XH v European Commission

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Use the Advanced search Document 62024CJ0075 Help Print Text Document information Case file Permanent link Download notice Save to My items Create an email alert Create an RSS alert ​ Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 15 January 2026.#XH v European Commission.#Appeal – Civil service – European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) – Allegations of psychological harassment during periods of sick leave – Rejection of the request for assistance and of the claim for compensation – Opening of an invalidity procedure – Action for annulment and for damages – Admissibility – Acts open to challenge – Obligation on the part of the General Court of the European Union to state reasons – Contradictory reasoning – Distortion of the facts and evidence.#Case C-75/24 P. Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 15 January 2026. XH v European Commission. Appeal – Civil service – European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) – Allegations of psychological harassment during periods of sick leave – Rejection of the request for assistance and of the claim for compensation – Opening of an invalidity procedure – Action for annulment and for damages – Admissibility – Acts open to challenge – Obligation on the part of the General Court of the European Union to state reasons – Contradictory reasoning – Distortion of the facts and evidence. Case C-75/24 P. Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 15 January 2026. XH v European Commission. Appeal – Civil service – European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) – Allegations of psychological harassment during periods of sick leave – Rejection of the request for assistance and of the claim for compensation – Opening of an invalidity procedure – Action for annulment and for damages – Admissibility – Acts open to challenge – Obligation on the part of the General Court of the European Union to state reasons – Contradictory reasoning – Distortion of the facts and evidence. Case C-75/24 P. ECLI identifier: ECLI:EU:C:2026:6 Expand all Collapse all Languages and formats available Language of the case Language BG ES CS DA DE ET EL EN FR GA HR IT LV LT HU MT NL PL PT RO SK SL FI SV HTML EN Toggle Dropdown BG ES CS DA DE ET EL EN FR GA HR IT LV LT HU MT NL PL PT RO SK SL FI SV PDF EN Toggle Dropdown BG ES CS DA DE ET EL EN FR GA HR IT LV LT HU MT NL PL PT RO SK SL FI SV Multilingual display Language 1 English (en) Bulgarian (bg) Spanish (es) Czech (cs) Danish (da) German (de) Estonian (et) Greek (el) English (en) French (fr) Irish (ga) Croatian (hr) Italian (it) Latvian (lv) Lithuanian (lt) Hungarian (hu) Maltese (mt) Dutch (nl) Polish (pl) Portuguese (pt) Romanian (ro) Slovak (sk) Slovenian (sl) Finnish (fi) Swedish (sv) Language 2 Please choose Bulgarian (bg) Spanish (es) Czech (cs) Danish (da) German (de) Estonian (et) Greek (el) English (en) French (fr) Irish (ga) Croatian (hr) Italian (it) Latvian (lv) Lithuanian (lt) Hungarian (hu) Maltese (mt) Dutch (nl) Polish (pl) Portuguese (pt) Romanian (ro) Slovak (sk) Slovenian (sl) Finnish (fi) Swedish (sv) Language 3 Please choose Bulgarian (bg) Spanish (es) Czech (cs) Danish (da) German (de) Estonian (et) Greek (el) English (en) French (fr) Irish (ga) Croatian (hr) Italian (it) Latvian (lv) Lithuanian (lt) Hungarian (hu) Maltese (mt) Dutch (nl) Polish (pl) Portuguese (pt) Romanian (ro) Slovak (sk) Slovenian (sl) Finnish (fi) Swedish (sv) Display Text JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Fifth Chamber) 15 January 2026 ( *1 ) (Appeal – Civil service – European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) – Allegations of psychological harassment during periods of sick leave – Rejection of the request for assistance and of the claim for compensation – Opening of an invalidity procedure – Action for annulment and for damages – Admissibility – Acts open to challenge – Obligation on the part of the General Court of the European Union to state reasons – Contradictory reasoning – Distortion of the facts and evidence) In Case C‑75/24 P, APPEAL under Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, brought on 29 January 2024, XH , represented by P. Nowak, adwokat, appellant, the other party to the proceedings being: European Commission , represented initially by I. Melo Sampaio and L. Vernier, acting as Agents, and subsequently by L. Vernier, acting as Agent, defendant at first instance, THE COURT (Fifth Chamber), composed of M.L. Arastey Sahún (Rapporteur), President of the Chamber, J. Passer, E. Regan, D. Gratsias and B. Smulders, Judges, Advocate General: D. Spielmann, Registrar: A. Calot Escobar, having regard to the written procedure, after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 22 May 2025, gives the following Judgment 1 By her appeal, XH seeks to have set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 22 November 2023, XH v Commission (T‑613/21, ‘the judgment under appeal’, EU:T:2023:739 ), by which the General Court dismissed her action seeking, first, the annulment of Decision D/374/20 of the European Commission of 4 December 2020 rejecting her request for assistance (‘the decision rejecting the request for assistance’) and of Decision Ares(2021) 3466486 of the Commission of 21 May 2021 concerning the referral of her case to the Invalidity Committee (‘the decision opening the invalidity procedure’), and, second, compensation for the damage she alleged to have sustained. Legal context 2 Article 11a of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union, in the version applicable to the facts of the case (‘the Staff Regulations’), provides: ‘1. An official shall not, in the performance of his duties and save as hereinafter provided, deal with a matter in which, directly or indirectly, he has any personal interest such as to impair his independence, and, in particular, family and financial interests. 2. Any official to whom it falls, in the performance of his duties, to deal with a matter referred to above shall immediately inform the Appointing Authority. The Appointing Authority shall take any appropriate measure, and may in particular relieve the official from responsibility in this matter. 3. An official may neither keep nor acquire, directly or indirectly, in undertakings which are subject to the authority of the institution to which he belongs or which have dealings with that institution, any interest of such kind or magnitude as might impair his independence in the performance of his duties.’ 3 Article 12 of the Staff Regulations provides: ‘An official shall refrain from any action or behaviour which might reflect adversely upon his position.’ 4 Article 12a of the Staff Regulations is worded as follows: ‘1. Officials shall refrain from any form of psychological or sexual harassment. 2. An official who has been the victim of psychological or sexual harassment shall not suffer any prejudicial effects on the part of the institution. An official who has given evidence on psychological or sexual harassment shall not suffer any prejudicial effects on the part of the institution, provided the official has acted honestly. 3. “Psychological harassment” means any improper conduct that takes place over a period, is repetitive or systematic and involves physical behaviour, spoken or written language, gestures or other acts that are intentional and that may undermine the personality, dignity or physical or psychological integrity of any person. 4. “Sexual harassment” means conduct relating to sex which is unwanted by the person to whom it is directed and which has the purpose or effect of offending that person or creating an intimidating, hostile, offensive or disturbing environment. Sexual harassment shall be treated as discrimination based on gender.’ 5 Under Article 21 of the Staff Regulations: ‘An official, whatever his rank, shall assist and tender advice to his superiors; he shall be responsible for the performance of the duties assigned to him. An official in charge of any branch of the service shall be responsible to his superiors in respect of the authority conferred on him and for the carrying out of instructions given by him. The responsibility of his subordinates shall in no way release him from his own responsibilities.’ 6 Article 24 of the Staff Regulations provides: ‘The [European] Union shall assist any official, in particular in proceedings against any person perpetrating threats, insulting or defamatory acts or utterances, or any attack to person or property to which he or a member of his family is subjected by reason of his position or duties. It shall jointly and severally compensate the official for damage suffered in such cases, in so far as the official did not either intentionally or through grave negligence cause damage and has been unable to obtain compensation from the person who did cause it.’ 7 Article 59 of the Staff Regulations is worded as follows: ‘1. An official who provides evidence of being unable to carry out his duties by reason of illness or accident shall be entitled to sick leave. The official concerned shall notify his institution of his incapacity as soon as possible and at the same time state his current address. … The official may at any time be required to undergo a medical examination arranged by the institution. If the examination cannot take place for reasons attributable to the official, his absence shall be considered as unauthorised as from the date that the examination is due to take place. If the finding made in the examination is that the official is able to carry out his duties, his absence shall, subject to the following subparagraph, be regarded as unjustified from the date of the examination. … 4. The Appointing Authority may refer to the Invalidity Committee the case of any official whose sick leave totals more than 12 months in any period of three years. …’ 8 Under Article 60 of the Staff Regulations: ‘Except in case of sickness or accident, an official may not be absent without prior permission from his immediate superior. Without prejudice to any disciplinary measures that may apply, any unauthorised absence which is duly established shall be deducted from the annual leave of the official concerned. If he has used up his annual leave, he shall forfeit his remuneration for an equivalent period. If an official wishes to spend sick leave elsewhere than at the place where he is employed he shall obtain prior permission from the appointing authority.’ 9 Article 90 of the Staff Regulations provides: ‘1. Any person to whom these Staff Regulations apply may submit to the appointing authority, a request that it take a decision relating to him. The authority shall notify the person concerned of its reasoned decision within four months from the date on which the request was made. If at the end of that period no reply to the request has been received, this shall be deemed to constitute an implied decision rejecting it, against which a complaint may be lodged in accordance with the following paragraph. 2. Any person to whom these Staff Regulations apply may submit to the appointing authority a complaint against an act affecting him adversely, either where the said authority has taken a decision or where it has failed to adopt a measure prescribed by the Staff Regulations. …’ 10 Article 7 of Annex II to the Staff Regulations provides: ‘The Invalidity Committee shall consist of three doctors: – one appointed by the institution to which the official concerned belongs; – one appointed by the official concerned; and – one appointed by agreement between the first two doctors. Should the official concerned fail to appoint a doctor, the President of the Court of Justice of the European Union shall appoint one. In the event of failure to agree on the appointment of a third doctor within two months of the appointment of the second doctor, the third shall be appointed by the President of the Court of Justice of the European Union at the request of one of the parties concerned.’ Background to the dispute 11 The background to the dispute was set out in paragraphs 2 to 34 of the judgment under appeal. For the purposes of the present proceedings, it may be summarised as follows. 12 The appellant is an official in the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). 13 Until 16 June 2020, she held the post of investigator in the unit formerly designated as Unit A of OLAF. Within that unit, she was handling, as lead investigator, three ongoing cases in particular, namely Cases E, F and G. 14 An internal reorganisation of OLAF came into effect on 16 June 2020. Following that reorganisation, and having regard to the preferences expressed by the appellant, she was assigned, as from that date, to a new unit within OLAF, namely Unit B. 15 Between 2 and 22 June 2020, the appellant was on sick leave following a medical operation. An extension of that leave was granted for a continuous period from 23 June until 31 October 2020, by way of approval in the Commission’s human resource management information system called ‘Sysper 2’, for the first time on 23 June 2020, in respect of the period from that date until 10 July 2020, for the second time on 14 July 2020, in respect of the period from 11 until 31 July 2020, for the third time on 4 August 2020, in respect of the period from 1 until 31 August 2020, for the fourth time on 1 September 2020, in respect of the period from that date until 30 September 2020, and for the fifth time on 1 October 2020, in respect of the period from that date until 31 October 2020. 16 On 2 June 2020, the appellant sent an email to members of Unit A, which contained a summary of Case E. In that email, she stated that she was on sick leave but that, as a matter of precaution in order to avoid delays, she would remain connected and open for any contact concerning those three cases. 17 On 8 June 2020, a member of Unit A sent an email to the appellant and the Head of Unit A. That email concerned Cases E, F and G, and contained comments and suggestions for the next stages. The Head of Unit A replied that, given the fact that the appellant was on leave, that member had to consult the future Head of Unit C (‘the Head of Unit C’), in order to find out whether she preferred to close the cases at issue before the reorganisation of 16 June 2020 or to wait for the appellant’s return from sick leave expected to be after that date. That member of Unit A sent an email to the Head of Unit C, copying in the appellant and the Head of Unit A. The appellant replied to that email, stating that she expected that all cases could be closed without delay in the light of OLAF’s reorganisation and her sick leave. Furthermore, she stated that, even though she was on leave, she was open to receiving the final proposals concerning the cases in question so that they could be finalised. 18 The appellant sent, on 8 June 2020, an email to a colleague entrusted with the role of ‘confidential counsellor’. In that email, the appellant sent him the exchanges referred to in paragraph 17 above and asked him for advice on her situation. 19 On the same day, a secretary from Unit A (‘the secretary of Unit A’) sent the appellant an email concerning the appellant’s change of office owing to OLAF’s internal reorganisation referred to in paragraph 14 above. In that email, the secretary of Unit A asked the appellant whether, in the light of her sick leave until 22 June 2020, she was willing to authorise a third person to move her belongings prior to that date. The appellant replied on the same day that she preferred to take care of that herself. 20 On 9 June 2020, the Head of Unit C replied to the emails referred to in paragraph 17 above. In her reply, she stated that, in the light of those circumstances, it seemed to her very difficult to close the cases at issue before 16 June 2020. She stated that she found it realistic to close Case E in mid-July. 21 On 23 June 2020, the Head of Unit C sent an email to the appellant in order to discuss the draft final report in Case E. In that email, she asked the appellant to call her if available. On the same day, she sent the appellant an invitation to a video call scheduled for the following day, namely 24 June 2020. The appellant replied to that email on the following day, 24 June, stating that she was still on sick leave and that that invitation coincided with a medical appointment. She added that she would, however, be available the entire day on the following day for a discussion over the phone of the case in question. 22 The appellant sent, on 23 June 2020, an email to the confidential counsellor, containing the invitation by the Head of Unit C to the video call. In that email, she explained that she had a scheduled hospital visit to make during her sick leave and that that invitation went beyond her capacity and was against the rules. She asked him to ‘notify [that conduct] as a harassment’. 23 On 30 June 2020, the secretary of Unit A sent the appellant a second email asking her whether she had reached a decision concerning her office move. 24 On 1 July 2020, the Head of Unit C sent the appellant two emails in which she asked the appellant questions concerning Case E. The appellant replied on 6 July 2020. 25 On 1 August 2020, the appellant lodged a request for assistance with the competent appointing authority (‘the appointing authority’), pursuant to Articles 24, 59 and 60 of the Staff Regulations. In her request, the appellant stated, in essence, that the emails that she had received during her sick leave constituted requests from the OLAF hierarchy or staff to work or to go immediately to her office in order to prepare her belongings for the office move, which she considered to be attempts to interrupt or terminate her sick leave. 26 On 26 August 2020, the Head of Unit C sent the appellant an email which contained a new draft final report in Case E. In that email, the Head of Unit C asked the appellant, first, whether she approved of its contents and, second, if she could carry out a check with the European Patent Office (EPO). The appellant replied to her that she was still on sick leave. In a second email, the Head of Unit C stated that she had sent her first email for it to be dealt with by the appellant upon her return. The appellant replied on 28 August 2020, stating that she did not think it necessary to wait for her return in order to finalise the reports at issue. 27 On 31 August 2020, the Head of Unit C sent an email to the appellant, explaining to her that, given the significant workload of the investigation team in question, she could not transfer the three cases at issue to another lead investigator and that, consequently, she was counting on the appellant to close those cases upon her return from leave, in line with what had been agreed. On the same day, she sent the appellant two more emails which contained, respectively, an amended draft final report in Case F and a new draft final report in Case G. In those two emails, she stated that the appellant had to deal with them only once back from sick leave. 28 On 6 September 2020, the appellant replied that her sick leave had been extended and that the cases at issue could be closed without her. 29 On 7 September 2020, the appellant signed electronically a declaration of conflict of interest in Case G, in OLAF’s content management software (OCM). 30 On 8 September 2020, the Head of Unit C informed the appellant that she had appointed a new investigator, who did not speak the language of the case, in two of the three cases at issue. Furthermore, she referred to a consultation in order to close, without the appellant, the third case, namely Case G. The Head of Unit C asked the appellant to send her the missing information concerning that third case if, in the meantime, she would return from her sick leave. 31 On 11 September 2020, the appellant received an email from a colleague from Unit C, congratulating her on her success in a case heard before the General Court. 32 On 17 September 2020, the appellant received, from that colleague, another email containing a link to the judgment delivered by the General Court. 33 On 18 September 2020, the Head of Unit C sent the appellant an email informing her that she had become aware of the declaration of conflict of interest. Furthermore, in order to allow for a decision on that declaration to be reached, she requested the appellant to provide additional information on the conflict of interest in question. The appellant replied to that request on 20 September 2020. 34 On 25 September 2020, the Head of Unit C sent the appellant an email in order to inform her that the appellant was released from her last pending case owing to the conflict of interest in question. She thus concluded that the appellant had no more cases within her unit. 35 On 28 October 2020, the Head of Unit HR.AMC.5 of the Commission sent a note to that institution’s medical service requesting the opening of an invalidity procedure against the appellant. That request was based on the fact that, for the period from November 2017 until October 2020, namely a period of 3 years, the combined sick leave taken by the appellant exceeded 12 months. 36 On 4 December 2020, the appointing authority adopted a decision rejecting the appellant’s request for assistance referred to in paragraph 25 above. 37 On 28 February 2021, the appellant lodged a complaint under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations challenging the decision rejecting the request for assistance. 38 On 6 May 2021, a video call was organised between, on the one hand, the appellant and, on the other, the Investigation and Disciplinary Office (IDOC) and the HR.E.2 Unit (Appeals and Case Monitoring) of the Commission. 39 On 10 May 2021, the appellant was sent a summary of her arguments put forward during that video call. 40 On 11 May 2021, the appellant submitted her comments on that summary and sent documents. 41 On 21 May 2021, the Director-General of the Directorate-General for Human Resources and Security of the Commission adopted the decision opening the invalidity procedure, by which the appellant’s case was referred to the Invalidity Committee and a doctor was appointed to represent the Commission, in accordance with the provisions of Article 7 of Annex II to the Staff Regulations. 42 On 31 May 2021, the appellant lodged a complaint under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations challenging the decision opening the invalidity procedure. 43 On 2 July 2021, the appointing authority adopted Decision R/138/21, which rejected her complaint against the decision rejecting the request for assistance (‘Decision R/138/21 rejecting the complaint’), on the ground that there was no prima facie evidence supporting the appellant’s claims. Furthermore, the appointing authority rejected the claim for compensation for the damage allegedly sustained. 44 On 30 September 2021, the appointing authority adopted Decision R/301/21 rejecting the appellant’s complaint against the decision opening the invalidity procedure (‘Decision R/301/21 rejecting the complaint’), by which it concluded that the complaint lodged by the appellant against that decision was inadmissible. The action before the General Court and the judgment under appeal 45 By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 17 September 2021, the appellant brought an action for annulment, first, of the decision rejecting the request for assistance and of Decision R/138/21 rejecting the complaint and, second, of the decision opening the invalidity procedure and of Decision R/301/21 rejecting the complaint. Furthermore, the appellant requested the General Court to order the Commission to pay her the sum of EUR 20000 by way of compensation for the non-material damage she alleged to have sustained and to order the Commission to produce a number of internal documents. 46 In support of her claim for annulment of the decision opening the invalidity procedure and of Decision R/301/21 rejecting the complaint, the appellant relied, in essence, on a plea alleging infringement by the Commission of Articles 59 and 90 of the Staff Regulations, read in the light of Articles 12a and 24 of the Staff Regulations. In support of her claims for annulment of the decision rejecting the request for assistance and of Decision R/138/21 rejecting the complaint, the appellant relied on four pleas in law alleging, first, infringement by the Commission of Articles 12a and 24 of the Staff Regulations, of the duty of care, and of Articles 7 and 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), as well as a failure to observe the principle of good administration; second, infringement by that institution of Articles 12a, 24, 59 and 60 of the Staff Regulations; third, infringement by the Commission of Articles 59 and 90 of the Staff Regulations, read in the light of Articles 12a and 24 of the Staff Regulations; and, fourth, infringement by the Commission of Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter. 47 By the judgment under appeal, the General Court dismissed, first, the claim for annulment of the decision opening the invalidity procedure as inadmissible and, second, the claim for annulment of the decision rejecting the request for assistance as unfounded. 48 Furthermore, the General Court dismissed the appellant’s claim for damages and rejected the measures of inquiry requested by her. 49 Consequently, the General Court dismissed the action brought by the appellant in its entirety. Forms of order sought by the parties to the appeal 50 By her appeal, the appellant claims that the Court should: – set aside the judgment under appeal; – annul the decision rejecting the request for assistance and Decision R/138/21 rejecting the complaint; – annul the decision opening the invalidity procedure and Decision R/301/21 rejecting the complaint; – order compensation for the damage sustained; – order the Commission to pay the costs relating to the appeal proceedings and those before the General Court; and – in the event that the judgment under appeal cannot be set aside, refer the case back to the General Court. 51 The Commission contends that the Court of Justice should: – dismiss the appeal, and – order the appellant to pay the costs. The appeal 52 In support of her appeal, the appellant relies, in essence, on two grounds of appeal relating, first, to the grounds of the judgment under appeal dismissing the claim for annulment of the decision opening the invalidity procedure and, second, to the grounds of the judgment under appeal in so far as they dismissed the claim for annulment of the decision rejecting the request for assistance. The first ground of appeal Arguments of the parties 53 The first ground of appeal, which is divided, in essence, into five parts, alleges that the General Court erred in classifying the decision opening the invalidity procedure as a preparatory act and therefore as not being open to challenge before that Court. 54 By the first part of the first ground of appeal, the appellant submits that, in accordance with the case-law of the General Court, an act may be classified as ‘preparatory’ only where it has no separate legal effect, whereas acts which produce effects going beyond the procedural framework and substantively altering the rights and obligations of the parties concerned are subject to judicial review by the General Court. 55 Consequently, according to the appellant, in paragraphs 47 and 48 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court erred in law in not applying that case-law. If that had been the case, given that the opening by the Commission of the invalidity procedure led to the definitive and irreversible disclosure of data covered by medical secrecy, thus affecting the appellant’s rights, the General Court would necessarily have reached the conclusion that the decision opening the invalidity procedure must be regarded as an act that substantively alters her rights and obligations. 56 In the second part of the first ground of appeal, the appellant claims that, by classifying the decision opening the invalidity procedure as a preparatory act, the General Court erred in law, distorted the evidence and, in essence, failed to take account of certain decisive circumstances. 57 According to the appellant, first, it is apparent from settled case-law, resulting from the judgment of 18 March 1997, Guérin automobiles v Commission ( C‑282/95 P , EU:C:1997:159 , paragraph 37 ), that the Commission’s definitive decision must, in accordance with the principle of good administration, be adopted within a reasonable time. Given that, in the present case, the Commission did not proceed any further with the invalidity procedure, the opening of that procedure no longer served its purpose as a preparatory act. 58 The appellant submits, second, and in essence, that, given that the decision opening the invalidity procedure amounts to harassment, that decision should be regarded as an act open to challenge. 59 Third, the appellant asserts that, even though the invalidity procedure was intrinsically linked to the appellant’s sick leave, she was not informed of the initiation of the invalidity procedure until the end of May 2021. That severe lack of transparency on the part of the Commission was not taken into account by the General Court in the judgment under appeal. 60 Fourth, in the appellant’s submission, Decision R/301/21 rejecting the complaint did not finalise the invalidity procedure concerning the appellant, leaving her in a prolonged state of uncertainty that infringes Articles 90 and 59 of the Staff Regulations. 61 Fifth, the appellant claims that final decisions are not the only ones that can produce adverse effects, since the indirect effects of certain acts or actions of an EU institution can have serious consequences for the situation of the person concerned. Consequently, even if the decision opening the invalidity procedure were a preparatory act, it would be open to challenge, because it had a negative effect on the status of the person concerned. 62 By the third part of the first ground of appeal, the appellant claims that the General Court failed to take account of the fact that Article 59(4) of the Staff Regulations does not leave any discretion to the Commission in referring a case to the Invalidity Committee. In the present case, according to the appellant, the condition for such a referral laid down in that provision, according to which the combined sick leave of the official in question must exceed 12 months in any period of 3 years, is not satisfied. Therefore, the opening of the invalidity procedure constitutes an act open to challenge, since it is unlawful, or even vitiated by a misuse of powers. 63 By the fourth part of the first ground of appeal, the appellant asserts that the General Court distorted the evidence by failing to examine the specific aspects of her situation. According to her, the General Court merely accepted the version of the facts presented by the Commission, without examining the relevant facts, even though the decision to initiate the invalidity procedure is based on a miscalculation of sick leave days, disregarding the appellant’s actual presence in the office. 64 In the fifth part of the first ground of appeal, the appellant submits, again in order to establish that the General Court failed to examine the specific aspects of her situation, that the inquiry of the Commission into her health as a result of the decision opening the invalidity procedure and the mishandling by that institution of sensitive medical data amount to an infringement of the rights to respect for private life and to the protection of her data, laid down in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, read in conjunction with Articles 59 and 60 of the Staff Regulations. 65 The Commission contends that the first ground of appeal is in part inadmissible and in part unfounded. Findings of the Court 66 By her first ground of appeal, which is divided, in essence, into five parts, the appellant criticises paragraphs 47 and 48 of the judgment under appeal. 67 In paragraph 47 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court found that, in the case at hand, the decision opening the invalidity procedure had been adopted on the basis of Article 59(4) of the Staff Regulations. According to its own case-law, a decision to refer an applicant’s case to the Invalidity Committee is a preparatory act which is a step in the procedure for retiring an official and it is only in connection with an action brought against the decision taken at the conclusion of that procedure that an applicant may contest the legality of earlier steps which are closely linked to it. 68 Applying that case-law to the case at hand, the General Court held, in paragraph 48 of the judgment under appeal, that the decision opening the invalidity procedure was not an act which definitively laid down the Commission’s position, but was an act preparatory to a final decision to be taken upon the conclusion of the invalidity procedure and that, consequently, the decision opening the invalidity procedure did not amount to an act adversely affecting the appellant within the meaning of Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations. 69 In order to assess whether, as the appellant claims, the General Court erred in classifying the decision opening the invalidity procedure as a preparatory act, it must be recalled, as a preliminary point, as the General Court held in paragraph 45 of the judgment under appeal, that it follows from settled case-law that, both in the specific context of proceedings relating to the European civil service and in proceedings generally, only decisions producing binding legal effects capable of affecting the applicant’s interests by bringing about a distinct change in his or her legal position constitute acts adversely affecting that applicant and, consequently, may be challenged as such (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 June 2020, SatCen v KF, C‑14/19 P , EU:C:2020:492 , paragraph 69 and the case-law cited). 70 As the General Court also recalled in paragraph 46 of the judgment under appeal, in the case of acts or decisions adopted by a procedure involving several stages, in particular where they are the culmination of an internal procedure, in principle, an act is open to review only if it definitively lays down the position of the institution upon the conclusion of that procedure and not if it is an intermediate measure intended to pave the way for the final decision (judgment of 14 February 1989, Bossi v Commission, 346/87 , EU:C:1989:59 , paragraph 23 , and, see, to that effect, order of 7 April 2005, Van Dyck v Commission, C‑160/04 P , EU:C:2005:207 , paragraph 32 ). 71 It is in the light of those principles that the five parts of the first ground of appeal must be examined. – The first part of the first ground of appeal 72 By the first part of the first ground of appeal, the appellant submits that, in paragraphs 47 and 48 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court erred in law by failing to take account of the fact that the opening by the Commission of the invalidity procedure had led to the disclosure of data covered by medical secrecy, thereby affecting her rights, and by considering that the decision opening the invalidity procedure is not an act definitively laying down the Commission’s position with regard to her, but an act preparatory to the final decision to be taken at the end of the invalidity procedure. According to the appellant, an act may be classified as ‘preparatory’ only where it does not give rise to a separate legal effect, whereas acts which produce effects going beyond the procedural framework and substantively altering the rights and obligations of the parties concerned are subject to judicial review by the General Court. 73 In that regard, it must, however, be noted that the decision opening the invalidity procedure, by which an institution decides to refer the case of an official to a medical committee, in accordance with Article 59(4) of the Staff Regulations, does not, in itself, have any binding legal effect capable of affecting the interests of the person concerned by bringing about a distinct, and therefore at the very least a definitive, change in that official’s legal position. 74 That conclusion cannot be invalidated by the fact that the opening by the Commission of the invalidity procedure is alleged to have subsequently led to the definitive and irreversible disclosure of data covered by medical secrecy. 75 Even if that disclosure were to be regarded as being in breach of medical secrecy, that circumstance, which relates to the substance of that disclosure, would not mean that the decision opening the invalidity procedure should be regarded as amounting to an act adversely affecting that official within the meaning of Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations, since the fact remains that that decision did not, in itself, bring about a distinct, and therefore at the very least a definitive, change in that official’s legal position. 76 Accordingly, the General Court did not err in law in holding, in paragraphs 47 and 48 of the judgment under appeal, that the decision opening the invalidity procedure did not amount to an act adversely affecting the appellant within the meaning of Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations. 77 The first part of the first ground of appeal must therefore be rejected as unfounded. – The second part of the first ground of appeal 78 In support of the second part of the first ground of appeal, the appellant claims, first, that the excessive duration of the invalidity procedure meant that the decision opening the invalidity procedure no longer served its purpose as a preparatory act and that, therefore, it should have been regarded, by the General Court, as an act adversely affecting her and therefore as being open to challenge. 79 In that regard, it is sufficient to note that, as is apparent from the case-law recalled in paragraph 69 above, the condition, in order for an act to be regarded as adversely affecting an official, is that it must have produced binding legal effects capable of affecting the interests of the applicant by bringing about a distinct change in his or her legal position. 80 The duration of a procedure, even if excessive, cannot have the effect that the act which opened that procedure must be regarded as having brought about a distinct change in that appellant’s legal position. 81 In those circumstances, the General Court did not err in law by not taking into account the duration of the Commission’s handling of the case when it examined whether the decision opening the invalidity procedure amounted to an act adversely affecting the appellant within the meaning of Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations. 82 Second, the appellant submits, in essence, that the adoption of the decision opening the invalidity procedure constituted harassment, with the result that, in order to enable her to assert her rights, that decision should have been regarded as adversely affecting her. 83 In that regard, it is sufficient to note that, while it is true that it cannot be ruled out that the opening of a procedure may form part of harassment of which the person concerned alleges to be a victim and, consequently, may be relied on as a relevant factual element in the context of a request for assistance or a claim for compensation, that does not mean that the decision opening the invalidity procedure must be regarded as amounting to an act adversely affecting that person. As has been recalled in paragraph 69 above, in order to be classified as an act adversely affecting the person concerned, the decision at issue must have brought about a distinct change in the legal position of its addressee and not be liable to have caused damage to that person. 84 Contrary to what the appellant seems to imply, that interpretation of Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations does not preclude a person who has sustained damage precisely as a result of the adoption of such an act from being able to obtain compensation for that damage. In the case of a preparatory act, the person concerned may, in particular, bring an action against the act that will be adopted at the end of the procedure in question and, on that occasion, seek compensation for the damage resulting from the opening of that procedure. 85 The appellant claims, third, that the General Court failed to take account of the fact that she was only belatedly informed of the opening of the invalidity procedure, whereas, fourth, Decision R/301/21 rejecting the complaint left her in a prolonged state of uncertainty, in breach of Articles 90 and 59 of the Staff Regulations. 86 Nevertheless, it must be noted that the appellant has not explained why the General Court should have taken those circumstances into account. A mere abstract statement of the grounds in the application does not alone satisfy the requirements laid down in Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and in Article 169 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice (see, inter alia, judgment of 1 August 2025, PNB Banka v ECB, C‑100/23 P , EU:C:2025:610 , paragraph 34 ). 87 Fifth, the appellant submits that, even if the decision opening the invalidity procedure were a preparatory act, that decision should nevertheless be regarded as an act open to challenge, since it has a negative effect on the status of the person concerned. 88 That argument, which is in line with the second argument, cannot be accepted since, as has already been recalled in paragraph 83 above, the fact that the adoption of an act is capable of producing negative effects on the status of the person concerned does not necessarily mean that that act has brought about a distinct, that is to say, in particular, a definitive, change in the legal situation of that person. 89 Sixth, the appellant claims that the General Court distorted the evidence by classifying that decision as a preparatory act. 90 Nevertheless, where an appellant alleges distortion of the evidence by the General Court, he or she must, failing which that assertion will be inadmissible, indicate precisely the evidence alleged to have been distorted by the General Court and demonstrate the errors in the analysis which, in his or her view, resulted in the General Court making that distortion (judgment of 10 September 2024, KS and Others v Council and Others, C‑29/22 P and C‑44/22 P , EU:C:2024:725 , paragraph 148 ). 91 In the present case, the appellant has not provided details on the evidence that is concerned by that assertion or on the manner in which the General Court distorted that evidence. 92 In those circumstances, the argument alleging distortion of the evidence by the General Court must be rejected as inadmissible. 93 The second part of the first ground of appeal must therefore be rejected as in part inadmissible and in part unfounded. – The third, fourth and fifth parts of the first ground of appeal 94 Under the third part of the first ground of appeal, the appellant claims that the Commission could not open the invalidity procedure vis-à-vis her because the cumulative duration of her sick leave did not exceed 12 months in any period of 3 years, as required by Article 59(4) of the Staff Regulations. 95 By the fourth part of the first ground of appeal, the appellant claims that the General Court distorted the evidence, since it merely accepted the Commission’s miscalculation of the number of days of sick leave taken by the appellant, without examining her actual presence at work. In the fifth part of the first ground of appeal, the appellant claims, in essence, that the General Court should have found that the Commission had infringed her right to respect for her private life and had failed to comply with the obligation to protect her personal data, guaranteed by Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter. 96 In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, as is apparent from paragraphs 67 and 68 above, the General Court held that the decision opening the invalidity procedure did not amount to an act adversely affecting the appellant within the meaning of Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations. For that reason, in paragraph 49 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court rejected as inadmissible the claim for annulment of that decision. 97 In those circumstances, given that the General Court did not examine the substantive legality of that decision, the third, fourth and fifth parts of the first ground of appeal, all of which relate to that legality, must be rejected as ineffective. The second ground of appeal Arguments of the parties 98 The second ground of appeal is divided, in essence, into 12 parts. 99 In the first part of the second ground of appeal, the appellant submits that, in accordance with the case-law of the Court of Justice, the infringement by an institution of a clear legal provision is a matter of public order and must be raised by the General Court of its own motion. According to the appellant, in paragraph 98 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court failed to take due account of that case-law. Had it done so, the General Court would have had to find that the decisions at issue were contrary to Articles 59 and 90 of the Staff Regulations, which, apart from being clear, also set out rules of public order. 100 By the second part of the second ground of appeal, the appellant asserts that the General Court failed to refer to the lack of reasons for the decision rejecting the request for assistance, which is contrary to the requirements of transparency and accountability laid down in Articles 59 and 90 of the Staff Regulations, read in conjunction with Articles 41 and 47 of the Charter. 101 In the third part of the second ground of appeal, the appellant submits that, in paragraphs 97 and 98 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court erred in its interpretation and application of Article 84(1) of its Rules of Procedure. The General Court rejected the new evidence submitted by the appellant after the reply had been lodged, even though that evidence had not been available at the time the application at first instance or the reply had been lodged. According to the appellant, the General Court’s rejection of that evidence was contrary to Articles 7, 8 and 47 of the Charter and Article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (‘the ECHR’). 102 In that regard, the appellant further claims that the purpose of the pre-litigation procedure is to enable an amicable settlement of disputes between officials and the administration, and not to limit the scope of judicial review by the Courts of the European Union. 103 By the fourth part of the second ground of appeal, the appellant asserts,