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Rydo Telecom (the controller) is a telecommunications provider

In 2023, a data subject made an access request following a dispute with the controller on whether the data subject received two phones they had purchased from the controller.

District Court Noord-Holland
Summary

The data subject informed the controller in a letter that they intended to claim costs in the event that it did not respond to the request. The controller began investigating the data subject and found a similar claim against PostNL (one of the controller’s suppliers). According to PostNL, the data subject had made a similar claim that it had failed to deliver the two phones. The data subject later filed a case with the Amsterdam sub district court after the controller refused to respond to the request. The court dismissed the data subject’s claim for reimbursement of €2,908, on the grounds that the data subject had accused both companies of the same issue, and had left the hearing early. The data subject continued to reiterate their access request in 2024, and received a response from the controller in 2025. The controller stated that it no longer had data related to them beyond their email address in connection to the previous lawsuit. The data subject filed a case with the sub district court in 2026, who later referred the case to the court. The data subject requested the court to order the controller to provide full access to their data, subject to a penalty for noncompliance. Holding — The court first noted that the data subject had filed approximately 20 GDPR request cases with the sub district court within one year against different controllers. The court then assessed whether the data subject’s request was abusive within the meaning of Article 12(5) GDPR. This includes an objective and subjective element following CJEU case law (Brillen Rottler). According to the CJEU, the subjective element requires the data subject to intend to obtain a benefit by artificially creating the conditions to receive said benefit. Publicly available information can be used for this assessment. The court considered that the data subject had abused their right. The court took into consideration other cases the data subject had initiated, and considered that the data subject had a financial motive for their requests rather than a genuine concern to assess their personal data or verify the lawfulness of its processing. The court gave as an example the fact that the data subject had insisted that the controller reach a settlement in the form of paying compensation or damages. The court dismissed the case. Since there was an established abuse of rights, the court saw no need to assess the merits of the data subject’s claim.

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¶0

1 The proceedings 1.1 The further course of the proceedings is evident from: - the interlocutory order of 4 June 2026, - the notice regarding the provision of security by Weelen, - the email of 4 June 2026 from Weelen. 1.2 The order was set for today. 2 Facts 2.1. [Petitioner] appeared as authorized representative in the proceedings of a third party, Mr. [name] (hereinafter: [name]), against Rydo, represented by Mr. Giltay Veth. These proceedings concerned the order of two Apple phones via Rydo's website, in which the receipt of the phones was disputed and the purchase amount was reclaimed. Rydo initiated an investigation following threats of legal action and, to that end, contacted PostNL, among others.

¶2.2

On December 20, 2023, [petitioner] sent an email to Rydo containing a request for access pursuant to the General Data Protection Regulation (hereinafter: GDPR). In that email, he included: ‘It appears that you are spreading stories about me. Unfounded stories that can unequivocally be classified as defamation/slander. Moreover, your actions also create the impression of misuse of my personal data. I do not know you. Therefore, please answer the questions below within 5 working days from today. - What data you hold about me - How you obtained my data - Why you retain my data - How long you retain my data - Whether I have given consent to retain my data - How I have given consent to retain my data - With whom you have shared this data or with whom you intend to share this data - Whether I have given consent to share this data. - Since when you have been using this data - Why you use this data - How you use my data - Whether I have given consent to use my data - How I have given consent to use my data - Whether and how automated decisions are made regarding my data. I am asking you these questions in the context of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Therefore, I point out that you are legally obliged to provide me with the requested information.’

¶2.3

On behalf of Rydo, Mr. Giltay Veth responded by email dated December 22, 2023. He writes, among other things: ‘For the time being, regarding your most recent GDPR claim, I see no reason to advise the client to comply with it. I also confirm that I am acting on behalf of Mr. [respondent] (court addition: Rydo) in this GDPR matter. I therefore request that you direct further communication exclusively to me, at the request of Mr. [respondent].’

¶2.4

On December 29, 2023, [petitioner] sent a formal notice to Rydo. In this email, [petitioner] included, among other things, the following: ‘For the sake of completeness, I claim the extrajudicial costs in the event that You do not comply with this formal notice. These amount to EUR 925.00 ex. VAT and have been calculated in accordance with BGK 2013. No – or an incomplete – response means that I will proceed to summon your company, as you are legally obliged to provide me with the requested information.’

¶2.5

On May 2, 2024, the sub-district court judge of the Amsterdam District Court issued a judgment in the case between [name] and Rydo.1 In this judgment, the court rejected [name]’s claim for repayment of € 2,908. In this judgment, the sub-district court judge considered the following for the sake of completeness: ‘[defendant] (court addition: Rydo) initiated an investigation after [name] threatened legal action against him. During this investigation, the supplier of [defendant] immediately recognized [name]’s claim as well as the name of [petitioner] (hereinafter: [petitioner]). The supplier received a similar claim from its customer, which also involved an order for two telephones (…), in which [petitioner] stated that the telephones were not delivered to his address by PostNL (…) Neither [name] nor his representative responded to the summons to appear at the oral hearing. However, [petitioner] did appear but left the hearing prematurely because he could not participate in the proceedings without authorization from [name]. The non-appearance of [name] and his representative confirmed [respondent]'s doubts that both persons do not exist. [respondent] made various attempts to ascertain the identity of [name] and his representative, without success. (…) The Chamber of Commerce extract for Webshop Juristen B.V. shows [petitioner] as the sole shareholder and 0 employees; this does not correspond with [name]'s assertion that the representative is employed there. [petitioner] is connected to this case in a remarkable manner. The payment for the phones was made via iDEAL using an account of mvwebdesign B.V., of which [petitioner] is the sole shareholder. Additionally, [petitioner] is the sole shareholder of Webshopjuristen.nl, where the authorized representative is allegedly employed.’

¶2.6

In an email dated January 12, 2024, addressed to Mr. Giltay Veth and Rydo, [petitioner] announces that he will proceed with issuing a summons, because Rydo’s uncooperative attitude leaves him no choice.

¶2.7

In an email dated July 10, 2024, to Mr. Giltay Veth and Rydo, [petitioner] points out that his GDPR request has not been heeded: ‘You are given one more week to do so entirely voluntarily, and otherwise I will proceed with issuing a summons. Your client will then have your ‘refusal advice’ to thank for that, so for his sake I hope you offer free services.’

¶2.8

On May 19, 2025, PostNL’s Special Customer Responses department included the following in a letter to [petitioner]: ‘PostNL hereby declares, without acknowledging any liability, that it stated, inter alia in an email dated May 19, 2023, that shipments had allegedly been systematically and frequently reported as missing by Mr. [petitioner]. It cannot verify this statement by PostNL. It is therefore possible that the employee made this statement incorrectly, especially since only one concrete case is mentioned in the email from the Special Customer Responses employee. In any case, PostNL draws no conclusions from this statement. PostNL realizes that Mr. [petitioner] may have experienced inconvenience due to the statement made because third parties have, as Mr. [petitioner] indicates, drawn the conclusion from this that Mr. [petitioner] incorrectly reported these shipments as not received. It was not PostNL’s intention to imply this, and it apologizes for the situation that has arisen.’

¶2.9

On July 1, 2025 (at 08:31), [petitioner] contacts Mr. Giltay Veth and Rydo again by email. In doing so, he refers to his GDPR information request of December 2023. Additionally, he writes, among other things: ‘If I do not receive a full and substantive response from you within five working days, I will summon you to court. In doing so, I will demand the following: - Immediate full compliance with my GDPR request; - Imposition of a penalty payment of €350 per day that you remain in default, with a maximum of €25,000. - Full reimbursement of all incurred (extra)judicial costs; - Any additional measures that the judge deems appropriate, given your intentional and persistent refusal. (…) I am giving you one last chance. No response, an incomplete response, or the repetition of legal smokescreens will inevitably lead to a summons, with all the associated costs and consequences.’

¶2.10

Rydo replied by email on July 1, 2025 (at 10:45 AM) as follows: ‘We no longer have any data regarding you in our system. In connection with the lawsuit against Mr. [name], we had the following from you: Your email address. Your name The PostNL statement the file has been closed and the data has been removed from our system.’ 2.11. [Petitioner] replied by email on July 1, 2025 (at 11:10 AM). In this email, he gives Rydo ‘one final, fatal deadline of 5 working days to provide full access’.

¶2.12

Rydo responds by email on July 1, 2025 (at 11:16 AM). This email includes, among other things: ‘My response was submitted in consultation with the Data Protection Authority.’ 2.13. [Petitioner] sends the following response by email on July 1, 2025 (at 5:24 PM), among other things: ‘Your latest response truly defies all legal logic and confirms once again your unwillingness to comply with the law. (…) Therefore, I state the following to you perfectly clearly: You have another 5 working days to fully comply with my GDPR request, including: - Access to the (former) processing of my data; - Demonstrable proof of deletion. By an independent third party - Information regarding any provision of data to third parties; - The complete processing history.You must provide me with the following in writing within the same timeframe: - With whom you spoke at the AP; - Exactly what the content and outcome of that consultation were; - Whether the AP actually gave you permission to continue refusing my request (which is legally impossible). And what evidence supports this, If you do not fully comply with this, the following will follow without further notice: A summons to court, including a claim for performance, damages, and a penalty payment of € 300 per day that you refuse to provide access. All this separate from court fees, bailiff costs, legal costs, and of course your costs for your own lawyer. An official report to the Data Protection Authority regarding your structural refusal, misuse of their name, and frustration of my rights. Or we can settle this matter for a payment of € 3,250 from you so that this can be closed. In that case, I would like to hear from you no later than July 3rd, 12:00 PM. Please note: this is a one-off proposal, from which no rights can be derived, to prevent further costs. (…).’

¶2.14

After the summons was issued, Mr. Giltay Veth requests [petitioner] by email dated July 24, 2025, to send the contact details of his authorized representative Mr. M. Weelen (email and telephone). 2.15. [Petitioner] replies a few minutes later that same day by email as follows: ‘If your client wishes to reach an amicable settlement, you may submit that to me. Furthermore, there is no reason whatsoever for contact now that your client is letting it come to legal proceedings. On your advice, I believe that was…’

¶3

The request

¶3.1

By deed dated May 27, 2026, and during the oral hearing, [petitioner] reduced his request. He now requests the court – in summary – to order Rydo, by means of a provisionally enforceable order, to provide [petitioner] with full access to all personal data, subject to a penalty payment of € 250 per day with a maximum of € 35,000, and to order Rydo to pay the legal costs in accordance with the applicable liquidation tariff, plus statutory interest. 3.2. [Petitioner] has not maintained the initially submitted requests for payment of extrajudicial costs and an order to pay the actual legal costs.

¶3.3

In support of his request, [petitioner] argues that Rydo refuses to respond to his request for access and thereby violates statutory obligations under the GDPR. In addition, Rydo suggests that [petitioner] is guilty of fraud. These statements by Rydo constitute defamation, and there is absolutely no question of fraud.

¶3.4

Rydo submits a defense and primarily argues that [petitioner] should be declared inadmissible in his request. In the alternative, the request should be dismissed. Referring to the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter: CJEU) of 19 March 2026, Rydo argues that [petitioner]'s excessive requests to multiple parties constitute an abuse of law. Rydo argues that [petitioner] is making the access requests under the GDPR in order to profit from them. [Petitioner] has also made multiple settlement proposals to Rydo. Rydo further requests the court to investigate ex officio whether [petitioner]'s representative is an existing person. In its own investigation, Rydo was unable to establish the existence and identity of representative Weelen. No company belonging to or related to representative Weelen was found in the Trade Register of the Chamber of Commerce at the address provided. There are also no hits on representative Weelen via Google. Furthermore, it does not appear from rechtspraak.nl that Weelen has ever previously acted as a representative in judicial proceedings. In addition, Rydo points to the condition of Article 12 paragraph 6 of the GDPR, which includes the obligation that the person requesting personal data must have their identity established. [Petitioner] has not complied with this. It is clear from the statement of defense submitted by Rydo in the proceedings against [name] at the District Court of Amsterdam which personal data of [petitioner] Rydo holds. It is therefore clear to [petitioner] which personal data Rydo holds, how these were obtained, for what purpose Rydo processed them, and for what purpose Rydo must process them for the current proceedings. Rydo has used these data for judicial proceedings, which is permitted under the GDPR. [Petitioner] therefore has no interest in his GDPR request.

¶4

The assessment Security

¶4.1

In the interlocutory order of 4 June 2026, the court ordered [petitioner] to provide security for the legal costs to which he might be ordered in the main proceedings no later than 15 June 2026, while simultaneously providing written proof thereof to the court. On June 17, 2026, the court received a copy of a bank statement on behalf of [petitioner] showing that on June 11, 2026, an amount of €1,647 was transferred to Rydo with the notation ‘guarantee 224 Rv – decision 4 6 2026’. By transferring this sum of money, [petitioner] provided security in the prescribed manner, so that the case can proceed. [Petitioner]’s objection to the submitted documents

¶4.2

By email dated June 4, 2026, [petitioner] reiterated his earlier objection to the combination of a written and oral defense by Rydo. According to [petitioner], Rydo wrongly combined three routes, namely a statement of defense, a supplementary statement of defense, and an oral defense at the hearing using speaking notes, whereas [petitioner] had objected to this beforehand. [Petitioner] therefore expressly requests the court to disregard these documents (in part).

¶4.3

The court will not grant this request. Although the proceedings in the case were closed following the conclusion of the oral hearing on June 1, 2026, and the email from [petitioner] is dated June 4, 2026, the court sees reason to nevertheless address [petitioner]'s objection, because [petitioner] has raised this objection in several cases.

¶4.4

Pursuant to the Act3, any interested party may submit a statement of defence up to the commencement of the proceedings. Pursuant to the National Rules on Procedural Rules for Petition Procedures in District Courts: Sub-district, Commercial, and Preliminary Relief Judge4, parties may present and submit brief speaking notes at the oral hearing. [Petitioner]'s assertion that a written defence cannot be combined with an oral hearing is therefore incorrect.

¶4.5

In this case, the following is additional. This case—and other cases initiated by [petitioner] before the Sub-district Court—is characterized by an atypical course of proceedings. The case was first heard by the sub-district court, and Rydo (like several other defendant parties) filed a statement of defense with the sub-district court. Because [petitioner] bases his claims on the assertion that Rydo does not comply with Article 15 of the GDPR, the sub-district court referred these (and the other) cases to the district court for further handling in the petitions chamber. In doing so, Rydo was given the opportunity by the sub-district court—due to the payment of court fees at the district court—to state whether it wished to present an oral or written defense. Rydo chose to present a written defense, which entails that the statement of defense already filed is considered by the district court as a statement of defense.

applies Art. 15
¶4.6

The district court does not consider it contrary to procedural law or the proper conduct of proceedings that Rydo further explained its position regarding the alleged violation of Article 15 of the GDPR in a supplementary statement of defense (and prior to the oral hearing). It has not appeared to the court that [petitioner] was unable to respond sufficiently to the supplementary statement of defence. On the contrary, [petitioner] acknowledges in his email that the oral hearing as such was not an objection for him. Rydo's very brief speaking notes, written out on half an A4 page, are no more than a brief explanation and contain no new or additional defence. There is therefore no reason to disregard them either. Finally, the court considers it important that not only Rydo, but also [petitioner], made additions and submitted new documents at various times. After all, he submitted additional documents by deed of 4 May 2026, providing an (extensive) explanation in connection therewith, and amended his requests by deed of 27 May 2026. Those documents are also included in the assessment. 4.7. [Petitioner]'s objection therefore fails, and all documents, both those of Rydo and those of [petitioner], form part of the case file. Abuse of rights Introduction

applies Art. 15
¶4.8

Rydo's defense that there is an abuse of rights is Rydo's most far-reaching defense. If this defense succeeds, [petitioner] must be declared inadmissible in his request.5 The court will then not proceed to a substantive assessment of [petitioner]'s request. For that reason, the court will first address this defense of Rydo.

¶4.9

In assessing the defense that [petitioner] is abusing his rights, the court prioritizes the following. This case of [petitioner] against Rydo does not stand alone. Specifically, approximately twenty cases were initiated by [petitioner] before the sub-district court of the District Court of North Holland from mid-2025 up to and including April 2026. All these cases concern GDPR requests from [petitioner] to various companies. The sub-district court referred all these cases to the trade sector. In a similar GDPR case brought by [petitioner] against another company, the court is also ruling today.6 In that case, the court addressed the assessment framework in detail, which is also applicable in this case. Explicit reference is therefore made to it, so that the court will suffice below with a shortened summary thereof. In that case, the court ruled that [petitioner] was abusing his rights and declared his request inadmissible. In this case, the court reaches the same conclusion.Assessment Framework

¶4.10

Article 3:13 paragraph 1 of the Dutch Civil Code states that ‘a person to whom a power is granted cannot invoke that power insofar as he abuses it’. Restraint is appropriate when assuming abuse of (procedural) law.

applies Art. 3
¶4.11

Article 12 paragraph 5 of the GDPR gives the controller the option – among other things – to refuse to comply with manifestly unfounded or excessive requests, particularly because of the repetitive nature of these requests. This concerns cases of abuse of law. It is up to the controller to demonstrate the manifestly unfounded or excessive nature of the request. The EDPB Guidelines7 state that a request may be deemed excessive when (for example) a person submits a request but simultaneously offers to withdraw it in exchange for some benefit to the controller.8

¶4.12

In assessing the claim of abuse of rights, the judgment of the CJEU of 19 March 2026 on the application of Article 12(5) of the GDPR is of importance, inter alia. According to this judgment, proof of abuse requires, on the one hand, a set of objective circumstances and, on the other hand, a subjective element, namely ‘the intention of the data subject to obtain a benefit conferred by Union legislation by artificially creating the conditions under which the right to that benefit arises. Furthermore, for such a qualification, all the facts and circumstances of the case must be taken into account.’ In this regard, account may be taken of publicly accessible information showing that the data subject systematically submits requests for access to his personal data and claims for damages to various controllers following a similar pattern. Application of the assessment framework to this case 4.13. It appears from the applicable assessment framework that the bar for assuming abuse of rights under Article 3:13 of the Dutch Civil Code, viewed in conjunction with Article 12(5) of the GDPR, is set high and that restraint must be exercised when assuming abuse. However, the Court is of the opinion (also) in this case that sufficient weighty grounds have been demonstrated justifying the conclusion that [petitioner] is abusing his rights with his request. The manner in which [petitioner] initiated the proceedings in this file, and in other files, and communicated with Rydo, shows that [petitioner] has a financial motive behind his requests and that he is not genuinely seeking access to his personal data or verifying the accuracy of this data and the lawfulness of the processing. Although, in principle, it must be assessed on a case-by-case basis whether there is an abuse of rights, this case cannot be viewed in isolation from the other comparable cases that [petitioner] has brought before the court.9 It is precisely the pattern in the working method and procedural conduct visible in these and other cases that contributes significantly to the judgment that [petitioner] is abusing the rights.

¶4.14

To substantiate its judgment that there is an abuse of rights, the court first of all refers expressly to its reasoned judgment in the order mentioned under 4.9, which is based—in short—on the procedural conduct and working method of [petitioner], the involvement of (alleged) representatives, and the role of Webshop Juristen. Such circumstances are also present and alleged in the present case. For instance, in this case too, [petitioner] announced extrajudicial costs at an early stage and repeatedly threatened legal proceedings, in which penalty payments, all incurred (extra)judicial costs, and damages would be claimed. Here too, [petitioner] subsequently insisted on several occasions on a settlement in the form of payment of compensation (for damages) by Rydo. It is striking that there has been a considerable lapse of time between, on the one hand, the emails from [petitioner] dated 1 July 2025, containing, inter alia, a settlement proposal for €3,250, and, on the other hand, the request for access dated 21 December 2023 and the last message from [petitioner] to Rydo on 10 July 2024. This does not create the impression that [petitioner] genuinely wanted clarity regarding his personal data. Moreover, the court is aware ex officio that [petitioner] has also submitted various GDPR access requests to other companies since July 2025, the moment he again turned to Rydo in this case. Furthermore, in this case as well, [petitioner] claimed in the summons, without written substantiation, reimbursement of extrajudicial collection costs and reimbursement of actual legal costs, and subsequently—without proper or convincing explanation—reduced his request to merely access to his personal data subject to a penalty payment. It is important in this regard that this reduction took place in this instance only shortly before the hearing. The court also considers it important that [petitioner] noted during the oral hearing that a request for damages may also be raised in another procedure. It is therefore not plausible that he no longer has a financial motive regarding his GDPR request.

¶4.15

Finally, in this case as well, [petitioner] requested reimbursement of legal costs, initially concerning actual legal costs, while Rydo expressed its justified doubts regarding the actual existence of authorized representative Weelen. Authorized representative Weelen proved untraceable for Rydo, and direct and personal contact with Weelen did not take place. [Petitioner] knew that Rydo suspected that Weelen did not exist. After all, Rydo had already raised this in its defense. Nevertheless, [petitioner] chose not to provide clarity regarding the existence and identity of the authorized representative. In any case, it was incumbent upon him to be assisted by this representative at the hearing, but this did not happen. [Petitioner] has not provided a good or plausible reason for this. Consequently, [petitioner] has failed to make the existence of representative Weelen plausible. He is held accountable for this.

¶4.16

As was also considered in the decision referred to under 4.9, [petitioner] employed the described course of action not only with regard to his request for access to Rydo, but also in other cases. This concerns, among other things, the other GDPR requests made by [petitioner] against various other companies that were heard at the hearing of June 1, 2026, as well as the approximately twenty other cases pending before the court. [Petitioner] has engaged in similar communication and procedural approach in these cases as in this case and—using virtually identical summonses and documents—claimed substantial damages and/or reimbursement of costs. Virtually all cases pending before this and other courts originate from an online order by [petitioner] or registration for other reasons, followed some time later by a GDPR request. In those cases, too, [petitioner] insisted at an early stage and repeatedly on the payment of compensation by the companies involved, and in those cases as well—or at least in the cases heard in court—[petitioner] amended and reduced his request shortly before the hearing without further explanation. It is important in this regard that in most of these cases, an appeal based on abuse of rights was also made.

¶4.17

Furthermore, the court is aware ex officio that similar cases have been initiated at least before the District Courts of Rotterdam and Central Netherlands. During the oral hearing in the case referred to in paragraph 4.9, [petitioner] stated, when asked, that he had made approximately 90 requests for access to records under the GDPR over the past year and a half. The companies that refused to comply with that request or provided no or insufficient access are the companies against which he ultimately initiated proceedings.

¶4.18

Finally, the court takes into account that [petitioner]'s working method and conduct during the proceedings have also been noted by other judges. This led to the rejection of the claim and, in some cases, even to an order to pay the actual legal costs, as was also established in the decision referred to in paragraph 4.9.10

¶4.19

From the foregoing, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that [petitioner], by making use of the possibilities of the GDPR, deliberately constructed a situation that enables him to obtain compensation from the companies concerned. There is therefore a pattern. In this regard, the court cannot escape the impression that [petitioner] is taking advantage of these companies' unfamiliarity with the content and operation of the GDPR and of those companies' fear of being ordered to pay high compensation. Conclusion

¶4.20

Because [petitioner] is abusing his right, the court will declare [petitioner]'s request inadmissible. Consequently, an assessment of the request on its merits will not be undertaken. Order for costs

¶4.21

Rydo requests that [petitioner] be ordered to pay the legal costs and subsequent costs. The court sets Rydo's legal costs (including subsequent costs) at an amount of (€ 735 in court fees + € 1,306 in attorney fees and € 189 in subsequent costs = ) € 2,230. [Petitioner] provided security in the amount of € 1,647 on June 11, 2026. In view of the court's judgment in this case, this amount is due to Rydo and shall be deducted from what [petitioner] still has to pay, so that an additional amount of (€ 2,230 - € 1,647 =) € 583 remains. The court will award the statutory interest requested by Rydo as set out below.

¶5

The Decision The Court 5.1. declares [petitioner] inadmissible in his petition, 5.2. orders [petitioner] to pay the legal costs of € 2,230.00, less the amount already paid of € 1,647.00, and the remainder of € 583.00 to be paid within fourteen days after notification to that effect, to be increased by € 98.00 plus the costs of service if [petitioner] fails to comply with this order in a timely manner and the decision is subsequently served, 5.3. orders [petitioner] to pay statutory interest as referred to in Article 6:119 of the Dutch Civil Code on the legal costs if these are not paid within fourteen days after notification, 5.4. declares this decision provisionally enforceable insofar as the order to pay legal costs is concerned. This decision was rendered by Mr. S. Slijkhuis and pronounced in public on 13 July 2026. 1 Amsterdam District Court 2 May 2024, ECLI:NL:RBAMS: 2024:2774. 2 Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 19 March 2026, C-526/24 (Brillen Rottler/ TC). 3 Article 282 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 4 Article 1.6.9. 5 Council of State 24 August 2022, ECLI:NL:RVS:2022:2403.

applies Art. 1Art. 6
¶6

ECLI:NL:RBNHO:2026:8285.

¶7

The EDPB Guidelines are guidelines published by the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) clarifying various topics from the GDPR.

¶8

Note 190 of EDPB Guidelines.

¶9

Cf. Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State, 24 August 2022, ECLI:NL:RVS:2022:2403, legal ground 5.4.

¶10

Amsterdam District Court 2 May 2024, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2024:2774, Rotterdam District Court 21 November 2025, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2025:13631, North Holland District Court 24 December 2025, ECLI:NL:RBNHO:2025:15801, North Holland District Court 19 January 2024, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2024:299, North Holland District Court 16 July 2025, ECLI:NL:RBNHO:2025:7793 and North Holland District Court 17 June 2026, ECLI:NL:RBNHO:2026:6889. Help with searching An extensive manual is available for searching for judgments, including explanations regarding: Search by date of judgment/publication Search by keywords Search by ECLI or LJN Search by area of law Finding locations for judgments Finding judgments at locations Selection criteria The Judiciary, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands, and the Council of State publish judgments based on selection criteria: Judgments in multi-judge chamber cases Judgments of the Supreme Court and appellate courts Judgments with media attention Judgments in criminal cases European law Guideline judgments Recusal Full selection criteria Weekly overview Select a week and view which judgments have been added to the judgment register in that week. Weekly overview of judgments English Sitemap Privacy Cookies Accessibility Spoofing Vacancies Archive Disclaimer Follow us twitter facebook facebook linkedin youtube Stay up to date rss email