# Processing Agreement — legal context bundle

> Curated from overview.legal on 2026-08-22. Canonical page: https://overview.legal/topics/verwerkersovereenkomst
> Sources are cited per item. Verify against the official texts before relying on them.

Contract between controller and processor defining processing terms

## Overview

## Legal Framework
Article 28 GDPR mandates a binding written contract between controllers and processors, requiring specification of the subject matter, duration, nature, purpose, types of personal data, and categories of data subjects. This processing agreement must legally bind the processor to act solely on documented controller instructions, implement appropriate security measures, and assist the controller in fulfilling data subject rights requests. Recital 108 and Article 46(2)(c) GDPR extend these contractual requirements to international data transfers: absent an adequacy decision, parties must implement appropriate safeguards, primarily through standard contractual clauses (SCCs) or supervisory authority-approved contractual clauses, ensuring data subjects retain enforceable rights regardless of the destination country.

## Key Developments
The Court of Justice of the European Union in *Data Protection Commissioner v. Facebook Ireland Ltd, and Maximillian Schrems* (Schrems II) established that SCCs provide uniform contractual guarantees but may require supplementary measures depending on the destination country's legal framework. The ruling places the burden on the controller or processor to conduct a case-by-case assessment of whether the third country's laws undermine the SCCs' effectiveness, necessitating additional technical or contractual safeguards. Dutch administrative jurisprudence (*Reikwijdte beginselplicht tot handhaving en onderzoeksverplichtingen van de AP*) confirms that the absence of a valid processor agreement and adequate transfer safeguards constitutes distinct, actionable violations warranting supervisory authority intervention. The EDPB has subsequently elaborated that codes of conduct and certification mechanisms can serve as appropriate transfer safeguards under Article 46, offering complementary tools to standard contractual clauses within complex processing arrangements.

## Practical Guidance
- Execute a comprehensive Article 28 GDPR processing agreement before any data processing commences, explicitly detailing controller instructions, security obligations, breach notification timelines, and sub-processor authorization procedures.
- Integrate Article 46 GDPR transfer mechanisms—specifically the Commission's current SCC modules—directly into the processing agreement whenever personal data leaves the EEA.
- Conduct a documented transfer impact assessment for each third-country transfer as required by *Schrems II*, evaluating whether local surveillance laws necessitate supplementary technical measures like strong encryption or contractual transparency obligations.
- Mandate flow-down clauses ensuring all sub-processors are bound by data protection terms equivalent to the primary processing agreement, preserving the controller's audit and liability rights.
- Monitor EDPB guidance on codes of conduct and certifications to deploy them as supplementary transfer safeguards where standard clauses alone prove insufficient for specific third-country contexts.

## Legislation (full text of key provisions)

### Recital 109 — standard data protection clauses contractual flexibility

*Source: GDPR, gdpr-rec-109-en, 2016-04-27 — https://overview.legal/posts/91733*

The possibility for the controller or processor to use standard data-protection clauses adopted by the Commission or by a supervisory authority should prevent controllers or processors neither from including the standard data-protection clauses in a wider contract, such as a contract between the processor and another processor, nor from adding other clauses or additional safeguards provided that they do not contradict, directly or indirectly, the standard contractual clauses adopted by the Commission or by a supervisory authority or prejudice the fundamental rights or freedoms of the data subjects. Controllers and processors should be encouraged to provide additional safeguards via contractual commitments that supplement standard protection clauses.

### Recital 108 — appropriate safeguards for international data transfers

*Source: GDPR, gdpr-rec-108-en, 2016-04-27 — https://overview.legal/posts/91731*

In the absence of an adequacy decision, the controller or processor should take measures to compensate for the lack of data protection in a third country by way of appropriate safeguards for the data subject. Such appropriate safeguards may consist of making use of binding corporate rules, standard data protection clauses adopted by the Commission, standard data protection clauses adopted by a supervisory authority or contractual clauses authorised by a supervisory authority. Those safeguards should ensure compliance with data protection requirements and the rights of the data subjects appropriate to processing within the Union, including the availability of enforceable data subject rights and of effective legal remedies, including to obtain effective administrative or judicial redress and to claim compensation, in the Union or in a third country. They should relate in particular to compliance with the general principles relating to personal data processing, the principles of data protection by design and by default. Transfers may also be carried out by public authorities or bodies with public authorities or bodies in third countries or with international organisations with corresponding duties or functions, including on the basis of provisions to be inserted into administrative arrangements, such as a memorandum of understanding, providing for enforceable and effective rights for data subjects. Authorisation by the competent supervisory authority should be obtained when the safeguards are provided for in administrative arrangements that are not legally binding.

## Case law

### VG München - M 26a K 25.5210

*Source: Administrative Court Munich, 2026-05-18 — https://overview.legal/posts/108991 — original: https://gdprhub.eu/index.php?title=VG_München_-_M_26a_K_25.5210*

Facts — The data subject had been liable to pay broadcasting contributions to the Controller, a German regional public broadcasting authority, since 2007. Following objections to several contribution assessment notices, the data subject submitted a request under Article 15 GDPR seeking a copy of all personal data processed about him by the Controller. The Controller responded by providing the categories of personal data and related information specified under § 11(8) of the German Broadcasting Contribution Treaty (RBStV), which governs data subject access requests relating to broadcasting contribution records, together with general privacy information. The data subject argued that the response was incomplete because it did not include copies of all documents containing his personal data, including correspondence with him and third parties. The Controller maintained that it had fully complied with its obligations under the RBStV. After the Controller declined to provide additional information, the data subject brought proceedings seeking disclosure of all personal data concerning him processed by the Controller. Holding — The Court held that § 11(8) of the German Broadcasting Contribution Treaty (RBStV) constituted a lawful restriction of the broader right of access under Article 15 GDPR pursuant to Article 23(1)(e) GDPR. It found that the national provision was a valid legislative measure, respected the essence of the fundamental right to data protection, and pursued an important public interest by ensuring the effective financing and administration of the public broadcasting system. The Court further held that the restriction was necessary and proportionate, noting that requiring the Controller to comply with the full scope of Article 15 GDPR across more than 44 million broadcasting contribution accounts would impose a disproportionate administrative and financial burden capable of undermining that public interest. The Court also held that § 11(8) RBStV satisfied the safeguards required under Article 23(2) GDPR by specifying the purposes of processing, categories of personal data, scope of the restriction, safeguards against misuse and unlawful access, the identity of the Controller, applicable storage periods and other statutory protections. Accordingly, while the Controller was required to disclose the categories of information specified under § 11(8) RBStV, it was not required to provide a copy of all personal data processed under Article 15(3) GDPR. As the Controller had already provided all information required under the national provision, the court dismissed the action.

### Data Protection Commissioner v. Facebook Ireland Ltd, and Maximillian Schrems

*Source: CJEU, 2020-07-16 — https://overview.legal/posts/6120 — original: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62018CJ0311&ref=6120*

“[…] the standard data protection clauses adopted by the Commission on the basis of Article 46(2)(c) of the GDPR are solely intended to provide contractual guarantees that apply uniformly in all third countries to controllers and processors established in the European Union and, consequently, independently of the level of protection guaranteed in each third country. In so far as those standard data protection clauses cannot, having regard to their very nature, provide guarantees beyond a contrac

### CJEU - C-311/18 - Facebook Ireland and Schrems

*Source: GDPRhub, 2026-07-17 — https://overview.legal/posts/125639 — original: https://gdprhub.eu/index.php?title=CJEU_-_C-311/18_-_Facebook_Ireland_and_Schrems*

Facts — Maximillian Schrems, an Austrian citizen, had been a Facebook user since 2008. As is the case with users residing in the European Union, some of the data belonging to Mr. Schrems had been transferred by Facebook Ireland to its servers belonging to Facebook Inc., located in the United States. In 2013, Mr. Schrems complained to the Irish Data Protection Commissioner (DPC) seeking to prohibit these transfers. When this complaint was rejected, he brought an action against the decision before the Irish High Court, which in turn referred a number of questions to the CJEU, the most prominent of which was whether the EU-US adequacy decision, the so-called “Safe Harbor", was valid. In its judgment on October 6th 2015 (Case C-362/14, “Schrems I”), the CJEU invalidated the Safe Harbor and stated that, in order to be "adequate", the level of data protection offered by the third country should be “essentially equivalent” to that being offered in the EU. As a result, the High Court annulled the decision rejecting Mr. Schrems’ complaint, and referred the case back to the DPC. In the remittal “judgment” before the DPC, Facebook Ireland explained that the invalidated adequacy decision was not relevant as a large part of personal data was transferred to Facebook Inc. pursuant to Standard Contractual Clauses (SCCs). On this basis, the DPC asked Mr. Schrems to reformulate his complaint. In his reformulated complaint lodged on December 1st 2015, Mr. Schrems alleged that US law required Facebook Inc. to disclose his personal data to certain United States authorities in the context of various monitoring programs (in particular, the FISA 702 and the Executive Order 12.333). In Mr Schrems’ view, these programs contravened different data protection principles as well as Article 7 CFR, Article 8 CFR, and Article 47 CFR. After investigating the allegations made by Mr. Schrems, the DPC argued that it could not adjudicate on them until the CJEU had examined the validity of the SCCs, and so it brought proceedings before the High Court. On May 4th 2018 the High Court made the reference for a (second) preliminary ruling to the CJEU. In its reference to the CJEU, the High Court specified that Section 702 of the FISA permitted the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence to authorize jointly, following FISA approval, the surveillance of individuals who are not US citizens and who are located outside of the US in order to obtain foreign intelligence information. It was also affirmed that Section 702 of the FISA provided the basis for the PRISM and UPSTREAM surveillance programs. PRISM in particular, requires Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to supply the NSA with all communications to and from a ‘selector’. UPSTREAM on the other hand, permitted the NSA to copy and filter Internet traffic flows from the ‘backbone’ of the internet, granting it access to both the content of communications and their metadata. Furthermore, the High Court had found that Executive Order 12.333 (E.O. 12333) allowed the NSA to access data in transit by accessing underwater cables on the floor of the Atlantic. The High Court stated that the only limit on US surveillance activities was found in the Presidential Policy Directive (PPD-28), and even this only stated that intelligence activities should be ‘tailored as feasible’. On the basis of these findings, the High Court considered that the US carried out mass processing of personal data without ensuring a level of protection that was essentially equivalent to that which was guaranteed by Article 7 CFR and Article 8 CFR. The High Court also highlighted that EU citizens did not have the same remedies available to them as US citizens with regards to the processing of their personal data, since the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States did not apply to non-US citizens. This meant that it was particularly difficult for EU citizens to establish standing before a US court. Moreover, activities based on E.O. 12333 were not subject to judicial oversight and were not justiciable. Given the considerable effects of US surveillance law on the rights of Europeans, the High Court raised the question of whether the SCCs are valid, given that they may not be binding on the State authority of the third country. If they did not bind the third country State authority, then they are not capable of remedying a possible lack of an adequate level of protection of personal data. Dispute — The request for a preliminary ruling referred eleven questions to the Court of Justice. The topics covered in these questions were as follows: the applicability of EU law to data transfers made for commercial purposes, but further processed for national security and law enforcement purposes the relevant legislation for determining whether there has been a violation of individual rights how to assess the level of protection in a third country whether data transfers to the US violate the Charter whether the level of protection offered in the US respects or limits an individual’s right to a judicial remedy what level of protection is required to be afforded to personal data that is transferred under SCCs whether the SCCs can even be adequate as safeguards given they do not bind national authorities whether there is an obligation to suspend data flows if a data importer is subject to surveillance law what the relevance of the Privacy Shield decision is with regards to assessing safeguards whether the presence of an ombudsperson can ensure that the US provides an effective remedy to data subjects whether the SCCs violate the Charter Holding — The Court began by clarifying that the GDPR applies to the transfer of personal data for commercial purposes by an economic operator established in a Member State, to another economic operator established in a third country, even if in that country the data would be processed by the national authorities for public security, defense, and state security purposes. In particular, the Court stressed that a transfer of data is not excluded from the scope of the GDPR for the reason that it may be processed by the national authorities of a third country. Regarding the level of protection required in such an instance, the Court held that the requirements presented by the GDPR regarding safeguards, enforceable rights, and legal remedies must continue to be applied. In other words, when their data is transferred abroad, a data subject must be afforded a level of protection essentially equivalent to that which they would receive in EU. In such circumstances, in order to assess the level of protection, both existing contractual clauses between the data importer and exporter, and the potential access by public authorities in a third country must be taken into account, along with the relevant aspects of the legal system in the third country. The Court then analyzed Decision 2016/1250 (the “Privacy Shield”), which was the self-certification scheme in place for controllers based in the US. Examining the decision in light of the provisions of the Charter, the Court held that the requirements of US national security, public interest, and law enforcement do in fact interfere with the fundamental rights of persons whose data is transferred there. These limitations on the protection of personal data were not circumscribed in a way that satisfied requirements that are essentially equivalent to those required under EU law. The principle of proportionality was also not satisfied, in so far as US surveillance programs are not limited to what is ‘strictly necessary’. It was noted that the provisions in the US surveillance programs neither limited the power they conferred onto national authorities, nor granted data subjects actionable rights before the courts against the US authorities. The Court proceeded to scrutinize the Ombudsperson mechanism that had been in place under the Privacy Shield, stating that it too did not provide data subjects with a cause of action before a body which was fully independent, and that this body was limited in so far as it could not impose rules that were binding on US intelligence services. Taking all of this into account, the Court declared the Privacy Shield Decision to therefore be invalid. The Court also clarified that in the absence of an adequacy decision, the competent supervisory authorities are required to suspend or prohibit a transfer of personal data to a third country where they consider that the standard data protection clauses are not or cannot be complied with in the third country, and that the protection of the data transferred cannot be ensured by other means. Following this, the Court then examined the validity of the SCCs (Decision 2010/87). First, the Court held that the validity of the Decision was not called into question by the mere fact that the SCCs do not bind national authorities in a third country. After establishing this, the Court emphasized that the validity of the SCCs, however, did depend on whether there were effective mechanisms in place that make it possible to ensure compliance with the level of protection required by EU law. Important to note is that here the Court held that the SCCs in themselves did provide for such mechanisms. However, it went on to stress that where these mechanisms cannot be complied with, the transfers of personal data pursuant to these clauses is to be suspended or prohibited. Furthermore, there is an obligation on the data exporter and the recipient of the data to verify prior to a transfer, what the level of protection in a third country is, and whether it will be possible to comply with the requirements of the SCCs.

### Rb. Den Haag - C/09/689833

*Source: District Court Den Haag, 2026-05-27 — https://overview.legal/posts/53095 — original: https://gdprhub.eu/index.php?title=Rb._Den_Haag_-_C/09/689833*

Facts — Kindred Group PLC and Risepoint Limited (the controllers) are companies that provide online gambling products. Several companies within Kindred Group PLC (Risepoint was initially in this group) offered online gambling products before a national law requiring a license entered into force. In response, several lawsuits were filed before courts regarding the validity of the gambling agreements between players and unlicensed online gambling providers. Several data subjects later requested access (Article 15 GDPR, or in the alternative, the right to portability under Article 20 GDPR) to the controller to receive information on specific transaction data and the types of games they participated in. The data subjects did not receive access and brought a claim to the court. The data subjects requested the court to hold both companies liable (jointly or separately) The court initially dismissed the claim based on the code of civil procedure, but allowed the data subjects to amend their arguments regarding the GDPR. Both companies argued that they were not controllers, and that the requests made by the data subjects were abusive. According to the companies, the data subjects requested access for the sole purpose of bringing legal actions against them. Finally, the companies argued that they did not have the obligation to comply with the requests under Article 15(4) GDPR. Holding — The court first clarified that both Kindred Group PLC and Risepoint Limited were controllers. Kindred Group PLC argued that it did not exercise any decisive influence over the purpose and means of processing. The court took into consideration the functional definition of “controller” under Article 4(7) GDPR and CJEU case law, rather than a formal definition. The court found that Kindred Group PLC was a controller for access made between May and October 2024, but not for requests made after October 2024. This is because Kindred had a unified privacy policy for companies under its group, and answered the access request from an email address containing its name. However, after October 2024, Risepoint was no longer a part of the group, and the data from Kindred had been transferred to Risepoint. The court then dismissed the controllers’ arguments, and stated that the access requests were not abusive under Article 12(5) GDPR. Under Article 12(5) GDPR, a controller may refuse a request for access if it is manifestly unfounded or excessive. However, the CJEU has clarified that a data subject does not need to justify an access request, and a controller cannot refuse a request for access on the sole ground that it serves a purpose other than obtaining information about the processing of personal data and verifying its lawfulness. In any case, the court stated that the controller bears the burden in proving that a request is manifestly unfounded or excessive. Similarly, the controllers could not rely on Article 15(4) GDPR to refuse the data subjects’ requests. The court stated that the controllers’ interest in not granting information that data subjects could use against them in court is not recognised under EU law as a basis to refuse access. While the GDPR allows for national law to restrict specific rights under Article 23 GDPR, the court stated that the restriction must be necessary and proportionate. This, however, does not apply for hypothetical situations. The court upheld the data subjects’ claim, and ordered the controllers to provide them with a copy of their transaction data. The court specified that the controllers had the obligation to provide a complete copy, in accordance with CJEU case law.

### Meta Platforms and Others v Bundeskartellamt

*Source: CJEU, C-601/21, 2023-07-04 — https://overview.legal/posts/51482 — original: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62021CJ0601*

Competition authorities can assess GDPR compliance in context of competition law proceedings.

### LG Rostock - 3 O 762/19

*Source: LG Rostock, 2020-09-15 — https://overview.legal/posts/122848 — original: https://gdprhub.eu/index.php?title=LG_Rostock_-_3_O_762/19*

Facts — The German consumer organisation Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen und Verbraucherverbände - Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband e.V. (vzbv, the claimant) filed a lawsuit against advocado GmbH (advocado, the defendant), a German-based company that runs an online platform where attorneys can offer their services. The defendant's website had used a cookie banner with pre-ticked boxes for the use of marketing and analytics cookies. This included the use of tools such as Google Analytics that entail a data transfer to third countries. The claimant argued that the data processing in connection with the placed cookies was unlawful under Article 6(1) GDPR: A user's consent under Article 6(1)(a) GDPR could not be considered valid under Articles 4(11) and 7 GDPR, especially since the boxes were pre-ticked. Moreover, the claimant claimed that the defendant had violated Articles 5(1)(a), 13/14, 26 and 44 et seqq. GDPR as it had failed to properly inform users of the scope of intended processing activities, joint controllers and international data transfers in connection with the use of cookies. The defendant stated that it had based the use of cookies on legitimate interests under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR until the CJEU issued its decision C-673/17 on 01.10.2019 ("Planet 49"). Afterwards, the defandent argued that they changed the legal basis for processing to consent under Article 6(1)(a) GDPR, which it considered valid under Articles 4(11) and 7 GDPR. The defendant also stated that it was the sole controller for the processing activities - there were no joint controllers involved, only processors. (Furthermore, the claimant had also argued that some provisions in the defendant's general terms and conditions were unlawful from a civil law / consumer protection law perspective. This will not be discussed further in this summary.) Dispute — Was it necessary to ask for the users' consent under Article 6(1)(a) GDPR or could the processing activities in connection with the use of marketing and analytics cookies be based on legitimate interest under Artilce 6(1)(f)? Was the consent given by users' when interacting with the defendant's cookie banner valid under Articles 6(1)(a), 4(11) and 7 GDPR? Did the defendant violate GDPR provisions on transparency? Was the defendant the sole controller regarding the processing activities in connection with the use of marketing and analytics cookies or were there any joint controllers? Holding — Legal basis and validity of consent — The court held that the marketing and analytics cookies used by the defendant c an only be placed with the users' consent under Article 6(1)(a) GDPR : § 15(3) Telemediengesetz that deals with such cookies must be interpreted in light of Article 5(3) e-Privacy Directive, which requires consent for cookies not strictly necessary for technical reasons. Taking into consideration the design of the cookie banner and the lack of information provided to a website user, the court held that consent given could not be considered valid under Articles 6(1)(a), 4(11) and 7 GDPR. The banner featured pre-ticked boxes and a big "OK" button. The option "use only necessary cookies" was designed to not look like an interactive button but rather a link. Consent could therefore not be considered "freely given" and was invalid. Transparency — The court further held that the defendant violated Article 13 GDPR by mentioning an incorrect transfer mechanism under Articles 44 et seqq. GDPR for data transfers in connection with the use of cookies. Sole or joint controllership when using Google Analytics? — Lastly, the court held that the use of Google Analytics results in joint controllership of the website provider using this tool and Google . Google does not qualify as the website provider's processor under Article 4(7). This is because Google does not process the data solely for the purpose of use by the website provider. Rather, Google, like other third-party providers, expressly reserves the right to process the data for its own purposes as well. The fact that the defendant and Google entered into a data processing agreement under Article 28 GDPR does not change this assessment. The court's legal view is in line with the official opinion of the "Datenschutzkonferenz", a gathering of all German DPAs.

### Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland and Maximillian Schrems

*Source: CJEU, C-311/18, 2020-07-16 — https://overview.legal/posts/51470 — original: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62018CJ0311&ref=51470*

Invalidated Privacy Shield adequacy decision and upheld validity of Standard Contractual Clauses with additional safeguards required.

### Data Protection Commissioner v. Facebook Ireland Ltd, and Maximillian Schrems

*Source: CJEU, 2020-07-16 — https://overview.legal/posts/5945 — original: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62018CJ0311*

“the national supervisory authorities are responsible for monitoring compliance with the EU rules concerning the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data. Each of those authorities is therefore vested with the power to check whether a transfer of personal data from its own Member State to a third country complies with the requirements laid down in that regulation” / “The exercise of that responsibility is of particular importance where personal data is tra

### HvJ EU: Privacy Shield ongeldig verklaard (Schrems II)

*Source: Hof van Justitie EU, 2020-07-16 — https://overview.legal/posts/1 — original: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/NL/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62018CJ0311*

Het Hof van Justitie verklaart het Privacy Shield-akkoord ongeldig wegens onvoldoende waarborgen voor Europese burgers tegen toegang door Amerikaanse inlichtingendiensten.

### Fashion ID GmbH & Co. KG v Verbraucherzentrale NRW eV

*Source: CJEU, C-40/17, 2019-07-29 — https://overview.legal/posts/51478 — original: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62017CJ0040*

Website operators using Facebook Like button are joint controllers for data collection.

### Unabhängiges Landeszentrum für Datenschutz v Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-Holstein

*Source: CJEU, C-210/16, 2018-06-05 — https://overview.legal/posts/51477 — original: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62016CJ0210&ref=51477*

Facebook fan page administrators are joint controllers with Facebook.

### Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner

*Source: CJEU, C-362/14, 2015-10-06 — https://overview.legal/posts/51471 — original: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62014CJ0362&ref=51471*

Invalidated Safe Harbor adequacy decision. National supervisory authorities can examine adequacy decisions.

## Guidance

### Opinion 22/2024 on certain obligations following from the reliance on processor(s) and sub-processor(s)

*Source: EDPB, opinion-222024-on-certain-obligations-following-from-the-en, 2024-10-09 — https://overview.legal/posts/125715 — original: https://www.edpb.europa.eu/documents/opinion-of-the-board-art-64/opinion-222024-on-certain-obligations-following-from-the_en*

A dopted 1 Opinion 22/2024 on certain obligations following from the reliance on processor(s) and sub - processor(s) Adopted on 7 October 2024 Adopted 2 Executive summary The Danish SA requested the EDPB to issue an opinion on matters of general application pursuant to Article 64(2) GDPR. The opinion contributes to a harmonised interpretation by the national supervisory authorities of certain aspects of Article 28 GDPR, whe re appropriate in conjunction with Chapter V GDPR. In particular, the…

### EDPB-EDPS Joint Opinion 2/2021 on standard contractual clauses for the transfer of personal data to third countries

*Source: EDPB, edpb-edps-joint-opinion-22021-on-standard-contractual-clauses-for-the-en, 2021-01-14 — https://overview.legal/posts/126083 — original: https://www.edpb.europa.eu/documents/legislative-opinion/edpb-edps-joint-opinion-22021-on-standard-contractual-clauses-for-the_en*

Adopted 1 EDPB - EDPS Joint Opinion 2 /2021 on the European Commission’s Implementing Decision on standard contractual clauses for the transfer of personal data to third countries for the matters referred to in Article 46(2)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 Adopted 2 Adopted 4 The European Data Protection Board and the European Data Protection Supervisor Having regard to Article 42(2) of the Regulation 2018/1725 of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing…

### Information note on data transfers under the GDPR to the United Kingdom after the transition period

*Source: EDPB, information-note-on-data-transfers-under-the-gdpr-to-the-united-kingdom-en, 2020-12-15 — https://overview.legal/posts/126093 — original: https://www.edpb.europa.eu/documents/other-guidance/information-note-on-data-transfers-under-the-gdpr-to-the-united-kingdom_en*

Adopted 1 Information n ote on data transfers under the GDPR to the United Kingdom after the transition period Adopted on 15 December 2020 T he transition period for the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union will end on 31 December 2020 . This means that as of 1 January 2021, the UK will no longer apply the GDPR to the processing of personal data and a separate legal framework reg arding data protection will be in force in the UK . Consequently, as of 1 January 2021 , all…

### Frequently Asked Questions on the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Case C-311/18 - Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Ltd and Maximillian Schrems

*Source: EDPB, frequently-asked-questions-on-the-judgment-of-the-court-of-justice-of-the-en, 2020-07-24 — https://overview.legal/posts/126131 — original: https://www.edpb.europa.eu/documents/other-guidance/frequently-asked-questions-on-the-judgment-of-the-court-of-justice-of-the_en*

1 F requently Asked Questions on the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Case C - 311/18 - Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Ltd and Maximillian Schrems Adopted on 23 July 2020 This document aims at presenting answers to some frequently asked questions received by supervisory authorities (“SAs”) and will be developed and complemented along with further analysis, as the EDPB continues to examine and assess the judgment of the C our t of J ustice of the E…

### Information note on data transfers under the GDPR in the event of a no-deal Brexit

*Source: EDPB, information-note-on-data-transfers-under-the-gdpr-in-the-event-of-a-no-en, 2019-02-12 — https://overview.legal/posts/126244 — original: https://www.edpb.europa.eu/documents/other-guidance/information-note-on-data-transfers-under-the-gdpr-in-the-event-of-a-no_en*

Information n ote on data transfers under the GDPR in the event of a no - deal Brexit Adopted on 12 February 2019 Updated on 4 October 2019 Introduction In the absenc e of an agreement between the EEA and the UK ( n o - deal Brexit), the UK will become a third country from 00.00 am CET on 1st November 2019 . This means that the transfer of personal data to the UK has to be based on one of the following instruments 1 as of 1st November 2019 : - Standard or ad hoc Data Protection Clauses -…

### Opinion 25/2025 on the decision of the Polish Supervisory Authority regarding the Processor Binding Corporate Rules of the BOX Group

*Source: EDPB, opinion-252025-on-the-decision-of-the-polish-supervisory-en, 2025-10-07 — https://overview.legal/posts/125693 — original: https://www.edpb.europa.eu/documents/opinion-of-the-board-art-64/opinion-252025-on-the-decision-of-the-polish-supervisory_en*

Opinion 25/2025 on the decision of the Polish Supervisory Authority regarding the Processor Binding Corporate Rules of the BOX Group Adopted on 07 October 2025 1 | 2 | The European Data Protection Board Having regard to Article 63, Article 64(1)(f) and Article 47 of the Regulation 2016/679/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing…

### Statement 4/2025 on the European Commission’s Recommendation on draft non-binding model contractual terms on data sharing under the Data Act

*Source: EDPB, edpb-statement-202504-commission-s-draftmcts-dataact-en, 2025-07-14 — https://overview.legal/posts/51075 — original: https://www.edpb.europa.eu/documents/reports-statements-and-letters/statement-42025-on-the-european-commissions-recommendation_en*

1 Adopted Statement 4 /2025 on the European Commission’s Recommendation on draft non - binding model contractual terms on data sharing under the Data Act (version of 22 May 2025) Adopted on 8 July 2025 The European Data Protection Board has adopted the following statement: The European Commission has shared the draft non - binding model contractual terms on data sharing (‘MCTs’) and non - binding standard contractual clauses for cloud computing contracts pursuant to Article 41 of the Data Act…

### Opinion 15/2025 on the draft decision of the Austrian Supervisory Authority (AT SA) regarding the certification criteria of BDO Consulting GmbH

*Source: EDPB, edpb-opinion-202515-dbo-certificationcriteria-en, 2025-07-14 — https://overview.legal/posts/51079 — original: https://www.edpb.europa.eu/documents/opinion-of-the-board-art-64/opinion-152025-on-the-draft-decision-of-the-austrian_en*

Adopted 1 Opinion 15/2025 on the draft decision of the Austrian Supervisory Authority ( AT SA) regarding the certificat ion criteria of BDO Consulting GmbH Adopted on 8 July 2025 Adopted 2 Adopted 3 The European Data Protection Board Having regard to Article 63, Article 64(1)(c) and Article 42 of the Regulation 2016/679/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of…

## Enforcement decisions

### UODO (Poland) - DKN.5131.7.2022

*Source: UODO (Poland), 2026-04-13 — https://overview.legal/posts/53109 — original: https://gdprhub.eu/index.php?title=UODO_(Poland)_-_DKN.5131.7.2022*

Facts — An electricity sales company (the controller) had outsourced some of its operations to two processors and one sub-processor. Employees of the sub-processor had used a smartphone application between July 2020 and March 2021 to send pictures of customer contracts containing the personal data of individuals residing at addresses visited during door-to-door sales (the data subjects). The controller had not authorised this practice, and former employees of the sub-processor could still access the personal data through the app. The controller identified the use of the app as a data breach and notified the supervisory authority about it in April 2021. The DPA initiated administrative proceedings in March 2022. Holding — First, the DPA held that the controller had violated the principles of integrity and confidentiality enshrined in Article 5(1)(f) and the principle of accountability laid down in Article 5(2) GDPR. It had also violated Articles 24(1), 25(1), 28(1), 32(1) and 32(2) GDPR, which specify these principles. The DPA issued the controller a reprimand. The DPA found the controller had failed to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures itself and also failed to properly verify whether the (sub-)processors had provided sufficient guarantees that they had implemented such measures. The data protection agreements required in Article 28(1) GDPR were very general in nature, and none of the parties in the chain of contracts had conducted a risk analysis to select appropriate security measures. In addition, the controller had not continuously monitored the processing activities. Second, the DPA held that the two processor and the sub-processor had violated Articles 32(1) and 32(2) GDPR read in conjunction with Article 28(4) GDPR. They had all failed to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure the security of personal data processing. The sub-processor was largely held responsible for the data breach – it had started using the app to process customers’ personal data without authorisation from the controller or the processors. Furthermore, the DPA pointed out the sub-processor should have verified whether the application would allow access to the personal data through it even after the termination of the employment relationship. The DPA reprimanded the processors and fined the sub-processor €2,415.

### Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2020-431-0061 (Helsingor decision no. 4)

*Source: Datatilsynet (Denmark), 2022-09-28 — https://overview.legal/posts/6313 — original: https://gdprhub.eu/index.php?title=Datatilsynet_(Denmark)_-_2020-431-0061_(Helsingor_decision_no._4)*

Facts — This is the Danish DPA's fourth decision in the case relating to Helsingor municipality's processing of personal data in primary and lower secondary school. Helsingor municipality, the controller, has been using Google Chromebooks and Workspace for Education in violation of several GDPR requirements, as detailed in the first decision of September 2021, the second decision of 14 July 2022 and the third decision of 18 August 2022. Following the third decision, the municipality submitted more documentation and also requested a consultation with the DPA as per Article 36 GDPR. Holding — The DPA temporarily suspended its processing ban against Helsingor municipality until 5 November 2022, and also ordered the municipality to: Change the data processing agreement with Google so that the DPA's remarks in their 14 July and 18 August decisions, are implemented. This includes, at a minimum, a clarification of where and if Google acts as a sole controller and any uncertainties that may entail that Google acts beyond their role as a processor, see Article 28(3)(a) GDPR. Document that all transfers of personal data to insecure third countries, are in line with the GDPR. Describe all data flows and identify the personal data that are shared with the vendor, and clarify when the vendor acts as a sole or joint controller. This documentation must include the whole technology stack used by the municipality (for this processing activity). Update their data protection impact assessment based on all identified risks. Consult the DPA if the DPIA shows any high risks the municipality is not able to mitigate. If any processing activities are still not in line with the GDPR before the DPA's deadline 3 November 2022, present a final plan for bringing them in line with the GDPR.

### Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2020-422-0026

*Source: Datatilsynet (Denmark), 2022-09-28 — https://overview.legal/posts/6312 — original: https://gdprhub.eu/index.php?title=Datatilsynet_(Denmark)_-_2020-422-0026*

Facts — The Danish DPA had decided to investigate three research projects of Region Syddanmark (the controller) with regards to its processing activities, the use of processors, data processing agreements and processor audit practices. Holding — The DPA first held that, based on the information provided by the controller, there were no indications that the controller's assessment of the legal bases for the processing were incorrect. The DPA then held that the use of processors had been lawful and that the relevant data processing agreements satisfied the requirements of Article 28 GDPR. However, the DPA reprimanded the controller, partly for its lack of clear auditing procedures, and partly for not actually conducting audits in line with the routines that did exist. The DPA held that the accountability principle in Article 5 GDPR entails an obligation for the controller to oversee the security of the data processing operations performed by a processor. The DPA highlighted that entering into a data processing agreement that contains security obligations is not sufficient, and that the controller must also oversee that the processor actually adheres to the agreement. The fact that the controller had auditing procedures in place was not good enough if these auditing procedures were not being followed in practice.

### Kolibri Image
Regina und Dirk Maass GbR: Insufficient data processing agreement

*Source: Data Protection Authority of Hamburg, 2018-12-17 — https://overview.legal/posts/46141 — original: https://www.enforcementtracker.com/ETid-26*

Please note: According to our information this fine has been withdrawn in the meantime. Kolibri Image had send a request to the Data Protection Authority of Hessen asking how to deal with a service provider who does not want to sign a processing agreement. After not answering Kolibri Image in more detail, the case was forwarded to the locally responsible Data Protection Authority of Hamburg. This Authority then fined Kolibri Image as controller for not having a processing agreement with the serv

### Slovenian DPA fines controller €1,282 for missing Art. 28(3) processor contract

*Source: IP (Slovenia), 2026-08-11 — https://overview.legal/posts/262256 — original: https://gdprhub.eu/index.php?title=IP_(Slovenia)_-_0609-41/2026/7*

Facts — A company (the controller) used a service provider (the processor) to store personal data, manage a database, and provide technical support and maintenance on its behalf. A legal representative of the controller, who was responsible for ensuring that the controller complied with the GDPR, had not concluded a valid contract defining the contractual relationship with the processor, regulating the processing operations entrusted to it. Holding — The DPA held that the controller had violated Article 28(3) GDPR and issued the controller a fine of €1,282. It concluded that the legal representative of the controller had failed to properly conclude the contractual relationship with the processor: the processing operations carried out by the processor were not governed by a contract or other legal act in accordance with EU or Member State law, setting out the obligations of the processor. As the representative acted in the performance of their duties as an employee and on behalf of the controller, the DPA held that the controller was liable for the infringement as the responsible legal entity.

### NAIH fines online store HUF 15M for transparency and Article 12(1) GDPR violations

*Source: NAIH (Hungary), 2026-05-12 — https://overview.legal/posts/184727 — original: https://gdprhub.eu/index.php?title=NAIH_(Hungary)_-_NAIH-450-7-2026*

Facts — The DPA initiated an investigation into the processing of personal data of customers (the data subjects) by the operator of an online store (the controller) in April 2025. The period under review extended from January 2020 to November 2025. During this time, the company had multiple privacy notices in force, as well as other documents that contained relevant information on the processing of personal data. Holding — The DPA found the controller guilty of multiple GDPR violations and issued it a fine of HUF 15,000,000 (€41,500). In addition, it ordered the controller to bring its processing operations in compliance with the GDPR by amending the information system used on its website, in particular the data processing provisions of the general terms and conditions and the data processing notices related to prize contests. First, the DPA held that the controller had violated the principle of transparency laid down in Article 5(1)(a) GDPR: several separate documents contained partially conflicting, irrelevant, and incomplete information regarding the processing of personal data. The information was not organised within a uniform, transparent system. Second, the DPA determined that the controller had failed to provide concise, transparent, and intelligible information regarding the purposes and the legal basis for each processing activity and therefore infringed Article 12(1) GDPR. Finally, the DPA found infringements of Articles 13(1) and 13(2) GDPR – the controller had not provided the data subjects all information necessary when personal data is collected from data subjects. In particular, the controller had failed to adequately distinguish the purposes and the legal bases for each processing operation, recipients of personal data, and retention periods. The controller’s website also contained contradictory information on whether or not personal data was transferred to the United States.

### DPD Polska sp. z o.o.: Insufficient data processing agreement

*Source: Polish National Personal Data Protection Office (UODO), 2026-02-05 — https://overview.legal/posts/53514 — original: https://www.enforcementtracker.com/ETid-3063*

Polish National Personal Data Protection Office (UODO) fined DPD Polska sp. z o.o. €2,682,000 on 2026-02-05 for: Insufficient data processing agreement.

### SENDING TRANSPORTE Y COMUNICACIÓN, S.A.: Insufficient data processing agreement

*Source: Spanish Data Protection Authority (aepd), 2025-10-22 — https://overview.legal/posts/49056 — original: https://www.enforcementtracker.com/ETid-2941*

The Spanish DPA has imposed a fine of EUR 80,000 on SENDING TRANSPORTE Y COMUNICACIÓN, S.A. The fined entity is a subprocessor of the controller. It appointed another subcontractor without being allowed to do so, using an inadequate DPA.

## Recent developments

### Strengthening data protection worldwide: EDPB meets with the countries and organisation with an adequacy decision

*Source: European Data Protection Board, 2025-12-03 — https://overview.legal/posts/49123 — original: https://www.edpb.europa.eu/news/news/2025/strengthening-data-protection-worldwide-edpb-meets-countries-and-organisation_en*

Brussels, 3 December - As part of its December’s plenary meeting, the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) held yesterday an online meeting with Commissioners and representatives of Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) from the countries and the organisation with an EU adequacy decision. This meeting marked the second of its kind, following the first gathering in October 2024. An adequacy decision is a key-mechanism in EU data protection legislation which allows free flow of personal data from Eu

### Coordinated Enforcement Framework: EDPB selects topic for 2026

*Source: EDPB, 2025-10-14 — https://overview.legal/posts/49129 — original: https://www.edpb.europa.eu/news/news/2025/coordinated-enforcement-framework-edpb-selects-topic-2026_en*

Brussels, 14 October - During its October plenary, the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) picked the topic for its fifth coordinated enforcement action, which will concern compliance with the obligations of transparency and information under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The GDPR ensures that individuals are informed when their data is being processed (under Art. 12, 13 and 14). This right to be informed is a core element of transparency and ensures that individuals have more

### Hunton geeft een samenvatting van twee artikelen uit de nieuwe SCC-richtlijnen: het onderdeel over "lokale wetgeving en toegang tot overheidsinstanties".

*Source: DataGuidance, 2022-10-18 — https://overview.legal/posts/51831*

Volgens artikel 14 van de Standaard Contractuele Bepalingen (SCC's) voor gegevensuitwisseling, moet de partij die de gegevens importeert een risicoanalyse uitvoeren om te verifiëren of de wet- en regelgeving en praktijken van het ontvangende derde land de mogelijkheid van de gegevensimporteur om te voldoen aan de SCC's voor gegevensuitwisseling, kunnen belemmeren. Indien de risicoanalyse aantoont dat de SCC's voor gegevensuitwisseling op zichzelf niet voldoende zijn om een in wezen gelijkwaardig beschermingsniveau te garanderen voor de persoonsgegevens in het ontvangende derde land, moeten aanvullende waarborgen worden geïmplementeerd, zoals end-to-end-versleuteling.

### What Happened to the Risk-Based Approach to Data Transfers?

*Source: Future of Privacy Forum, 2022-09-27 — https://overview.legal/posts/6271 — original: https://fpf.org/blog/what-happened-to-the-risk-based-approach-to-data-transfers/#entry-912*

The GDPR incorporates the RBA for all obligations of the controller in the GDPR. Where the transfer rules are stated as obligations of the controller (rather than as absolute principles), the RBA of Article 24 therefore applies. Other than the DPAs assume, this is not contradicted by the ECJ in Schrems II nor by the EDPB recommendations on additional measures following the Schrems II judgment, according to Lokke Moerel, Professor of Global ICT Law at Tilburg University and a Dutch Cyber Security

### Strengthening data protection globally: The European Data Protection Board (EDPB) is meeting with countries and organizations that have an adequacy decision.

*Source: EDPB, 2025-12-03 — https://overview.legal/posts/52055*

Brussels, December 3rd - During its plenary meeting in December, the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) held an online meeting yesterday with commissioners and representatives from national data protection authorities (DPAs) from the countries and organizations that have made a decision regarding adequate protection within the EU. This meeting was the second of its kind, following the first meeting in October 2024. A decision on adequate protection is an important instrument in EU data protection legislation, enabling the free flow of personal data from within the EU.

## Literature

### Unprotected Processing by Default vs Data Protection by Design and by Default Under the GDPR for Schrems II and GDPR

*Source: SSRN Electronic Journal, 2022-01-01 — https://overview.legal/posts/132477 — original: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4018408*

### Council of Europe ∙ Convention 108+, the GDPR, and Data Processing in the National Security Domain

*Source: European Data Protection Law Review, 2022-01-01 — https://overview.legal/posts/132483 — original: https://doi.org/10.21552/edpl/2022/3/14*

### GDPR Implementation Series ∙ Malta: An Overview of the GDPR Implementation

*Source: European Data Protection Law Review, 2020-01-01 — https://overview.legal/posts/132480 — original: https://doi.org/10.21552/edpl/2020/4/15*

### GDPR Implementation Series ∙ Hungary: Introduction to the GDPR Application and a Brief History of Data Protection

*Source: European Data Protection Law Review, 2019-01-01 — https://overview.legal/posts/132426 — original: https://doi.org/10.21552/edpl/2019/4/11*

### GDPR Implementation Series ∙ Portugal: A Brief Overview of the GDPR Implementation

*Source: European Data Protection Law Review, 2019-01-01 — https://overview.legal/posts/132482 — original: https://doi.org/10.21552/edpl/2019/4/12*

## Related topics

- **Supervisory Authorities** — https://overview.legal/topics/supervisory-authorities
  National data protection authorities and their powers
- **Processing** — https://overview.legal/topics/verwerking
  Any operation performed on personal data
- **Personal Data** — https://overview.legal/topics/persoonsgegevens
  Information relating to identified or identifiable natural persons
- **Controllers** — https://overview.legal/topics/controllers
  Entities that determine purposes and means of processing
- **Data Controller** — https://overview.legal/topics/verwerkingsverantwoordelijke
  The entity that determines purposes and means of processing personal data
- **Law Enforcement** — https://overview.legal/topics/law-enforcement
  Processing for law enforcement purposes

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