20 By the first ground of appeal, the appellant claims that the conclusion reached by the General Court in paragraphs 14 and 15 of the order under appeal, namely that the action he had brought for failure to act had become devoid of purpose, with the result that there was no longer any need to adjudicate on that action, was based on two incorrect premisses. 21 In the first place, the appellant claims that paragraphs 12 and 13 of the order under appeal are based on the premiss that his emails of 6 January 2017 and of 6 September 2018 asking the Court of Justice of the European Union to act had the same legal basis, namely Article 8 of the Charter, which is incorrect. 22 The appellant claims, in this regard, that, while the legal basis of his first request, dated 6 January 2017, was the right to object under Article 21(1) of Regulation 2016/679 and, more generally, the right of every individual to the protection of personal data concerning them, enshrined in Article 8 of the Charter, his second request, dated 6 September 2018, was based on four legal bases, namely (i) the right to object provided for in Article 21(1) of Regulation 2016/679, or its equivalent provided for in Article 18(a) of Regulation No 45/2001, (ii) the principle of equal treatment, enshrined in Article 20 of the Charter, (iii) Article 8(2) of the Charter, which provides that personal data should be processed on a legitimate basis laid down by law, the meaning of which was set out in Article 5 of Regulation No 45/2001, which was adopted on the basis of Article 16(2) TFEU, and (iv) the right to an effective remedy, enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter. 23 However, in the order under appeal, the General Court did not take into consideration three of the four legal bases mentioned above (‘the three additional legal bases’), on which the appellant relied in both his email of 6 September 2018 and in his application at first instance.