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Enforcement·AEPD (Spain)·ps-00287-2025EN
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AEPD fines DGT for unnecessary data transmission via DGT mobile app push notifications

StatusNot cited by any decision here yet

Original title: AEPD (Spain) - ps-00287-2025

Holding

The DPA held that the controller violated Article 5(1)(c) GDPR because the app collected and transmitted personal data that were not necessary for its intended purposes. In particular, the DPA considered that information such as IP addresses, country and mobile network operator data exceeded what was necessary for the app's functionality. The DPA also considered IP addresses to be personal data because they can allow a user to be identified when combined with other information. The controller's subsequent technical changes did not remove the infringement that had already occurred. Therefore, the DPA found a violation of Article 5(1)(c) GDPR. Since the controller was a public authority subject to Article 77 LOPDGDD, the DPA found the infringement without imposing an administrative fine.

From GDPRhub’s case note — a summary of the decision, not its own words.Read it in the text ↓

Summary

Facts — A data subject lodged a complaint with the DPA against the Dirección General de Tráfico (DGT), the controller, the Spanish public authority responsible for traffic management, road safety and the administration of driving licences and vehicle records, after discovering that its mobile app transmitted numerous categories of personal and device data to a third-party service provider, the processor. The controller explained that the processor's software was integrated into the app to provide push notifications. However, the integration also enabled an optional functionality which transmitted usage and device data that were not necessary for providing those notifications. During its investigation, the DPA found that different versions of the app transmitted data including IP addresses, device information, country, language, app identifiers and information concerning the user's mobile network operator. The controller acknowledged that older versions of the app had transmitted personal data unnecessarily and implemented technical changes aimed at stopping the collection and transmission of such data.

Full text

Machine translation of the decision, via GDPRhub — not the official text.Read the original

Case No.: EXP202317928 TABLE OF CONTENTS BACKGROUND..........................................................................................................2 FIRST: Filing of the Complaint........................................................................2 SECOND: Forwarding of the complaint and response from the respondent..................3 THIRD: Acceptance of the complaint for processing......................................................3 FOURTH: Preliminary investigative actions........................................................3 FIFTH: Decision to Initiate Disciplinary Proceedings..............................................33 SIXTH: Arguments Regarding the Agreement to Initiate Disciplinary Proceedings: Acknowledgment of Noncompliance and Measures Taken..............................................33 ESTABLISHED FACTS................................................................................................35 LEGAL GROUNDS.................................................................................................38 I Jurisdiction.........................................................................................................38 II Preliminary Issues...............................................................................................38 III Breach of Obligation. Data minimisation....................................................39 IV Classification of the violation of Article 5.1.c) of the GDPR and determination of the the statute of limitations.........................................................................................................41 V Notice of Violation..............................................................................................42 C/ Jorge Juan 6 www.aepd.es 28001 - Madrid sedeaepd.gob.es 2/27 DECISION ON SANCTIONING PROCEEDINGS Regarding the proceedings conducted by the Spanish Data Protection Agency and based on the following: BACKGROUND FIRST: Filing of a Complaint On November 17, 2023, a complaint was filed with the Spanish Data Protection Authority regarding a possible violation attributable to the GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF TRAFFIC, Tax ID No. Q2816003D (hereinafter, D.G.T.). The facts brought to the attention of this authority were as follows: The complainant states that he installed the ***APP.1 app from the General Directorate of Traffic on his cell phone. According to the complainant, after using the app, he discovered that 47 pieces of information about his device (location, GPS coordinates, cookies, microphone status, IP address, etc.) are sent to ***COMPANY.1. The complainant believes that his data is being used in an unusual and unnecessary manner. Along with the complaint, he provides a screenshot showing the data that is allegedly sent to ***ENTERPRISE.1: - Screenshot of the ***APP.1 app, showing the following data captured by ***BROWSER.1 (unofficial translation from German):  App version  Pixel density  App installation date  Operating system build number  Battery level  App name  Unique identifier  CPU data  Screen resolution  Network carrier  Device name  Time zone  Email address  Headphone status  Advertising ID from ***SISTEMA.2  Cookies  Gender  ZIP code  Device boot time  Country C/ Jorge Juan 6 www.aepd.es 28001 - Madrid sedeaepd.gob.es 3/27  Device language SECOND: Forwarding of the complaint and response from the respondent Pursuant to Article 65.4 of Organic Law 3/2018, of December 5, on Data Protection and Guarantee of Digital Rights (hereinafter LOPDGDD), said complaint was forwarded to the D.G.T. so that it could proceed with its analysis and inform this Agency within one month of the actions taken to comply with the requirements set forth in data protection regulations. On January 23, 2024, a response was received from the respondent to the referral made by this Agency, in which the following documentation and statements were provided: - That the app incorporates the ***APP.2 plugin from ***ENTERPRISE.1 for managing push notifications sent to the User’s mobile device. Additionally, this plugin includes a feature that sends usage data from the mobile device to ***APP.2. This data transmission has been taking place since January 13, 2020. - That this transmission of data to ***APP.2 is a feature independent of notification management. While it is necessary to incorporate the ***APP.2 plugin to send push notifications to mobile devices (a required feature of the app), it is optional for that plugin to send usage data to ***APP.2. That with this data, ***APP.2 allows for the display of (anonymous) User information in real time on various dashboards. - That the User account used to access ***APP.2 is used exclusively by the ***APP.1 development team. They are not aware of anyone else at the DGT using the data collected and sent to ***APP.2. - Since it is not necessary to enable the transmission of this data for the app enable the sending of push notifications to mobile devices, and since this data is not currently being used, we will proceed to disable the transmission of data to ***APP.2. - On January 10, 2024, the release of the new version of the app was approved, both on ***SYSTEM.1 and on ***SYSTEM.2, in which the transmission of data to ***APP.2 is deactivated. THIRD: Acceptance of the complaint for processing On January 30, 2024, in accordance with Article 65 of the LOPDGDD, the complaint was accepted for processing. FOURTH: Preliminary Investigative Steps The Subdirectorate General for Data Inspection proceeded to carry out preliminary investigative steps to clarify the facts of question, by virtue of the functions assigned to supervisory authorities under Article 57.1 and the powers granted under Article 58.1 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (General Data Protection Regulation, hereinafter GDPR), and in accordance with the provisions of Title VIII of the LOPDGDD. C/ Jorge Juan 6 www.aepd.es 28001 - Madrid sedeaepd.gob.es 4/27 As a result of the actions taken, the following facts have come to light: 1. On March 27, 2024, it was verified that the privacy policy at the URL (…) states: - The controller is the General Directorate of Traffic. - There is a link to the Ministry of the Interior’s Register of Processing Activities, which, in turn, lists a processing operation named “***APP.1” whose controller is the General Directorate of Traffic, and furthermore: “[…] Purpose of Processing: Querying data pertaining to vehicle owners or their driver’s licenses and compiling statistics. Legal basis (legitimacy) under the GDPR: Article 6(1)(a)—the data subject has given consent to the processing of their personal data for one or more specific purposes. Categories of Data Subjects Natural persons who are vehicle owners or hold a driver’s license. Categories of data First name, last name, identifier, date of birth, date of license issuance, remarks, license plate number, vehicle , penalty points. Categories of recipients No data disclosures are planned. International transfers No international data transfers are planned. […]” 2. On April 3, 2024, it was verified that: - No calls to external servers were detected in the app version on ***SYSTEM.2 and version 1.12.8. However, on ***SYSTEM.1 and using the same previous version of the app, calls were detected—among others—to (…). 3. On April 4, 2024, it was verified that: - In version 1.8.13 of the app on ***SYSTEM.2, obtained from the web portal ***URL.1, and using the ***BROWSER.1 browser with the “***APP.3” feature enabled, “150 tracking attempts” caused by the app and related to ***ENTERPRISE.1 were detected. - According to documentation published online at the domain ***DOMINIO.1: “***APP.3 is a feature in the ***NAVEGADOR.1 for ***SISTEMA.2 that helps block third-party trackers in your apps, even when you’re not using them. When App Tracking Protection is enabled, it will detect when other apps on your phone are about to send data to any of the third-party tracking companies on our list of app trackers and block most of those requests. You can get ***NAVEGADOR.1 ***APP.3 by installing our ***NAVEGADOR.1 Private Browser ***SISTEMA.2 app and then going to ***APP.3 in the 'More from ***NAVEGADOR.1’ sections of settings” [Unofficial translation from English: “***APP.3 is a feature of the ***NAVEGADOR.1 private browser designed to ***SISTEMA.2 that helps block 3 third-party trackers in your apps, even when you’re not using them. When ***APP.3 is enabled, it will detect C/ Jorge Juan 6 www.aepd.es 28001 - Madrid sedeaepd.gob.es 5/27 when other apps on your phone are about to send data to any of the 3 third-party Tracking enterprises listed in our list of app trackers and will block most of those requests. You can get Tracking protection for the ***NAVEGADOR.1 app by installing the ***SISTEMA.2 app from the private browser ***NAVEGADOR.1 and then access ***APP.3 in the “More from ***NAVEGADOR.1” sections.”] - Additionally, using the ***APP.4 app installed on the same mobile device ***SYSTEM.2 and version 1.8.13 of the app, the following calls to external servers are detected: (…) 4. On April 5, 2024, it was verified that: - According to the website ***URL.1, version 1.12.8 of the app was released on April 2, 2024; however, according to the device ***SYSTEM.2, version 1.12.8 was updated on March 20, 2024. - According to the website ***URL.1, version 1.8.13 of the app was released on January 27, 2023. - According to the ***ENTERPRISE.2 online app store, version 1.12.8 was released around April 2, 2024. - In the ***ENTERPRISE.1 online store, the app ***APP.4 is described as “[…] an privacy-friendly open-source app that lets you track, analyze, and block connections made by other apps on your device. It also lets you export a PCAP dump of the traffic, extract metadata, and much more![…]”. - As published on ***URL.2: “The app tracker blocklist is used by ***BROWSER.1 and ***APP.3, currently available in beta on ***SYSTEM.2 only. We build this list by interacting with popular ***SYSTEM.2 apps and identifying common third-party requests that are sharing personal data, unique identifiers, or other information that could be used for fingerprinting.[…] […] Questions • Where are the blocklists? (…) […] Format The blocklist is in JSON format and consists of objects: trackers packageNames entities Trackers Trackers are grouped by their domain[…]. The domain should be matched against outgoing requests to identify tracking attempts. Each tracker contains the following fields: owner Entity (usually a company) that controls this tracker C/ Jorge Juan 6 www.aepd.es 28001 - Madrid sedeaepd.gob.es 6/27 default The default behavior when blocking this tracker [block or ignore] […] PackageNames A list of ***SISTEMA.2 package names developed by entities that also engage in tracking. Each package name here is accompanied by the corresponding developer name as found in ***APP.5 entity data. Entities The entities object contains an entry for each of the trackers found in the blocklist and contains a single field signals The type of data the tracker collects (e.g., gps_coordinates) signals The type of data the tracker is known to collect. […]” [Unofficial translation from English: “The app tracking blocklist is used by ***BROWSER.1 ***APP.3, currently available in beta only on ***SYSTEM.2. We built this list by interacting with popular applications on ***SYSTEM.2 and identifying common requests from third-party requests that share personal data, unique identifiers, or other information that could be used for fingerprinting. […] Questions • Where are the blocklists located? (…) [...] Format The blocklist is in JSON format and consists of the following objects: trackers packageNames entities Trackers Trackers are grouped by their domain [...]. The scope must be checked against submitted requests to identify tracking attempts. Each tracker contains the following fields: entity—the owning entity (typically an enterprise) owner—who controls this tracker to by The default behavior when blocking this tracker [block or ignore] [...] PackageNames C/ Jorge Juan 6 www.aepd.es 28001 - Madrid sedeaepd.gob.es 7/27 A list of package names ***SISTEMA.2 compiled by entities that also participate in Tracking. Each package name here is accompanied by the name of the corresponding developer, as listed in the data from the entity ***APP.5. Entities The entities subject to objection contain an entry for each of the trackers listed on the blocklist and contain a single field signals The type of data collected by the tracker (for example, gps_coordinates) signals The types of data known to be collected by the tracker.[…]” - And as recorded in ***URL.2, the file ***FILE.1 contains, within (…) the following “signals” data: (…) SOME PARAMETERS TRANSMITTED (…) (…) (…) (…) 5. On May 30, 2024, the traffic transmitted by app version 1.8.13 was captured after it was launched. The app was downloaded from the website ***URL.1 and installed on a mobile device running the operating system ***SISTEMA.2. The detected, among others, the following calls and parameters extracted from said calls and sent to the following hosts or Internet addresses: 6. On June 3, 2024, and June 4, 2024, the traffic transmitted by app versions 1.11.4, 1.11.5, and 1.12.12 after they were launched. The apps were downloaded from the website ***URL.1 and installed on a mobile device running the ***SISTEMA.2 operating system. The following calls, among others, were detected, along with parameters extracted from those calls and sent to the following hosts or IP addresses: VERSION 1.11.4 ***SYSTEM.2 (released on 11/07/2023 according to ***URL.1) CALL SOME PARAMETERS TRANSMITTED (…) (…) (…) (…) C/ Jorge Juan 6 www.aepd.es 28001 - Madrid sedeaepd.gob.es 8/27 CALL SOME PARAMETERS TRANSMITTED (…) Parameters obtained from a decoding performed during proceedings on March 7, 2025: (…) (…) (…) (…) VERSION 1.11.5 (release date 01/15/2024 according to ***URL.1) While the app is running, it is not possible to access specific data about a logged-in User, such as vehicle data, as was possible in version 1.11.4 CALL SOME TRANSMITTED PARAMETERS (..) (…) (…) (…) (…) (…) There are no calls to the domain (…) that were present in version 1.11.4. VERSION 1.12.12 (published on 05/17/2024 according to ***URL.1) It is possible to access data resulting from the app's execution. Now, only calls to the domains (…) are detected, transmitting the following data: CALL SOME TRANSMITTED PARAMETERS (…) (…) (…) (…) There are no calls to the domain (…) that were detected in previous versions. 7. On March 7, 2025, it was verified that, during the execution of the app ***APP.1 1.8.13 on May 30, 2024, it was confirmed that the app made calls to hosts on the Internet, specifically the following call, which has been decoded and from which the transmitted parameters have been extracted: CALL SOME TRANSMITTED PARAMETERS TRANSMITTED (…) (…) C/ Jorge Juan 6 www.aepd.es 28001 - Madrid sedeaepd.gob.es 9/27 Furthermore, it has been verified that: - The code “***CODE.1” refers to the subscriber’s country of origin as well as the subscriber’s specific carrier. In the case of ***CASE.1, it would be “(…)”. - The domain ***DOMAIN.2 belongs to ***ENTERPRISE.1. - That, according to documentation retrieved from the internet regarding the domain ***DOMAIN.3 concerning the content of calls to (…), the following data may be included, among others: (…) - According to documentation retrieved from the internet from the domain ***DOMAIN.3 regarding the content of calls to ***DOMAIN.2, they may contain the following data, among others: (…) - It is confirmed in documentation retrieved from the internet that “***IDENTIFIER.1” is an identifier for the ***APP.2 application and that it has a value with a structure similar to that of the parameters “***PARAMETER.1” and “***PARAMETER.2.” It is verified that “***PARAMETER.1” and “***PARAMETER.2” have the same value as in the tests conducted previously. - Documentation retrieved from the internet confirms that “***CODE.2” is a unique string of random numbers. This ID will be discarded once that data is used for a conversion. The documentation also states that it is a unique identifier for a specific installation of ***APP.2. - Documentation retrieved from the internet confirms that “***ID.1” is the ID of the app package; in this case, based on the tests and decodings performed, it would have the value "(…)". 8. On March 7, 2025, it was confirmed that during the execution of the app ***APP.1 1.11.4 on the date previously mentioned, that app made calls to hosts on the Internet, specifically the following call, which has been decoded and from which the transmitted parameters have been extracted: CALL: SOME PARAMETERS TRANSMITTED (…) (…) 9. On March 20, 2025, the defendant submitted the following documentation and statements: - “On January 11, 2024, the App ***APP.1, version 1.11.5, was released to eliminate the collection and transmission of user data, a situation that was occurring due to its integration with the ***APP.2 product. This integration was designed and implemented in the ***APP.1 App to send push notifications to Users’ mobile devices. C/ Jorge Juan 6 www.aepd.es 28001 - Madrid sedeaepd.gob.es 10/27 The data sent from the ***APP.1 app, in versions prior to 1.11.5, are those listed in the appendix to the technical report titled “Report on the AEPD’s Request for Information,” prepared on January 10, 2024, and are as follows: Device boot time, battery status, first name, last name, state, ZIP code, gender, local IP, device model, available internal storage, system version number , network connection type, device language, device brand, city, unique identifier, GPS coordinates, CPU data, device orientation, country, ***SISTEMA.2 advertising ID, headphone status, cookies, total device storage, operating system version, system , app version, app installation date, battery level, email address, screen density, network carrier, app name, screen resolution, time zone, and device name” - Provides a screenshot of the app’s code, as stated, where the references to the following are set to “false”: (…) The reference to (…) remains set to “true.” - Regarding the functionality of ***SYSTEM.3, he states: “This is an option that displays information about push notifications, and it is it is necessary to clarify that this is the only feature of ***APP.2 that ***APP.1 uses knowingly and intentionally to notify the User, and not to collect data.” - Provides a screenshot of a post on ***ENTERPRISE.1 for version 1.11.5 of the app, with a release date of January 11, 2024. Likewise, the release date for version 1.11.4 is listed as 11/06/2023. - Provides a screenshot of a post (…) for version 1.11.5 of ***APP.1 with a release date of 01/11/2024. - Several screenshots are provided of the dashboards offered by ***APP.2, which show that:  Data received is not displayed in the “Realtime Analytics” dashboard when filtering by app versions corresponding to versions 1.12.8, 1.13.4, 1.14.4, and 1.15.2—all of which are later than 1.11.5. Data is displayed for several versions prior to 1.11.5. (Some versions have been selected, although there are more selectable versions prior to 1.11.5.) Data includes the number of active Users, approximate User location, and event types, among others.  In the “***TOOL.1” dashboard, for ***SYSTEM.1, data collected for versions later than 1.11.5 is displayed. For ***SYSTEM.2, no versions equal to or later than 1.11.5 appear, and therefore, you cannot filter by these versions. Data is available for the last 90 days, such as active Users and the number of failures.  In the “***SYSTEM.3” dashboard, changes made to the app have affected the integration with the ***APP.2 API (***SYSTEM.3). This section displays information about the functionality of C/ Jorge Juan 6 www.aepd.es 28001 - Madrid sedeaepd.gob.es 11/27 push notifications. It shows “368k” notifications sent in the last 90 days.  In the “Audiences” dashboard. It states that: “This feature allows developers to group users of an app based on common behaviors or characteristics. For example, you can create groups of users from a specific country or who have performed a specific action, such as a purchase, visiting certain pages, etc. In the following illustration, you can see that there is only one audience created for all users, where 26,723 is the total number of users who triggered at least one event during the last 28 days. Compared to the previous period, the number of active users active users fell by 6.2%. The count is performed by ***APP.2 based on all the recorded data from all versions, so it may include events collected from versions prior to 1.11.5.”  In the “Analytics Dashboard.” It states that this dashboard is where ***APP.2 Analytics presents all the information collected from the app. For the period from January 1, 2024, through December 31, 2024: “[…] a drop in the amount of data collected is observed precisely during the release period of version 1.11.5, in early January 2024. However, minimal activity is also observed in the central column (2nd column) for versions equal to or higher than the one mentioned. This coincides with the transmission of some event data (first app launch, usage time, etc.). Section 3.2.10 details the data sent, and Section 3.2.11 explains why this applies to device versions ***SISTEMA.1.” During the period from January 1, 2024, to December 31, 2024, there was a sharp drop in the amount of data received starting around January 2024 for versions prior to version 1.11.5 and starting in April for versions later than 1.11.5. In the former case, the absolute values are in the thousands, and in the latter, the absolute values are in the tens or single digits. Specifically, as shown in the graph for versions later than 1.11.5, data corresponding to the quantity “2” has been sent in the last 30 days, and according to the graph for versions earlier than 1.11.5, , data corresponding to the amount “21,000” has been sent in the last 30 days. And for all versions of the app, in the last 30 days, data corresponding to the number “28,000” has been sent. According to the user, the reason data is still being sent is because some data corresponding to “first app launch ,” “usage time,” etc., is being sent for app versions on the SISTEMA.1 operating system. According to the statement, the data currently being sent—despite the change made in version 1.11.5— applies only to the ***SISTEMA.1 operating system and consists of error reports and basic app usage events. The data would be as follows: C/ Jorge Juan 6 www.aepd.es 28001 - Madrid sedeaepd.gob.es 12/27 (…) According to the explanation of this situation, the measures to be taken would be: (…) As a corrective measure, we propose releasing a new version that prevents the transmission of residual data that continues to be sent from ***SISTEMA.1 mobile devices. This measure requires the deployment of a new version into production. To verify the correct result, one must wait at least one month after its release and re-examine the data collected by ***APP.2.” It also appears from the graph of collected events that for versions prior to 1.11.5, hundreds of thousands or millions of events are collected, whereas for versions after 1.11.5, the number is in the range of tens or hundreds of events. Some of the collected events are “(…)”. It is also evident that for versions prior to 1.11.5, information about the user’s country is displayed, e.g., “2.3 M” users in “Spain” or “7.6 thousand” in “Morocco,” but for versions after 1.11.5, only the country “Spain” is shown with “25” Users. Data on the device types of “active users” is included. Information on the model of the device used is displayed for versions prior to 1.11.5; for example, “iPhone 11” is used by “97 thousand” active users. For versions later than 1.11.5, for example, “iPhone XS Max” is used by “6” active Users, which is the highest number of Users shown in this case.  The “Events” dashboard displays information about the events triggered in the app, such as the “first_open” event, which is the number of times the app was opened for the first time. For example, for the “first_open” event, it shows that this event was triggered 2,009 times by 2,007 Users during the period from February 17, 2025, to March 16, 2025. He states that these numbers apply to all versions of the app, and it is not possible to distinguish whether they correspond to versions prior to or after version 1.11.5.  It displays an “Analytics” dashboard which, according to the report, shows the latest version detected by ***APP.2 that is sending analytics data. It is noted that this is version 1.11.4 for both ***SYSTEM.2 and ***SYSTEM.1.  The “Performance” dashboard does not show any data for either ***SYSTEM.2 or ***SYSTEM.1 for the past 60 days. - It concludes with the following statements: “Following the request for information received on December 13, 2023, regarding case EXP202317928, Development Area 2 first conducted an analysis of the requested information and the current status of ***APP.1 with respect to the request received; second, it implemented the necessary modifications to the App ***APP.1 to disable the transmission of User data to ***APP.2, resulting in a C/ Jorge Juan 6 www.aepd.es 28001 - Madrid sedeaepd.gob.es 13/27 new version (1.11.5) that was released on January 11, 2024, both in the app store for ***SISTEMA.2 devices (***ENTERPRISE.1 Console) as well as the app store for ***SYSTEM.1 devices ((…)). Following the new request for information received on March 11, 2025, Development Area 2 has conducted a new analysis of the status of ***APP.1 regarding the request received, which leads to the following main conclusions: • Following the release of version 1.11.5, the data collection graphs for data sent from mobile devices have dropped dramatically. • User data continues to be received because app versions prior to 1.11.5 • Some activity is observed in the form of data sent by app versions later than 1.11.4 (the latest version configured to send data to ***APP.2). • This activity stems from data sent from ***SYSTEM.1 devices, primarily consisting of error data (see Section 2.3.2) and basic activity events (see Sections 2.3.6 and 2.3.7). • Residual data that continues to be sent from ***SYSTEM.1 devices is identified (see Section 2.3.10). • A new solution is identified that can achieve the erasure of residual data transmission from ***SYSTEM.1 devices (see Section 2.3.11). • A proposal is made to release a new version to incorporate the new solution identified.” 10. On April 16, 2025, it is verified, based on documentation published by ENTERPRISE.1 and on the internet, that: - At the URL (…) titled “Prepare for the data disclosure requirements of ***ENTERPRISE.1,” it is confirmed that the data collected by the SDK for ***APP.2 on ***SYSTEM.2 includes the following: User-agent of ***APP.2, included in various ***APP.2 SDKs: a. Device metadata: operating system version, name, model, brand, and form factor. b. The app used to install your app (e.g., (…)) c. Which ***APP.2 SDK is used in your app, including its versions. “Cloud ***SYSTEM.3” automatically collects the following data: a. The data collected by default by the Cloud ***SYSTEM.3 SDK. b. App version. c. ***APP.2 User agent. It is noted that “fid” stands for ***APP.2 installation ID. By default, the ***APP.2 installation SDK generates and collects an installation identifier (FID) which, as stated, does not uniquely identify a user or a physical device uniquely. C/ Jorge Juan 6 www.aepd.es 28001 - Madrid sedeaepd.gob.es 14/27 - The URL (…) regarding “Privacy and Security in ***APP.2” states that various services of ***APP.2, including ***APP.2 Cloud ***SYSTEM.3 and ***APP.2 ***TOOL.1, use “User Data” corresponding to “***APP.2 installation IDs.” It also states that the “***APP.2 installation ID” is the “FID” parameter. It also lists, as an example of information collected by ***TOOL.1, data including, among others, the “FID” and a “session ID for ***APP.2,” which, as explained in the documentation, is a random UUID that is generated para tag events with a session, the name and version number of the device’s operating system, the device model name, CPU architecture, amount of RAM and disk space, and the installation UUID of ***TOOL.1. 11. The URL (…) confirms that the agreements related to the use of ***APP.2 SYSTEM.3, as well as with ***APP.2 and ***TOOL.1 regarding the processing of User data, are (…) and state that: - ***ENTERPRISE.1 is a processor. - “[…]10. Data Transfers 10.1 Data Storage and Processing Facilities. Subject to ***ENTERPRISE.1’s data location commitments in the Agreement (if applicable) and to the remainder of this Section 10 (Data Transfers), Customer Data may be processed in any country in which ***ENTERPRISE.1 or its Subprocessors maintain facilities.[…]” [Unofficial translation from English: “[…]10. Data Transfers 10.1 Data Storage and Processing Facilities. Subject to the data location commitments of ***ENTERPRISE.1 in the Agreement (if applicable) and to the remainder of this Section 10 (Data Transfers), the Customer’s may be processed in any country in which ***ENTERPRISE.1 or its subprocessors maintain facilities.[…]”.] - No references to data location commitments have been found in the terms for ***APP.2 ***SYSTEM.3 (url (…)) or in the terms for ***APP.2 ***TOOL.1 (url (…) ) 12. As of March 30, 2025, the URL (…) confirms that there are locations of ***ENTERPRISE.1, among others, in (…). 13. As of March 28, 2025, ***DOCUMENT.1 confirms that: “[…] (…) FIFTH: Decision to Initiate Disciplinary Proceedings On July 30, 2025, the Presidency of the Spanish Data Protection Agency agreed to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the respondent, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 63 and 64 of Law 39/2015, of October 1, on the Common Administrative Procedure of Public Administrations (hereinafter, C/ Jorge Juan 6 www.aepd.es 28001 - Madrid sedeaepd.gob.es 15/27 LPACAP), for the alleged violation of Article 5.1.c) of the GDPR, as defined in Article 83.5 of the GDPR. SIXTH: Arguments regarding the decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings: acknowledgment of non-compliance and measures taken Upon notification of the aforementioned decision to initiate proceedings in accordance with the provisions of Law 39/2015, of October 1, on the Common Administrative Procedure of Public Administrations (hereinafter, LPACAP), the respondent filed a written submission on August 13, 2025, in which it acknowledges the noncompliance and outlines the measures taken to correct it: “(…) the App ***APP.1 has been in violation of the LOPDGDD insofar as versions of the app prior to 1.11.5 sent usage and app error data—including personal data—from Users of the APP.1 App. Although this has been the case, this non-compliance was not intentional on the part of the DGT and has resulted, as a side effect, from the use of a legitimate and common feature in App development, namely the use of the ***APP.2 platform from ***ENTERPRISE.1 to send push notifications to mobile devices. This usage and app error data sent to APP.2 has not been and is not being used by the DGT.” Regarding versions prior to 1.11.5 in particular and the app stores of ENTERPRISE.1 and ***ENTERPRISE.2, the DGT adds that: “- The DGT cannot make corrections to versions released in the past. It can only release a new version that incorporates the corrections. - Official distribution channels do not allow for the invalidation or revocation of obsolete versions that are already installed on Users’ devices. That said, thanks to a feature implemented in version 1.3.7, released on November 24, 2020, on ***ENTERPRISE.1 and on December 3 on ENTERPRISE.2, the DGT can “force” the update of an obsolete version to a more recent version. This feature prevents the app from functioning properly when its version is lower than a minimum version defined by DGT, displaying an error screen and prompting the User to update the app (…). - The DGT confirms that currently only version 1.15.7 is available for download through official distribution channels; therefore, users cannot officially access any earlier versions, including those that collected usage and application error data. - From the reports submitted by the AEPD, which are independent of the DGT, it appears that older versions are available to Users through unofficial channels. The DGT cannot prevent this situation, nor has it confirmed that these versions are identical to those distributed through official channels. In any case, according to the terms of use of these official distribution channels, this is a restricted activity and violates those terms of use (…).” Regarding the specific measures taken, the DGT states the following: - Regarding the transmission of Users’ personal data in versions 1.11.5 and later: C/ Jorge Juan 6 www.aepd.es 28001 - Madrid sedeaepd.gob.es 16/27 “On January 11, 2024, the App ***APP.1, in version 1.11.5, was released to eliminate the collection and transmission of user data, a situation that was occurring due to its integration with the ***ENTERPRISE.1 platform known as ***APP.2. This integration was designed and implemented in the ***APP.1 app for the send push notifications to Users’ mobile devices; however, due to an incorrect configuration of the integration with that platform, the app was sending usage data and app error data generated during its operation. After the integration with ***APP.2 was correctly configured, the collection and transmission of user data and app errors ceased, (…)”. - Regarding the transmission of users’ personal data in the latest version 1.15.7 : “We have also included the results of an analysis conducted on the current production version of ***APP.1 (version 1.15.7), as of the date of this report. (…).” - Regarding the data “***CODE.1”: “Without addressing the legal question of whether the data item ‘***CODE.1’ is considered personal data, the agreement itself notes that this data is no longer transmitted as of version 1.11.5, following the implementation of measures proposed in the first technical report (…)”. - Regarding the “IP address” data: “Without addressing the legal question of whether an IP address is considered as personal data, it should be noted that communication between an App and the various servers with which it communicates (DGT on the one hand, and ***APP.2 on the other) takes place over the Internet using standard protocols such as HTTPS. IP addresses are a fundamental pillar upon which these communication protocols are built. Thanks to the design of the Internet, the servers themselves can implement security mechanisms (against cyberattacks) such as IP-based traffic blocking, for example. Beyond the fact that this information is necessary for the integration with the ***APP.2 platform from ***EMPRESA.1 to function, we wish to clarify that the web servers and the service providers hosting those servers will always be able to determine the IP address from which calls are being received over the Internet; and since mobile apps run on mobile devices connected directly to the Internet, we cannot prevent a third party server from knowing the IP address from which it is being called. This situation is not unique to the ***APP.1 app or to using the ***APP.2 platform. This will be the case with any app and with any third party server. C/ Jorge Juan 6 www.aepd.es 28001 - Madrid sedeaepd.gob.es 17/27 In the specific case of the DGT app, we do not send IP addresses to store them on ***APP.2 or to activate any functionality with them. Rather, they are simply part of the Internet communication protocols between and ***APP.2 in this case. (…)”. - Regarding the “User-Agent” data: The tests included in the reports commissioned by the AEAD show the “User-Agent” data, which may contain user information such as the metadata of the device from which ***APP.2 is invoked, as stated in the documentation for APP.2 (…). As indicated in the tests conducted on April 16, 2025, by the AEPD and as indicated in the ***APP.2 documentation itself, this data is not linked to a User or device identifier.” - New measures to be implemented: “1. Render all versions obsolete upon the release of the next version. (…). 2. Prevent data from being stored in ***APP.2. This can be achieved, for example, by creating a new project/installation in ***APP.2 (with its new project identifier in ***APP.2) for the next version to be released and deleting the previous project/installation in ***APP.2. This does not prevent older versions from sending data as they have been doing, but they would be doing so against a the erasure of which occurred in ***APP.2, which would cause an error on the platform that would prevent any data from being saved or retained in ***APP.2 (the ***APP.2 installation ID of the mobile device).” In light of the foregoing and taking into account the provisions of Article 64.2.f) of the LPACAP, which establishes that if no objections are filed within the prescribed period regarding the content of the notice of initiation—when said notice contains a specific ruling regarding the alleged liability—it may be considered a proposed resolution, taking into account that the respondent has acknowledged the breach indicated in said notice of initiation, the notice of initiation is considered, in the present case, a proposed resolution. In light of all the proceedings, the Spanish Data Protection Agency in this proceeding considers the following to be ESTABLISHED FACTS FIRST: On May 30 and June 6, 2024, according to the evidence on file, on a virtual mobile device running the SISTEMA.2 operating system and executing different versions of the app downloaded from the website ***URL.1, the following transmitted parameters were detected: a. In version 1.8.13, data such as the device model, country, “Build Number” displayed by the device’s ***SISTEMA.2 operating system, language, app version, time zone, “user-agent,” IP address, “appInstanceId,” "***CODE.1," “***PARAMETER.2” C/ Jorge Juan 6 www.aepd.es 28001 - Madrid sedeaepd.gob.es 18/27 b. In version 1.11.4, data such as the device model, country, “Build Number” showing the device’s ***SYSTEM.2 operating system, language, app version, “user-agent,” IP address, "***CODE.1," “fid,” “***PARAMETER.2,” “***CODE.2.” c. In version 1.11.5, data such as country and “Build Number” is sent, which is displayed by the device’s ***SYSTEM.2 operating system, language, app version, time zone, “user-agent,” IP address, “fid,” “***PARAMETER.2,” and “appInstanceId.” Data such as “***CODE.1,” device model, and “***CODE.2” has not been detected. d. In version 1.12.12, data such as “Build Number”—which indicates the device’s ***SYSTEM.2 operating system—“user-agent,” IP address, “fid,” and “***PARAMETER.2” are sent. No data was detected such as “***CODE.1”, device model, “***CODE.2”, language, app version, time zone, “appInstanceId”, country. SECOND: On March 20, 2025, the D.G.T. acknowledged the violation of the LOPDGDD, stating the following: “(…) the app ***APP.1 has been in violation of the LOPDGDD in that versions of the app prior to 1.11.5 sent usage and app error data—including personal data—from Users of the App ***APP.1. Although this has been the case, this violation was not intentional on the part of the DGT and has resulted, as a side effect, from the use of a legitimate and common feature in App development, namely the use of the ***APP.2 platform from ***ENTERPRISE.1 to send push notifications to mobile devices. This usage and app error data sent to APP.2 has not been and is not being used by the DGT. (…) The data sent from the App ***APP.1, in versions prior to 1.11.5, are those listed in the appendix to the technical report titled “Report on the AEPD’s Request for Information,” prepared on January 10, 2024, and consists of the following: Device startup time, battery status, first name, last name, state, zip code, gender, local IP address, device model, available internal storage, operating system version number, type of network connection, device language, device brand, city, unique identifier, GPS coordinates, CPU data, device orientation, country, advertising ID from ***SISTEMA.2, headphone status, cookies, total device memory, device, operating system version, system volume, app version, app installation date, battery level, email address, screen density, network carrier, app name, screen resolution, time zone, and device name. (…) Following the new request for information received on March 11, 2025, Development Area 2 conducted a new analysis of the status of ***APP.1 with respect to the request received, which allows for the following main conclusions: • Following the release of version 1.11.5, the data collection graphs for data sent from mobile devices have dropped dramatically. • User data continues to be received because versions of the app prior to 1.11.5 remain in use C/ Jorge Juan 6 www.aepd.es 28001 - Madrid sedeaepd.gob.es 19/27 • Some activity is observed from data sent by app versions later than 1.11.4 (the latest version configured to send data to ***APP.2). • This activity stems from data being sent from ***SYSTEM.1 devices, primarily through the transmission of error data (see Section 2.3.2) and basic activity events (see Sections 2.3.6 and 2.3.7). • Residual data that continues to be sent from ***SISTEMA.1 devices has been identified (see Section 2.3.10). • A new solution is identified that can achieve the erasure of residual data transmission from ***SYSTEM.1 devices (see Section 2.3.11). • A proposal is made to release a new version that incorporates the new solution identified.” THIRD: Regarding the specific measures taken, the DGT has reported the following: - Regarding the transmission of Users’ personal data in versions 1.11.5 and later: “On January 11, 2024, version 1.11.5 of the ***APP.1 App was released to eliminate the collection and transmission of user data, a situation that was occurring due to its integration with the ***ENTERPRISE.1 platform known as ***APP.2. This integration was planned and implemented in the ***APP.1 app for the send push notifications to Users’ mobile devices; however, due to an incorrect configuration of the integration with that platform, the app was sending usage data and app error data generated during its operation. After the integration with ***APP.2 was correctly configured, the collection and transmission of user data and app errors ceased (…)”. - Regarding the transmission of users’ personal data in the latest version 1.15.7 : “Additionally, we have included the results of an analysis conducted on the current production version of ***APP.1 (version 1.15.7), as of the date of this report. (…).” - Regarding the data point “***CODE.1”: “(…) this data is no longer transmitted as of version 1.11.5, following the implementation of measures proposed in the first technical report (…)”. - New measures to be implemented: “1. Render all versions prior to the next version to be released obsolete. (…). 2. Prevent data from being saved in ***APP.2. This can be achieved, for example, by creating a new project/installation in ***APP.2 (with its new project identifier in ***APP.2) for the next version to be released and deleting C/ Jorge Juan 6 www.aepd.es 28001 - Madrid sedeaepd.gob.es 20/27 the previous project/installation in ***APP.2. This does not prevent older versions from sending data as they have been doing, but they would be sending it to an erased installation in ***APP.2, which would cause an error on the platform that would prevent any data from being saved or retained in ***APP.2 (the ***APP.2 installation ID of the mobile device).” LEGAL BASIS I Jurisdiction In accordance with the powers granted by Article 58(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (General Data Protection Regulation, hereinafter GDPR) grants to each supervisory authority, and in accordance with the provisions of Articles 47, 48.1, 64.2, and 68.1 of Organic Law 3/2018, of December 5, on the Protection of Personal Data and the Guarantee of Digital Rights (hereinafter LOPDGDD), the Presidency of the Spanish Data Protection Agency has jurisdiction to resolve this proceeding. Likewise, Article 63.2 of the LOPDGDD provides that: “Proceedings handled by the Spanish Data Protection Agency shall be governed by the provisions of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, this Organic Law, the adopted in implementation thereof, and, to the extent they do not contradict them, on a subsidiary basis, by the general rules on administrative proceedings.” II Preliminary Issues Article 4(1) of the GDPR defines “personal data” as: “any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘the data subject’); an identifiable natural person is any person whose identity can be determined, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier, or one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural, or social identity of that person.” Article 4(2) of the GDPR defines “processing” as: “any operation or set of operations performed on personal data or sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as collection, recording, organization, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure, or destruction.” Article 4(7) of the GDPR defines the “controller” or “data controller” as: “the natural or legal person, public authority, agency, or other body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the processing; if the law of the Union or of the Member States determines the purposes and means of the processing, the C/ Jorge Juan 6 www.aepd.es 28001 - Madrid sedeaepd.gob.es 21/27 controller or the specific criteria for their appointment may be established by Union or Member State law.” In turn, Article 4(8) of the GDPR defines the “processor” or “processor” as “a natural or legal person, public authority, agency, or other body that performs data processing on behalf of the controller.” In this case, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 4.1 and 4.2 of the GDPR, the processing of personal data has taken place, since the D.G.T. carries out, among other processing activities, the collection and storage of personal data belonging to individuals: first and last name, date of birth, national ID number, and email address. The D.G.T. carries out this activity in its capacity as the controller, since it is the entity that determines the purposes and means of such activity, pursuant to Article 4.7 of the GDPR. III Breach of Obligation. Data Minimisation Article 5.1(c) of the GDPR states: “1. Personal data shall be: (…) (c) adequate, relevant, and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed (‘data minimisation’);” The principle of data minimisation contained in Article 5.1(c) of the GDPR implies that, in a specific processing operation, only personal data that is appropriate, relevant, and strictly necessary to fulfill the purpose for which it is processed may be processed. The processing must be tailored and proportionate to the purpose for which it is intended. The relevance of data processing must be ensured both at the time of data collection and during the subsequent processing thereof. Thus, the processing of excessive data must be restricted or such data must be deleted. The D.G.T.’s ***APP.1 app has lawful authority to collect the data necessary for the functionality of said app. However, in this case, there is an excess of data collected by said app. Accordingly, on March 20, 2025, the D.G.T. provided the following documentation and statements: “The data sent from the ***APP.1 App, in versions prior to 1.11.5, is that listed in the appendix to the technical report titled ‘Report on the AEPD’s Request for Information,’ prepared on January 10, 2024, and consists of the following: device boot time, , first name, last name, state, ZIP code, gender, local IP address, device model, available internal storage, operating system version number, network connection type, device language, device brand, city, unique identifier, GPS coordinates, CPU data, and device orientation C/ Jorge Juan 6 www.aepd.es 28001 - Madrid sedeaepd.gob.es 22/27 , country, ***SISTEMA.2 advertising ID, headphone status, cookies, total device memory, operating system version, system volume, app version, app installation date, battery level battery level, email address, screen density, network operator, app name, screen resolution, time zone, and device name.” In its conclusions, the D.G.T. states that: “Following the new request for information received on March 11, 2025, Development Area 2 has conducted a new analysis of the situation regarding ***APP.1 in light of the request received, which allows for the following : • Following the release of version 1.11.5, the data collection graphs for data sent from mobile devices have dropped dramatically. • User data continues to be received because versions of the app prior to 1.11.5 • Some activity is observed from data sent by app versions later than 1.11.4 (the latest version configured to send data to ***APP.2). • This activity stems from data sent from ***SYSTEM.1 devices, primarily consisting of error data (see Section 2.3.2) and basic activity events (see Sections 2.3.6 and 2.3.7). • Residual data that continues to be sent from ***SYSTEM.1 devices is identified (see Section 2.3.10). • A new solution is identified that can achieve the erasure of residual data transmission from ***SYSTEM.1 devices (see Section 2.3.11). • A proposal is made to release a new version that incorporates the newly identified solution.” However, as verified by this Agency and documented in the proceedings dated May 30 and June 6, 2024, on a virtual mobile device running the SYSTEM.2 and running different versions of the app downloaded from the website URL.1, the following parameters were detected: a. In version 1.8.13, data such as the device model, country, “Build Number” (which indicates the device’s ***SYSTEM.2 operating system), language, app version, time zone, “user-agent,” IP address, “appInstanceId”, "***CODE.1", “***PARAMETER.2” b. In version 1.11.4, the following data is sent: device model, country, “Build Number” indicating the device’s ***SYSTEM.2 operating system, language, app version, “user-agent,” IP address, "***CODE.1," “fid,” “***PARAMETER.2,” “***CODE.2.” c. In version 1.11.5, data such as country and “Build Number”—which shows the device’s ***SYSTEM.2 operating system, language, app version, time zone, “user-agent,” IP address, “fid,” “***PARAMETER.2,” C/ Jorge Juan 6 www.aepd.es 28001 - Madrid sedeaepd.gob.es 23/27 “appInstanceId.” Data such as “***CODE.1,” device model, and “***CODE.2” have not been detected. d. In version 1.12.12, data such as “Build Number” is sent, which indicates the device’s operating system ***SYSTEM.2, “user-agent”, IP address, “fid”, “***PARAMETER.2”. No data was detected such as “***CODE.1”, device model, “***CODE.2”, language, app version, time zone, “appInstanceId”, country. Therefore, data subjects using any version prior to the latest one would have their personal data collected, such as “***CODE.1,” which refers to the subscriber’s specific country and carrier. Even in the latest version released after this agency’s request, personal data such as the IP address is still being collected. Although an IP address does not always directly identify the data subject, when combined with other information—such as activity logs or data from the Internet service provider—it can be linked to a device and, consequently, to the data subject using it. In this regard, this Agency’s Report 327/2003 states that: “Although it is not always possible for all Internet operators to identify a User based on data processed on the Internet, this Data Protection Agency operates on the premise that the possibility of identifying an Internet User exists in many cases and, therefore, both static and dynamic IP addresses—regardless of the type of access—are considered personal data, and data protection regulations apply.” Thus, the various versions of the ***APP.1 application appear to be collecting more data than is strictly necessary—such as the IP address, the country, or the service provider with which the data subjects are subscribed—which would constitute a violation of the principle of data minimisation, since the collection of information exceeds what is necessary for the legitimate purposes of said app. While it is true that the D.G.T. has acknowledged that the app ***APP.1 has been in violation of the LOPDGDD insofar as versions of the app prior to 1.11.5 sent usage and app error data, including personal data, from users of the ***APP.1 App, and has adopted specific measures regarding the collection and transmission of users’ personal data in versions 1.11.5 and later—the “***CODE.1” data is no longer transmitted, and it has reported new measures to be implemented; this does not negate the violation of Article 5.1.c) of the GDPR based on the facts established up until the adoption of the aforementioned measures by the D.G.T. following notification of the decision to initiate this enforcement proceeding. Therefore, it is considered that the established facts constitute a violation, attributable to the D.G.T., for breach of Article 5.1.c) of the GDPR, as quoted above. C/ Jorge Juan 6 www.aepd.es 28001 - Madrid sedeaepd.gob.es 24/27 IV Classification of the violation of Article 5.1.c) of the GDPR and determination for purposes of the statute of limitations Article 83.5 of the GDPR classifies as an administrative violation the breach of the following articles, which shall be penalized, in accordance with paragraph 2, with administrative fines of up to 20,000,000 EUR or, in the case of an enterprise, an amount equivalent to up to 4% of the total annual global turnover for the previous fiscal year, whichever is higher: “a) the basic principles governing processing, including the conditions for consent pursuant to Articles 5, 6, 7, and 9;” For its part, Article 71 of the LOPDGDD, “Infractions,” states that: “Acts and conduct referred to in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of Article 83 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, as well as those that are contrary to this Organic Law, constitute violations.” For the sole purpose of the statute of limitations, article 72.1 of the LOPDGDD provides as follows: "Pursuant to Recital 83(5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, infractions constituting a substantial violation of the articles mentioned therein—and, in particular, the following—are considered very serious and shall be subject to a three-year statute of limitations: a) The processing of personal data in violation of the principles and safeguards set forth in Article 5 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679.” V Statement of Violation Article 83, “General conditions for the imposition of administrative fines,” of the GDPR, in paragraph 7, provides: “Without prejudice to the corrective powers of supervisory authorities under Article 58(2), each Member State may lay down rules on whether and to what extent administrative fines may be imposed on public authorities and bodies established in that Member State.” Article 77, “Rules applicable to certain categories of controllers or data processors” of the LOPDGDD provides as follows: “1. The regime established in this article shall apply to processing operations for which the following are controllers or processors: a) Constitutional bodies or bodies of constitutional significance and the institutions of the autonomous communities analogous to them. b) Judicial bodies. C/ Jorge Juan 6 www.aepd.es 28001 - Madrid sedeaepd.gob.es 25/27 c) The General State Administration, the administrations of the autonomous communities, and the entities comprising the local administration. d) Public agencies and entities governed by public law that are linked to or dependent on public administrations. e) Independent administrative authorities. f) The Bank of Spain. g) Corporations governed by public law when the purposes of the processing are related to the exercise of public law powers. h) Public-sector foundations. i) Public universities. j) Consortia. k) Parliamentary groups in the Spanish Parliament (Cortes Generales) and the regional legislative assemblies, as well as political groups within local governments. 2. If the data controllers or processors listed in paragraph 1 commit any of the violations referred to in Articles 72 through 74 of this organic law, the competent Data Protection Authority shall issue a decision declaring the violation and establishing, where appropriate, the measures that must be taken to cease the conduct or correct the effects of the violation that has been committed, with the exception of that provided for in Article 58.2.i of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council, dated April 27, 2016. The decision shall be notified to the controller or processor, to the body to which it reports hierarchically, if applicable, and to the affected individuals who have the status of data subjects, if applicable. 3. Without prejudice to the provisions of the preceding paragraph, the Data Protection Authority shall also propose the initiation of disciplinary proceedings when there is sufficient evidence to do so. In this case, the procedure and sanctions to be applied shall be those established in the applicable legislation on disciplinary or sanctioning regimes. Likewise, when violations are attributable to authorities and executives, and it is established that technical reports or recommendations regarding the processing were not duly addressed, the decision imposing the sanction shall include a reprimand specifying the title of the responsible official and shall order its publication in the Official State Gazette or the corresponding regional official gazette. C/ Jorge Juan 6 www.aepd.es 28001 - Madrid sedeaepd.gob.es 26/27 4. Decisions rendered in relation to the measures and actions referred to in the preceding paragraphs must be communicated to the Data Protection Authority. 5. The Ombudsman or, where applicable, the equivalent institutions of the autonomous communities shall be notified of the actions taken and the decisions issued pursuant to this article. 6. When the competent authority is the Spanish Data Protection Authority, it shall publish on its website, with due distinction, the decisions pertaining to the entities referred to in paragraph 1 of this article, expressly indicating the identity of the controller or processor that committed the violation. When jurisdiction lies with an autonomous community Data Protection Authority, the publication of these decisions shall be governed by the provisions of its specific regulations.” This provision establishes that proceedings arising from violations of personal data protection laws committed by the categories of controllers or processors listed in paragraph 1 shall in all cases result in a finding of violation, which is the case with the D.G.T. Therefore, in accordance with applicable legislation, the Presidency of the Spanish Data Protection Agency RESOLVES FIRST: TO DECLARE that the GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF TRAFFIC, with Tax ID No. Q2816003D, has violated the provisions of Article 5.1.c) of the GDPR, as set forth in Article 83.5 of the GDPR. SECOND: TO NOTIFY the GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF TRAFFIC of this decision. THIRD: TO COMMUNICATE this decision to the Ombudsman, in accordance with the provisions of Article 77.5 of the LOPDGDD. In accordance with the provisions of Article 50 of the LOPDGDD, this Decision shall be made public. Publication shall take place once it has been notified to the data subjects. Against this resolution, which concludes the administrative proceedings pursuant to Article 48.6 of the LOPDGDD, and in accordance with the provisions of Article 123 of the LPACAP, the data subjects may, at their discretion, file an appeal for reconsideration with the Presidency of the Spanish Data Protection Agency within one month from the day following notification of this resolution, or directly file an administrative appeal with the Administrative Chamber of the National Court, in accordance with the provisions of Article 25 and paragraph 5 of the fourth additional provision of Law 29/1998, of July 13, regulating the Administrative Jurisdiction, within two months from the C/ Jorge Juan 6 www.aepd.es 28001 - Madrid sedeaepd.gob.es 27/27 day following notification of this decision, as provided for in Article 46.1 of the aforementioned Law. Finally, it is noted that, in accordance with the provisions of Article 90.3.a) of the LPACAP, the final administrative decision may be provisionally suspended if the data subject expresses their intention to file an administrative appeal. If this is the case, the data subject must formally notify the Spanish Data Protection Agency of this fact by means of a written notice addressed to the Spanish Data Protection Agency, submitting it through the Agency’s Electronic Registry web/, or through any of the other registries provided for in Art. 16.4 of the aforementioned Law 39/2015, of October 1. The data subject must also submit to the Agency the documentation proving that the contentious- administrative appeal has been filed. If the Agency is not made aware of the filing of the within two months from the day following notification of this decision, it shall consider the precautionary suspension to have ended. 926-250625 Lorenzo Cotino Hueso President of the Spanish Data Protection Agency 28001 - Madrid6 sedeaepd.gob.es

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