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Nitra District Court: Teacher's dismissal for posting children's photos on Facebook
A kindergarten teacher (hereinafter, the teacher) has been working for the Municipality of Malý Lapáš (hereinafter, the municipal school) since January 2016.
StatusNot cited by any decision here yet
Original title: Ss. v Nitra - 53Cpr/1/2023
Judgment
Holding
The Court upheld the teacher's claim and declared the immediate termination of her employment invalid. Regarding the photographs, the Court held that the overnight kindergarten event was connected to the teacher's employment. She therefore remained bound by her confidentiality obligations under § 79 Act No. 18/2018 on Personal Data Protection. The Court considered that, under Article 5 GDPR, the publication of the children's photographs on the teacher's private Facebook profile required prior consent from their legal representatives. The general informed consent signed by the parents did not cover publication on a private social-media account, as it was limited to specified channels used by the kindergarten. Since the teacher had published the photographs without prior parental consent, despite having received data-protection training and being bound by confidentiality obligations, the Court found that she had breached her data-protection and employment duties, including § 81(f) Labour Code. However, the Court held that the breach was not serious enough to justify immediate termination under § 68(1)(b) Labour Code. It considered the circumstances of the publication, the teacher's intention to thank a sponsor, her attempt to limit the children's identifiability, her previous work record, the absence of proven complaints and the lack of demonstrated damage to the municipal school. The Court also found that the municipal school had not sufficiently proven that the teacher's early departure from the workplace constituted a serious breach of work discipline. Consequently, the Court held that immediate termination was disproportionate and declared it invalid. The claim for compensation for lost wages was separated into independent proceedings. No GDPR fine or other data-protection corrective measure was imposed.
From GDPRhub’s case note — a summary of the decision, not its own words.Read it in the text ↓
On 4 July 2023, the controller immediately terminated the teacher's employment on the basis of a serious breach of work discipline. The municipal school relied on two incidents. First, the teacher had allegedly left the workplace shortly before the end of her working hours without the consent of her superior. Second, she had published photographs of children from the kindergarten on her private Facebook profile. The photographs were taken during an overnight kindergarten event. The teacher published seven photographs alongside a post thanking a local pizzeria for providing sponsored pizza to the children. She maintained that she had tried to avoid showing the children's faces and that her intention was merely to thank the sponsor. The municipal school argued that the photographs constituted personal data and that the teacher was not authorised to publish them on her private Facebook account. Parents provided an informed consent at the beginning of each school year which permitted the publication of photographs through specified channels, including the municipality's website, the kindergarten's official website, EduPage and within the kindergarten premises. This consent did not cover publication on an employee's private Facebook profile. The teacher admitted that she did not have prior written consent from the children's legal representatives for publication on her private account. She considered the general informed consent sufficient and claimed that the parents had been aware of the planned publication. After the termination of her employment, she attempted to obtain additional consent from the parents. The teacher challenged the immediate termination before the Court and requested a declaration that the termination was invalid as well as compensation for lost wages.
Full text226paragraphs
Machine translation of the decision, via GDPRhub — not the official text.Read the original
Court: Nitra District Court Case Number: 53Cpr/1/2023 Case File ID: 4123236876 Date of Decision: February 14, 2025 Name and Surname of Judge, Court of Appeal: Ľuboš Chrenko ECLI: ECLI:SK:OSNR:2025:4123236876.11 JUDGMENT IN THE NAME OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC The Nitra District Court, presided over by Judge Ľuboš Chrenko, in the legal matter of the plaintiff: A. B. C., born XX.XX.XXXX, residing at D. E. XXX, XXX XX D. E., represented by: Legal Aid of the Trade Union of Education and Science Workers in Slovakia, with its registered office at Námestie legionárov 5, 080
Prešov, ID No.: 50 739 620, against the defendant: the Municipality of Malý Lapáš, with its registered office at Hlavná ulica 87/4, 951 04 Malý Lapáš, ID No.: 00 611 174, represented by: JUDr. Róbert Hipp, MBA, attorney-at-law, with registered office at Farská 40/I.p., 949 01 Nitra, ID No.: 37 516 884, regarding a declaration of invalidity the immediate termination of the employment relationship and for compensation for lost wages, as follows h a s d e c i d e d : I. The Court declares that the immediate termination of the employment relationship dated July 4, 2023, imposed by the defendant on the plaintiff, is invalid. II. The Court refers the plaintiff’s claim for compensation for lost wages to separate proceedings. III. The Court grants the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant for reimbursement of the full amount of the costs of the proceedings. The amount of such reimbursement shall be determined by the court of first instance in a separate order after this judgment becomes final. IV. The defendant is obligated to pay the court fee for the filed complaint in the amount of 140 euros to the account of the Nitra District Court within three days of this judgment becoming final. R e a s o n i n g : 1 In her complaint, the plaintiff sought a declaration that the immediate termination of her employment, served on the plaintiff on July 4, 2023, is invalid. The defendant is obligated to pay the plaintiff compensation for lost wages resulting from the invalid termination of employment in the amount of her average earnings from July 4, 2023, until she is allowed to resume work, together with statutory interest for late payment and the costs of the proceedings, within three days of the judgment becoming final.
The plaintiff filed the complaint on the grounds that, as of January 11, 2016, she had been working for the defendant in the position of kindergarten teacher. On July 4, 2023, the defendant served her with notice of immediate termination of her employment pursuant to Section 68(1)(b) of the Labor Code (ZP). It is clear from this immediate termination of the employment relationship that the defendant is terminating her employment immediately due to a gross violation of work discipline, which the plaintiff allegedly committed by arbitrarily leaving her workplace and, on June 24, 2023, published internal documents—photographs of children—on her website.
Regarding the unauthorized leaving of the workplace, the defendant stated that it allegedly occurred during class time without the knowledge or consent of a supervisor. Regarding the second allegation, the defendant states that on June 24, 2023, the plaintiff allegedly misused work materials that were intended solely for the purpose specified by the employer; these materials were used to an extent that was not permissible, and the visual recordings are subject to the GDPR. The plaintiff is alleged to have published these materials on her private Facebook account without the consent of the parents or the employer, thereby violating Work Rule No. 5/2020, the scope of authority of the authorized person dated December 17, 2020, Act No. 18/2018 Coll., the rights of third , the employment contract, and Work Regulations No. 5/2020 in conjunction with Amendments No. 2 and No. 3 (in Part IV, “Work Evaluation and Vacation”—specifically the section on “Leaving the Workplace”). The employer considers the acts described above to be a serious breach of work discipline, and therefore it is not possible to continue employing the plaintiff, not even during the notice period.
The plaintiff considers the immediate termination of her employment to be invalid and responds to the individual allegations as follows: A: Arbitrary leaving the workplace. The plaintiff is alleged to have committed a breach of work discipline by arbitrarily leaving the workplace during class time, and the employer refers to Section IV of the work rules. In response, she states that the defendant’s allegation is untrue. It is true that the mayor of the defendant’s municipality sent the plaintiff an SMS message on June 26, 2023, at 4:25 p.m., stating that she was not at her workplace at that time and that her shift ended at 4:30 p.m. To which the plaintiff replied that they had been instructed by the director that if there were no children at the preschool, they could leave the workplace, and she herself offered that if the mayor needed anything, she could come to work. At the same time, she forwarded to the mayor the defendant’s text message, which stated that the plaintiff had permission from the director to leave the workplace; in response, the mayor asked her to provide proof of permission to leave the workplace on June 26, which the plaintiff was unable to provide, as she did not have such explicit permission in the text message for June 26, 2023 .
The plaintiff works as a kindergarten teacher, and her job duties consist of direct educational and instructional work with children. If parents pick up their children before the end of the kindergarten’s operating hours (4:30 p.m.), this constitutes an obstacle to work on the part of the employer pursuant to Section 142 (3) of the Labor Code, and it is therefore understandable why it is customary at the defendant’s workplace that once all the children have left, employees may go home. This practice is followed by the plaintiff’s other colleagues as well, not just the plaintiff. With regard to the reference to the work rules in Article 11, the working hours for employees on the second shift—where the plaintiff also worked that week—as 10:00 a.m. – 4:00 p.m., as well as 10:00 a.m. – 4:30 p.m. and 10:30 a.m.–4:30 p.m., which, however, does not correspond to actual practice at the workplace, where working hours were applied such that one colleague on the second shift arrived at 10:00 a.m. and left at 4:10 p.m., while another arrived at 10:20 a.m. and left when the parents arrived to pick up all the children. On the day in question, the plaintiff also acted in this manner, leaving the workplace as was customary, that is, only after the parents had come to pick up the last child. Since the plaintiff no longer had any children in her care, she could not have left the workplace during class time. The plaintiff’s actions did not endanger the children in her care, as there were no children left at the workplace , nor could any harm have been caused to the defendant; therefore, the plaintiff disagrees with the characterization of the aforementioned conduct as a serious violation of work discipline.
B: Protection of Personal Data. The defendant refers to documents and images that the plaintiff allegedly posted on her Facebook profile on June 24, 2023, without the consent of the legal guardians and without the employer’s consent. The plaintiff did not post any documents on her Facebook profile, but she did post a status update on her own profile in which she “thanked Pizzeria BELLA Hosťová for the fantastic sponsored pizza for the children who spent the Night at Preschool,” and attached to this post 7 photos, which, among other things, show children from the preschool eating pizza, mostly without their faces visible. On that day, the preschool held a “Night at Preschool” event, during which the children were not provided with dinner; however, one of the children’s parents arranged for a sponsored meal, whereupon the plaintiff expressed her gratitude for the donation in this manner on behalf of all the children. The children’s parents also agreed to this, and no one complained. The plaintiff posted the aforementioned status on Facebook with the good intention of expressing gratitude for the sponsorship donation and not with the aim of misusing the children’s personal data or harming them in any way. The plaintiff assumed that she did not need specific consent for the post, as this is covered by the so-called “informed consent” form that the children’s parents sign at the beginning of each school year.
The plaintiff further pointed out that the defendant’s conduct was contrary to good morals, stating that she has long criticized the poor social climate in the workplace regarding the principal’s behavior. In this regard, on June 5, 2023, she spoke as a member of the kindergarten’s school board representing the employees, where she openly criticized the principal’s conduct and pointed out the fact that since April 2023, five employees (four teachers and one school custodian) had left the school precisely because of the poor work environment. Instead of addressing this situation, the defendant responded by serving the plaintiff with a notice of breach of work discipline dated June 12, 2023, which she was alleged to have committed by raising this issue at the school board meeting. The defendant itself refers to this breach of work discipline in the immediate termination of employment, but does not specify the reason for the breach or the facts of the case. By issuing such a notice of a breach of work discipline, the defendant seeks to create the impression that the plaintiff is a dishonest employee who does not deserve to continue to be employed, which is not based on the truth. The defendant had already attempted to terminate the plaintiff’s employment on the grounds of a fabricated serious breach of work discipline earlier this school year, when the plaintiff received a notice of a breach of work discipline dated September 23, 2022. Similarly to the present case, the defendant characterized the serious breach of work discipline as a failure to adhere to the schedule for direct educational activities without the consent or knowledge of a superior. The defendant was required to rescind the notice of breach of work discipline, as the allegations contained therein were unfounded.
In light of the foregoing, the plaintiff is of the opinion that this case does not involve a serious breach of work discipline. In determining whether a serious breach of work discipline had occurred, the defendant failed to take into account the employee’s character, her previous attitude toward performing her work duties, the manner, severity, and motive of the breach of work discipline, or any damage that may have been caused by such conduct. On the contrary, the defendant concluded that the plaintiff had breached work discipline solely for the purpose of getting rid of an inconvenient employee, rather than to realistically and objectively assess compliance with work discipline and the severity of the breach.
Regarding the plaintiff’s average earnings, she stated that, immediately prior to the termination of her employment, her salary was determined by the notice regarding the amount and composition of her position-based salary dated March 30, 2023, in the the amount of 1,185 euros gross, with the salary payable by the defendant on the 14th day of the following calendar month. In addition to claiming the invalidity of the termination, the plaintiff also seeks compensation for lost wages resulting from the invalid termination of her employment relationship, effective from the immediate termination of the employment (July 4, 2023) until she is again permitted to perform her work; however, the specific amount of the wage compensation cannot be specified, as it is not due as of the date the complaint was filed. On July 4, 2023, the plaintiff notified the defendant that she insists on continued employment.
In her written response to the complaint dated August 17, 2023, the defendant stated that the plaintiff, in the filed complaint, is deliberately distorting and downplaying the grounds for termination. In the complaint, the plaintiff states that she had the principal’s permission to leave the workplace during working hours and provides evidence of this permission in the form of an SMS message with the following text: “Good morning, we have instructions from the director that if all the children have left, we can go home. Do you need anything? Should I come back?” According to the plaintiff’s assertion, this constitutes permission to leave the workplace during working hours. It is by no means clear from the submitted text message that the plaintiff had permission to leave the workplace. When asked by the mayor of the municipality, as the founding authority, to submit such consent (which she did not provide, even subsequently), and the director herself stated that she had not given the plaintiff such consent to leave the workplace during working hours. On the contrary, the aforementioned text message only confirms the grounds for termination, namely that at the time when the plaintiff was supposed to still be at the workplace, she was no longer there.
The plaintiff states that her work consists of “direct educational activities with children; if parents come to pick up their children before the kindergarten’s operating hours end (4:30 p.m.), this constitutes an obstacle on the employer’s part pursuant to Section 142(3) of the Labor Code, and therefore it is understandable why it is established practice at the claimant’s workplace that once all the children have left, employees may go home.” This claim by the plaintiff is viewed merely as a self-serving defense, as the plaintiff is bound by the Labor Code, her employment contract, and the workplace rules, and not by any “established rules.” Arbitrarily leaving the workplace without a supervisor’s consent is in violation of both the employment contract and the job description. The plaintiff’s argument that she can leave the workplace when she has no children is misguided. Even if the plaintiff did not have children starting at 10:00 a.m., this does not mean she may leave the workplace at will. It is also necessary to point out that, as an educator, the plaintiff was required to prepare lesson plans for the children, and even if the plaintiff “did not have children,” she was required, until the end of her working hours, she was required to prepare lesson plans, study professional literature, and perform routine administrative tasks related to the teaching process. The plaintiff did not perform these duties and was unprepared for the teaching process, as was also evident during an inspection by the State School Inspectorate in May 2023. In conclusion, it should be noted that this was not the first time the plaintiff had left her workplace; she systematically left her workplace without her supervisor’s knowledge and failed to prepare for teaching the children.
Regarding the grounds for the invalidity of the immediate termination of employment set forth in Section B.—Protection of Personal Data, the defendant cites the plaintiff’s statement that “The defendant refers to documents and video recordings that she allegedly posted on her Facebook profile on June 24, 2023, without the consent of legal guardians and without the employer’s consent. The plaintiff did not post any documents on her Facebook profile, but she created a status update on her own profile.” The plaintiff strongly disputes this claim, as the status itself, on which the plaintiff posted these photos, is linked to the Facebook account of the person who publishes the post on their profile. The profile itself cannot be used without a link to the Facebook account of the person making the post (Facebook profile).
At the same time, they agree with the plaintiff’s assertion that she posted them on her own profile, where she had created a status update. In this status update, she posted photographs of “children from preschool”; the plaintiff did not have the parents’ consent and therefore acted in violation of the GDPR and misused photographs of a personal nature (of minor children) for her own personal promotion without the consent of their legal guardians. Given that she did not have the consent of the legal guardians or the employer to publish these photographs, since these photographs were taken at a facility not owned by the defendant—that is, the employer—and during working hours.
The plaintiff’s mere assertion that the parents consented to this publication and that no one complained is merely an attempt by the plaintiff to mislead the court. The defendant has on record complaints from parents filed with the principal and directly with the mayor. It also has on record the opinion of its Data Protection Officer (DPO) in accordance with the GDPR (Certificate No.: Osobnyudaj.sk-2019-21273) dated June 28, 2023, under reference number INT.XXXXXXXXXX/XX/ X-XXX (Osobný údaj s.r.o., DUETT Business Residence, Námestie osloboditeľov 3/A, 040 01 Košice, Slovak Republic). The attached opinion clearly demonstrates that the plaintiff acted in violation of the law; she was not authorized to publish such photographs. Based on the published photographs, it is possible to directly identify the data subject. This conduct constitutes a violation of several articles and principles of the General Data Protection Regulation, and thereby infringes upon the rights to the protection of personal data of the data subjects—children and minors—who, under the General Data Protection Regulation, deserve special protection of their personal data.
The defendant is also aware that the parents expressed their disagreement and dissatisfaction with the publication of these photographs on Facebook, directly to the mayor. Furthermore, the culmination of the plaintiff’s inappropriate conduct was her personal visits to individual parents to persuade them to grant retroactive consent. The result of this action was that the parents went to the municipal office—i.e., the school’s governing body—and, in the form of an official record dated July 12, 2023, stated that the plaintiff does not have consent for such publication on her private social media profile (The official record dated July 12, 2023 is attached to this statement).
The plaintiff also finds it confusing that, if she has informed consent, she may post status, yet she concludes by stating that “The plaintiff assumed that she did not need specific consent for the aforementioned status, as this is covered by so-called informed consent, which the children’s parents always sign at the beginning of the school year.” This informed consent applies exclusively to this educational institution for activities that are part of the educational process and exclusively for the defendant’s needs; these photographs may only be published on the defendant’s website. Any other disposal or use of the photographs on other websites, Facebook, or related posts is not permitted without the consent of the legal guardian and the school. The defendant never gave consent to the publication of these photographs taken during the educational process on the plaintiff’s private Facebook profile. The The informed consent of the parents, who signed for the school’s purposes, cannot be construed as consent to the use of photographs by a third party. The defendant also views this solely as a deliberate misrepresentation on the part of the plaintiff. The plaintiff exceeded her authority to process personal data and violated the confidentiality of the personal data of all natural persons (data subjects) with whom she comes into contact while performing her job duties for the data controller. The plaintiff completes annual training for natural persons focused on personal data protection. The plaintiff last completed this training on January 8, 2023.
Regarding the claimant’s assertion of a violation of public policy, the defendant states only that this allegation is merely the claimant’s one-sided perception, since, paradoxically, the employees who resigned from this educational institution decided to leave because of the claimant, as she created tension in the workplace and communication with her was difficult. Paradoxically, it is the plaintiff who creates the poor social climate.
Regarding the plaintiff’s claim concerning average earnings, they state that they will not comment on this claim, as this fact has been proven by the plaintiff with documentary evidence, which they do not dispute and which forms part of her personnel file.
Based on the foregoing, the defendant requests that the court dismiss the complaint in its entirety as mereless and order the plaintiff to pay 100% of the costs of the proceedings.
In her written response to the defendant’s statement regarding the complaint, in a letter dated September 8, 2023, , the plaintiff stated that, with regard to the unauthorized leaving of the workplace, the defendant essentially only addresses the allegations set forth in the complaint to support the correctness of its decision to terminate the plaintiff’s employment immediately. According to the defendant, the new factual allegations are that the plaintiff systematically left the workplace without her supervisor’s knowledge and did not prepare for teaching the children. The plaintiff disputes the aforementioned allegation, as her working hours had been adhered to since she began working in 2016, as stated in the complaint, and this was known to the mayor of the defendant municipality, the school principal, and other colleagues, as it was standard practice at the workplace. Regarding the alleged lack of preparation for classes, this allegation is new to the plaintiff and unfounded, as she has never before been criticized for her preparation for classes; on the contrary, she performed her work diligently and conscientiously.
Regarding the protection of personal data, she stated that it is true that she did not have any prior written consent from legal guardians, as she did not even know that such consent was required, believing that this was covered by the informed consent form the parents had signed. She obtained consent only afterward, after the defendant served her with immediate termination of employment; at that time, all the children’s parents gave their consent without reservation; however, one of the parents—who is also mentioned in the official record and who is a personal friend of the defendant’s mayor—later objected. It is up to the court to determine whether she needed such consent at all, since although the event in question was held with the consent of the mayor and the principal, it was not an official school event, was not part of the plaintiff’s work duties, nor was it part of the educational process. “Sleepover at School” has been held in this manner since 2009 and consists of the graduating class’s final farewell to the school, their teachers, and their classmates. This event has always received positive feedback, and everyone has praised it.
In its written response dated September 30, 2023, to the plaintiff’s written statement , stated regarding the plaintiff’s claim that the plaintiff significantly contradicts herself in her statements and deliberately simplifies her misconduct from the perspective of employment law. Under the terms of the employment contract and other related documents, the plaintiff is required to adhere to her working hours and thereby fulfill the agreed-upon work quota. The plaintiff is not entitled to leave the workplace early even if she does not have children , as in the event that parents pick up their children early and her working hours have not yet expired, she is obligated to use this time to prepare for the upcoming school , i.e., preparing for the following days as well as completing reports on teaching activities, updating the class register, preparing teaching aids, and handling other required administrative tasks. The plaintiff clearly did not perform these duties, since she was no longer at her workplace at the time she was supposed to be performing them.
The defendant’s assertion that the mayor and the school principal were also aware that the plaintiff had left the workplace is merely an attempt to downplay the matter and constitutes a self-serving defense. The plaintiff systematically left her workplace, and there is no reason for her to inform the mayor—as the representative of the founding authority, who is not her immediate supervisor—every time she left her workplace. In this case, her immediate supervisor is solely the kindergarten director, and she is authorized to grant her direct subordinate leave from the workplace based on written consent, confirmed by a pass or other document. The mayor is not even authorized to approve such a release from the workplace for a teaching staff member. The plaintiff has not, to date, provided any evidence of approval to leave the workplace during working hours. The argument that leaving the workplace was standard practice is a self-serving defense by the plaintiff.
The plaintiff’s claim that she did not know she needed consent from legal guardians is untrue, since the defendant, during the performance of her duties and prior to the occurrence of these circumstances, was instructed and retrained every year , and received a certificate of successful completion of GDPR training (we are attaching this document as an appendix to this statement). The school’s governing body arranged such training through the designated person for all employees.
In the following section, the defendant states that the disclosure is based on informed consent—yes, but only for the purposes of the school and in compliance with the conditions set forth by law, with a precisely defined scope of processed information and the duration of personal data processing—and not for private purposes or on private websites. Furthermore, this consent did not cover the publication of photographs of children for the purpose of promoting or advertising a business entity that sponsored pizza for this facility. In the authorization granted to the authorized person, the plaintiff undertook not to use personal data for personal purposes and not to publish, provide, or make such data available without the consent of the data controller (the defendant). The legal guardian’s consent, as well as the scope and conditions of the data processing, are part of the child’s personal file, to which the plaintiff, as the teacher of the class in question, has access. Consent is granted by the legal guardian to the data controller (the defendant) and not to an employee (the plaintiff). It is not true that all parents have granted consent to such disclosure. We are attaching the parents’ statements and their complaints as an appendix to this letter. Obtaining additional and backdated consent constitutes an abuse of the plaintiff’s authority in the processing of personal data.
The plaintiff incorrectly states in her response that the aforementioned event, during which personal data and photographs of minors were misused, was not part of the educational process. This claim is also untrue, as this event (sleeping over at school) falls within the educational process since it took place directly on school premises, with the the school administration’s consent and constituted an indirect educational process—a so-called “play-based” approach—and preparation for the next stage of education. If it had not been part of the educational process, the school administration would not have permitted the free use of the school building.
In her testimony at the hearing on December 13, 2023, the plaintiff stated that she had been working at the Malý Lapáš Preschool as a teacher since January 2016. Her relationships with parents were very cordial; during those seven years, she had no serious misconduct or problems. She also had friendly relationships with her colleagues and remains in contact with them to this day. She loved the children, and they loved her. The work fulfilled her, and she saw it as her calling—until last year, when she began to experience bullying from the principal and her supervisor. The principal has a moody disposition. She refused to communicate, took offense easily, and spread rumors. The principal had been in that position for five years.
Regarding the first act cited in the immediate termination of employment—leaving the premises on June 26, 2023—she stated that on that day her work hours began at 10:20 a.m., noting that the preschool is open until 4:30 p.m., when it closes. It was a normal day like any other; around 4:00 p.m., the children began to leave, and she remained there with her colleague F. F., who was scheduled to finish at 4:10 p.m., and the just the two of them. She helped her with the final tasks at the preschool—tidying up, recording the necessary details required every day, entries in the class registers, and they locked up the preschool together. Around 4:20 p.m., they left the preschool, noting that they had to lock the upper gate; and as they were heading toward the lower gate—the municipal office is located below the preschool— so there they saw the mayor arriving by car; he was heading to the municipal office, which is directly below the preschool. They greeted him politely and continued walking home. Her cell phone was on silent mode because, when the children are sleeping, she doesn’t want to disturb them, so she didn’t notice that the mayor had called her; she didn’t hear him, and it wasn’t until she got home that she found a message from the mayor stating that it was 4:25 p.m. and she was not at work. She replied to the mayor, asking if he needed anything or if he should come to the preschool; he then asked her for proof of how she could have left her workplace. He wanted to know the reason, so she explained to him that they had received information—an instruction—from the principal that if they had no more children left and had completed all their tasks as required, they could go home. The mayor requested such confirmation, so she sent him a photocopy of a memo from the principal, in which she states that once there are no more children, they can go home. This memo was from April and did not apply to the day in question. But in general, it applied; it was standard practice. She believes that as long as they managed to finish their duties related to closing the preschool, it happened that other colleagues also left early. She insists that the principal had given her permission to do so. She added that, given the nature of working with children, there were times when parents could not agree on who would pick up a child, so she stayed longer than her working hours required as long as the children were still there.
Regarding the second reason for the immediate termination of her employment, she stated that she was the teacher of 24 students in a preschool class, but it is customary to hold a farewell event for these students as they move on to school— a festive farewell involving a performance by the students for their parents, after which the children stay at preschool and spend the night with their teachers; the performance usually takes place on Friday, and they then spend the night at preschool with their teacher, and on Saturday morning their parents come to pick them up. It’s a 20-year-old tradition, and the children look forward to it. Of course, since parents are leaving their 5- to 6-year-old children there for the whole night, they naturally had concerns, so the teachers kept them informed about every activity they undertook with the children. So they were informed about the hiking trip to the forest, the treasure hunt, and the walk through the vineyards. Around 7:00 p.m., she ordered by phone the previously arranged refreshments—pizza from Bella, which had been arranged in advance with a mother, who made this snack option available to the children, since they were there from 4:00 p.m. until morning; thus, she provided them with this hot dinner at no charge—it was free. Since they had been on a long walk, the children just had time to wash up before the pizza they had ordered arrived. The children were very excited about it, and of course they ate it all. Afterward, they played night games with headlamps on the preschool grounds, and around 10:00 p.m. they went to the classroom, where they had their beds set up for the night games; the last children fell asleep around midnight. In the morning, around 9:00–10:00 a.m., the parents came to pick up their children. She pointed out that every parent had been informed about the program and what the children would eat; she told everyone that this option for refreshments—ordering a pizzeria, and that she would thank this company on social media for providing the children’s meals. There was no other dining option. Every parent was informed, and no one had a problem with it. They knew that she wanted to publicly thank Bella Pizzeria. She took photos of the children and also documented the process of the woman bringing them the pizza; she wanted to capture moments of them enjoying the food, so she asked the children to lower their heads so they wouldn’t be visible and took their photos. There were 22 children there; their heads were turned to the side, and some of the photos were blurry—the point was that they couldn’t be identified. She had no idea she’d violated any rules, since she had signed informed consent forms from the parents, and she also had a verbal agreement with all the parents; they were informed and agreed to the publication of this thank-you note and the photos of the children. The parents knew in advance that she would take their photos when they received the pizza. She pointed out that the GDPR training was conducted via a 30- to 40-minute video, after which she completed a test; once she submitted it, she felt she had completed the GDPR training. She is currently employed at a new preschool in Nitra, where she completed GDPR training and was able to ask more specific questions regarding the issue currently being addressed. The training was conducted by an instructor whom she could ask in greater detail about this issue. She believed she was not doing anything illegal, since she had the parents’ consent and believes that this activity she carried out for the preschool was well-intentioned, intended to uphold the preschool’s good reputation. There was no ill intent.
When asked by her attorney what working hours the teaching staff had during the afternoon shift, the plaintiff stated that their actual working hours were from 10:00 a.m. to 4:20 p.m., and her shift was from 10:20 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.
When asked by the plaintiff’s representative who specifically instructed them to hold the “Night at the Preschool” event, the plaintiff stated that it was an annual tradition and was automatically linked to the farewell party, which was subsequently rescheduled; the preschoolers now hold a farewell event at the kindergarten. The principal announced that this farewell event would take place. It was agreed upon for Friday, a time that suited everyone. It was customary to hold it during the last weeks of June.
In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative as to whether they had been assigned overtime work for the night at the preschool, the plaintiff stated that they were not paid for this activity; they were told that it was work outside of direct activities with the children, which is not paid. They were told to count this as part of their work-from-home duties and preparation.
When asked by the plaintiff’s representative whether she had ever filed a complaint against a colleague in the past, and if so, what it concerned, the plaintiff stated that she had always had friendly relationships with her colleagues; the only harassment she experienced was from the principal. It is true that she filed a complaint against the principal once; it was on November 7, 2022. This complaint concerned the fact that the principal was constantly looking for problems with her, blaming her for things that happened at the preschool and for various issues. She also failed to comply with the school rules by not allowing her to take her lunch break; furthermore, she was moody, uncommunicative, shouted, and refused to resolve problems.
In response to a question from the plaintiff’s attorney as to whether she had committed a breach of work discipline prior to the delivery of the notice of immediate termination of employment, the plaintiff stated that she had not.
In response to a question from the defendant’s legal counsel regarding the first ground for breach of work discipline— how did the other workdays proceed in cases where parents picked up their child from the school facility earlier—and thus at certain times the plaintiff no longer had children in the classroom—how did things proceed from there? The plaintiff responded to the question by stating that they had duties that were part of their job description. That is, they tidied up, flushed the toilets, checked the classrooms, made entries in the class registers, and checked the schoolyard. They usually picked up the children around 4:00 p.m., so there were 15 minutes left to perform these tasks. It was unpredictable; the children left at different times each day. It was common for the last child to leave at 4:20 p.m., which left time to tidy up, and at 4:30 p.m. the school closed, or sometimes even later.
In response to a question from the defendant’s attorney regarding whether it was common for a situation to arise in the past where she left the workplace early when there were no children present and managed to tidy up in time? The plaintiff stated that she does not recall, but these were matters taking only a few minutes, and this case involves 5 minutes.
In response to a question from the defendant’s attorney asking whether she could specify exactly where she met with the mayor on June 26, 2023? The plaintiff stated that the mayor arrived by car; he had a meeting at the municipal office with parents. They met in front of the municipal office. He was sitting in his car, and they greeted him.
In response to a question from the defendant’s legal counsel regarding her statement that she had felt bullied by the principal at this school, how was the matter addressed? The plaintiff stated that she filed a complaint against the principal.
In response to a question from the defendant’s attorney about the outcome of that complaint, the plaintiff stated that on December 1, the mayor wrote back to her, stating that he believed he had done everything possible to resolve the negative atmosphere, since he had organized a mediation meeting and claimed that he would refer this issue to the school inspectorate. May 10 In response to a question from the defendant’s legal counsel asking whether she knew how the inspection authority had evaluated her complaint, The plaintiff stated that yes, an unannounced inspection took place in May 2023; the principal was aware of this inspection, but the teachers were not. The teachers performed averagely. The principal had numerous violations.
In response to a question from the defendant’s legal counsel, who specifically asked about the issue of bullying, the plaintiff stated that during a personal conversation with the inspector, she asked why they had come and, in fact, why the the teachers informed that they were coming, but she wanted to know why they hadn’t been notified, and the inspector told her that the inspection was specifically targeted at her to prevent her from going on sick leave, and that is why the teachers were not informed that the inspection was coming. At the conclusion of the inspection regarding the complaint, the inspectorate did not address her complaint at all.
In response to a question from the defendant’s legal counsel regarding whether, at the time she was addressing the complaint about bullying, she held a position in certain bodies of the school or the school district, the plaintiff stated that she was a member of the school board. She had previously served as chair, but at that time she was a member.
In response to a question from the defendant’s legal counsel asking why they did not address this issue through the school board, The plaintiff stated that she had addressed this issue at the school board meeting. In May 2023, at a school board meeting, she drew attention to the high number of departures among female teachers as well as a non-teaching staff member—the school custodian. She also drew attention to the atmosphere in the workplace.
In response to a question from the defendant’s legal counsel regarding whether she had raised the issue of bullying directed at her personally, and if so, what the outcome was, the plaintiff stated that the principal did not respond; the result of the bullying was that she was immediately terminated.
In response to a question from the defendant’s legal counsel asking whether she could specifically point out which document contained this information and what it stated, The plaintiff stated that she received a written warning from the principal at the school board meeting regarding a violation of work discipline for resolving interpersonal conflicts among employees. It is a letter dated June 5, which was discussed at the school board meeting. November 10 In response to a question from the defendant’s legal counsel regarding the second part of the breach of work discipline— whether the plaintiff had any authorization, consent, or permission from her employer to publish documents and data—or, in other words, information—pertaining to the school on her own Facebook status? The plaintiff stated that she believed she was not doing anything illegal. She had no one to consult with.
In response to a question from the defendant’s legal counsel regarding the fact that she had completed several training courses, on the basis of which she was recognized as a professionally qualified person authorized to handle personal data. If she published this information on her private page, did she have consent from the parents of the children concerned? He is referring to written consent as required by law. The plaintiff stated that she had verbal consent. After receiving notice of immediate termination of her employment, when the mayor explained to her that she was required to have written consent, she—knowing that all the parents had agreed to this action, to the posting of photos and the thank-you message on social media—drafted a written consent form for the publication of the photos. There was no problem with that; however, the mayor sent an email to the parents asking them not to sign anything.
In response to a question from the defendant’s legal counsel as to whether, at the time she published these photos, she had the consent of all the parents, the plaintiff stated that everyone was aware of it, but she did not request consent in writing.
In response to a question from the defendant’s attorney asking whether she was aware of any parents who did not agree to this publication, the plaintiff stated that the mayor had forwarded two statements from Mr. and Mrs. G. Mrs. G. had no problem with publicly thanking the pizzeria. After the mayor informed her via email, her husband, Mr. G., had issues with the publication.
In response to a question from the defendant’s attorney asking whether she had not obtained consent prior to publication and, after publication, had not obtained consent from all the parents whose children were featured on her website, the plaintiff stated that since one of the legal guardians confirmed to her that he had no problem with it, she assumed that both parents had no problem with it.
The mayor of the defendant’s municipality, H. H. I., H., stated in his testimony that, regarding his early departure work at 4:30 p.m., he had an appointment with the parents of children who were applying to their second preschool. That is, he was driving through the village and encountered the plaintiff along with Ms. F. on the way. He estimates that it was 4:15 p.m.; he parked in front of the municipal office, asked the parents to wait for him—not everyone was there . He went to get the keys to the preschool and entered the building to check the attendance records to see what the plaintiff had recorded in the attendance log. Since the plaintiff had not recorded her departure time, he called her supervisor, the principal, to ask if she had been granted permission to leave early. He then called the plaintiff, who did not answer, so he sent her a text message that included the time 4:25 p.m., but some time had passed since he had last seen her. The plaintiff did not deny that she had left early or that she had sent him a text message, but according to the principal’s statement, that message was from April of the previous year. He does not believe this can be used as a precedent, since other employees always ask for permission whenever they need to leave. This does not establish a rule for the future.
Regarding the second part, as an employer, they place great emphasis on acting in accordance with the law and respect the children’s personal data. They have a contracted company that ensures and oversees the protection of personal data so that it complies with the General Data Protection Regulation, which means that every single employee has been trained and informed about the security guidelines in place at the municipal office, and each has been assigned the scope of their authorization regarding how they may handle personal data. Every employee is bound by a confidentiality agreement regarding the handling of personal data and completes annual e-learning training; 11 of the topics also cover the publication of photographs. At the same time, at the beginning of each school year, the children’s legal guardians sign an informed consent form, in which they specify the scope of personal data processing and, through yes/no questions, indicate whether they agree or disagree. One of these items is consent to the publication of photographs, which specifies exactly where the photographs may be published. These include the municipality’s website, the kindergarten’s official website, the Edupage system, and on the kindergarten’s premises. Each legal guardian must sign this consent form. This means that the parents could not grant additional consent, because at the beginning of the school year they had already given consent regarding where the photographs could be published, and the operator did not request further consent from the legal guardians. The plaintiff, within the scope of her authority, did not have the right to represent the employer in obtaining such consent. At the beginning of the school year, this is done because the law requires that consent be given in writing and prior to the actual act of data processing. By publishing those photographs, the plaintiff violated all the documents with which she had been familiarized; they requested an opinion from the responsible person to assess whether there had been a violation of the documents the plaintiff signed or a violation of the General Data Protection Regulation, and we have attached the opinion of our designated official. In the work regulations, this is defined as a gross violation of work discipline.
He has currently been serving as mayor for his second term, i.e., since December 2011. As an employer, he does not come into direct contact with teachers nor does he evaluate their professional competence; this is the responsibility of the kindergarten director, who is required to conduct periodic evaluations of teaching staff. He has information only from the end of the 2022/2023 school year, when the plaintiff received a significantly negative evaluation. The kindergarten director took office during his term of office because the previous director had terminated her employment; there had already been a gross violation of workplace discipline at the kindergarten in the past. At that time, the plaintiff was the chair of the school board, and the school board recommended hiring the candidate for principal. March 11 Communication training was held at the kindergarten; its goal was to improve mutual communication among teachers, and if the plaintiff, as chair of the school board, had any information about inappropriate, unprofessional, or otherwise improper conduct by the principal, the school board has full authority to propose the dismissal of the kindergarten principal—which did not happen. She did not begin addressing the matter until she no longer had this authority due to the expiration of the school board’s term at the end of 2022. The training took place in the summer of 2022, as a result of the need to address the deteriorating atmosphere among the staff. It is true that she contacted the State School Inspectorate with a request to conduct an inspection; however, the scope of the inspection is determined by the Inspectorate itself. Most inspections by the State School Inspectorate are unannounced, because the Inspectorate frequently encounters conduct at many schools that could undermine the purpose of the inspection. That is why the staff were not aware of it. The inspection’s findings were not positive for them or for the staff, even though the parents did not complain—but they had no reason to. From this perspective, based on the results and consultation with the inspection authorities, the plaintiff is assessed as a typical teacher who has many shortcomings in her teaching and educational process.
In response to a question from the defendant’s attorney about where exactly in the village they met the plaintiff at the time when she had left her workplace early, The mayor stated that it was on the main street, about 300 meters from the municipal office, and that the preschool shares a fence with the municipal office. So it could have been the fifth house from the intersection.
In response to a question from the defendant’s attorney asking whether he could estimate how long it takes to walk from the kindergarten to the place where they met, the mayor stated that it takes approximately 4–5 minutes on foot.
In response to a question from the defendant’s attorney regarding whether, when he called the kindergarten director to ask about the plaintiff, he also inquired whether she had permission to leave her workplace? The mayor stated that he had asked, and she did not have permission, but he does not know whether she even asked for it.
In response to a question from the defendant’s legal counsel as to whether, subsequently, when he contacted the plaintiff, she ever provided provide consent in writing or confirm that she actually had such consent? The mayor stated that she did not provide consent in writing, only via the aforementioned text message, which is a year old. He added that the plaintiff did not have consent.
In response to a question from the defendant’s legal counsel regarding whether the plaintiff subsequently altered the data in the attendance records, or whether anything was added to the attendance records, the mayor stated that on the following day, an entry was added to the attendance record at 4:25 p.m.
In response to a question from the defendant’s legal counsel regarding whether the attendance record was filled out at the time the plaintiff left the workplace, the mayor stated that the time of departure was not indicated.
In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative regarding how many kindergarten locations they have and how many teaching staff members are employed there, the mayor stated that at that time they had two kindergartens. At the kindergarten where the plaintiff worked, there were 6 teaching staff members; at the second kindergarten, there was one teaching staff member.
In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative asking whether he was aware of how the plaintiff’s working hours were actually implemented —specifically, from what time to what time she was supposed to be at work—the mayor stated that he was aware and could specify the schedule: the first shift began at 6:30 a.m. is the first shift, followed by shifts starting at 7:00 a.m. and 7:30 a.m., and the second shift begins at 10:00 or at 10:30 a.m., with the longest work shift ending at 4:30 p.m., when the preschool closes—and that was the reason he called the principal to ask until what time the plaintiff’s shift lasted. Because he does not have information on which employee is assigned to which shift, as the schedule changes every week , one employee always starts at 6:30 a.m. and one employee works until 4:30 p.m. This schedule occurs once every 6 weeks.
In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative asking whether he was aware that the work schedule for the second shift at the workplace was as described by the plaintiff—i.e., from 10:00 a.m. to 4:10 p.m.—and for the other teacher from 10:20 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.? The mayor stated that he could not answer this question, as the work schedule had been modified by amendments to the work regulations.
In response to the plaintiff’s representative’s question as to whether they also conducted attendance checks on employees other than the plaintiff and found any irregularities among them, the mayor stated that they did, but found none.
In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative asking whether they had any internal regulations governing the conduct of such checks or how they selected employees for attendance checks, the mayor stated that he checked all employees at the preschool. The reason was that he had encountered an employee outside the workplace at a time when, in his opinion, the employee should have been at work. The attendance check merely confirmed that the employee should have still been at work. From the employer’s perspective, it is unthinkable for an employee to be absent from the workplace without the knowledge of their supervisor and without permission to leave the workplace. The employer is the municipality; the kindergarten does not have legal personality.
In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative regarding whether, at the time the plaintiff’s attendance was checked on June 26, there were any students at the school without pedagogical supervision, the mayor stated that there were not.
In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative regarding the second incident cited in the immediate termination of employment—how did he learn of the breach of work discipline on June 22, 2023—was he referring to the publication of photos? The mayor stated that one of the child’s parents had inquired via email how it was possible photos of his child had been published without his consent; however, out of fear that the teacher would take it out on the child, the mother, Ms. J., did not want to file an official complaint. If Ms. J. had not contacted the municipal office and the principal, they likely would not have learned of the personal data breach. July 13 In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative regarding why the publication of the plaintiff’s photos on Facebook was considered so serious that her employment was terminated, The mayor stated that it was a gross violation of workplace discipline regarding the confidentiality of personal data, as defined in the letter of appointment, the consent form, and the workplace rules. As an employer, he cannot tolerate intentional violations of the work rules; otherwise, they would be pointless.
In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative regarding who assigned the plaintiff to work overtime during overnight events at the daycare center, the mayor of the municipality stated that this is determined by a senior employee, so he assumes it was the director. He further stated that no such instruction had come directly from him.
In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative asking whether he could describe how data protection training is conducted, The mayor stated that every employee has access to a portal operated by the designated person in charge, and each employee receives an email with instructions on how and where to access the training. After completing the training, each employee must take a test; if the test is passed, a certificate of completion is generated for them.
In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative regarding what the relationship between the plaintiff and the director was, from his perspective as the employer’s statutory body, the mayor stated that it was not ideal.
In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative asking whether he could specify what the problem was between the director and the plaintiff, the mayor stated that he did not know.
In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative about who filed the reports regarding violations of work discipline in September 2022 and on June 12, 2023, concerning the plaintiff? The mayor stated that these documents are attached; he does not currently recall whether it was him or the director, as he filed some of them and the director filed others. 13:13. In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative asking whether he knew why the plaintiff received a notice of a breach of work discipline on June 12, 2023, the mayor stated that he believed it was due to leaving the workplace; after reviewing the document, he corrected himself and stated that it was due to a conflict at the school board meeting.
In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative asking whether this breach of work discipline had an impact on the delivery of the plaintiff’s immediate termination? The mayor stated that it constituted a gross violation at the time of termination, and they took into account that the employee had previously been warned about a breach of work discipline. The incident at the school board meeting itself was not an automatic ground for termination of employment. It was also stated that this was a warning that, in the event of a future violation, it could lead to termination of employment with notice. However, the plaintiff’s employment was not terminated by notice but by immediate termination for gross violation of work discipline.
In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative asking why the plaintiff received—and why the notice of breach of work discipline from September 2022 was rescinded—the mayor stated that the notice of breach work discipline from September 2022 was revoked by the employer on the grounds that it amounted to a case of one party’s word against another’s without any witnesses.
In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative regarding a contradiction in Section 9(5) of the defendant’s work rules, where, according to subparagraph (a), leaving the workplace without the consent and knowledge of a supervisor, whereas under letter h), it is considered a serious violation of work discipline to repeatedly arrive late or leave early from the workplace. The mayor of the municipality stated in this regard that if there is any contradiction, he is unable to comment. The work rules are model work rules issued by the Ministry of Education.
In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative as to why, upon establishing the facts stated in the notice of immediate termination, they proceeded immediately to terminate the employment relationship rather than utilizing other labor-law sanctions? The mayor of the municipality stated that because they consider such conduct to be an abuse of authority regarding a particularly protected group of persons—namely, children—the publication of photographs of children on private profiles without parental consent, from the perspective of cybersecurity and the potential for misuse of photographs on freely accessible profiles—is a reason they considered so compelling that they proceeded as described there.
At the hearing on March 13, 2024, the witness JUDr. B. H. stated in his testimony that he is the managing director of the company Osobný údaj SK. They have been providing services in the area of personal data protection to the municipality of Malý Lapáš continuously since the beginning of 2019. In this regard, a security audit regarding personal data protection was conducted at the municipality and the school, and security documentation was prepared. The controller’s employees receive regular training in the area of personal data protection. The training focuses on the performance of their duties in relation to personal data protection; therefore, it is not general in nature. Employees must complete the training once a year. The training is followed by a test, and upon successful completion of the test, the employee is awarded a certificate valid for one year. Every employee is bound by a confidentiality obligation regarding the GDPR and personal data protection; they are also authorized in writing by the employer to process personal data and are familiarized with security policies. They also serve as advisors to both employees and employers on the protection of personal their contact information is available at both the school and the municipal office, as well as on their websites, and they are, of course, available to answer any questions that may arise. They also regularly visit their clients, including the Municipality of Malý Lapáš, and monitor the status of the relevant personal data and compliance with legal regulations in this area.
From his perspective, as he stated in his written opinion, this constitutes a serious violation of the GDPR, as there has been a breach of the fundamental principles set forth in Article 5 of the GDPR—and thus the lawfulness of processing—as well as a violation of Article 6 of the GDPR regarding the absence of a legal basis for processing. Other articles were also violated, such as Article 32 on the security of processing. From his perspective, the employee exceeded his authority, particularly in relation to a specially protected group, namely minors. Based on his professional experience, he concludes that the controller faces a substantial fine for such a violation. At the same time, there was a violation of the Personal Data Protection Act, which mandates employee confidentiality regarding personal data. In this specific case, the employee in question had received regular training at least four times, with these training sessions focused specifically on the processing of personal data in the education sector; he was also authorized in writing to process personal data, on how to process personal data and bound by a confidentiality obligation.
In response to a question from the defendant’s attorney asking whether he could state what grade the plaintiff received upon completion of this training, the witness stated that the plaintiff successfully completed each of the training sessions and tests. He believes that three tests had a 100% pass rate and one had a 93% or 95% pass rate.
In response to a question from the defendant’s attorney asking whether he could state whether the plaintiff had , given that in his testimony he stated that he acts as an advisory body for the founder and employees? The witness stated that prior to the incident in question, neither he personally nor anyone from the company Osobný údaj SK had been contacted by the plaintiff.
In response to a question from the defendant’s legal counsel regarding how he perceives the violation of the law and the subsequent actions of the plaintiff, in which she sought to remedy the violation by obtaining consent from the parents of the affected children? The witness stated that he viewed this as a significant overreach of authority and a violation of several fundamental principles and provisions of both the GDPR and the Personal Data Protection Act. Any consent must be unambiguous and obtained in advance; it is not in accordance with the GDPR to obtain consent retroactively or to backdate it in any way. She views this as particularly sensitive, given that it concerns a special category of data subjects—minors—as both the GDPR and the European Data Protection Board place particular emphasis on this category.
In response to a question from the defendant’s legal counsel regarding how he assesses or perceives the fact that the plaintiff obtained such informed consent in the context of the other facts? The witness stated that for the municipality as the data controller, such consent would not be valid; any consent forms drafted for the municipality based on a request from a client or employees constitute a significant overreach of authority or a violation of labor regulations.
In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative regarding what specifically makes the plaintiff’s Facebook status problematic from the perspective of personal data protection, the witness stated that if photographs of minors without a legal basis, this constitutes a violation of the GDPR. It is also a violation of the fundamental principle of lawfulness in the processing of personal data.
In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative asking whether this also applies to photographs in which the face is not visible or identifiable, the witness stated that a data subject is considered a data subject if they are identified or identifiable. For a data subject to be identifiable, it is not necessary for their face to be visible in the photograph. Just as a parent recognizes the face of their child or other children, they can identify the individuals in the photograph based on other characteristics. For individuals to be considered “data subjects” under the GDPR, the face of the data subject does not necessarily have to be shown in the photograph. Regarding the photographs submitted, he stated that, from his perspective, the individuals in the photographs are clearly identifiable, and based on his experience and professional practice, he believes that a supervisory authority would reach the same conclusion in the event of an inspection. The individuals are not blurred in the photographs, nor are they blacked out. Therefore, it is possible to identify them.
In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative: What specifically must be visible in the photograph of the child in order to conclude that the child is identifiable? The witness stated that, under the GDPR and the supervisory authority’s decision-making practice, a data subject is identifiable if another natural person can identify them based on certain characteristics. In other words, it is not necessary to show the face or the entire figure; sometimes just the hairstyle or posture is enough—there are an incredible number of such characteristics.
In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative asking whether any data subject had filed a complaint regarding the published post with the data controller, the defendant, the witness stated that no data subject had filed a complaint with him personally. However, he is aware that a complaint was addressed to the operator.
In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative asking whether he was aware of whether the data controller had reported a personal data breach to the Office for Personal Data Protection, the witness stated that not every incident in the area of personal data protection must be reported to the supervisory authority; there are essentially specific criteria specifying when a given incident must be reported and when it does not need to be reported. In this particular situation, no report was filed, as it was determined that this was an incident that did not need to be reported. The key issue is whether the data subjects—or their legal representatives—were notified that such an incident had occurred. May 15 In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative asking whether it is possible to obtain consent from legal guardians in a form other than in writing, the witness stated that the GDPR does not specify a particular form, meaning that consent may be obtained in a form other than in writing. However, it must always be obtained prior to the processing of the information, before the actual processing takes place.
In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative asking whether he had prepared his opinion based on the information provided by the data controller that the plaintiff had not obtained consent in any way from the data subjects, the witness stated that the information was that the photographs had been published without the consent of the data subjects and without the knowledge the operator, as the employer, and that the plaintiff subsequently attempted to obtain some retroactive consent.
Witness F. F. stated in her testimony that she has been a teacher at the kindergarten in the village of Malý Lapáš since November 2023, having previously given notice of her resignation effective at the end of August 2023. On that day, i.e., June 26, 2023, she and the plaintiff had the afternoon shift; she worked until 4:10 p.m., and the plaintiff worked until 4:30 p.m. They left the preschool at 4:20 p.m., when there were no children left. They met with the mayor in front of the municipal office after 4:20 , and the principal had repeatedly emphasized that once the last children had left, they were allowed to go home earlier. It was never earlier than 4:20 p.m., because they couldn’t leave earlier until they had finished cleaning up. It happened that she left earlier on several occasions; when her workday ended at 4:30 p.m., she left at 4:20 p.m., and the other colleagues did the same whenever possible. The principal often emphasized to them that once the children had left, they could go home. As for the workplace atmosphere, the colleagues got along very well as a team; the only one who caused discord was the principal, who wouldn’t communicate with them. When they asked questions because they didn’t know something, she would took offense at them and was more or less in conflict with the plaintiff because she took issue with everything the plaintiff did. But essentially, she didn’t do anything wrong; she fulfilled her job duties as she was supposed to. It was just that the plaintiff asked about certain things that weren’t clear, and the principal had a problem with that—she would go to the office to ask.
Regarding the posting of a photo on Facebook, the witness stated that nothing like that happened to her; she didn’t do anything like that. It is true that training sessions were held regarding the GDPR.
In response to the plaintiff’s representative’s question, “Why did you resign in 2023?” The witness stated that because it was impossible to communicate with the principal, who began yelling at her for no reason, calling her a bad person and things like that, and she would not work in such an environment. She returned to work after the director, J. B., was no longer employed there.
In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative asking whether she ever participated in “night at the preschool” events, The witness stated that yes, always with the preschoolers.
In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative asking whether they received any overtime pay for this work, the witness stated that they did not.
In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative asking who assigned them to work at the “night at the preschool” event and who told them that they had to perform this work, the witness stated that this was already standard practice before she started working there.
In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative about how meals were provided during the overnight event at the preschool, the witness stated that they were not provided in any way—only what the parents brought.
In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative asking whether she had ever encountered the mayor conducting an inspection of working hours, the witness stated that she had—not just once, but on occasions when he saw them leaving early.
In response to a question from the defendant’s attorney regarding the witness’s statement in her testimony that the plaintiff “performed her job duties well,” the witness was asked on what basis she made that assessment and whether she had any authorization from the employer or the founding entity to assess the scope of her work, the manner in which it was performed, and whether it was in accordance with the employment contract? The witness stated that she did not have such authorization, but she made this statement in connection with how she had observed the plaintiff working.
In response to a question from the defendant’s attorney asking whether she had consulted with anyone about how she would testify at this hearing, the witness stated that she had not. She confirmed that she had come to the hearing with the plaintiff, but they had not discussed the matter.
In response to a question from the defendant’s attorney asking whether she could describe her assessment of the plaintiff as a person, specifically regarding her work duties—to what extent did she conscientiously fulfill her work duties? The witness stated that, to the extent their work allowed, she engaged in activities with the children, exercised with them, and went for walks; she worked exactly as she was supposed to.
In response to a question from the defendant’s attorney asking whether they carried out those activities together, the witness stated that when they were outdoors, yes, they did so together; in the classroom, no, because each had her own class. But when she sees on the bulletin board that she was on the morning shift and there are art projects there, she obviously worked with them.
In response to a question from the defendant’s attorney regarding the witness’s statement that they were allowed to leave the workplace many times. The witness stated that yes, they were told many times that they could leave early, but it was only a few minutes before the end of the workday.
In response to a question from the defendant’s attorney asking whether they had received this permission in writing, the witness stated that there was one written message from the director—specifically, a text message—stating that once the children had left, they could go home.
In response to a question from the defendant’s attorney about how she assessed the kindergarten staff, the witness stated that, as a team—excluding the principal—they were very good, worked well together, and helped one another; there were no conflicts among them, and they had no problems with one another.
In response to a question from the defendant’s legal counsel asking whether they had conflicts only with the principal, the witness answered yes.
In response to a question from the defendant’s attorney regarding what position she held at this school, the witness stated that she worked as a teacher and represented the teaching staff on the school board. She was a regular member.
In response to a question from the defendant’s attorney asking whether those conflicts were also addressed at the school board meetings, the witness stated that she was no longer on the board when this matter was being addressed. A new school board had been appointed, and there were already other members on it. 10/17. In response to a question from the defendant’s attorney asking whether, as an employee, she had brought this issue to the school board for discussion when they were having problems with the principal, the witness stated that no, she had not.
In response to a question from the defendant’s attorney asking whether the mayor had attempted to resolve these communication problems, the witness stated that they had a mediator once, but nothing was resolved then. 12/17. In response to a question from the defendant’s attorney asking whether she knew Ms. E., the witness stated that yes, she was a teacher at the preschool, a colleague.
In response to a question from the defendant’s attorney asking whether she knew the reason for her resignation, the witness stated that she was transferring to Veľký Lapáš, which was closer to her home, and that she had told her she was leaving because of the relationships at the kindergarten.
In response to a question from the defendant’s attorney regarding the nature of her relationship with Ms. E., the witness stated that it was a professional, normal relationship. Whenever Ms. E. needed something, she helped her.
In response to a question from the defendant’s attorney asking whether it was true that Ms. E. left because of her, the witness stated that Ms. E. had told her it was due to work-related issues.
Witness J. F. stated in her testimony that she has been employed by the defendant for four years as a kindergarten teacher. As for the possibility of leaving work early, this was only permitted with the principal’s consent. When she needed to leave, she would call her; she had to notify someone that she needed to leave. Their afternoon work shift ended at 4:30 p.m., and after the children left, they would either stay until 4:30 p.m. or, if they wanted to leave earlier, they would arrange it with the principal. When she worked there the first year, everything was fine—relationships were positive, and everyone was able to communicate well—but the following year, tensions began to escalate. It came to the point where a conflict arose between the director and the plaintiff.
In response to a question from the plaintiff’s attorney asking whether she knew if her other colleagues, when working the last shift, asked the director for permission each time the parents had already picked up all the children before leaving the workplace? The witness stated that no one had personally informed her of this, but it was an unwritten rule that one could not simply leave the workplace at will.
In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative asking whether Director B. had ever emphasized that they could leave the workplace once the legal guardians had picked up all the children, the witness stated that yes, she had informed them, but she wanted to know whether anyone would remain at the workplace or not, so that she would be aware that no one was there. She personally reported this. There were times when the director said that if no one was at the workplace, they could leave, but on other occasions when she did not say this, she did not leave the workplace. March 18 In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative asking whether she had participated in the “Night at the Preschool” event from June 23 to 24, 2023, together with the plaintiff, the witness answered yes. When asked how meals were provided for this event, , she stated that the parents arranged it themselves; it was their responsibility.
In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative asking whether they were paid overtime for this work, the witness stated that they were not.
In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative asking who had instructed them to hold the “night at the preschool” event, the witness stated that no one had instructed them to do so; it was part of their tradition, and it was already an established practice by the time she arrived.
In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative asking whether she had ever encountered the mayor checking the attendance of certain employees, the witness stated that he had looked at the attendance log. But generally, since it is a public logbook kept in the principal’s office, all arrivals, departures, and breaks were recorded there when someone needed to leave, for example, to see a doctor.
In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative regarding the “night at the preschool” event, asking whether she knew if the plaintiff had informed the parents verbally about how meals would be provided and whether she would post an update about it on social media? The witness stated that she had no way of knowing, because they meet between 10:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m., meaning she was not with her either when the children were dropped off in the morning or when they left. She does not know when she spoke with the parents. August 18 In response to a question from the defendant’s attorney asking whether she could describe the plaintiff in terms of her performance of her job duties? The witness stated that she had the lesson plans and whatever else was required prepared.
Witness J. C. F. stated in her testimony that she worked for the defendant as a kindergarten teacher for 9 years, and her employment ended on June 30, 2023. Working hours were set; early departures were permitted, specifically for the afternoon shift, and in cases where the preschool closed—which occurred every sixth week— since their workday ended at 4:30 p.m. and once the children had all left, the principal would verbally inform them that they could leave early once the children were gone. This is how it was explained by Director B. Her predecessor did not allow this. Essentially, every sixth week, when the daycare center closed—which happened about twice a week— the children had all left, so they could leave early; and it also happened that they stayed longer after working hours while waiting for a child’s parents due to certain situations, such as traffic delays. This was permitted verbally; sometimes she even wrote it down or called in. It happened that when she was on shift with her and she was leaving at 4:00 p.m., she said that if the children had already left, she should go home.
In general, there was a very poor work environment at the workplace; specifically, the entire atmosphere and dynamics among her colleagues depended on the principal’s mood; that was also the reason for her departure—those adverse working conditions at the workplace—since she is currently performing the same job. For example, it would happen that when they arrived at work in the morning, they could tell from her greeting what kind of mood the director was in; if they asked her something, she would snap at them, so they preferred to stay quiet and not ask her anything. When the situation got worse toward the end, she would, for example, send emails to all her female colleagues stating that they were to clean up their supplies or return them; they knew it was meant for the plaintiff, but she wrote to all her female colleagues in general. It happened, for example, that she came to see her in the classroom and said that the email she’d written wasn’t meant for her and that she knew who it was for.
In response to a question from the plaintiff’s attorney regarding whether, when they were working the last shift and the legal guardians had picked up all the children, the principal’s explicit consent was required for a specific day, the witness stated that no, she had said in general terms—for example, during a staff meeting—that they could go home early. She never said that this was no longer the case. They took it as general information that she would not repeat every day.
In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative asking whether she knew how many employees had their employment terminated at the end of 2023? The witness stated that it was Ms. K., herself, E., and Ms. J. had also left—she did not know what the reasons were in her case, as she was in the other building—and Ms. F. during the summer. Ms. E. left her job because she found work closer to home. Ms. K., the witness, and Ms. F. left due to workplace relationships.
In response to the plaintiff’s representative’s question as to whether she had ever organized a “night at the preschool” event, the witness stated that yes, the teacher in charge of the preschoolers always organized such an event when the school year ended. Even when she first started working there, it was a tradition; they took it for granted that this was the expected practice.
In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative asking whether they received overtime pay for this work, the witness stated that no, they recorded it as part of the daily activities they performed after work.
In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative asking whether she had ever encountered the mayor conducting an attendance check, the witness stated that since she started working there, it had happened only once toward the end, and that instance concerned the plaintiff’s case itself.
In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative about how meals were provided during the “night at the preschool” event, the witness stated that no meals were provided; parents brought food, ordered pizza, or baked something.
In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative asking whether any photographic documentation of this event was posted on the school’s website, the witness stated that photos were always taken and sent to parents either via Messenger or the Úschovňa portal.
In response to a question from the defendant’s attorney asking whether she had served on any school governing bodies, the witness stated that she had done so in the municipality of Malý Lapáš, but not previously.
In response to a question from the defendant’s legal counsel asking whether she had served on the school board, the witness answered yes. At first, she was a member, and then, for a short time—she does not know exactly how long—she served as chair.
In response to the defendant’s legal representative’s question about how she handled the issues that arose between the principal and the plaintiff, the witness stated that when these issues arose, she was no longer a member of the school board.
In response to a question from the defendant’s attorney about where the attendance book was located, the witness stated that it was in the hallway outside the principal’s office. She further stated that her classroom was located in that hallway.
In response to a question from the defendant’s attorney regarding the basis for her conclusion that the mayor did not check this attendance book, the witness stated that the question was whether she had knowledge of this, and she did not.
In response to a question from the defendant’s attorney asking whether she could state on what basis Ms. E. had resigned or what the reasons were, the witness stated that she had been trying to get into the Veľký Lapáš preschool for a year , that is, even before those conflicts, but she had not been accepted. Since the preschool is right behind her house, she had told them even before the conflicts began that this was the reason she wanted to go there.
At the hearing on May 7, 2024, witness J. J. G. stated in his testimony that he did not learn about the publication of those photos until after they had been published. He does not use Facebook; his wife simply told him that the photos had been published. He was asked for consent only later, presumably after his employment with the plaintiff had ended, when the plaintiff came to his home with her husband and requested retroactive consent for the publication of the photograph, noting that she had already terminated her employment. She added that she wanted to clear her name and leave with a clean slate. She did not ask him for this consent, only his wife. She, acting in good faith, signed the consent form for her. He did not give any written consent; he was in contact with the plaintiff, but she did not ask him for this consent. It is true that in the past he gave consent for publication on the municipality’s website when their son started kindergarten; consent was given for photographs to be taken, but only for the municipality’s website. If he had given consent to the publication of the photographs on the plaintiff’s Facebook page, that would have been fine, but he did not give that consent, and the matter should not be resolved by retroactive signing now that a problem has arisen.
In response to a question from the defendant’s attorney asking whether he could roughly estimate how much time—in terms of days—had passed from the publication of these photos until the plaintiff came to see him? The witness stated that it was perhaps within a week of their publication. She probably came by when she already had her statement.
In response to a question from the defendant’s attorney: How did the wife react to the disclosure? How did she perceive it? The witness stated that after this information was made public—specifically, after the lawsuit was filed in court—it affected her more deeply, and she took it to mean that she had been misled. That statement about clearing her name ruined her overall impression.
In response to a question from the defendant’s legal representative asking whether he had seen the form she signed, the witness stated that he had seen it but did not remember exactly what was on it. There were some names and signatures of certain parents. In response to a follow-up question, he said he did not believe there were any instructions on that form.
In response to a question from the defendant’s attorney asking whether the plaintiff had verbally informed his wife of the circumstances under which this consent could be revoked or withdrawn, the witness replied, “No.”
In response to a question from the defendant’s legal counsel: When he gave consent to the disclosure of the children’s personal data, was that consent specifically for the purposes of the school facility? The witness answered “yes.”
In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative asking whether the witness remembered who dropped off their child on the day of the “Night at Preschool” event, the witness stated that he did not remember. He was usually the one who dropped the children off at preschool. All three of them— that is, he, his wife, and their younger son—took the child there.
When asked by the plaintiff’s representative whether he was aware of how meals would be provided at this “Night at Preschool” event, The witness stated that perhaps his wife had more information about it; he had overheard that there would likely be some pizza for dinner.
Witness J. J. J. stated in her testimony that she had learned about the specific photos from acquaintances, noting that a friend had called or texted her to say she had seen her daughter in a photo on Facebook. At first, she didn’t know what the friend was talking about; the friend told her she’d seen her in connection with a certain restaurant. Then the friend sent her a screenshot of the restaurant’s page, which featured photos of children, so she realized that it was a photo of their daughter taken at preschool. This surprised her; they didn’t post photos of the children on such sites often, only on rare occasions. She was surprised by this, though not particularly upset. She was not contacted by the plaintiff for additional consent. They liked the plaintiff as a teacher, but she was surprised that someone would inform her about the publication of the photos. Jan. 25 In response to a question from the defendant’s attorney following the publication, she stated that she was surprised and felt concern for the child? The witness stated that not really, but she was surprised that someone else had alerted her that her child was on the website, and she was taken aback that her child was featured on the restaurant’s website. This was after acquaintances sent her a screenshot of the restaurant’s page where the children had been photographed. 25.2 When asked by the defendant’s attorney whether she assumed she had not given consent to that restaurant either, The witness stated that no, she had not, and she did not know which restaurant was in question. March 25 When asked by the defendant’s attorney whether she was afraid to address this issue officially, the witness stated that she certainly was, because, as she said, people don’t like to get involved in such matters. She didn’t want to be on either side. 25.4 In response to a question from the defendant’s attorney asking whether she would like it if these photos were shared by x people on the internet, the witness stated that no, since they aren’t posting more photos, she wouldn’t like it if more people shared them. 25.5 In response to a question from the defendant’s attorney regarding the fact that the plaintiff, in the minutes of the hearing dated March 13, she stated, and I quote, “As for Ms. J., she had been informed even earlier, since I had informed every parent, and she had no problem with it.” Is this information true or not? The witness stated that it is not. June 25 In response to a question from the defendant’s legal representative asking whether she had signed any documents for the plaintiff prior to the event, the witness stated that she had not.
In response to a question from the plaintiff’s attorney asking whether the witness knew how meals were provided for the “Night at Preschool” event? The witness stated that the parents had created a Facebook Messenger group where they discussed the event; the parents provided food for their children, and then one of the mothers mentioned that she could arrange a sponsorship donation for the dinner.
In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative asking whether she knew if the plaintiff had mentioned to them that she wanted to publicly express her gratitude for the sponsorship donation? The witness stated that she did not, but as she said, the public announcement could have been intended as a thank-you.
At the hearing on September 6, 2024, witness J. B. stated in her testimony that she worked for the defendant as the director of a preschool from 2019 to October 2023. It is true that the option to leave the workplace before the end of the workday, after the children had left, was available when the teachers at the workplace informed her. This was permitted by agreement with the school’s governing body and was utilized in practice. On June 26, 2023, she was on vacation and was not present. If the teachers left the workplace early, they sent her a text message; once the children were no longer at the preschool, it was agreed that they could go home, but that they would always let her know. As for the “sleepover,” it was an event where the children said goodbye to the preschool together with their teachers and parents. First, there was a program, and then the children stayed there with the teachers, who organized activities for them during the time they spent at the preschool in the evening. Jan. 27 In response to a question from the defendant’s attorney asking her to describe the plaintiff in terms of the work environment, the work she performed, and her relationships with other colleagues? The witness stated that when she started working there, they had a very good relationship; in fact, she liked the plaintiff best out of all her colleagues. Over time, that relationship soured; she still doesn’t know why. Then the plaintiff began to rally a few female coworkers and even parents to her side. The situation at work was very tense, which upset her greatly; she used to really enjoy going to work, but then she became afraid to go. Things went well for about two years, and then for a year and a half, the situation got worse. She further stated that her fear of going to work was due to the plaintiff; she sensed hostility from her, and this began to affect her health as well. As for her other female coworkers, it wasn’t like that. 27.2 In response to a question from the defendant’s attorney about how she handled problems in the workplace when the plaintiff was her coworker, the witness stated that at first things were very good; they got along well, communicated, and laughed together. But not toward the end. The plaintiff formed a group of female colleagues with whom she shut herself away in a classroom and discussed matters there. March 27 In response to a question from the defendant’s attorney regarding her statement that if an employee wanted to leave the workplace early, it was only possible with her consent, the witness stated that yes, that was the case. To the next question: At the time she left the workplace, did she have her consent? The witness stated that she did not. 27.4 In response to a question from the defendant’s attorney about what form that consent took, the witness stated that it was sufficient just send a text message saying she was leaving work so they would know. Or call. She replied to them, saying that the specific teacher in question could leave. May 27 In response to a question from the defendant’s attorney asking whether the plaintiff had requested such permission, the witness stated that no, she had neither sent a text message nor made a phone call. She added that she was on vacation at the time. June 27 In response to a question from the defendant’s mayor regarding whether, at the time the plaintiff was chair of the school board, she had addressed any conflicts with the principal in any way, the witness stated that yes, she had sent her an email, asking for the budget for the preschool—specifically, what budget they had received—but since they lack legal personality, the funds, including the budget, are managed by the founding entity. July 27 In response to a question from the defendant’s legal counsel asking whether she would have been able to determine that her employee had left the workplace without permission? Is there any other obligation, such as an attendance log? The witness stated that they had an attendance log where arrivals and departures were recorded, which they submitted to the municipal office at the end of the month and also monitored themselves.
In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative asking if she could specify what the working hours were for kindergarten teachers at the defendant’s facility during the second shift, the witness stated that they were five and a half hours of direct work with the children, plus a lunch break. The kindergarten opened at 6:30 a.m.; the first shift began with two teachers arriving for the morning shift, and then three arrived for the afternoon shift, whose first shift began at 10:00 and lasted until 4:05 p.m. The others arrived at 10:10 a.m., and their work shift lasted until 4:30 p.m. Jan. 28 In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative asking whether she could specify what constitutes the teachers’ direct educational activities and what constitutes other activities, The witness stated that direct educational activities take place starting in the morning and include creative games, educational activities, and time spent outdoors, while other activities mostly consist of work done at home or at the workplace when the children are no longer with them. 28.2 In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative regarding the employees’ work schedule during the “Night at the Preschool” event: The witness stated that they were later granted compensatory time off, which they could take. At 8:00 a.m., as agreed with the teachers, parents began arriving to pick up their children. She noted that she had not arranged this; when she started the job, this was already the established practice. March 28 In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative about when the employees’ workday began the day before, the witness stated that they worked normally the day before the event; then they either went home to change clothes or they started the afternoon shift and were already at the preschool, though they could go home to change or get ready. 28.4 In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative asking whether they also worked during the night on the day of the event, the witness stated that the children were usually asleep by 10:00 p.m. or 10:30 p.m., and that the teachers also slept; if the children wanted to go home, the parents would call after consulting with the teacher. She had stayed overnight twice and slept through the entire night. She confirmed that the teachers did not receive overtime pay for this event, nor did they receive additional pay for working at night or on Saturdays. May 28 In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative regarding how meals were provided for the staff and children during this event, The witness stated that the parents always communicated with each other in consultation with the teachers, and they agreed that either one of the mothers would bake a cake, or they would bring pastries, snacks, water, and chips. They always handled it so that the municipality provided them with skewers, mustard, and bread, and the children could always roast food with their parents. June 28 In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative asking why she had issued the plaintiff a warning for a violation of work discipline dated June 12, 2023, the witness stated that she did not recall this. After the warning itself was presented, she explained that the issue was that the plaintiff had already discussed these matters with the parents; she had begun to air internal matters among the parents, and there were other issues as well.
Witness L. H. M. M., H., stated in her testimony that she has been the chair of the school board since January 2023. She was elected in December 2022. Even before her election to the school board, she had been made aware of the situation at the preschool during a workshop on teacher training. Thus, she gained an understanding of the workplace atmosphere . As for the period following her election not only to the school board but also as chair of the school board, she did not have any detailed information, as the agenda had not been provided to her; thus, she could rely only on her observations during that training and her observations of the first school board meetings. It’s essentially a coherent sequence: the workshop was preceded by a meeting with some teachers; since it was a workday, not everyone could attend, so the selection was random. There was a very—even extremely—bad atmosphere in the workplace, with exceptionally poor personal and professional relationships, to the extent that nearly all the participants identified one name, which they identified as the source of their discomfort in the workplace. That name was A. B. C. The reaction from most of the teachers was so emotional that it even led to crying, and they had to take breaks, even though it was just a preliminary meeting. Subsequently, there was a workshop, during which she approached the matter professionally and impartially; however, the plaintiff’s demeanor toward her, particularly in such subliminal matters, suggested a certain dominance and an effort to control the entire process. This line of conduct was definitively confirmed at the first school board meeting, where, despite the fact that she rejected this agenda item, the plaintiff insisted on it—even though it was not entirely in accordance with the rules—and demanded a resolution to the problematic relationship with the principal, or rather, the principal’s incompetence to lead the school. When the principal refused to grant her the floor, the plaintiff—in a calm yet assertive manner—posed a suggestive question as to whether this was not important for the functioning of the preschool. Consequently, the principal agreed to hear her out.
In response to a question from the defendant’s legal counsel regarding how the plaintiff functioned within the work team and how she was perceived by her colleagues, The witness stated that she could answer this question based on two sources: information conveyed to her directly by the plaintiff’s female colleagues, who told her that communicating with the plaintiff was very stressful for them. Comments were made regarding her attempts to take charge, even though she did not hold that position. The second source from which she can answer this question is her personal experience, not only during that workshop, where the plaintiff behaved dominantly toward her. A second example is that when the teachers were asked to express their emotions using so-called Dixi cards, she observed a situation in which the plaintiff tended to influence the answers of her more submissive colleagues by fixing them with a long, intense gaze; their automatic reaction was to lower their eyes. Her second experience was during a school board meeting, where, despite her efforts to follow generally accepted rules, the plaintiff, through her statements and tone of voice, attempted to force the chairperson to grant her the floor. She emphasized that the workshop was not about the plaintiff; indeed, the school’s governing body had not provided any such information.
In response to a question from the defendant’s legal counsel regarding her previous statement that the work environment was hostile, she was asked whether, at that time, she had identified specific individuals who were causing unrest within the work team and whether she could name them. The witness stated that yes, she did not need to identify anything specifically; it was clear and understood by all the teachers—the name in question was B. C..
In response to a question from the plaintiff’s representative asking whether she had also discussed her findings with the plaintiff, the witness stated that she had no reason to do so, as it was not a mediation meeting. Nor had this name been mentioned in the assignment from the school’s governing body. The assignment was to prepare a workshop aimed at improving the work environment. She did not address the plaintiff personally.
In response to the witness’s testimony, the plaintiff stated that she had met her twice in her life—once at a training session, which was supposed to last three hours, and the second time at a school board meeting—and was very upset by the way the witness spoke about her, because she is not a problematic person, she has no enemies, and she does not need to be a dominant person, as the witness described her. She fulfilled her duties responsibly; the children loved her; she loved this job and did it the best she could; and she was also friendly within the team. She has no need to be dominant. That is very misleading information, and she does not know where the witness got that idea. She was enthusiastic about the training; they described cards and emotions in a playful way.
In her closing statement, the plaintiff’s representative stated that, based on the evidence presented, they believe the proceedings have sufficiently demonstrated that the immediate termination of employment in question is invalid. Regarding the plaintiff’s arbitrary departure from the workplace on June 26, 2023, it is also evident from the statements of the witnesses Ms. F., Ms. F., H. F., and Ms. B. that leaving the workplace after the children had left was standard practice at the workplace, as communicated by the kindergarten director to the teachers, and could not have been an arbitrary departure from the workplace, since it was an established practice permitted and tolerated by superiors at that workplace. Witnesses F. and F. also confirmed the specific manner in which the workplace was left, namely that no permission was required for a specific day and time to leave; this was not refuted even by witness F., who claimed that she personally always reported her departure and that she would not have left the workplace unless the director had permitted it. The submitted Addendum No. 3 to the work rules formally acknowledges this practice as accepted by the employer, as the penultimate sentence states, and I quote: “A teaching staff member may perform other activities related to direct educational work in a home setting.” Direct extracurricular activities refer to teaching activities with children in accordance with Section 7(1) of Act No. 138/2019 Coll.; therefore, if the employee was no longer was not in charge of any children—since their legal guardians had come to pick them up—this cannot be considered direct after-school care, but rather other activities for which, pursuant to the aforementioned Addendum No. 3, she has explicit consent to work from home, and therefore she was not required to remain at the employer’s workplace. If, on the other hand, this were not “other work” but direct work outside the workplace, the employee would not have had any assigned work at that time, and this would constitute an obstacle to work on the part of the employer pursuant to Section 142(3) of the Labor Code, which likewise relieves the employee of the obligation to be present at the workplace. From the statements of the parties to the proceedings and the witness F., it is clear that the plaintiff did not leave the workplace during the teaching period, as this was no longer time, as there were no longer any children at the preschool, and leaving the workplace earlier after the last child had left was a common and tolerated practice at the employer’s, therefore the plaintiff that the employer failed to prove in the proceedings that the elements of the offense specified in the immediate termination of employment—specifically, the arbitrary leaving of the workplace—were met. At the same time, they point out a contradiction in the employer’s work rules, whereby the same violations of work discipline are subject to different disciplinary sanctions: while Section 9/5(a) of the work rules defines a serious violation of of work discipline is considered to be leaving the workplace without the consent and knowledge of a superior, but according to subparagraph (h), it refers to repeated early departures from the workplace.
Regarding the violation of personal data protection by the employer, the plaintiff maintains that it was proven in the proceedings that the nighttime activity at the daycare center did not take place within the framework of an employment relationship, as it lacks the characteristics of dependent work under Section 1(2) of the Labor Code. All witnesses confirmed that the aforementioned activity was not ordered by anyone; it was a long-standing tradition, the participants did not perform it during working hours, were not entitled to overtime pay for it, nor to premiums for night work or work on Saturdays; they were not provided with meals, nor were the children provided with meals—these were arranged by the participants in cooperation with the children’s legal guardians. On the contrary, the plaintiff performed the aforementioned activity voluntarily in her free time, at her own expense, for the purpose of bringing joy to the children in her class and saying goodbye to them. Based on the testimony of witnesses and the parties to the proceedings, other colleagues also approached this event in the same manner. The claim by the defendant and witness B. that this constituted overtime work is refuted by the statements of witnesses Ms. F., Ms. F., and Ms. F., who state that they were not paid overtime for this work. In light of these facts, the plaintiff was able to take photographs and post them on her Facebook profile, since such processing is not subject to the General Data Protection Regulation (pursuant to Art. 2(2)(c) of the Regulation) nor the Personal Data Protection Act No. 18/2018 Coll. (pursuant to Section 3(5)(a)). The statements and Mr. H.’s testimony referred to a situation different from that of the defendant at the time, which the witness himself confirmed, as he assessed the situation solely by referring to the defendant’s statements—namely, that the employee had disclosed personal data without the consent of the individuals concerned and without the controller’s knowledge, but did not assess a situation in which such actions were carried out by a natural person as part of their personal activities. At the same time, they also point to the circumstances and nature of the published photographs, in which the children are depicted, for the most part, with their heads bowed while eating pizza, making it impossible for anyone other than a close acquaintance to recognize them. This is certainly not a publication that portrays them in a derogatory or undignified light, which could lower their social standing or otherwise endanger the children in the future, as evidenced by the fact that, in similar situations, photos of children from the kindergarten are published on the defendant’s website. By this action, the plaintiff could not have committed a breach of work discipline as stated in the notice of immediate termination of employment, since she did not use work materials intended for the employer’s needs and for a purpose designated by the employer, since she used only her own photographs in the course of her personal volunteer activities, thereby not violating personal data protection. At the same time, the plaintiff’s intention was not to harm anyone or violate any legal provision, but to express gratitude for the meals provided to the children who participated in the “Night at the Preschool” event.
The plaintiff considers it necessary to comment on the defendant’s reference to previous warnings regarding breaches of work discipline dated September 29, 2022, and June 12, 2023, in connection with the fact that this is not the plaintiff’s first breach of work discipline. However, the defendant itself, after investigating all the facts, rescinded the warning dated September 29, 2022, by a notice dated November 7, 2022, and the warning regarding the breach of work discipline dated June 12, 2023, was issued to the plaintiff by the director, Ms. B., who was not authorized to do so under the work regulations, since only the mayor of the municipality, as the employer’s statutory body, was authorized to do so; moreover, the notice concerned a breach of work discipline related to remarks made at a school board meeting, where, however, the plaintiff was not acting as an employee but as a member of a school governing body and therefore could not be sanctioned for a breach of an employee’s work discipline. The plaintiff notes that she considers the defendant’s assessment of the severity of the breach of work discipline to be too harsh; the defendant did not sufficiently explain why it immediately imposed the most severe labor law sanction—namely, immediate termination of employment—and did not make use of the option of another labor law sanction. None of the facts cited in the immediate termination of employment did not result in any damage to the employer, nor was there any threat to the life or health of the children in her care or to the employer’s property. Furthermore, the plaintiff did not act with the intent to harm the employer, her colleagues, or the interests of the children, which, based on established judicial precedent, could be assessed as circumstances justifying the application of immediate termination of employment. Based on the evidence presented, the plaintiff believes that the defendant, in deciding on a serious breach of work discipline, failed to take into account the claimant’s character, her previous attitude toward performing her work duties, the manner, intensity, and motive of the breach of work discipline, or the fact that the aforementioned conduct did not cause any harm to anyone. On the contrary, the defendant concluded that the plaintiff had violated work discipline solely for the purpose of getting rid of an inconvenient employee, rather than to realistically and objectively assess compliance with work discipline and the severity of the violation.
In its closing statement, the defendant stated that it considers the plaintiff’s motion to declare the immediate termination of employment invalid and to award back pay to be unfounded, since the plaintiff herself, through her approach to fulfilling her job duties, had placed herself in a situation where she violated the Act on the Protection of Personal Data, the Labor Code, and work discipline, as well as a violation of the internal work and procedural guidelines established by the employer.
First, it is necessary to note the gross violation of work discipline on the part of the plaintiff, namely that she posted photographs on her Facebook (FB) profile of children attending the Malý Lapáš, including those whose parents had not provided written consent, thereby violating the provisions of Act No. 18/2018 Coll., as also confirmed by the Data Protection Officer (DPO). This act is all the more serious because the misuse of this personal data involved minors children (in the form of photographs), which were subsequently misused to promote third parties (posted on the restaurant’s website). Last but not least, it is important to note the high degree of seriousness of this act, namely that the plaintiff did not have the consent of the legal guardians (parents) for such publication, who expressly objected to and refused such publication of their children’s images. The extent of the exceeded authority is also confirmed by the fact that only the employer and authorized persons only in designated locations (only on the school’s EduPage and the school’s official Facebook profile—which, however, has not been created—and only after obtaining informed written consent from both parents or legal guardians). The plaintiff misused these photographs and published them on her Facebook profile without the written consent of the legal guardians. She subsequently attempted to obtain this consent retroactively, which is in violation of the Personal Data Protection Act. The The serious nature of this offense is further underscored by the fact that it involved minors. The plaintiff exceeded or failed to respect the authorization to process and collect personal data granted by the information system operator, which is the municipality. The scope of the authorization was limited to IS25 and IS29.
The plaintiff was not authorized to obtain any other consent; only the municipality, as the data controller (i.e., the defendant), has that authority. Subsequently, she posed as the data controller (i.e., the defendant—the municipal office) and, using this pretext, she obtained retroactive consents from parents. In light of these circumstances, the plaintiff was unaware that even if some legal guardians of minor children subsequently granted her consent to the processing of personal data (which the law subsequently excludes; consent must be given in advance and must be expressed by both legal guardians, and the consent must contain provisions defined by law), this consent was also granted to the school’s operator, but the operator did not publish these photographs, and certainly not on its website). The plaintiff published these photographs on her private Facebook profile, and she was not authorized to do so even with the consents that had been granted. The plaintiff granted additional consents on behalf of the defendant without the defendant’s knowledge, and only after complaints from the parents of the minors in question. Thus, the very fact that the plaintiff knowingly posed as the defendant when obtaining signatures on behalf of the defendant is viewed as a gross violation of work discipline. The mere failure to maintain confidentiality (which she signed) during the performance of her work and even after the termination of her employment, during the period when she was in an employment relationship, is also viewed as a gross violation of work discipline.
Another serious violation is her leaving the workplace on June 26, 2023, at 4:25 p.m., without her supervisor’s consent. They view the argument that this is “standard practice” at the workplace is viewed merely as a self-serving defense on the part of the plaintiff. They continue to hold the view that leaving the workplace without the supervisor’s knowledge is in violation of the Labor Code as well as other internal regulations of the employer. In this case, the plaintiff did not record her departure from the workplace in the Time Sheet, but instead recorded other activities from 5:00 p.m. to 6:40 p.m. At the time when she was supposed to be at the workplace, she was no longer present. They view the plaintiff’s claims as merely self-serving. The plaintiff was unable to explain why, when she left the workplace, she did not record the actual time of her departure from the workplace in the Time Sheet, even though, as she claims, she had her supervisor’s approval to leave the workplace at that time. The plaintiff worked as a teacher and was required to be properly present at work, as she bears full responsibility for the children; therefore, the argument that the children were no longer there or had left earlier does not constitute grounds for leaving the workplace without authorization. In light of these facts, they bring to the court’s attention that even though the plaintiff claims she had such permission, she was unable to prove it in any way. On the contrary, witness testimony confirmed that such consent to leave the workplace was not granted to her. They further state that the use of compensatory time off, the crediting of other activities, or the payment of overtime are not the subject of these proceedings.
Based on the aforementioned facts, they consider that the defendant’s (i.e., the municipality’s) conduct was proper and request that the court dismiss the complaint in its entirety as unfounded and, at the same time, award the defendant 100% of the in the amount of 100%.
The court conducted the taking of evidence by examining the plaintiff, the mayor of the defendant municipality, and the following witnesses: J. B. H., F. F., J. F., J. C. F., J. J. G., J. J. J., J. B., and Assoc. Prof. PhDr. M. M., PhD., and by reviewing the contents of the plaintiff’s employment contract, the notice of immediate termination of employment, SMS communications, written warnings regarding violations of work discipline, notifications regarding the amount and composition of the position-based salary, a notice regarding the continuation of employment, official records, the statement of the responsible person, the confidentiality, the authorization of the authorized person to process personal data, certificates of completion of training, photographs from the plaintiff’s Facebook status, reports on the results of a school inspection, email correspondence, the Work Regulations of the Municipality of Malý Lapáš No. 05/2020, instructions regarding the duty of confidentiality and measures for the protection of personal data, Amendments No. 2 and No. 3 to the Work Regulations, photographs of children on the defendant’s website, the minutes of the second meeting of the school board, and other documentary evidence, and established the following facts:
On January 11, 2016, the plaintiff, as an employee, entered into an employment contract with the defendant, as the employer, for the agreed position of kindergarten teacher, with the place of work being Malý Lapáš. The start date was January 11, 2016. The agreed daily working hours were 7.50 hours without breaks, with a 30-minute break for rest and meals to be taken no later than after 6 hours.
The notice regarding the amount and composition of the functional salary dated March 30, 2023, indicates that the defendant determines the plaintiff’s total position-based salary at 1,185 euros, effective January 1, 2023.
The plaintiff’s letter dated July 4, 2023, marked as an immediate termination of employment by the employer pursuant to Section 68(1)(b) of Act No. 311/2001 Coll. (Labor Code, as amended) contains the following text: “Dear Ms. A. B. C., pursuant to Section 68(1)(b) of Act No. 311/2001 (Labor Code, as amended subsequent regulations), we are immediately terminating the employment relationship established by your employment contract, due to a gross violation of work discipline. The breach of work discipline occurred on your part on June 26, 2023 (unauthorized absence from the workplace) and on June 24, 2023 (publication of internal documents—photographs of children—on your website). The grounds for immediate termination of the employment relationship pursuant to the aforementioned provision of Section 68(1)(b) of the Labor Code are: - The fact that on June 26, 2023, you left the workplace without authorization during class time. You left the workplace without the knowledge or consent of your supervisor. - On June 24, 2023, you unauthorizedly used work materials that were intended solely for the needs of the employer and only for the purpose specified by the employer. You used these materials in a manner that was not permitted, including visual recordings subject to the GDPR. You published these materials on your private Facebook account without the consent of the legal guardians or the employer. By your actions, you fundamentally and knowingly violated the Work Rules of the Municipality of No. 05/2020; you exceeded the scope of the authorization granted to you as an authorized person on December 17, 2020, thereby also violating Act No. 18/2018 Coll. (the Act on the Protection of Personal Data and on Amendments to Certain Acts), which resulted in a violation of the rights of third parties as well.
Based on this conduct, you have fundamentally and knowingly exceeded the scope of the authorization granted to you as an authorized person on December 17, 2020, thereby violating Act No. 18/2018 Coll. You have also seriously violated your employment contract, the valid and effective Work Rules No. 05/2020 dated September 2, 2020, as amended, specifically the provisions of Amendment No. 2 dated August 30, 2022, in conjunction with Amendment No. 3 dated September 30, 2022 (in Part IV, “Work Rules and Vacation”—in the section on leaving the workplace). The above-mentioned and described act constitutes a serious violation of work discipline; therefore, it is not possible to continue employing you under this employment relationship, not even during the notice period.” The notice of immediate termination of employment was delivered to the plaintiff on July 4, 2023.
The notice of continued employment dated July 4, 2023, contains a statement by the plaintiff that on July 4, 2023, she received written notice of immediate termination of her employment and hereby states that she considers the termination of her employment to be invalid, insists that the defendant continue to and requests that the defendant fulfill its obligation under Section 47(1)(a) and assign her the work specified in the employment contract. Following this notice, her employment continues, and the defendant is obligated to provide her with wage compensation until such time as it allows her to resume work.
The submitted email correspondence between the plaintiff and the mayor of the defendant’s municipality includes a message dated June 26, 2023, at 4:25 p.m.: “Good afternoon, it is 4:25 p.m. and you are not at work; your shift is scheduled to end at 4:30 p.m. .” The plaintiff’s reply: “Good afternoon, we have instructions from the director that once the children have left, we can go home. Do you need anything? Should I come in?”
The following text message reads: “This message is from April; please provide me with the supervisor’s approval to leave the workplace from yesterday.”
A written warning regarding a violation of work discipline, noting the possibility of termination of employment—a notice from the principal of the Preschool, 89/1 Hlavná Street, Malý Lapáš dated June 12, 2023, issued to A. B. C., it appears that on June 5, 2023, a serious breach of work —the resolution of interpersonal conflicts among employees, despite a warning that these were internal matters involving the children’s legal guardians. Given that this constitutes a serious breach of work discipline, she was hereby notified in writing, with a warning regarding the possibility of terminating her employment if she fails to rectify the situation and a repeat breach of work discipline is found. In this case, the employer will exercise the aforementioned right, and the employment relationship will be terminated by notice pursuant to Section 63(1)(e) of the Labor Code.
From the written notice of a breach of work discipline, including a warning regarding the possibility of termination of employment—a letter from the mayor of the defendant dated September 23, 2022, addressed to to the plaintiff—it follows that on September 21, 2022, and September 22, 2022, a serious breach of work discipline occurred —failure to adhere to the schedule for direct educational activities, without the consent or knowledge of a superior employee. Given that this constitutes a serious breach of work discipline, she was hereby notified of this in writing . At the same time, she was notified in writing of the possibility of termination of employment should she fail to remedy the situation and should a repeat violation of work discipline be discovered. In this case, the employer will exercise the aforementioned right, and the employment relationship will be terminated by notice pursuant to Section 63(1)(e) of the Labor Code. August 35 The official record submitted by the defendant, drawn up on July 12, 2023, indicates that on that day, J. J. G. appeared at the Malý Lapáš Municipal Office to submit a statement that on July 4, Ms. A. B. C. had contacted her via Facebook to ask if she objected to the publication of photos from the farewell party on Facebook. On July 11, she was contacted again with the aim of having her retroactively sign a consent form for the publication of the photos on Facebook, stating that all participating parents were required to sign. In the evening, around 8:00 p.m., the teacher visited her at home and said: “I just want to clear my name; I also received an hourly notice, and I’m looking for a new job.” She retroactively signed the consent form with the date June 16, 2023, in good faith that she would not face any problems in the future.
The official record submitted by the defendant, drawn up on July 12, 2023, indicates that on that day, J. J. G. appeared at the Malý Lapáš Municipal Office to make the following statement: On July 11, 2023, in the early evening, around 8:00 p.m., A. B. C. came to their home to retroactively sign consent to the publication of a photo of their son on a Facebook page. The undersigned, J. G., did not grant consent to the publication.
According to the statement from the responsible person at Osobnyudaj.sk, a consulting firm providing services in the field of , dated June 28, 2023, it follows that the opinion was issued regarding the situation in which, based on the information and supporting documents provided, it is evident that an employee of the controller published personal profile on the social network Facebook. She did not receive explicit instructions from the controller regarding the processing operation in question. The opinion indicates that every employee was bound by a confidentiality obligation upon the establishment of an employment relationship or a similar labor-law relationship pursuant to Section 79 of Act No. 18/2018 Coll. A breach of confidentiality—whether in the form of misuse of personal data for one’s own benefit or its unauthorized disclosure—constitutes a violation of the confidentiality provisions set forth both in Section 81(f) of the Labor Code and in Section 79(2) of Act No. 18/2018 Coll. The employee in question also exceeded her authority to process personal data. The controller authorized her in writing to process personal data on December 17, 2020. In view of the foregoing, as well as in light of the Office for Personal Data Protection’s of the Slovak Republic, they have no doubt that these actions constitute a violation of several articles and principles of the General Data Protection Regulation, and that these actions infringe upon the rights to personal data protection of the data subjects. Based on the above, the controller is exposed to a risk that may result in sanctions for violating data protection laws with the possibility of a fine of 20,000,000 euros pursuant to Act No. 18/2018 Coll.
The document titled “Confidentiality” pursuant to Section 79(2) of Act No. 18/2018 Coll. on the Protection Personal Data and on Amendments to Certain Laws, it follows that the controller—the Municipality of Malý Lapáš—is the controller pursuant to Act No. 18/2018 Coll. and is obligated to maintain confidentiality regarding the personal data it processes. The obligation of confidentiality continues even after the processing of personal data has ended. The controller is required to impose a confidentiality obligation regarding personal data on natural persons who come into contact with the controller’s personal data. In accordance with the foregoing, A. B. C. (preschool teacher, i.e., the plaintiff) is hereby bound by the controller to maintain confidentiality regarding the personal data of all natural persons (data subjects) with whom she comes into contact in the performance of her job duties, obligations, or other activities arising from the job description or from the controller’s membership or position. It further follows from the foregoing that the controller notes that it considers situations in which there is unauthorized or unlawful processing of personal data, whether intentional or resulting from a failure to comply with the obligations and measures adopted to protect such data. A personal data breach may be caused, for example, by intentional conduct or an unintentional error by an employee and may lead to a compromise of the integrity, availability, and confidentiality of personal data.
The authorization to process personal data issued by the authorized person on December 17, 2020, indicates that training was conducted by the responsible person; the defendant is listed as the controller, and the authorization was issued by the mayor, who hereby authorizes the following individual: A. B. C., a kindergarten teacher, for the purposes listed below to process personal data and to perform the processing activities that the authorized person carries out as part their job description. Scope of the authorization: IS25: records of children in kindergarten; IS29: photographs and videos (creation of an image for the purpose of transferring it to paper or another medium). Description of processing activities: a) performing processing operations on personal data: obtaining, collecting, recording, organizing, structuring, storing, revising or modify, search, browse, use, disclose by transmission, dissemination, or other means, rearrange or combine, restrict, erase, or destroy. Rights of the Authorized Person: a) The authorized person is authorized to process personal data within the scope of the above-mentioned authorizations, with which they come into contact while using the controller’s information system.
The Osobnyudaj.sk training completion certificate confirms that the natural person, an “authorized person” of the controller who processes personal data within the meaning of Article 32 of the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council, as specified in this certificate, which was issued in the name of the employee: A. B. C., whose job title is kindergarten teacher, with an issuance date of January 8, 2023, and an validity of January 8, 2024.
The following text appears in the plaintiff’s post on Facebook dated June 24, 2023: “Thank you Pizzeria BELLA Hosťová for the fantastic sponsored pizza for the children who spent the night at the preschool,” followed by photographs of children sitting at a table with pizzas on the tables.
An electronic communication between the plaintiff and the mayor of the defendant’s municipality, dated November 7, 2022, contains text in which the plaintiff states that she is filing a complaint against the kindergarten director, J. B., who has been bullying and slandering her for a long time, thereby causing her physical and psychological trauma and making her work as a kindergarten teacher unpleasant. She further points out that she was served with a written warning regarding a breach of work discipline along with a notice regarding the possibility of termination of employment.
The text of the mayor’s response dated December 1, 2022, indicates that the Municipality of Malý Lapáš, represented by its mayor, sought to resolve workplace relations through a mediator and also meetings with individual employees involved in the dispute. Both parties pledged to make an effort to improve workplace relations and the work environment. He thereby considered the situation resolved. On November 7, 2022, another email containing a complaint was sent, in which she stated that the situation had not improved and continues to persist. The content of the email does not formally constitute a complaint; therefore, it is not within his authority, as mayor of the municipality, to address the issues raised therein.
From the Work Regulations of the Municipality of Malý Lapáš No. 05/2020 dated September 2, 2020, in Part III, titled “Work Discipline,” in § 9, titled “Labor-Law Consequences of Breaches of Work Discipline,” point 5 states that the following are considered serious breaches of work discipline: a) leaving one’s workplace without the consent and knowledge of a supervisor, h) repeated late arrivals or early departures from the workplace, failure to fulfill work tasks, xx) violation of and failure to comply with internal regulations, y) failure by employees to comply with their obligations regarding the protection of the personal data of employees and children, z) failure to accept the provisions of the internal rules on personal data protection set forth in the school’s personal data protection impact assessment.
It follows from point 1 that a breach of work discipline is considered to be a culpable violation or failure to fulfill an employee’s obligations arising from: a) Section 47(1)(b) and Sections 81 and 82 of the Labor Code, b) Sections 8, 9, 9a, and 10 of Act No. 552/2003 Coll., c) other generally binding regulations applicable to the work performed by the employee, d) orders or measures issued by superior employees, e) the organization’s work or organizational rules.
From Section 4 of the Work Regulations, § 11, titled “Length and Use of Working Hours,” paragraph 1, it follows that the working hours of municipal office employees and non-teaching staff at the kindergarten are evenly distributed over the 5 days of the workweek. The specified working hours for employees, excluding breaks for rest and meals, are in accordance with KZVS at 37.5 hours per week. Point 4 provides an overview and breakdown of working hours for teaching staff and the shift schedule from 6:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. , with the first shift running from 6:30 a.m. to 1:00 p.m.; 7:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m.; 7:30 a.m. to 1:30 p.m.; the second shift runs from 10:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.; 10:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.; and 10:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. Paragraph 6 of this Part IV, it follows that an employee may not leave the workplace without the consent of the relevant supervisor, with the exception of breaks for rest and meals. According to point 8, an employee is required to record every arrival at the workplace, as well as every interruption of work involving leaving the workplace, in the “Arrival and Departure Log.”
From Addendum No. 3 to Work Regulations No. 05/2020 dated September 30, 2022, effective October 3, 2022, in Part IV, titled “Working Hours and Leave,” Section 11, paragraph 2 is replaced with the following wording: 2 The weekly working hours of teaching staff, in accordance with Section 7(1) of Act No. 138/2019 Coll., consists of the time during which the teaching staff member performs direct educational activities and the time during which the teaching staff member performs other activities related to their direct educational activities. The working hours of a teaching staff member working two shifts are, according to the KZVS, 36.25 hours, excluding breaks for rest and meals; of this, the basic working workload for a kindergarten teacher is 28 hours and for a principal 17 hours. A teaching staff member may perform other activities related to their direct educational and instructional duties from home.
The instructions on the duty of confidentiality and measures for the protection of personal data, signed by the defendant’s employees—including the plaintiff—it follows that the employer or employee processes personal data exclusively in accordance with applicable law, in particular Act No. 18/2018 Coll. on the Protection of Personal Data. By signing, employees confirm that they will: a) maintain confidentiality regarding all personal data with which they come into contact while performing their job duties or with which they come into contact even accidentally, b) maintain confidentiality regarding facts they have learned in the course of their employment and which, in the employer’s interest, may not be disclosed to other persons; however, the duty of confidentiality does not apply to the reporting of criminal activity or other anti-social behavior, c) maintain confidentiality in accordance with Section 79(2) of the Personal Data Protection Act, even after the termination of their position and employment relationship, d) school employees are required to maintain confidentiality and protect from misuse personal data, information regarding the health status, and the results of medical examinations of children with whom they have come into contact. The instructions further state that the duty of confidentiality is not a contractual requirement but a legal obligation arising from Act No. 18/2018 Coll. on the Protection of Personal Data.
Pursuant to Section 68(1)(b) of Act No. 311/2001 Coll., the Labor Code, an employer may immediately terminate an employment relationship on an exceptional basis only if the employee has committed a serious breach of work discipline.
Pursuant to Section 79(1) of the Labor Code, if an employer has given an employee an invalid notice of termination or has invalidly terminated the employment relationship with the employee immediately or during the probationary period, and if the employee has notified the employer that they insist on continuing to be employed, their employment relationship does not terminate, unless a court decides that it cannot be reasonably required of the employer to continue employing the employee. The employer is obligated to provide the employee with wage compensation. This compensation is payable to the employee in the amount of his or her average earnings from the date on which he or she notified the employer that he or she insists on continued employment until the time when the employer allows the employee to resume work or until a court decides to terminate the employment relationship. 38. Pursuant to Section 47(1)(b) of the Labor Code, from the date the employment relationship began, the employee is required, in accordance with the employer’s instructions, to perform work in person as specified in the employment contract during the designated working hours and to observe work discipline.
Pursuant to § 81(a), (b), (c), and (f) of the Labor Code, an employee is obligated, in particular, to a) work responsibly and properly, and to follow instructions from superiors issued in accordance with legal regulations; a superior also includes a manager as defined by a special regulation, b) be at the workplace at the start of working hours, use working hours for work, and leave the workplace only after working hours have ended, c) comply with laws and other regulations relating to the work performed by the employee, provided the employee has been properly informed of them, f) maintain confidentiality regarding facts learned in the course of employment that, in the employer’s interest, must not be disclosed to other persons; the duty of confidentiality does not apply to the reporting of criminal activity or other antisocial conduct.
It follows from the provision of Section 68(1)(b) of the Labor Code that immediate termination of employment is an exceptional method of terminating an employment relationship. It is a unilateral legal act by the employer aimed at terminating the employment relationship with the employee upon delivery of the written notice to the employee.
An employer may terminate an employee’s employment immediately only in exceptional cases, and only for reasons exhaustively listed in the law and only if the employee’s conduct, taking into account all relevant circumstances, be considered so serious that it would be unreasonable to expect the employer to continue employing the employee.
The employer must issue the immediate termination of employment in writing; the notice must factually define the reason for the termination in such a way that it cannot be confused with any other reason, and must deliver it to the other party within the prescribed time limit; otherwise, it is invalid. The stated reason may not be changed subsequently (provision of § 70 of the Labor Code). If even one of the aforementioned formal conditions is not met, the immediate termination of employment is invalid.
The obligation to maintain work discipline is one of the fundamental obligations of an employee, arising from the employment relationship (Section 47(1)(b) of the Labor Code) and consists of fulfilling the obligations set forth by law, in particular the provisions of Sections 81 and 82 of the Labor Code, as well as by the work rules, the employment contract, or instructions from a superior manager. For a breach of work discipline to be legally actionable as grounds for termination employment by the employer, this breach of work duties by the employee must be attributable to the employee (at least through negligence) and must involve a certain degree of severity. The Labor Code distinguishes, for the purposes of employment termination, between a minor breach of work discipline and a serious breach of work discipline. A breach of work discipline of the highest severity, i.e., a serious violation, constitutes grounds for immediate termination of employment or for notice of termination of employment (Section 68(1)(b) and Section 63(e) of the Labor Code).
Labor law theory defines the term “work discipline” as the body of legal norms governing work discipline, as well as the set of an employee’s obligations and, last but not least, the employee’s compliance with those obligations. In general, the concept of “work discipline” encompasses an employee’s obligations. When considering a breach of work discipline, the court is not limited by any specific criteria or boundaries, but takes into account only the specifics of the particular case under consideration. It follows from the foregoing that, when assessing the severity of a breach of work discipline, the court is not bound by how the employer, in its work rules (or in other internal regulations), characterizes a particular act of its employee. In accordance with established case law, when determining the severity, the court should take into account the employee’s character, the position they hold, their past attitude toward performing work tasks, the time and circumstances in which the breach of work discipline occurred, the degree of the employee’s fault, the manner and severity of the breach of the employee’s specific duties, the consequences of the breach of work discipline for the employer, whether the employee’s actions caused damage; at the same time, the specific circumstances at the employer’s organization must also be taken into account (established practices at the employer’s organization, e.g., the extent to which breaches of work discipline are tolerated and the like).
Only a serious breach of work discipline constitutes grounds under Section 68(1)(b) of the Labor Code for immediate termination of employment. Given the nature of the cited statutory provision, which falls under legal norms with an indefinite hypothesis, it is always the court’s task to define this hypothesis itself, at its discretion and with due regard to the circumstances of the case. It is up to the court to assess whether the employee committed a culpable breach of work discipline and, if so, to determine the degree of such breach in the given case. In these considerations, the court is not limited by any specific criteria or boundaries, but takes into account only the specifics of the case at hand and, by way of support, applicable case law.
In the event of immediate termination of employment pursuant to Section 68(1)(b) of the Labor Code, it is required to establish that the employee has committed a serious breach of work discipline. The seriousness must be established objectively, and it is not sufficient for the employer to classify a breach of certain work duties as a serious breach of work discipline in its internal regulations.
With regard to the first ground for immediate termination of employment given by the defendant to the plaintiff on July 4, 2023—namely, willful absence from the workplace during class on June 26, 2023— , the court found, based on the evidence presented, that on that day the plaintiff’s working hours were from 10:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., and the text of the SMS message exchanged between the defendant’s mayor and the plaintiff dated June 26, 2023, the text states: “Good afternoon, it is 4:25 p.m. and you are not at work; your shift is supposed to end at 4:30 p.m.” The plaintiff did not dispute her early departure from the workplace, i.e., the preschool. In her testimony, she stated that, together with her colleague F. F. (whose shift was scheduled to end at 4:10 p.m. ), the two of them were left alone after the children had left; F. F. helped her with the final tasks at the preschool, namely cleaning up and recording the daily requirements—such as entries in the class registers—they closed the preschool, and left together around 4:20 p.m. According to the plaintiff, the option to leave earlier, before the “children had left,” was permitted based on the kindergarten director’s consent; according to the plaintiff, this was generally the case and was also the established practice among other colleagues who left early. F. F. confirmed the plaintiff’s claims in her testimony, stating that they had permission from the principal and that it had been emphasized many times that once the last children had left, they could go home earlier. It was never before 4:20 p.m., because they could not leave earlier until they had finished their work. It happened that she left earlier on several occasions when her workday ended at 4:30 p.m., and her other colleagues did the same. She also stated that the principal had emphasized to them many times that they could leave once the children had gone. Witness J. C. F. also corroborated this in her testimony, stating that early departures were permitted; this was the case the afternoon shift, specifically when the preschool was closed—which happened every sixth week—since their work hours ended at 4:30 p.m. and all the children had left. The principal informed them verbally that they could leave early once the children had all left. That is what Principal B. said. It was permitted verbally; sometimes she even wrote it down or called to confirm.
According to the testimony of kindergarten principal J. B., who served as principal until October 2023, permission to leave the workplace before the end of the workday, after the children had left, was granted when the teachers at the workplace informed her. She added that on June 26, 2023, she took vacation leave. Witness J. F., who has been employed by the defendant as a kindergarten teacher for four years, stated that leaving work early was possible only with the principal’s consent. When she needed to leave, she would call her. She had to notify someone that she needed to leave. She added that she personally reported her early departure. It happened that the principal said that if no one was at work, they could leave, but on other occasions when she did not say so, she did not leave the workplace.
Given the discrepancies in the statements of the plaintiff, the witnesses F. F., J. C. F., and, on the other hand, the witnesses J. F. and J. B., the defendant’s assertion that the plaintiff did not have permission to leave the workplace was not unequivocally proven beyond any doubt in the proceedings. The defendant thus failed to meet the burden of proof to demonstrate a breach of work discipline by the plaintiff, which was alleged to have occurred through her unauthorized departure from the workplace on June 26, 2023. The testimony of witnesses F. F. and J. C. F. indicates that it had happened in the past as well that they left early when the children were no longer at the preschool; however, it has not been unequivocally proven that in every such instance it was necessary to request permission or, alternatively, to notify the director of the preschool.
Even if the court were to consider the defendant’s departure from the workplace as a breach of work discipline, it would not constitute a serious breach, given the circumstances under which it occurred—namely, shortly before the end of the workday and at a time when there were no children present at the kindergarten. Such a departure from the workplace at that time did not pose an increased risk of damage to the defendant, and the defendant did not even allege any such damage or potential threat of damage. In light of the foregoing, the court found that the plaintiff’s early departure from the workplace would not constitute a serious breach of work discipline within the meaning of Section 68(1)(b) of the Labor Code. When assessing the severity of a breach of work discipline by an employee, the court is not bound by how the employer, in its work rules or other internal regulations, classifies a specific act by an employee that constitutes a breach work discipline. In this regard, the court concurred with the plaintiff’s representative’s assertion, pointing to a contradiction in the employer’s—that is, the defendant’s—work rules, whereby the same breaches of work discipline are subject to different disciplinary sanctions: while Section 9(a) of the Work Rules considers leaving the workplace without the consent and knowledge of a superior breach of work discipline is defined as leaving the workplace without the consent and knowledge of a superior employee, whereas under letter h), repeated early departures from the workplace are considered serious breaches of work discipline. The mayor of the defendant municipality stated in this regard that if there is any contradiction, he is unable to comment on it. The Work Rules are model work rules issued by the Ministry of Education.
The second ground on which the defendant decided to immediately terminate the plaintiff’s employment, by letter dated July 4, 2023, is that on June 24, 2023, the plaintiff unlawfully used work documents, which were intended solely for the employer’s needs and only for the purpose specified by the employer. According to the defendant, these materials were used to an extent that was not permissible, and the visual recordings are subject to the GDPR. The plaintiff published these materials on her private Facebook account and did so without the consent of her legal guardians or her employer. By her actions, she thus knowingly violated the Municipality’s Work Regulations, exceeded the scope of the authorization granted to her as an authorized person on December 17, 2020, thereby violating Act No. 18/2018 Coll.
The plaintiff in the case confirmed that she posted a status on her own Facebook profile in which she thanked Pizzeria BELLA Hosťová for sponsoring pizza for the children who spent the night at the preschool, and attached seven photographs to this post, which, among other things, depict children from the preschool eating pizza. She did so because she wanted to express her gratitude for the sponsored gift, and she did so with good intentions and not with the aim of misusing the children’s personal data. She assumed that for the post in question she did not need specific consent, as she was covered by the so-called “informed consent” form that the children’s parents sign at the beginning of each school year. She confirmed that she did not have any prior written consent from the children’s legal guardians, as she was not even aware that such consent was required. She obtained consent only after the defendant had served her with immediate termination of her employment.
According to the opinion of the responsible person at Osobnyudaj.sk, a consulting firm providing services in the field of personal data protection, dated June 28, 2023, every employee was, upon the establishment of an employment relationship or a similar employment-related relationship, was bound by a confidentiality obligation pursuant to Section 79 of Act No. 18/2018 Z.z. A breach of confidentiality—whether in the form of misusing personal data for one’s own benefit or unauthorized disclosure—constitutes a violation of the duty of confidentiality enshrined both in the provision of Section 81(f) of the Labor Code and Section 79(2) of Act No. 18/2018 Coll. The plaintiff also exceeded her authority to process personal data. The controller authorized her in writing to process personal data on December 17, 2020. In the opinion of the data protection officer, the claimant’s actions constituted a violation of several articles and principles of the General Data Protection Regulation, and these actions infringe upon the data protection rights of the data subjects concerned. Based on the above circumstances, the controller is exposed to a risk that may result in sanctions for violating data protection laws, with the possibility of a fine in the 20,000,000 euros pursuant to Act No. 18/2018 Coll.
The testimony of the witness JUDr. B. H. indicates that the controller’s employees, i.e., the defendant’s employees, receive regular training in the area of personal data protection. The training focuses on the performance of their duties in relation to personal data protection; thus, it is not general in nature. Employees must complete the training once a year. The training is followed by a test, and upon successful completion of the test, the employee is awarded a certificate valid for one year. Every employee is bound by a confidentiality obligation regarding the GDPR and the protection of personal data; they are also authorized in writing by the employer to process personal data and is made aware of security policies.
The testimony of witness J. J. G. indicates that he only learned of the publication of the photographs after they were published by his wife. He was asked for his consent only later, after the defendant’s employment with the plaintiff had ended, when she came to their home.
The testimony of witness J. J. J. indicates that she learned about the specific photos from acquaintances who had seen her daughter in a photo on Facebook. At first, she did not know what they were talking about, and subsequently they sent her a screenshot of a restaurant page where the photos of the children were posted. This surprised her, as she did not post her children on such sites often—only on rare occasions. The plaintiff was not contacted regarding additional consent.
Pursuant to Section 79(1) and (2) of Act No. 18/2018 Coll. on the Protection of Personal Data and on Amendments to certain laws, it follows that the controller and processor are obligated to maintain confidentiality regarding the personal data they process. The obligation of confidentiality continues even after the processing of personal data has ended. The controller and processor are required to impose a confidentiality obligation regarding personal data on natural persons who come into contact with personal data at the controller’s or processor’s premises. The obligation of confidentiality under the first sentence must continue even after the termination of the employment relationship, civil service relationship, official service relationship, or similar working relationship of such a natural person.
Pursuant to Section 104(1)(a) of the cited Act, the Office may impose a fine of up to 10,000,000 euros, or in the case of an enterprise, up to 2% of its total worldwide annual turnover for the preceding fiscal year, whichever whichever amount is higher, on the operator—including public authorities and public-law institutions—for failure to comply with or a violation of any of the obligations under Section 15, Section 18, Sections 31 through 35, § 37, § 39 through 45, § 79, and § 109, or under Articles 8, 11, 25 through 39, 42, and 43 of Regulation (EU) No. (EU) 2016/679 of April 27, 2016, on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, May 4, 2016) (hereinafter referred to as “Regulation (EU) 2016/679”).
Pursuant to Section 104(2)(a) of the aforementioned Act, the Office may impose a fine of up to 20,000,000 euros, or in the case of an enterprise, up to 4% of its total worldwide annual turnover for the preceding fiscal year, depending on whichever amount is higher, on any person who has failed to comply with or has violated any of the fundamental principles of personal data, including the conditions for consent under Sections 6 through 14, Section 16, and Sections 52 through 58, or under Articles 5 through 7 and Article 9 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679.
Article 5 of the General Data Protection Regulation 2016/679/EU (GDPR) stipulates that all processing of personal data must be lawful. To fulfill this condition, the Regulation sets forth in Article 6 the legal bases for the processing of personal data. In order for a controller to lawfully process the personal data of data subjects, it must have a so-called legal basis, or a relevant legal basis (such as the data subject’s consent, a contractual relationship, the legitimate interest of the controller or a third party, etc.), which is legitimate and established by law, either directly in the Regulation or in another legal provision. The purpose of processing personal data is determined by the controller itself or is directly derived from a legal provision. Personal data may be collected only for a specific, explicitly stated, and legitimate purpose and must not be further processed in a manner that is incompatible with that purpose. The processing of personal data must be appropriate, relevant, and limited to the extent necessary to achieve the intended purpose of processing the personal data.
The principle of lawfulness of personal data processing is elaborated in greater detail in Article 6 of the Regulation, which governs the legal bases on which a controller may process the personal data of natural persons. In order for a controller to lawfully process the personal data of data subjects, it must have a so-called legal authorization, or a relevant legal basis. Each purpose of processing must have its own legal basis (or multiple legal bases), except in situations where the original purpose is compatible with another purpose of processing. The controller is authorized to process the personal data of data subjects because the data subject consents to it, or because another circumstance specifically provided for by law permits it.
The data subject’s consent continues to be considered one of the legal bases that require special consideration with regard to the conditions directly related to its granting. The controller is authorized to process the data subject’s personal data if the data subject has given consent to the processing of their personal data for at least one specific purpose.
Pursuant to Section 11(6)(a)(13) and (7) of Act No. 245/2008 Coll. on Education and Training (the Act) and on amendments to certain laws, schools or school facilities collect and process personal data on children, students, students, and participants in education and training, limited to portraits and photographs. Persons who, in the performance of their job duties, come into contact with personal data pursuant to paragraph 6 are bound by a duty of confidentiality, even after the termination of their employment relationship (reference to Section 79 of Act No. 18/2018 Coll.). In the event of a breach of the duty of confidentiality, the procedure set forth in a separate regulation shall apply (reference to Section 104(1)(a) of Act No. 18/2018 Coll.).
It follows from Section 81(f) of the Labor Code that the essence of this fundamental obligation of an employee is the duty to act in the employer’s best interests and to protect the employer’s interests. An employee is legally bound by a duty of confidentiality regarding facts of which he or she becomes aware in the course of employment. The statutory duty of confidentiality does not apply to all facts and information with which the employee comes into contact in the course of employment, but to those that, in the employer’s interest, must not be disclosed to other persons. These are facts whose disclosure—that is, making them available to other persons not bound by a duty of confidentiality—could cause harm to the employer. This duty of confidentiality remains in effect for the duration of the employment relationship. The Labor Code does not specify the information subject to protection. In practice, protected information is defined directly in the employment contract, or in the employer’s internal regulations, or in a separate document, so that the employee knows which facts the employer considers so important that disclosing them to third parties poses a threat to the employer.
According to the defendant’s Work Rules No. 05/2020 dated September 2, 2020, the following are considered serious violations work discipline are: xx) violation of and failure to comply with internal regulations, y) failure by employees to fulfill their obligations regarding the protection of personal data of employees and children, z) failure to accept the provisions of the internal rules on the protection of personal data set forth in the school’s data protection impact assessment.
Based on the evidence, the court found it proven that the defendant, as a data controller within the meaning of Section 79(2) of Act No. 18/2018 Coll. on the Protection of Personal Data, bound the plaintiff to confidentiality regarding the protection of all natural persons (data subjects) with whom she comes into contact in the performance of work tasks, duties, or other activities arising from her job description, or from the controller’s membership or functions. At the same time, she was informed that a personal data breach is defined as any situation in which there is unauthorized or unlawful handling of personal data, whether intentionally or as a result of neglect of the obligations and measures adopted to protect such data. Osobnyudaj.sk issued the plaintiff a certificate of completion of training regarding the training of a natural person acting as an “authorized person” of the controller who processes personal data within the meaning of Article 32 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of April 27, 2016, on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, issued on January 8, 2023, and valid until January 8, 2024).
Although the plaintiff was bound by a confidentiality obligation, as indicated above, violated the provisions of § 81 of the Labor Code, which establishes the fundamental obligations of an employee, namely failure to comply with the obligations regarding the protection of personal data and to maintain confidentiality in the performance her employment, and by publishing photographs of children in her private Facebook post on June 24, 2023 , and the court agreed with the defendant’s assertion that these images were not used within the permissible scope under the GDPR. The photographs were posted on a private Facebook account without the written consent of the children’s legal guardians or the defendant, i.e., the employer.
According to the plaintiff, the “Night at the Daycare” event did not take place within the framework of an employment relationship. No one ordered the event; it was a long-standing tradition. The plaintiff participated voluntarily during her time off, and therefore she was able to take photographs of the children and post them on her own Facebook profile, since such processing is not subject to the Personal Data Protection Regulation. In connection with this assertion, the court agreed with the defendant’s statement that the “Night at Preschool” event is part of the educational process, which took place directly on the school premises with the management’s consent and constituted an indirect educational process. Furthermore, it was not proven in the proceedings that the publication of photographs from previous “Night at Preschool” events constituted an established practice of publishing photographs of children on a private profile.
According to the court, the participation of the kindergarten teachers—including the plaintiff—was related to the performance of their jobs and is therefore subject by law to a duty of confidentiality pursuant to Section 79 of Act No. 18/2018 Z.z. Under Article 5 of the GDPR, any processing of personal data must be lawful, which in this case means the existence of consent from the data subject or their legal guardian—a requirement that was not met in the case at hand. The plaintiff herself confirmed in the case that she did not have the prior consent of the legal guardians and that she attempted to obtain it only retroactively and, as she stated in her testimony, after she was notified of the immediate termination of her employment. The fact that prior consent from the parents to post photographs of the children on the plaintiff’s private Facebook profile was not given is also confirmed by the testimony of witnesses J. J. J. and J. J. G..
The plaintiff’s assertion that the parents’ informed consent should have been sufficient is refuted by a statement by the defendant, which indicates that it pertains only to the needs of the school facility, subject to compliance with the conditions established by law and with a precisely defined scope of processed information, and not for private purposes on private pages. The testimony of the defendant’s mayor indicates that at the beginning of each school year, the children’s legal guardians sign an informed consent form, thereby agreeing to the scope of personal data processing. One of these items is consent to the publication of photographs, which specifies exactly where the photographs may be published. These include the municipality’s website, the official website of the preschool, the Edupage system, and on the premises of the preschool.
Based on the evidence presented, the court concluded that the plaintiff violated work discipline by publishing photographs of children on her private Facebook page without prior parental consent. As evidenced by the proceedings, during the term of her employment, the plaintiff completed training courses on personal data protection, as also confirmed by the certificate of completion issued for the training (point 35.13 of the judgment). Pursuant to Section 79(2) of Act No. 18/2018 Coll., the plaintiff was obligated to to maintain confidentiality regarding the personal data of data subjects, and it is undisputed that the processing of personal data is permissible only in accordance with the law, which required legal authorization—namely, the consent of the data subject or their legal representative, which did not occur in this case. The plaintiff thus violated the provision of Section 81(f) of the Labor Code regarding the maintenance of confidentiality.
As noted above, for the purposes of termination of employment, the Labor Code distinguishes between a minor breach of work discipline and a serious breach of work discipline. The Labor Code does not define the terms “serious” or “less serious” breach of work discipline. It therefore does not specify how to proceed when assessing whether a breach is less serious or serious, nor does it specify the criteria on which such an assessment should be based. One of the fundamental criteria in deciding on disciplinary action for a breach of work discipline is the severity of the breach. The assessment of the severity of a breach of work discipline depends on the specific circumstances and is influenced by the employee’s character, the position they hold, their previous attitude toward performing work tasks and fulfilling work duties, the manner and severity of the breach of specific work duties, as well as the situation in which the breach occurred, the consequences of the breach for the employer, and whether the employee’s conduct caused damage to the employer.
Based on the evidence presented, the court concluded that the plaintiff’s conduct in question cannot be considered a serious breach of work discipline. In assessing the severity of the breach of work discipline, the court took into account the circumstances of the case, which occurred during a “night at the kindergarten” event, and, as the the plaintiff, the post on her own Facebook profile was intended to thank the pizzeria, which, as a sponsor, provided pizza for the children when no meals were available for them during the event. She did so with the good intention of expressing gratitude for the sponsorship. As she stated in her testimony, while taking photos of the children, she asked them to lower their heads so that they would not be visible. Her intention was not to harm anyone or violate any regulations, but to express her gratitude for the meals provided to the children who participated in the “night at preschool” event.
The court further took into account the character of the plaintiff herself, who had served as a kindergarten teacher at the defendant’s institution since January 11, 2016, and had been fulfilling her job duties since that time. While it is true that the defendant issued her a warning on September 23, 2022 (point 35.7 of the judgment), it emerged from the evidence, this warning was subsequently rescinded; the mayor of the defendant’s municipality stated that the notice of breach of work discipline from September 2022 was revoked by the employer on the it was a case of one person’s word against another’s, with no witnesses. As for the written notice dated June 12, 2023, this was not issued by the defendant but by the director of the preschool, which cited a breach of work discipline involving the resolution of interpersonal conflicts among employees; however, this was not specified in detail; as the evidence showed, this may have been related to mutual disagreements between the then-director of the kindergarten and the plaintiff. This is evident primarily from the testimonies of witnesses F. F. and Mgr. C. F.. These witnesses also commented on the plaintiff’s performance of her job duties, with witness F. stating in her testimony that the plaintiff performed her job duties as she was supposed to, to the extent that her job allowed; she engaged in activities with the children, exercised with them, and went on walks with the children. When asked by the defendant’s attorney whether she could describe the plaintiff the plaintiff in terms of fulfilling her job duties, she stated that the plans and whatever was required, she had them prepared. The testimony of witness J. J. J. indicated that the children liked the plaintiff as a teacher.
Last but not least, the court took into account the fact that the children’s parents had not filed any complaints with the defendant regarding the plaintiff, which was not proven during the proceedings. J. J. G. testified as a witness in the case, commenting on the manner in which the plaintiff obtained additional consent for the publication of the photograph. Likewise, no complaint is implied by the testimony of the witness J. J. J., who stated that the publication of the photographs on Facebook surprised her—that is, she was surprised that someone had informed her that the photographs had been published.
It was not proven in the proceedings that the plaintiff’s breach of work discipline caused (although it may be agreed that the defendant faced sanctions under Act No. 18/2018 Coll.).
Under the circumstances, characterizing the plaintiff’s conduct as a serious breach of work discipline would therefore be disproportionately severe. In the court’s view, even if a serious breach of work discipline had occurred, the defendant was not required to immediately terminate the plaintiff’s employment, but could, for the same reason, give notice of termination of employment pursuant to § 63(1)(e) of the Labor Code, as a more lenient method of terminating the employment relationship, taking into account the plaintiff’s personal circumstances, the duration of the employment relationship, and her performance of her job duties. Immediate termination of employment pursuant to Section 68(1)(b) of the Labor Code is, in comparison with termination pursuant to Section 63(1) (e) of the Labor Code, an exceptional measure. Therefore, immediate termination of employment pursuant to Section 68(1)(b) may occur only if the circumstances of the case justify the conclusion that it cannot reasonably be expected of the employer to continue employing the employee, if necessary, until the expiration of the notice period. Therefore, the court concluded that the immediate termination of the employment relationship was a disproportionate measure on the part of the defendant, based on an assessment of the severity of the breach work discipline, although the court is not bound by the defendant’s assessment of the plaintiff’s conduct, which constitutes a breach of work discipline.
Based on the foregoing, the court granted the plaintiff’s claim and ruled as set forth in paragraph I of the operative part of this judgment.
Since, in the court’s view, further evidence must be taken regarding the plaintiff’s claim for compensation for wages, the court has separated this claim into a separate proceeding.
Pursuant to § 255(1) of the Civil Procedure Code (CSP), the court shall award a party reimbursement of litigation costs in proportion to its success in the case.
Pursuant to § 262(1), (2) of the CSP, the court shall decide on the claim for reimbursement of litigation costs, even without a motion, in the decision concluding the proceedings. The court of first instance shall determine the amount of the award of costs within 60 days after the decision concluding the proceedings becomes final, by a separate order issued by a court clerk.
In view of the plaintiff’s success in the proceedings, the court awarded the plaintiff reimbursement of litigation costs in full. The court of first instance shall determine the amount of reimbursement of litigation costs after the decision becomes final.
The court ruled on the defendant’s obligation to pay court fees pursuant to Section 2(2) and Section 4(2)(d) point 1 of Act No. 71/1992 Coll. on Court Fees and Fees for Criminal Record Extracts, since the plaintiff was exempt from paying the court fee for the complaint in these proceedings and was successful in the proceedings; the court therefore ordered the defendant to pay the court fee in full. The court determined the amount of the fee in accordance with Item 1(b) of the Schedule of Court Fees. Instruction: An appeal against this judgment may be filed within 15 days of the date of its service, in writing in two copies, through the Nitra District Court to the Nitra Regional Court. An appeal may be filed by the party against whom the decision was rendered. An appeal directed solely against the reasoning of the decision is not admissible. In addition to the general requirements for a filing, the appeal must specify the decision it challenges, the extent to which it is contested, the reasons why the decision is considered incorrect (grounds for appeal), and what the appellant seeks (statement of appeal). The appellant may expand the scope of the challenge to the decision only until the expiration of the deadline for filing an appeal. An appeal may be based only on the grounds that a) procedural requirements were not met, b) the court, through improper procedural conduct, prevented a party from exercising its procedural rights to such an extent that the right to a fair trial was violated, c) the decision was rendered by a disqualified judge or an improperly constituted court, d) the proceedings contain another defect that could have resulted in an incorrect decision on the merits of the case, e) the court of first instance failed to admit the proposed evidence necessary to establish the decisive facts, f) the court of first instance reached incorrect factual findings based on the evidence presented, g) the established facts do not hold up because other procedural defenses or other means of procedural challenge that were not raised, or h) the decision of the court of first instance is based on an incorrect legal assessment of the case. The grounds for appeal and the evidence supporting them may be amended or supplemented only until the expiration of the deadline for filing an appeal. Means of procedural attack or means of procedural defense that were not raised in the proceedings before the court of first instance may be used in the appeal only if a) they concern procedural requirements, (b) they concern the recusal of a judge or improper composition of the court, c) they are intended to demonstrate that defects occurred in the proceedings that could have resulted in an incorrect decision on the merits, or d) the appellant was unable, through no fault of their own, to raise them in the proceedings before the court of first instance. Enforcement proceedings are initiated upon petition. Enforcement may be carried out at the request of a person who is entitled to demand fulfillment of a claim under an enforcement order because the obligor has not voluntarily fulfilled the obligations imposed by the enforcement order. (Section 48(1), (2) of Act No. 233/1995 Coll.). A motion for enforcement must be filed with the competent court. The Banská Bystrica District Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over enforcement proceedings (Section 49 of Act No. 233/1995 Coll.).