded that a general right to opt out of being reviewed on the website, would reduce the value of Legelisten as a source of information on the quality of health-related services in Norway. They pointed to the almost immediate reservation requests from about 20% of general practicioners following the DPA's decision. In conclusion, the majority of the Board held that the various legitimate interests of Legelisten outweighed the rights and freedoms of the healthcare personnel, that the processing of their personal data is necessary for the purpose and, consequently, lawful as per Article 6(1)(f). For the objective personal data, an unanimous Board agreed that Legelisten had a legitimate interest in processing these. The Board's decision — Legelisten is the controller for all personal data published on their website. Legelisten's publishing of reviews of healthcare personnel is not subject to the exemptions or derogations for processing carried out for journalistic purposes. Legelisten has legal grounds for processing user contact information, cf. Article 6(1)(a), cf. Article 9(2)(a). Legelisten is not instructed to publish the identity of the users submitting reviews of healthcare personnel. Legelisten has legal grounds for collecting and publishing subjective reviews of healthcare personnel, cf. Article 6(1)(f), and does not have to provide healthcare personnel with the right to opt out. Legelisten has legal grounds for collecting and publishing objective personal data of healthcare personnel, cf. Article 6(1)(f), and does not have to provide healthcare personnel with the right to opt out.

### Court rejects DFW request for Ziggo customer IP addresses due to insufficient transparency

*Source: GHARL, 2019-11-05 — https://overview.legal/posts/122859 — original: https://gdprhub.eu/index.php?title=GHARL_-_200.256.426*

Facts — DFW (a Dutch movie distributor) applies a protocol to its processing of personal data which was approved by the Dutch DPA before the GDPR came into force. DFW asked Ziggo (an internet service provider) to provide IP addresses of customers who according to DFW shared movies illegally. Ziggo refused to provide this information. Dispute — Τhe Court had to assess whose interests prevail in this case: DFW's interest in the protection of its intellectual property rights or Ziggo's interest in the protection of the personal data of its customers. Holding — The Court found that any processing needed to be based on legitimate interests according to Article 6(1)(f) GDPR and that Ziggo had to comply with Article 6(4)(d) GDPR. The Court found that DFW had a legitimate interest and that the processing was necessary. However, the Court pursued a balancing exercise between the interests of DFW and the interests of the data subjects and found that the approved protocol was not transparent enough. Thus, the possible consequences for the data subjects of providing their data to DFW could not be estimated. DFW failed to make clear which action it would take, under which circumstances and in which manner it would inform the data subjects of their rights. The Court is of the opinion that the interests of Ziggo's customers are still insufficiently safeguarded, and it, therefore, rejected DFW’s claims confirming the ruling of the Court of First Instance. The Court based its ruling on the national civil code, Articles 4(2) and 6 GDPR, Articles 17 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR), and Articles 8 and 13 ECHR.

### BVwG - W137 2334047-1

*Source: Federal Administrative Court, 2026-08-03 — https://overview.legal/posts/353599 — original: https://gdprhub.eu/index.php?title=BVwG_-_W137_2334047-1*

Facts — The data subject did not pay for items ordered and collected from a pharmacy (controller). After several reminders, the controller commissioned a debt collection agency, which pointed to several enforcement proceedings against the data subject. The controller then reported the data subject for fraud and provided the police with a record of the enforcement proceedings. The data subject lodged a complaint with the Austrian DPA (DSB) regarding the violation of their right to confidentiality, claiming the disclosure of the record constitutes a violation of § 427 EO in conjunction with § 1 DSG. On 13. January 2026, the DPA dismissed the data subject's complaint and requests. The data subject subsequently appealed against the DPA's decision arguing that the provisioning of the record would violate the principle of data minimisation under Article 5(1)(c) GDPR, since handing over bills and reminders would have been sufficient. They also argued that the disclosure of the record would constitute a significant interference with their rights and, therefore, the conducted balancing of interests under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR was incorrect. Additionally, some of the listed enforceable titles were no longer current, thus violating the right to accuracy under Article 5(1)(d) GDPR. Holding — First, the court held that the controller had not violated the data subject's right to confidentiality under § 1(1) DSG, as the provision of the record of enforcement proceedings to the police was in the legitimate interest of the controller under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR and did not violate the right to data minimisation pursuant to Article 5(1)(c) GDPR. The record was necessary as it provided a substantive evidence of the alleged fraud - providing only bills and reminders would not have been sufficient - as well as for the collection of outstanding debts. Thus, the record was also the least intrusive means. Given their prior history, the data subject should have reasonably anticipated such legal action. Consequently, the data subject's rights were found not to outweigh the controller's competing interests. Secondly, the court held that the professional and ethical confidentiality obligations of a pharmacist do not prevent them from reporting (potential) criminal offences or pursuing civil causes of action. Therefore, the court dismissed the appeal, as the DPA's decision was not found to be unlawful.

### Rijeka Court: AZOP decision on media reporting of former Zagrebački Holding board

*Source: Administrative Court in Rijeka, 2025-11-11 — https://overview.legal/posts/49225 — original: https://gdprhub.eu/index.php?title=USR_-_Us_I-755/2025-8*

Facts — The data subject was a member of the management board of Zagrebački holding, a company owned by the City of Zagreb, from 3 September 2021 until 31 March 2023. A television broadcaster published several pieces, including a video on its YouTube channel, reporting on the data subject’s resignation. The publications mentioned his name, role, employer, salary, and information on the brand of his private car. The data subject filed a complaint with the Croatian Personal Data Protection Agency (AZOP), claiming that the publication constituted unlawful processing under the GDPR because the media lacked a valid legal basis under Article 6, the reporting was inaccurate and excessive, and it did not serve any genuine public interest. He latter further claimed during the lawsuit against AZOP's decision that the authority had incorrectly and incompletely established the facts, misapplied substantive law, and breached procedural rules. He emphasized that the published personal data was unrelated to transparency in public administration, that he was neither a public figure nor a political actor, and that any public interest ended once he left office on 31 March 2023. He invoked his right to erasure under Article 17 GDPR and sought removal of the content, annulment of AZOP’s decision, or alternatively, a remittal for a new procedure. AZOP contested the lawsuit in full, maintaining that it had acted in accordance with Article 34 of the Croatian GDPR Implementation Act and Article 77 GDPR. It argued that the publication fell within a justified public interest under Article 8 of the Croatian Media Act and that it had properly carried out a balancing test between privacy (Article 8 ECHR) and freedom of expression (Article 10 ECHR). According to AZOP, the reporting was necessary, proportionate, and not sensationalistic, and did not excessively intrude on the data subject’s privacy. It added that consent was not required because the processing relied on legitimate interest under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR. Holding — The Administrative Court dismissed the action and upheld AZOP’s decision. Because Zagrebački holding is a city-owned and publicly funded company, the court considered information about the data subject’s salary, compensation for using his private vehicle in official duties, and his managerial role to be directly connected to the use of public resources. This placed the publication within the legitimate public interest in transparency recognised by Article 8 of the Media Act. In its proportionality assessment, the court accepted AZOP's application of Article 5 and 6 GDPR, emphasizing that the published data did not touch upon the data subject’s family or intimate life but related solely to his public functions. Publication was therefore limited to what was necessary to inform the public about the management of a publicly owned company. The data subject’s claims that the publication was false or harmful to his reputation did not alter the outcome, as AZOP is not empowered to determine the truthfulness or tone of journalistic content, particularly under the journalistic exemption in Article 85 GDPR. Issues of accuracy or reputational harm must instead be pursued through media-law mechanisms such as requests for correction or civil actions. On the erasure request, the court held that the right to be forgotten under Article 17 GDPR cannot override freedom of expression and information where media reporting is involved. Although the data subject no longer served on the board, the publication continued to contribute to public understanding of how a major public entity was run during his tenure, thus the public interest persisted and erasure was not justified. Finally, the court reiterated that consent was not required because Article 6 GDPR offers alternative lawful bases for processing. Since Article 6(1)(f) was satisfied, the absence of consent was irrelevant. Concluding that AZOP had properly applied the law and that the interference with the data subject’s privacy was proportionate, the court upheld the decision and denied the data subject’s claim and costs.

### Valsts policijas Rīgas reģiona pārvaldes Kārtības policijas pārvalde v Rīgas pašvaldības SIA "Rīgas satiksme"

*Source: Court of Justice of the European Union, C-13/16, 2017-05-04 — https://overview.legal/posts/132348 — original: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62016CJ0013*

In Case C-13/16, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Second Chamber) addressed a preliminary ruling from the Latvian Supreme Court in proceedings between the Riga Regional Police Board and the municipal transit company SIA "Rīgas satiksme" concerning whether the police could compel disclosure of personal data identifying the perpetrator of a road accident. The Court interpreted Article 7(f) of Directive 95/46/EC, holding that while a third party's request to process personal data for the purpose of pursuing a legal claim may fall within the scope of legitimate interests, the directive does not impose an obligation on the data controller to grant such a disclosure request, as the controller must balance the legitimate interests against the data subject's fundamental rights and freedoms. No fine was imposed, as the ruling solely provided interpretative guidance on the conditions for lawful processing under the directive.

### BVwG - W137 2334258-1/5E

*Source: Federal Administrative Court, 2026-09-07 — https://overview.legal/posts/593206 — original: https://gdprhub.eu/index.php?title=BVwG_-_W137_2334258-1/5E*

Facts — XXXX as the party lodged a complaint at the Austrian DPA (District Hospital XXXX as the co-party) on the unauthorised sharing of her personal data in seven different instances by the District Hospital XXXX. XXXX complained that the municipal association running the hospital infringed her fundamental right to secrecy of personal data. During a bitter employment dispute, her court submissions, which included health data, were circulated to the hospital's collegiate management, the members of the association's committee, their secretaries and others, and were discussed at a committee meeting on 27 October 2020. She also filed 27 further procedural applications, on service of documents, an oral hearing, file management, and injunctions against further processing. Holding — The Court held that the disclosures were lawful, as they were based on the controller's legitimate interests under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR (and, for health data, the exception for legal claims in Article 9(2)(f) GDPR). The Court affirmed that the recipients were authorised in this case to review the data, as they needed the information gained from the personal data to decide on the dismissal, could not be classified as "unauthorised third parties". The processing was found to be necessary, in line with respected data minimisation, and no overriding interests of the appellant could be established for XXXX. The Court relied on earlier final BVwG judgments and on an Austrian Supreme Court (OGH) decision of 28 July 2021 concerning the same dispute. The Court further rejected the XXXX's argument that the hospital's administrative director was a "falsus procurator" (false agent) and that only the association's chairman could access her data. The Court supported DPA's stance, confirming XXXX has no subjective right to assert how an authority should conduct the proceedings, where the Court dismissed on some aspects of the appeal as they had already been previously decided (res iudicata ). An appeal on points of law (Revision) was declared inadmissible because no question of fundamental legal importance arose.

### VG Ansbach: Lawyer not required to redact client data when submitting files to court

*Source: VG Ansbach, 2021-09-22 — https://overview.legal/posts/158450 — original: https://gdprhub.eu/index.php?title=VG_Ansbach_-_14_K_19.01274*

Facts — In December 2018, the data subject filed with the DPA (the defendant in this case), a complaint under Article 77 GDPR against a lawyer who had represented the data subject in a traffic accident, before he terminated the mandate. In court proceedings after this termination, in which the lawyer's fee claim was at issue, the lawyer had submitted to the court a volume of documents containing extracts of all correspondence with the opposing insurance company, in which personal data and business secrets had not been blacked out. Since data subject had not released the lawyer from data protection and confidentiality, the data subject perceived this to be a breach of confidentiality. By letter dated 30 March 2016, the data subject contacted the lawyer regarding this breach. The data subject also complained to the Court about the lawyer's conduct, but this did not lead to any action undertaken by the Court. DPA acknowledged receipt of the complaint by letter dated 7 January 2019. In response to this complaint dated 31 May 2019, the DPA informed the data subject that it did not see any breach of data protection law in the conduct complained of and that there was therefore no reason for further supervisory measures pursuant to Article 58 GDPR. The lawyer was under no obligation to make the data subject's data unidentifiable when forwarding it to the court. According to the DPA, this processing was legitimised under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR since the pursuit of fee claims undoubtedly constitutes a legitimate interest of the lawyer. Moreover, the DPA held that, insofar as the personal data transferred were data belonging to special categories of data within the meaning of Article 9(1) GDPR (such as information on the consequences of the accident/injuries suffered by the data subject in the accident), the additional requirements of Article 9(2) GDPR were also met, as the transfer had been necessary for the assertion of legal claims. The data subject then brought the action to the Court, requesting her complaint to be accepted pursuant to Article 77 GDPR. Holding — The Court dismissed the action and found that the data subject's complaint of 29 December 2018 did not constitute a complaint under Article 77 GDPR, but a "submission" within the meaning of Article 28(4) of Directive 95/46/EC. In the present case the data subject claimed that a data protection breach occured in March 2016. As the GDPR has only been applicable since 25 May 2018, the conduct of the lawyer could therefore not have infringed the GDPR, as it was not yet applicable at that time. There was no transitional provision in German law stipulating that the GDPR also applied to facts before the above-mentioned date. The Court noted that the entry-into-force of the GDPR according to Article 99 GDPR represents a clear break between the old and the new law. Since the German legislator - unlike the Austrian legislator, for example - did not enact a transitional provision which, under certain circumstances, ordered the application of the new law also to breaches of data protection provisions committed before its entry into force, breaches committed before that date are fully subject to the old law.

### OLG München - 36 U 1054/25 e

*Source: Higher Regional Court Munich, 2026-06-26 — https://overview.legal/posts/184545 — original: https://gdprhub.eu/index.php?title=OLG_München_-_36_U_1054/25_e*

Facts — The data subject had used a social media platform operated by the controller, an Irish company, since 2013. The controller provided “Business Tools” to third-party website operators and app providers. These tools enabled the controller to obtain data concerning how users interacted with third-party websites and apps, including information about page visits, purchases and advertisements clicked. In November 2023, the data subject requested that the controller recognize that the processing of his personal data was contrary to the parties’ contract, erase or anonymize the personal data, provide access to the personal data and pay compensation. The data subject subsequently brought an action before the Regional Court of Munich II, seeking a declaration that the parties’ user contract did not permit the processing, cessation of the processing of personal data collected through the Business Tools on third-party websites and apps, restriction of further processing, erasure or anonymization of previously collected data and at least €5,000 in non-material damages. The relevant data included direct and indirect identifiers, such as his name, contact details, IP address and internal identifiers, as well as website URLs, visit times, app names and information about his interactions with websites and apps. The Regional Court of Munich II dismissed the action, holding that the declaratory and erasure or anonymization claims were inadmissible, the cessation claims were legally unavailable and the damages claim had not been sufficiently substantiated. In relation to the damages claim, it found that the data subject had not identified specific third-party websites or apps through which his personal data had been processed. The data subject accordingly appealed to the Higher Regional Court of Munich. Holding — The Higher Regional Court of Munich partially upheld the appeal. First, the court held that the Controller processed the data subject’s personal data under Articles 4(1) and 4(2) GDPR by receiving data transmitted through its Business Tools, associating it with a user account and storing it. The data subject was not required to identify every website, app or individual transmission because the relevant information was principally within the controller’s knowledge and it was sufficiently probable that he had been affected. Second, referring to CJEU C‑40/17 concerning the broad interpretation of “controller”, the court held that the controller was a joint controller under Articles 4(7) and 26 GDPR for the collection and transmission of the personal data. It controlled the programming of the Business Tools and participated in determining the purposes and means of processing. Allocating certain obligations to third-party website and app operators did not remove its responsibility. Third, referring to CJEU C‑252/21, the court held that the controller had not established a lawful basis for the processing of the personal data. The processing was not justified by consent under Article 6(1)(a), contractual necessity under Article 6(1)(b), a legal obligation under Article 6(1)(c), a public-interest task under Article 6(1)(e), or legitimate interests under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR. Accordingly, the court held that the controller's processing infringed Articles 5(1)(a), 5(1)(b), 5(1)(c) and 6 GDPR. Relying on CJEU C‑655/23, the court granted an injunction against future unlawful processing under German law. It also ordered restriction pending erasure under Article 18(1)(b) and erasure under Article 17(1)(d) GDPR. The court upheld the dismissal of the separate declaratory claim and also rejected anonymization of the website and app interaction data. Finally, relying on BGH VI ZR 10/24, the court awarded €1,500 in non-material damages under Article 82(1) GDPR for the data subject’s loss of control over his personal data.

### VS v Inspektor v Inspektorata kam Visshia sadeben savet

*Source: Court of Justice of the European Union, C-180/21, 2022-12-08 — https://overview.legal/posts/132300 — original: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62021CJ0180*

The Court of Justice of the European Union (Fifth Chamber) ruled on a preliminary reference from the Bulgarian Administrative Court of Blagoevgrad in Case C-180/21, addressing whether personal data collected during a criminal investigation could subsequently be processed by a public prosecutor's office to defend against a damages action brought by the data subject. The Court examined the interplay between the GDPR and Directive (EU) 2016/680, analyzing the concepts of "legitimate interest" under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR versus processing necessary for tasks carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority under Article 6(1)(e) GDPR, and whether such subsequent use constitutes a purpose "other than that for which the personal data are collected." No fine was imposed, as the proceedings concerned a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of EU data protection law.

## Guidance

### Opinion 28/2024 on certain data protection aspects related to the processing of personal data in the context of AI models

*Source: EDPB, opinion-282024-on-certain-data-protection-aspects-related-to-en, 2024-12-18 — https://overview.legal/posts/125697 — original: https://www.edpb.europa.eu/documents/opinion-of-the-board-art-64/opinion-282024-on-certain-data-protection-aspects-related-to_en*

Adopted 1 Opinion 28/2024 on certain data protection aspects related to the processing of personal data in the context of AI models Adopted on 17 December 2024 Adopted 2 Executive summary AI technologies create many opportunities and benefits across a wide range of sectors and social activities. By protecting the fundamental right to data protection, GDPR supports these opportunities and promotes other EU fundamental rights, including the right to freedom of thought, expression and information,…

### Guidelines 2/2018 on derogations of Article 49 under Regulation 2016/679

*Source: EDPB, edpb-guidelines-on-derogations-of-article-49, 2018-05-25 — https://overview.legal/posts/38057 — original: https://www.edpb.europa.eu/documents/guideline/guidelines-22018-on-derogations-of-article-49-under-regulation-2016679_en*

The European Data Protection Board (EDPB) issued Guidelines 2/2018 to provide interpretive guidance on the application of Article 49 derogations for international transfers of personal data under the GDPR. The guidelines emphasize that derogations under Article 49 are exceptions to the general rule requiring an adequacy decision or appropriate safeguards, and that controllers must first exhaust transfer mechanisms under Articles 45 and 46 before resorting to these derogations. The document details specific conditions and limitations for each derogation, including explicit consent, contractual necessity, public interest, vital interests, public registers, and compelling legitimate interests.

### One-Stop-Shop case digest on right of access

*Source: EDPB, oss-case-digest-right-of-access-en, 2025-01-16 — https://overview.legal/posts/50410 — original: https://www.edpb.europa.eu/documents/support-pool-of-experts/one-stop-shop-case-digest-on-right-of-access_en*

EDPB/SPE 16 jan 2025 One-Stop-Shop case digest on right of access. Een rapport opgesteld door Hanne Marie Motzfeldt (Københavns Universitet) waarin beslissingen inzake het inzagerecht onder het eenloketmechanisme worden geanalyseerd.

### Guidelines 3/2019 on processing of personal data through video devices

*Source: EDPB, edpb-guidelines-on-processing-of-personal-data-through-video-devices, 2020-01-30 — https://overview.legal/posts/38059 — original: https://www.edpb.europa.eu/documents/guideline/guidelines-32019-on-processing-of-personal-data-through-video-devices_en*

The European Data Protection Board (EDPB) adopted Guidelines 3/2019 to provide comprehensive guidance on the processing of personal data through video devices,including CCTV and smart camera systems, under the GDPR. The guidelines address key issues such as the scope of application, the household exemption, lawfulness of processing under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR (legitimate interests), data subjects' rights, and obligations of controllers, while also clarifying the boundary with the Law Enforcement Directive (EU 2016/680). The guidelines were adopted on 29 January 2020 following public consultation and do not impose fines but serve as interpretative guidance for controllers and supervisory authorities.

### Report on International Data Protection Enforcement Cooperation

*Source: EDPB, report-international-data-protection-en, 2026-02-02 — https://overview.legal/posts/53744 — original: https://www.edpb.europa.eu/documents/support-pool-of-experts/report-on-international-data-protection-enforcement-cooperation_en*

EDPB, Report on International Data Protection Enforcement Cooperation

### Guidelines 2/2019 on the processing of personal data under Article 6(1)(b) GDPR in the context of the provision of online services to data subjects

*Source: EDPB, guidelines-22019-on-the-processing-of-personal-data-under-article-61b-gdpr-in-en, 2019-10-16 — https://overview.legal/posts/126202 — original: https://www.edpb.europa.eu/documents/guideline/guidelines-22019-on-the-processing-of-personal-data-under-article-61b-gdpr-in_en*

1 Adopted Guidelines 2/2019 on the processing of personal data under Article 6(1)(b) GDPR in the context of the provision of online services to data subjects Version 2.0 8 October 2019 2 Adopted Version history Version 2.0 8 October 2019 Adoption of the Guidelines after public consultation Version 1.0 9 April 2019 Adoption of the Guidelines for publication consultation 3 Adopted 1 Part 1 – Introduction ................................ ................................…

### EDPB Annual Report 2024

*Source: EDPB, edpb-annual-report-2024-en, 2025-04-23 — https://overview.legal/posts/50818 — original: https://www.edpb.europa.eu/documents/reports-statements-and-letters/edpb-annual-report-2024_en*

De EDPB heeft het Jaarraport van 2024 gepubliceerd. Met ook een handzame samenvatting voor degene die geen tijd hebben. Er wordt ook een lijst met zaken van enkele DPAs uitgekozen, waaruit ook het volgende tabelletje met cijfers kan worden gedestilleerd. ↓ (dit leest het beste op de website, mind...

### Recommendations 02/2021 on the legal basis for the storage of credit card data for the sole purpose of facilitating further online transactions

*Source: EDPB, recommendations-022021-on-the-legal-basis-for-the-storage-of-credit-card-en, 2021-05-19 — https://overview.legal/posts/126030 — original: https://www.edpb.europa.eu/documents/recommendation/recommendations-022021-on-the-legal-basis-for-the-storage-of-credit-card_en*

adopted 1 Recommendations 02/2021 on the legal basis for the storage of credit card data for the sole purpose of facilitating further online transactions Adopted on 19 May 2021 adopted 2 The European Data Protection Board Having regard to Article 70(1)(e) of the Regulation 2016/679/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the fre e movement of such data, and repealing Directive…

## Enforcement decisions

### Italy Garante: TikTok switch to legitimate interest for personalized ads violates

*Source: Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy), 2022-07-07 — https://overview.legal/posts/122853 — original: https://gdprhub.eu/index.php?title=Garante_per_la_protezione_dei_dati_personali_(Italy)_-_9788429*

Facts — Social media platform TikTok (the controller) provided personalized advertising to its users (the data subjects) on the legal basis of consent (Article 6(1)(a) GDPR). In June 2022, the controller announced that a new privacy policy would come into effect on 13 July 2022. Under the new policy, the controller would only serve personalize advertising to users over 18 years of age and on the legal basis of the legitimate interest of the controller (Article 6(1)(f) GDPR). The Italian DPA started an investigation and found that personalized advertisement would likely involve the use of cookies or other tracking mechanisms. Holding — Regarding the competence of the Italian DPA, it should be noted that the Irish DPA is the lead supervisory authority for the controller’s data processing activities under the GDPR's "one-stop-shop" mechanism. The Italian DPA acknowledged the Irish DPA’s position in its decision. However, the Italian DPA held the ePrivacy Directive to be applicable to the processing of cookies by the controller and held itself competent to enforce the Directive. The DPA referenced Recital 173 GDPR and EDPB Opinion 05/2020 on this point. The DPA held that the controller’s new privacy policy violated Article 5(3) ePrivacy Directive 2002/58/EC. The Article only allows the controller to process cookies and use similar tracking mechanisms with the user’s consent . For this reason, legitimate interest under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR is not a valid legal basis for the processing of cookies. The Italian DPA also held that the controller violated Article 122 of the Italian Privacy Code (d. lgs. 30 giugno 2003, n. 196). Article 122 is a direct transposition of Article 5(3) ePrivacy Directive. The violation of the Code constitutes a direct consequence of the violation of the Directive. The DPA issued a warning against the controller.

### Belgian DPA: Legitimate interest can justify direct marketing to recent former customers

*Source: APD/GBA (Belgium), 2022-07-26 — https://overview.legal/posts/6318 — original: https://gdprhub.eu/index.php?title=APD/GBA_(Belgium)_-_117/2022*

Facts — The data subject was a former customer of the controller (which remained unknown). The data subject received direct marketing from the controller. The data subject objected to the further processing of its personal data while also requesting access to all personal data processed by the controller and the legal basis used to send the direct marketing. The controller responded within 30 days, confirming that the data subject would no longer receive direct marketing and provided all processed data, including the applicable legal bases. The data subject then submitted a complaint at the DPA stating that the controller cannot rely on legitimate interest for processing its email adress as the data subject was a former, not current customer. Holding — The DPA held that a controller is allowed to rely on legitimate interest to send direct marketing, including former customers under certain conditions, pursuant to Recital 47 GDPR and its Guidance 01/2020 on Direct Marketing (nr. 168). In its Guidance, it was stated that when there was no relationship between the controller and data subject, or when it goes back a long time, legitimate interest cannot be invoked, as direct marketing is not part of the data subject's reasonable expectations. The DPA followed that because the relationship between the controller and the data subject ended not that long ago (around two years prior), a contrario, the data subject could reasonably expect that his data would still be used for direct marketing. Hence the controller could use legitimate interest as a legal basis. In addition, the controller confirmed that the processing for direct marketing is only done up to two years after the cancellation of the service. The DPA therefore held that the controller did not breach the GDPR and dismissed the case.

### DSB Austria: Publishing companies-register data on free ad-funded platform unlawful

*Source: DSB (Austria), 2021-10-08 — https://overview.legal/posts/262252 — original: https://gdprhub.eu/index.php?title=DSB_(Austria)_-_2021-0.698.184*

Facts — The data subject was a shareholder and managing director of two companies. The controller operated a free online search platform that allowed users to look up companies registered in the Austrian companies register and see, for a given company, which natural persons held positions such as shareholder or managing director, as well as an overlay showing what other companies those persons were connected to. The controller obtained the underlying data from a commercial information provider, which in turn sourced it from the Federal Ministry of Justice under a data-reuse agreement covering companies register documents. The controller funded the free service through advertising displayed on the platform. The data subject had no contractual relationship with the controller. A direct name search for the data subject on the controller's platform returned no results, however, searching for a company in which he held a position returned his name together with his role (managing director, sole shareholder with a 100% stake) and through an „i“ icon, an overlay listing his positions in other companies. The data subject complained to the Austrian DPA, arguing that the controller published his name without any contract between them and without any identifiable legitimate interest justifying the publication. The controller argued that its processing pursued a legitimate commercial interest, enabling business participants to research potential contractual partners and pointed out that companies register data was already public and accessible to anyone under national law, including via other commercial and official information services. Holding — First, the DPA rejected the controller's argument that the data was already available and therefore outside the scope of a secrecy interest altogether. It held, citing CJEU case-law C-73/07, that a blanket assumption that lawfully published data cannot be subject to a legitimate secrecy interest is incompatible with EU law requirements. Second, the DPA held that the controller's processing constituted a new form of data use requiring independent justification, because the controller did not merely reproduce publicly accessible companies register data, but recombined and cross-linked it, thereby creating additional informational value beyond what a simple companies register search would reveal. Third, applying the balancing test under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR and Section 1(2) DSG, the DPA found that the controller had a legitimate interest in operating its platform, both a commercial interest of its own (generating advertising revenue) and a legitimate interest of platform users and market participants generally in being able to assess a business partner's other company affiliations. The DPA weighed this against the data subject's interest in secrecy and concluded that the balance favoured the controller, for three reasons: 1. the underlying data's general availability in the companies register reduced (though did not eliminate) its protection-worthiness 2. the data related exclusively to the data subject's professional sphere as someone who had voluntarily chosen to participate in commercial life as a shareholder and managing director 3. the resulting interference with his data protection rights was accordingly of low intensity. The DPA therefore rejected the complaint as unfounded.

### LfD (Lower Saxony) - Fine EUR 900,000 against bank

*Source: LfD (Lower Saxony), 2022-09-28 — https://overview.legal/posts/6319 — original: https://gdprhub.eu/index.php?title=LfD_(Lower_Saxony)_-_Fine_EUR_900,000_against_bank*

Facts — A commercial bank (controller) used personal data of current and former customers (data subjects) to identify customers with an affinity for digital media usage, in order to address them more intensely through electronic communication channels for further commercial communication (advertisement). A service provider analyzed digital usage behavior on behalf of the controller, including the total amount of app-store purchases, the usage frequency of bank statement printers as well as the total amount of transfers in online banking system (in comparison to the offline usage in their local branch offices). The results were compared and further enriched with data from a commercial credit reporting agency. Most customers were informed in advance, but no consent under Article 6(1)(a) GDPR was obtained. The controller based the data analysis, data enrichment and the subsequent creation of customer profiles on legitimate interest as per Article 6(1)(f) GDPR. Holding — The DPA found that the analysis of large amounts of data to create customer profiles could not be based on Article 6(1)(f). It followed that processing based on a legitimate interest requires a balancing act between the interest of the controller and the fundamental rights and freedoms if the data subject. The controller had to consider the reasonable expectations of the data subjects. The DPA argued that a data subject could not reasonably expect large amounts of its personal data to be analyzed by the controller to better target its advertising. Third-party data enrichment, like the use of commercial credit reporting agency data, further overrides the interest of the controller and tips the balancing test in favor of the data subject. The DPA held that in addition, data enrichment from a third-party source and linking it to profiles could also not be based on legitimate interest. This could potentially link data from all areas of life to an accurate customer profile, which could also not be reasonably expected by a customer. Customer consent (see Article 6(1)(a)) is required. The controller cooperated with the DPA throughout the process. For the violation, the DPA fined the controller €900,000.

### Estonian DPA: website republishing public authority documents independently liable under

*Source: AKI (Estonia), 2026-06-19 — https://overview.legal/posts/354297 — original: https://gdprhub.eu/index.php?title=AKI_(Estonia)_-_2.1.-4/26/1106-2333-4*

Facts — The controller was a private individual who operated a website that collected documents from public authorities’ document registers and made them easier to search and access online. The DPA found that some documents remained available on the website even after the original authorities had imposed access restrictions. Public authorities and data subjects had also contacted the controller requesting the removal of personal data. The controller relied on Article 6(1)(f) GDPR, arguing that the processing served the legitimate interest of facilitating access to public information. He also argued that continuously checking all republished documents for subsequent access restrictions was technically difficult. Holding — The DPA held that the controller was independently responsible for ensuring that the republication of personal data complied with the GDPR. The fact that personal data had previously been published by a public authority did not automatically provide a legal basis for its further publication. The DPA found that the controller lacked sufficient technical and organisational measures under Articles 5(2), 24 and 25 GDPR to prevent personal data from remaining publicly accessible after the original source had restricted access. Regarding Article 6(1)(f) GDPR, the DPA held that a general legitimate-interest assessment could not justify the republication of all documents containing personal data. The controller had to assess whether a valid legal basis existed for the specific processing, particularly where access restrictions had subsequently been imposed. Where special categories of personal data were involved, Article 9 GDPR also had to be satisfied. The DPA also required the controller to ensure proper handling of requests under Articles 15 to 22 GDPR. Under Article 58(2)(c) and (d) GDPR, the DPA ordered the controller to implement safeguards preventing unlawful publication, stop processing personal data when no legal basis existed, review documents for subsequent access restrictions, and adopt written procedures for data-subject requests. No administrative fine was imposed. However, failure to comply could result in a €500 penalty payment for each unfulfilled requirement.

### Datatilsynet ordered Lab Pharma AS to erase influencer's personal data used after

*Source: Datatilsynet (Norway), 2026-08-12 — https://overview.legal/posts/291399 — original: https://gdprhub.eu/index.php?title=Datatilsynet_(Norway)_-_23/00435-62*

Facts — Lab Pharma AS, the controller, is a Norwegian manufacturer of dietary supplements which markets and sells its products online. In 2016, an influencer, the data subject, entered into an agreement with the controller under which she would promote its products on her blog and social media profiles. The agreement also allowed the controller to use excerpts of her posts, including images, audio and text, in its own marketing. After the agreement had expired, the controller continued using the data subject’s name, photographs and comments about its products on its websites. In February 2023, the data subject requested the erasure of her personal data under Article 17 GDPR. The controller rejected the request, claiming that the agreement entitled it to continue using the data and stating that it would not respond to further inquiries. The data subject lodged a complaint with the DPA arguing that the controller lacked a legal basis for the processing and requesting the erasure of her personal data. In July 2024, the DPA initiated an investigation and ordered the controller to provide information concerning the processing. The controller challenged the DPA’s competence and refused to provide the agreement underlying the processing, arguing that it was confidential. The Privacy Appeals Board subsequently upheld the DPA’s information order. During the investigation, the controller repeatedly delayed providing requested information and documentation and its CEO sent numerous communications seeking to have the investigation discontinued, including threats of legal action and police reports against DPA employees. Holding — The DPA held that the controller processed the data subject’s personal data without a valid legal basis under Article 6(1) GDPR and failed to comply with its obligations under Articles 17, 21 and 31 GDPR. Regarding Article 6(1)(b) GDPR, the DPA rejected the controller’s argument that the processing remained necessary for the performance of the agreement. The agreement expressly had a duration of one year and expired in March 2017. Nothing in its wording established that the controller could continue using the data subject’s personal data after its expiry. Consequently, Article 6(1)(b) GDPR could no longer provide a legal basis for the processing. The controller also relied on legitimate interests under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR. The DPA noted that the fact that personal data had previously been made publicly available did not remove the requirement for a legal basis. Moreover, the data subject’s request to stop the processing constituted an objection under Article 21(1) GDPR. Since the controller failed to demonstrate compelling legitimate grounds overriding the data subject’s interests, it was required to cease the processing. As the processing was unlawful, the controller was also required under Article 17 GDPR to erase the personal data without undue delay. The DPA therefore ordered the controller to delete the data subject’s personal data from all websites it operated and to cease using her personal data for marketing purposes unless it obtained a lawful basis for doing so. Regarding Article 31 GDPR, the DPA held that the duty to cooperate requires controllers to facilitate supervisory investigations and comply with lawful information requests and deadlines. Attempts to delay or halt an investigation may breach Article 31 GDPR even where the supervisory authority is ultimately able to complete its investigation. The controller had intentionally attempted to obstruct the investigation through threats and pressure on DPA employees and had also negligently failed to comply with several deadlines for providing requested documentation. The DPA considered these circumstances sufficiently serious to warrant an administrative fine and imposed a fine of NOK 205,000 for the infringement of Article 31 GDPR. The decision cannot be appealed to the Privacy Appeals Board but may be challenged before the Oslo District Court.

### NAIH (Hungary) - NAIH-11443-3/2026

*Source: NAIH (Hungary), 2026-07-22 — https://overview.legal/posts/156361 — original: https://gdprhub.eu/index.php?title=NAIH_(Hungary)_-_NAIH-11443-3/2026*

Facts — The DPA initiated an investigation into the GDPR compliance of an online store (the controller) processing the data of its customers (the data subjects) in April 2025. The processing activities in question included, inter alia, cookies, registration, billing, shipping, consumer complaint, and processing of orders. The privacy notice of the company operating the online store had been in force unchanged from May 2018 to May 2025, and the period under investigation extended from 1 January 2020 to 27 June 2025. Holding — The DPA held that the controller had violated Articles 12(1), 13(1)(c), (d) and (f), and 13(2)(a) GDPR and issued the controller a fine of HUF 2,000,000 (€5,500). In addition, the DPA ordered the controller to bring its data processing operations into compliance with the GDPR and to amend the content of its privacy notice. First, the DPA found an infringement of Article 12(1) GDPR: the structure of the privacy notice was confusing and difficult to follow. The privacy notice also contained incomplete, incorrect, and unnecessary information as well as repetitive details. Based on this, the DPA concluded that the controller had failed to provide data subjects with information regarding the processing of personal data that was sufficiently concise, transparent, intelligible and easily accessible. Second, the DPA held that the controller had also violated Articles 13(1)(c), (d) and (f) GDPR by failing to specify a legal basis for certain processing operations such as the use of cookies, not specifying its legitimate interests when relying on Article 6(1)(f) GDPR as a legal basis, and not providing detailed information regarding the safeguards ensuring the lawfulness of data transfers to the United States. Finally, the DPA found a violation of Article 13(2)(a) GDPR as the controller had also failed to provide the data subjects information on the period for which the personal data processed would be stored.

### AEPD (Spain) - PS-00480-2025

*Source: AEPD (Spain), 2025-11-14 — https://overview.legal/posts/158452 — original: https://gdprhub.eu/index.php?title=AEPD_(Spain)_-_PS-00480-2025*

Facts — Tiger Media Inc., the controller, operated an advertising platform for publishers and advertisers of adult products and services. The platform acted as an ad network, connecting publishers offering advertising space with advertisers seeking to display ads on those websites. Through this platform, the controller processed personal data of users visiting publishers’ websites where its ads were displayed. This included IP addresses, device and browser information, website URLs, referral URLs, clicks, impressions and cookie identifiers. According to the controller, the data were processed for ad delivery, fraud prevention, frequency capping, performance measurement and service improvement. The controller argued that it did not carry out behavioural advertising or profiling. It claimed that any targeting was limited to contextual factors, such as country and language. The controller relied mainly on legitimate interest as a legal basis and argued that publishers, as independent controllers of their own websites, were responsible for obtaining any consent required for cookies. The DPA investigated the controller’s platform and several Spanish websites using it. It found that cookies linked to the controller’s platform were installed on users’ devices without prior consent. These cookies were used for advertising-related purposes, including measuring ad performance, improving ad relevance, limiting frequency and detecting fraud. The AEPD also noted that the controller was not established in the EU. Although the controller stated that it had appointed a representative in Northern Ireland and was in the process of changing representative, the DPA considered that it did not have a valid representative established in the Union. Holding — The AEPD held that the controller violated Article 6 GDPR by processing personal data without a valid legal basis. The DPA emphasised that the LSSI, the Spanish law implementing the ePrivacy Directive require prior consent for storing or accessing information on a user’s device through cookies, unless an exemption applies. The DPA distinguished between the placement or reading of cookies, which is governed by the cookie rules, and the subsequent processing of personal data obtained through those cookies, which must comply with the GDPR. Since the cookies were installed without consent, the subsequent processing of the data collected through them could not be considered lawful. The AEPD rejected the controller’s reliance on legitimate interest under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR. It found that users had not received clear information and had not consented to the use of cookies. Moreover, users of the affected websites did not have a reasonable expectation that their browsing-related data would be processed by a third-party advertising network for advertising purposes. Therefore, the processing did not pass the balancing test required under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR. The DPA also held that the controller violated Article 27 GDPR. Since the controller was not established in the EU but processed personal data of users in Spain in connection with its advertising services, it was required to appoint a representative established in an EU Member State. A representative in Northern Ireland did not meet this requirement. The AEPD fined the controller €120,000 in total: €70,000 for the violation of Article 6 GDPR and €50,000 for the violation of Article 27 GDPR. Pursuant to Article 85 of the Spanish administrative Law 39/2015, the notice of initiation informed the controller of the possibility of acknowledging liability and making a voluntary payment of the proposed penalty, which would entail two cumulative reductions of 20% each. With the application of these two reductions, the final penalty was set at €72,000, and its payment resulted in the termination of the proceedings. The AEPD also ordered the controller to adopt corrective measures within three months. In particular, the controller had to ensure compliance with Article 6 GDPR, ensure compliance with the Spanish cookie rules by the service providers using its cookies, appoint an EU representative and notify the AEPD of the measures adopted.

## Recent developments

### Meta (Facebook, Instagram) switching to "Legitimate Interest" for Ads

*Source: noyb - European Center for Digital Rights, 2023-03-30 — https://overview.legal/posts/53244 — original: https://noyb.eu/en/meta-facebook-instagram-switching-legitimate-interest-ads*

Forced Consent & Consent Bypass Meta (Facebook, Instagram) switching to "Legitimate Interest" for ads after noyb win. noyb will take immediate action to stop this illegal practice As reported by the Wall Street Journal, Meta (Facebook and Instagram) is switching from an illegal contract to an equally illegal basis "legitimate interests" for advertisement, after noyb won a series of complaints against them. noyb will take imminent action, as case law and guidance does not allow a company to argue

### De Belgische autoriteit heeft geoordeeld dat een verantwoordelijke partij zich kan beroepen op een gerechtvaardigd belang voor direct marketing aan voormalige klanten, mits de relatie "niet al te lang geleden" is beëindigd.

*Source: GDPRhub, 2022-09-28 — https://overview.legal/posts/51803*

De Belgische beschermingsautoriteit (SA) heeft geoordeeld dat een verantwoordelijke partij zich kan beroepen op een gerechtvaardigd belang als juridische basis om voormalige klanten direct marketing te sturen, mits de relatie "niet zo lang geleden" is beëindigd en de betrokkene geen bezwaar heeft gemaakt tegen deze verwerking.

### CJEU declares Meta/Facebook's GDPR approach largely illegal

*Source: noyb - European Center for Digital Rights, 2023-07-04 — https://overview.legal/posts/53227 — original: https://noyb.eu/en/cjeu-declares-metafacebooks-gdpr-approach-largely-illegal*

The GDPR allows for six legal bases to process personal data. In the case Meta v Bundeskartellamt, the CJEU has today ruled on all of them - further clarifying the interpretation of the GDPR. The CJEU has largely closed the doors for Meta to use personal data beyond what is strictly necessary to provide the core products (such as messaging or sharing content) - all other processing (like advertisement and sharing personal data) requires freely given and fair consent by users. Judgment in German

### Court rules on Experian appeal of ICO enforcement notice

*Source: IAPP, 2023-02-21 — https://overview.legal/posts/6241 — original: https://iapp.org/news/a/court-rules-on-experian-appeal-of-ico-enforcement-notice#entry-3894*

> 
																						The First-Tier Tribunal overturned portions of a 2020 enforcement notice by the U.K. Information Commissioner's Office against Experian, confirming the company's reliance on legitimate interests as a legal basis for processing credit reference agency information for direct marketing purposes. Deputy Commissioner Stephen Bonner, CIPP/E, CIPM, said marketing processes "must happen in line with the law and in an open and honest way" and the ICO noted it will consider an app

### USR - Reference number I-755/2025-8

*Source: GDPRhub, 2026-01-07 — https://overview.legal/posts/51962*

Facts. Finally, the court reiterated that consent was not required, because Article 6 of the GDPR provides alternative, legal grounds for data processing. Since the requirements of Article 6(1)(f) were met, the absence of consent was irrelevant. The court ruled that AZOP had correctly applied the law and that the infringement on the individual's privacy was proportionate, and therefore upheld the decision. The court dismissed the individual's claim and the associated costs. Finally, the court reiterated that consent was not required, because Article 6 of the GDPR...

## Literature

### Submission to the European Data Protection Board's Public Consultation on the 2024/01 guidelines on legitimate interest under the GDPR

*Source: SSRN Electronic Journal, 2025-01-01 — https://overview.legal/posts/132585 — original: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5029217*

### Grounds for Lawful Processing of Personal Data in GDPR and Personal Data Protection Bill 2018, India (PDPB): Section – VI: Legitimate Interests

*Source: SSRN Electronic Journal, 2019-01-01 — https://overview.legal/posts/132470 — original: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3743576*

### Privacy vs. business convenience: the Mousse judgment and the future of data protection in the EU

*Source: Unio - EU Law Journal, 2025-06-18 — https://overview.legal/posts/53865 — original: https://doi.org/10.21814/unio.11.1.6632*

The Mousse ruling represents a pivotal moment in EU data protection law, reinforcing strict limitations on personal data processing and clarifying the legal standards under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) reaffirmed that data collection must be objectively indispensable for a specified legal basis, rejecting broad interpretations of contractual necessity and legitimate interest. Additionally, the ruling confirms that the right to o

### GDPR Glasnost: Spain’s AEPD raises the transparency bar and sanctions two banks

*Source: Journal of Data Protection Privacy, 2021-12-01 — https://overview.legal/posts/132536 — original: https://doi.org/10.69554/roid7095*

This paper is a commentary on two recent decisions issued by the Spanish data protection authority (DPA): the AEPD (Agencia Española de Protección de Datos). Both decisions — issued one month apart — developed similar motives and grievances primarily arising from the alleged lack of clarity in the two banks’ privacy notifications to their clients as well as in the consent-collection process and in the formulation of their legitimate interest in processing personal data. These two decisions combi

### The data subject’s right to access to information under GDPR and the right of the data controller to protect its know-how

*Source: Przegląd Prawniczy Uniwersytetu im. Adam Mickiewicza, 2023-12-30 — https://overview.legal/posts/132546 — original: https://doi.org/10.14746/ppuam.2023.15.09*

The data subject’s right to access information on data processing has a very broad meaning. Considering the latest developments in this field (mainly the CJEU ruling on Austrian posts and EDPB guidelines) one can draw the conclusion that the controller’s right to protect its confidential in-formation is limited and less valuable than the data subject’s rights. However, this may lead to unfair and unequal treatment of companies and data subjects. When looking at this right in a more systematic pe

## Tools

### ICO lawful basis interactive guidance tool

*Source: ICO, 2026-07-17 — https://overview.legal/posts/125618 — original: https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/uk-gdpr-guidance-and-resources/lawful-basis/lawful-basis-interactive-guidance-tool/*

Interactive questionnaire by the UK regulator that helps controllers identify the most appropriate lawful basis under Article 6 (and conditions under Articles 9–10) for a given processing operation, with tailored guidance for the outcome.

### GDPR.eu compliance checklist

*Source: GDPR.eu (Proton), 2026-07-17 — https://overview.legal/posts/125625 — original: https://gdpr.eu/checklist/*

Widely used plain-language GDPR compliance checklist covering lawful basis, data inventory, accountability documents, data subject rights, security and transfer requirements. Published by Proton as part of the GDPR.eu resource site (an unofficial but well-maintained companion to the Regulation).

## Related topics

- **Personal Data** — https://overview.legal/topics/personal-data
  Information relating to identified or identifiable natural persons
- **Controllers** — https://overview.legal/topics/controllers
  Entities that determine purposes and means of processing
- **Processing** — https://overview.legal/topics/processing
  Any operation performed on personal data
- **Consent** — https://overview.legal/topics/consent
  Freely given, specific, informed indication of data subject wishes
- **Supervisory Authorities** — https://overview.legal/topics/supervisory-authorities
  National data protection authorities and their powers
- **Supervision** — https://overview.legal/topics/supervision
  Oversight and enforcement by supervisory authorities

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