A Critical Approach to Technofeudalism in EU Law: The Architecture of Big Tech’s Influence

The article critically examines the emergence of technofeudalism within the European Union’s legal framework, drawing on the theoretical contributions of Yanis Varoufakis, Alfred C. Yen, and Katrina Geddes. We argue that the EU’s historically market-oriented regulatory architecture contributed to conditions that facilitated the rise of dominant technology companies exercising quasi-governance functions over digital environments, extracting value from users while evading meaningful democratic accountability. Our analysis distinguishes between two categories of enabling legislation: structural rules, which govern corporate status, taxation, and market consolidation; and action-oriented rules, which regulate platform behavior, algorithmic governance, consumer relations, and data protection. We demonstrate how fragmented national tax regimes, ineffective merger control, under-regulated algorithms, asymmetric consumer protections, unclear liability frameworks for online content, exploitable private international law mechanisms, and inadequately enforced data protection standards collectively reinforce Big Tech’s dominance. While recent regulatory interventions such as the Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act represent important steps, they remain embedded in a market-oriented paradigm that insufficiently addresses the broader social, cultural, and democratic implications of platform power. The article concludes by calling for a more coherent, democratically grounded approach to digital regulation—one that moves beyond fragmented, reactive policymaking toward a comprehensive framework capable of strengthening democratic accountability and public oversight within the digital sphere.