LG Frankfurt am Main - 2-06 O 234/25

Frankfurt am Main Regional Court, Judgement of September 16, 2026, Case No. 2-06 O 234/25 6th Civil Chamber | REWIS RS 2026, 8634 Financial Flow: Liability for Fake Profiles—On the liability of a social media platform operator for fake profiles in the context of algorithmically determined content display, in accordance with the CJEU rulings in Webgroup and Coyote (C-188/24, C-190/24). Operative Part The defendant is ordered, on pain of a fine of up to EUR 250,000.00 to be determined by the Court for each instance of noncompliance, and, in the event that such fine cannot be collected, to serve a term of detention or a term of detention of up to six months, which shall be enforced against its legal representatives, to refrain, with respect to Plaintiff No. 1, from publishing and/or distributing third-party content on its platforms A and/or B without the consent of Plaintiff No. 1, and/or from causing third parties to perform such acts, where contain images in which Plaintiff No. 2 is depicted, even though such content does not originate from Plaintiff No. 1, if this occurs as evident from Exhibits K22, K24, K28, K29, and K33; and/or contain the mark “F” verbatim or in a modified form, even though this content does not originate from Plaintiff No. 1, if this occurs as evident from Exhibits K24, K28, K29, and K33.

The defendant is ordered, on pain of a fine of up to EUR 250,000.00 to be determined by the Court for each instance of infringement, and, in the event that such fine cannot be collected, to serve a term of detention or a term of detention of up to six months, to be enforced against its legal representatives, to refrain, with respect to Plaintiff No. 2, from publishing and/or distributing third-party content on its platforms A and/or B without the consent of Plaintiff No. 2, and/or from having such actions performed by third parties that feature images of Plaintiff No. 2, even though such content does not originate from Plaintiff No. 2 in the lawsuit, if this occurs as evident from Exhibits K22, 24, 26, 28–31, and 33; and/or contain, verbatim or in essence, the name “[Plaintiff No. 2]” even though such content does not originate from Plaintiff No. 2, where this occurs as shown in Exhibits K22 and K26.

Plaintiff 1’s channel currently has 1.5 million subscribers (Exhibit K2). Plaintiff 2 is one of the founders and managing directors of Plaintiff 1. The defendant is the controller in the EU for the operation of the “B” and “A” platforms, each of which has approximately 3 billion monthly active Users (Exhibit K43, p. 710 of the record). The defendant requires users to comply with the respective platform guidelines. It has implemented community standards regarding “fraud, scams, and deceptive practices” as well as “advertising standards” and terms of use (Exhibits B5 and B6). It employs technical methods to detect and block fake accounts, for example, when an unusually high number of accounts are created from a single location, or when suspicious email addresses or activities are detected. The defendant also uses tools it has developed, such as the Intellectual Property Reporting API, Rights Manager, Brand Rights Protection Tool, special reporting forms, and the IP Help Center (Exhibits B8 through B13).

Using the Brand Rights Protection Tool, rights holders can register their word and figurative marks, search the defendant’s platforms for content that infringes these marks using keywords, phrases, or URLs, and report such content, which is then reviewed and, if necessary, removed. Rights holders can also upload up to 200 reference images. In addition, it provides facial recognition software to detect and delete fraudulent content (see Exhibit B15). The plaintiffs dispute the effectiveness of these measures. Plaintiff No. 1 operates a B account on the defendant’s platforms under the handle “@F,” which—at the time the complaint was filed—had over 600,000 followers, as well as an A account under the handle “F” with nearly 29,000 followers (see Exhibit K4, p. 110 of the record). All posts for which the plaintiffs are responsible are distributed exclusively via the accounts with the handles “@F” and “F,” respectively.

Plaintiff No. 1 does not place any advertisements on the defendant’s platforms. Plaintiff No. 1 is the owner of the German word and figurative mark DE ... [Mark1], filed on March 18, 2022, which claims protection, among other things, for the services “advertising in electronic media and specifically on the Internet,” “advertising and marketing services provided via social media” (each in Nice Class 35) and the “provision of audio and visual media via communication networks” (Nice Class 41) (Exhibit K8, p. 115 of the record). Plaintiff No. 1 is also the owner of the German word mark “F” (DE ...), which claims protection for, among other things, the services “advertising, marketing, and sales promotion” (Nice Class 35), “computer-assisted provision of information in the field of finance,” “online information services regarding finance provided from a computer database or the Internet” (Nice Class 36), “education, training, entertainment, and sports activities,” as well as “video production” (Nice Class 41) (Exhibit K9, pp. 118 et seq. of the record), filed on January 25, 2025.

Plaintiff No. 1) also uses the designation “F” in the course of business to specifically identify its enterprise. Plaintiff No. 2 is, among other things, the public face of Plaintiff No. 1 due to his participation in numerous videos and all social media posts, as well as the podcast “...,” which now has at least 149 episodes. He is regularly featured in the photographs and image collages used by Plaintiff No. 1 in the lawsuit and is interviewed by national news and industry portals. He is co-author of the nonfiction book “D,” which ranked No. 1 on *Der Spiegel*’s nonfiction bestseller list and is now in its ... edition. He is also a regular columnist for ... as well as for ... (see Exhibit K5, pp. 112 ff. of the file). The plaintiffs are held in particularly high regard by the target audience in question. For some time now, user accounts not associated with the plaintiffs have been publishing on the platforms of Defendants B and A, using the designation “F” and the trademarks of Plaintiff No. 1, as well as the name and likeness of Plaintiff No. 2, in which they address topics related to the financial markets (Exhibit K14, p. 176 of the record).

The plaintiffs are not affiliated with the users who posted the content, nor have they given their consent to the use of the photographs or the name of Plaintiff No. 2 and the image collages, the trademarks of Plaintiff No. 1 or parts thereof, or the “F” symbol of Plaintiff No. 1. The plaintiffs regularly reported the disputed posts and advertisements via the defendant’s “Brand Rights Protection Tool” (see Exhibit K17, pp. 154 ff. of the record). They submitted the reference images provided as Exhibit K7 (pp. 164 et seq. of the file) and reported approximately 256 violations during the period from July 29, 2024, to August 28, 2024 (Exhibit K18, p. 51 of the record). The content in question has now been completely removed. Subsequently, numerous new identical or substantially similar advertisements were published. The plaintiffs initially attempted, without success, to contact the defendant directly and then retained the services of ...

GmbH, a company specializing in content removal. The plaintiffs then issued a cease-and-desist letter to the defendant via their attorney on October 1, 2024 (Exhibit K6, p. 56 of the file) and informed the defendant that they were the rights holders and that publications on the defendant’s platforms were to be considered unlawful whenever they contain the photographs included in Annex 2 thereof (= Exhibit K7 herein, p. 164 et seq.) and/or an account name containing the element “F” and/or “[Plaintiff No. 2],” possibly in different spellings, and/or contained the protected word/figurative mark [Mark 1] of Plaintiff 1), none of which were published under the aforementioned handles of Plaintiff 1) (see Exhibit K6, p. 69 of the record, under item 1.d). The parties subsequently engaged in settlement discussions. During these discussions, the defendant offered to include Plaintiff No. 2 in its facial recognition program, an offer that the plaintiffs did not initially accept.

However, the plaintiffs did participate in a “Brand Rights Protection Tool” training session offered by the defendant. A proposal was also on the table to activate a direct reporting channel from the plaintiffs to the law firm representing the defendant and to make a compensation payment to the plaintiffs. However, a settlement was not reached. The infringements increased, and in some cases it took weeks for infringing content to be removed. On the plaintiffs’ side, a full-time employee is dedicated to monitoring the platforms and reporting infringements. Subsequently, the following additional profiles and content, among others, were created: An “A” profile was created under the name “[Plaintiff No. 2]” (Exhibit K22, p. 157 of the file). In doing so, the plaintiff’s likenesses (Exhibit K7, p. 164, and presumably also p. 165 of the file) and name were used. The plaintiffs became aware of this on May 30, 2025, and reported the infringement on May 30, 2025, via the defendant’s Brand Rights Protection Tool (Exhibit K23, p. 200 of the file).

According to the defendant, the advertisement ran from June 3 to June 15, 2025, and was accessible online at least during that period. According to the defendant, more than 5,000 Users viewed the advertisement (Exhibit K30). Based on the plaintiffs’ alleged report in connection with the lawsuit, the duration of the removal was 62 days (p. 560 of the record). The plaintiffs became aware of Profile “F” (Exhibit K33, p. 103 of the record), which featured images of Plaintiff No. 2) (Exhibit K7, p. 167 of the record) and the trademarks of Plaintiff No. 1, the plaintiffs became aware of the content on June 5, 25. All of this content has since been deleted, although the defendant took between 0 and 62 days to do so (according to the plaintiffs’ submission) (see table on pp. 559 ff. of the record). After the lawsuit was filed, Plaintiff No. 2 gave his consent to the defendant’s facial recognition program via email dated September 24, 2025 (Exhibit K41, p. 482).

The defendant is also liable as an indirect infringer. It failed to fulfill its duties of scrutiny and conduct regarding the dissemination of infringing content and is therefore responsible for the infringement of the plaintiffs’ rights. The liability exemption under Article 6 of the DSA does not apply to the defendant. It is not a neutral host provider. The defendant had, at the latest following the plaintiffs’ cease-and-desist letter dated October 1, 2024 (Exhibit K6, p. 56 of the record), in combination with the photographs stored in the Brand Rights Protection Tool (Exhibit K7) and the reported content (Exhibit K18, p. 51 of the record), within the meaning of Article 16(3) of the DSA, of the relevant information indicating that a large number of pieces of content had been and were being published on its platforms that infringed the plaintiffs’ rights. On this basis, the defendant was capable of and obligated to remove identical and substantially similar content in the future even without further notice from the plaintiffs.

There is a likelihood of confusion. The defendant is liable as an indirect infringer pursuant to Art. 6(1) of the German Data Protection Act (DSA). These were cases of manifest unlawfulness. The defendant should have deleted the content immediately. It did not sufficiently fulfill its duties to review and cooperate. This is all the more true given that the statements also violate the defendant’s own terms and conditions. Plaintiff No. 2) is of the opinion that the Frankfurt am Main Regional Court also has territorial jurisdiction over Plaintiff No. 2)’s claims under personality rights. The infringements of Plaintiff No. 2’s personality rights are also perceived within the judicial district of Frankfurt am Main and affect him there as well. Plaintiff No. 2 is entitled to a claim for injunctive relief against the defendant under § 1004(1) BGB by analogy, § 823(1), (2) BGB in conjunction with §§ 22, 23 KUG, Art. 6(1) and Art. 17(1) of the GDPR (Lawsuit 2a).

The publication and distribution of the images of Plaintiff No. 2 infringe upon his right to his own image. Plaintiff No. 2 had not consented to the commercial use of his photographs. Nor was consent dispensable under § 23 of the German Artistic Copyright Act (KUG). In particular, the photographs did not constitute portraits in the field of contemporary history. In addition, Plaintiff No. 2 may base his claims on the GDPR. The photographs and videos contain his personal data. There is no legal basis for the data processing. The defendant is a joint controller for the data processing with the profile owner or advertiser pursuant to Article 26 of the GDPR. The defendant influences the processing of personal data in the context of the distribution of advertisements to optimize its own products. It also exerts influence through its ranking mechanism to direct Users’ attention toward its services and thereby generate higher revenue.

Furthermore, it plays a role in determining the means of publication. It must be assumed that, in the ad auction process, the ads created by users are analyzed, thereby providing the defendant with knowledge of the specific content of the ads. This is supported by the fact that the defendant advertises that ad quality is also taken into account in the auction. The defendant thus plays an active role in the infringement. Contrary to the defendant’s argument, the terms of use grant not only technically necessary rights of use, but also, in particular, rights of modification and sublicensing The principles from the CJEU decision in Russmedia can be applied to the present case. Therefore, the host provider privilege under Art. 6 DSA does not apply. This also follows from the CJEU’s “Webgroup and Coyote System” decision (NJW 2026, 2311). In the alternative, the requirements for the liability exemption under Article 6 of the DSA are not met.

The plaintiffs had sufficiently informed the defendant of the infringements and the specific details in the cease-and-desist letter dated October 1, 2024 (Exhibit K6). The specification of characteristics with the same meaning is sufficient. A detailed review of the advertisements is not necessary, as the plaintiffs do not place advertisements on the defendant’s platforms, a fact of which the defendant must have been aware at the latest since the cease-and-desist letter dated October 1, 2024. In the vast majority of cases, the defendant did not delete the unlawful content immediately, but only after several days or several weeks. This constitutes a violation of its duties to review and take action. The defendant no longer acted “promptly” within the meaning of Art. 6(1)(2) of the DSA. The defendant is also liable for publications with the same meaning. Article 8 of the DSA does not preclude this, as the present case involves monitoring obligations in a “specific case” pursuant to Explanatory Note 30 of the DSA.

It is also technically possible for the defendant to take action against all infringements, including those with the same substance. According to its own statements, the defendant uses an AI-supported facial recognition program intended specifically to combat fakes and scams, a fact known to the court. Furthermore, the publications infringe upon Plaintiff No. 2’s right to his own name under § 12 BGB (Lawsuit 2b). This results in confusion regarding attribution among the intended audience. There is a risk of repetition in each instance. The measures taken by the defendant were insufficient. Plaintiff No. 2 asserts the claim for injunctive relief sought in Claim 2a) primarily as a claim under the right of personality and, in the alternative, as a claim under data protection law. Both plaintiffs are entitled to a right to information pursuant to § 242 BGB (Lawsuit 3). Plaintiff No. 1 has a claim against the defendant for damages—the amount of which cannot yet be quantified—pursuant to § 97(2) of the German Copyright Act (UrhG) and § 823(1) of the German Civil Code (BGB) in conjunction with Art. 2(1), 1(1) of the Basic Law (GG), and Sections 14(6) and 15(5) of the Trademark Act (MarkenG) (Claim 4a).

Claims 2 through 5 could also be based on a violation of the defendant’s data protection obligations pursuant to the recent CJEU decision (BeckRS 2025, 32764 – Russmedia). The defendant is obligated, pursuant to § 1004 BGB in conjunction with Art. 2(1) in conjunction with Art. 1(1) GG, to cease data processing, and pursuant to Art. 82 GDPR, to pay damages. Plaintiff No. 2 has suffered a loss of control over his data and, as a result, damage to his personal and professional reputation. Plaintiff No. 1 clarified during the oral hearing that she bases claims 1b) and 1c) primarily on her right to a business identifier, secondarily on her word/figurative mark, and finally on her word mark. Plaintiff No. 2 clarified that he bases Claim 2a primarily on his right of personality and secondarily on claims under data protection law; Claim 2b is based primarily on claims under data protection law and secondarily on claims under the right to a name.

In their lawsuit, served no later than July 25, 2025, the plaintiffs ultimately request that the court rule as follows: The defendant is ordered, on pain of a fine of up to EUR 250,000.00 to be determined by the Court for each instance of violation, and, in the event that such fine cannot be collected, to serve a term of detention or a term of detention of up to six months, to be enforced against its legal representatives, to refrain, with respect to Plaintiff No. 1, from publishing and/or distributing third-party content on its platforms A and/or B without the consent of Plaintiff 1, and/or from having such actions performed by third parties, which contain images in which Plaintiff 2 is depicted and/or contain the word element of the word-and-design mark [Mark1] and/or the designation “F”—either verbatim or in a modified spelling— even though this content does not originate from Plaintiff 1 in the lawsuit, particularly when this occurs as shown in Exhibits K22, 24, 26, 28–31, and 33.

The defendant is ordered, on pain of a fine of up to EUR 250,000.00 to be determined by the Court for each instance of violation, and, in the event that such fine cannot be collected, to serve a term of detention or a term of detention of up to six months, which shall be enforced against its legal representatives, to refrain, with respect to Plaintiff No. 2, from publishing and/or distributing third-party content on its platforms A and/or B without the consent of Plaintiff No. 2, and/or from having such actions performed by third parties, which contain images of Plaintiff No. 2 and/or contain, either verbatim or in substance, the name “[Plaintiff No. 2],” even though such content does not originate from Plaintiff No. 2, particularly when this occurs as evident from Exhibits K22, 24, 26, 28–31, and 33. The defendant is ordered to provide the plaintiffs with information regarding the extent to which the content specified in paragraphs 1 and 2, as well as content with the same meaning, was distributed on platforms A and B, accessed, and/or made publicly available, by submitting a structured list organized by URL, the respective total number of views, and a breakdown of the defendant’s revenue generated thereby.

The user bears responsibility for the order, content, targeting decisions, and ad placement (Exhibit B16). Even with the Ad Creative Generative AI tool for optimizing advertisements, the defendant does not create any new content. Furthermore, this tool is not available for financial advertising. Operating a ranking system (“recommended content”) also does not result in the defendant adopting any posts as its own, but is likewise based on an automated process. Furthermore, the plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the content at issue in this lawsuit constituted “recommended content.” The defendant promptly reviewed and removed a large number of advertisements and profiles containing fraudulent content related to the lawsuits. It is not possible to develop a system capable of detecting every single infringement. There was no intentional delay in erasure for the purpose of generating revenue.

Furthermore, the content in question here does not involve advertising from which the defendant derives revenue; rather, the disputed content consists solely of user-generated content. The time taken to remove the undisputed reports ranged from 0 to 20 days. This time was necessary for the required case-by-case reviews. It is technically impossible for the defendant to detect “substantially identical” content. The defendant is of the opinion that the claims set forth in paragraphs 1 through 4 are inadmissible due to a lack of sufficient specificity within the meaning of Section 253(2)(2) of the German Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO). The phrasing “without the consent of Plaintiff No. 1” requires a case-by-case review. The phrasing “recordings in which Plaintiff No. 2 is depicted” does not constitute a reference to a specific work with regard to copyright claims. The word “in particular” in the claim results in an indefinite, abstract part of the claim.

Suits 2) are likewise indefinite due to the phrases “in particular,” “without consent,” as well as “literal or equivalent use of the name [Plaintiff No. 2]” and “portraits of Plaintiff No. 2.” The same applies to Suits 3 and 4. The lawsuit is also without merit. With regard to the alleged copyright infringements, Plaintiff No. 1 has failed to substantiate her standing to file a lawsuit. She also fails to specify for which content she claims copyright protection and whether she has been granted exclusive rights of use for such content {524 et seq.}. Claims under the UrhDaG are precluded because the defendant is not a service provider within the meaning of § 2 UrhDaG. Even if it were, this would not impose an obligation to remove, without restriction, all identical or substantively identical content. Nor is the defendant liable as an indirect infringer under the principles of host provider liability pursuant to Art. 6 of the German Data Services Act (DSA).

The defendant has not violated any duties to monitor or take action. The defendant is a neutral host provider that neither provides nor is responsible for any of the content on its platforms itself, but merely makes the technical infrastructure available. The defendant fulfills all of its obligations to combat unlawful fake accounts and fake ads. It not only removes infringing content when it becomes aware of it but has also established comprehensive measures—going beyond its legal obligations—to prevent infringements. Any remaining issues can only be resolved through cooperation. Sufficient notification pursuant to Art. 16(2) of the DSA can only be presumed under strict conditions. Neither the reports submitted via the Brands Right Protection Tool nor the cease-and-desist letter dated October 1, 2024, contained sufficient details regarding specific content. In particular, specific details regarding storage locations—such as URLs—were missing.

The protected works and the rights to them were not identified. There was also no declaration regarding the completeness and accuracy of the information provided. Even if a duty to act were assumed, the defendant would have sufficiently fulfilled it by removing the relevant content. The plaintiffs demanded an excessive manual review, which would be unreasonable to expect of the defendant as a neutral host provider. Pursuant to Article 8 of the DSA, there is no general monitoring obligation. Nor does the host provider have a general duty to ensure that new (similar or equivalent) content is not uploaded. The use of a name or a company identifier is not, in and of itself, sufficient to indicate an unlawful fake profile. Since there are several billion user accounts, it is not possible to unambiguously assign a name to a specific person. If additional characteristics, such as images, are present, it must be assessed on a case-by-case basis whether, after an overall evaluation, there is an indication of a fake account.

The defendant fulfilled this obligation by removing the content. Even if obligations to review and take action were assumed, there is no risk of recurrence. The defendant responded appropriately in each instance. The plaintiffs’ cease-and-desist letter dated October 1, 2024 (Exhibit K6) was not sufficient to provide adequate notice. It contained screenshots that were, in part, low-resolution; no specific storage location or URL was provided; no specific images were identified, and no proof of authorization was attached; furthermore, the word-and-design mark did not cover the relevant services. The breakdown of characteristics listed in the letter is unusable. The use of a specific photograph, an account name, or a word/figurative mark of Plaintiff No. 1 is not unlawful. The overview in Exhibit K18 is unsuitable. The reported content is not apparent there. The plaintiffs’ reports submitted via the Brand Rights Protection Tool were also, in some cases, very inaccurate or incomplete.

No use of the “F” mark in a trademark sense has been demonstrated, neither for the fake profiles nor for the disputed advertisement. There is no similarity in the services provided. Plaintiff No. 1) relies, with respect to the word/figurative mark DE ..., on the registration for services in Classes 35 and 41, namely “advertising in electronic media and specifically on the Internet,” “advertising and marketing services provided via social media,” and the “provision of audio and visual media via communication services.” However, the present case does not concern such services (provided by Users), but rather “advertising for financial products or (fraudulent) investment products” (by Users). Furthermore, Plaintiff 1’s trademark is not eligible for protection for such services. With regard to the word mark “F,” Plaintiff 1) relies on the registration for the services “advertising, marketing, and sales promotion” (Nice Class 35), “computer-assisted provision of information in the field of finance,” “online information services regarding finance provided from a computer database or the Internet” (Nice Class 36) “education, training, entertainment, and sports activities,” as well as “video production” (Nice Class 41).

These are not at issue in the present case. The trademark is not eligible for protection with respect to the disputed services at issue because it is generic and purely descriptive in the field of financial services. The defendant is also not liable as an infringer. Plaintiff No. 2 has no claim for injunctive relief based on a violation of the right to one’s own image. The defendant is not liable as a trespasser. The image of Plaintiff No. 2 is not unlawful in every context. This requires a case-by-case assessment. There is also no violation of data protection law. A claim under Article 17 of the GDPR is precluded; for Plaintiff No. 1) simply because she is not a natural person. For Plaintiff No. 2), the claim is precluded because all content at issue has been removed. Furthermore, Plaintiff No. 2 had not actively exercised his rights under Article 17 of the GDPR. Such a request under Article 17 of the GDPR would also be unfounded, as the request must be directed to the responsible controller—that is, the third-party users.

Furthermore, a claim for injunctive relief cannot be based on Article 17 of the GDPR. The CJEU’s Russmedia decision is not applicable to the present case. Nor can joint controllers be assumed. Furthermore, personality rights do not take precedence over the fundamental rights to freedom of expression and communication. As a social media platform, the defendant has no commercial interest of its own in exploiting the content of user posts. Nor does the ranking mechanism constitute any influence. Nor is the defendant liable under the principles of host provider liability pursuant to Article 6 of the DSA. It is a neutral host provider and does not adopt the content as its own. This neutrality pertains to the content itself and not to commercialization. Furthermore, the assessment of ad quality is based on automated pattern recognition and not on an individual review or active participation in shaping the content.

There is no claim for a declaration of liability for damages; in particular, in the context of indirect liability for interference, such a claim can only be considered in exceptional cases. Nor is the defendant liable as an accomplice, as there is a lack of dual intent on the part of the accomplice. There is no likelihood that damage will occur. A claim under Article 82 of the GDPR is ruled out because it can be directed exclusively against the controller. There is a lack of evidence of a specific breach of duty. In particular, Exhibit K18 does not meet the requirements for demonstrating a breach of duty. Plaintiff No. 2 also has no claim for monetary compensation. Such a claim would require a culpable infringement of personal rights. Liability as a third party causing interference is not sufficient. The third party causing interference is liable only for injunctive relief, but not for damages.

The Frankfurt am Main Regional Court also has territorial jurisdiction with respect to the plaintiff’s (2) claims under personality rights pursuant to § 32 of the German Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO) and Art. 7(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation, because the plaintiffs have convincingly asserted an infringement via the Internet. II. The claims are sufficiently specific. Pursuant to § 253(2)(2) of the German Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO), a claim—and, pursuant to § 313(1)(4) ZPO, a judgment based thereon—must not be formulated in such an unclear manner that the subject matter of the dispute and the scope of the Court’s authority to review and make decisions are not clearly defined, that the defendant is therefore unable to mount a comprehensive defense, and that, as a result, it is left to the enforcement authority to make the decision on what the defendant is prohibited or required to do (BGH, NJW 2024, 3152, para. 8 – Payout Fee).

Furthermore, a claim that requires interpretation may be acceptable if this is necessary to ensure effective legal protection (BGH, GRUR 2019, 813, para. 23 – Cordoba II, with further references; Federal Court of Justice (BGH), Decision of Nov. 18, 2021 – I ZR 205/20, GRUR-RS 2021, 56776 [juris para. 10] – Service fee; Teplitzky/Schwippert, loc. cit.O., chap. 51, para. 8a, with further references), which, however, may in turn be ruled out if the plaintiff could have filed a motion specific to the particular form of infringement (see Federal Court of Justice, GRUR 2011, 539 [juris para. 13] — Legal advice from a food chemist; Federal Court of Justice (BGH), Decision of Nov. 18, 2021 – I ZR 205/20, GRUR-RS 2021, 56776, para. 10 – flat-rate service fee). The motions most recently filed during the oral hearing satisfy these requirements. 1. Insofar as the defendant objects to the wording in Motions 1 and 2 “without the consent of Plaintiff 1,” it is sufficiently clear from the interpretation of the motion that the use is to be prohibited only if it occurs without the consent of the plaintiffs.

This means that, in general, only those rights of use that are indispensable for achieving the purpose of the contract are impliedly granted. Conversely, the grant of rights of use extending beyond the purpose of the contract can only be assumed if the parties’ intent—even if based solely on the accompanying circumstances and the conclusive conduct of the parties involved—has been unequivocally expressed (BGH, GRUR 2013, 1213, para. 32 – SUMO; Dreier/Schulze, UrhG, 8th ed., § 31, para. 110, with further references). For the purposes described by the witness—namely, use on social media platforms—the granting of simple rights of use is necessary but also sufficient. Although granting rights that exclude employees from personal use might seem obvious, this cannot be assumed here due to the rule of doubt in § 31(5) UrhG. This also applies in light of the interpretation of § 43 of the German Copyright Act (UrhG).

According to that provision, the results of the employee’s work generally belong to the employer to the extent that the employee created them in fulfillment of his or her obligations under an employment relationship. However, since copyrights do not automatically vest in the employer or public authority, the employed author is obligated to grant these copyrights. The grant itself, which usually concerns an exclusive right of use (OLG Karlsruhe, GRUR-RR 2013, 423 – Zwölffamilienhaus), additionally requires an express declaration (Dreier/Schulze, UrhG, 8th ed. 2025, § 43, para. 18, with further references). The obligation to grant rights of use may either be expressly stipulated or arise tacitly from the employment or service contract (Dreier/Schulze, UrhG, 8th ed. 2025, § 43, note 19, with further references). The scope of the grant of rights—in terms of content, territory, and duration—is determined by the content of the contract in cases of an express contractual provision.

Whether an infringement of the right to corporate personality is unlawful must—due to its nature as a framework right—be determined by weighing the conflicting interests protected by fundamental rights, taking into account the specific circumstances of the individual case as well as the fundamental rights at stake. An infringement of the right of personality is unlawful only if the interest of the affected enterprise that warrants protection outweighs the legitimate interests of the other party (BGH, GRUR 2021, 1207, para. 53 – “Vorsicht Falle,” with further references; see BGH, NJW 2020, 1587, para. 43, with further references). Highlighting the name of a personally liable partner in an enterprise may infringe upon that partner’s personality rights, which, in the case of enterprises that use their name or parts of their business name for advertising purposes, the right to determine for themselves the nature and scope of the use of the name or part of the company name by others.

In Annexes K30 and K31, however, no clear connection to Plaintiff 1) can be identified; therefore, there is no infringement of her corporate personality rights in these cases. Plaintiff No. 1 has undisputedly argued that Plaintiff No. 2 is the defining face of Plaintiff No. 1, in part due to his participation in numerous videos and all social media posts, as well as the podcast “...,” which now has at least 149 episodes. He is regularly depicted in the photographs and image collages used by Plaintiff 1) in the lawsuit and is interviewed by national news and industry portals. The unauthorized use of Plaintiff No. 2’s likeness in connection with Plaintiff No. 1’s “F” trademark for advertising purposes and promotional content constitutes an infringement of Plaintiff No. 1’s corporate personality rights, to determine for itself how it wishes to be presented in advertising. The profiles and posts give the false impression that they originate from Plaintiff No. 1.

Furthermore, the infringement is not justified. The interests of Plaintiff 1) outweigh the interests of the creators of the fake profiles and fake posts. It is undisputed that the creators of the fake profiles and fake posts use them for fraudulent activities. The users in question have no interest worthy of protection in this type of economic activity. 2. The defendant is also directly liable for this infringement of corporate personality. It cannot invoke the limitation of liability under Art. 6 of the DSA. This is because the defendant exercises “control” over the content at issue here within the meaning of Article 14 of Directive 2000/31/EC (E-Commerce Directive) and Article 6 of the DSA, which precludes the application of the liability exemption. To determine whether the operator of a service may be exempted from liability for the stored content under Article 14(1) of the E-Commerce Directive, it must be examined whether the operator’s role is neutral, that is, whether its conduct is purely technical, automatic, and passive—meaning it has no knowledge of or control over the content it stores—or whether, on the contrary, the provider plays an active role that enables it to acquire knowledge of or control over that content.

In light of Recital 42 of the E-Commerce Directive, these two conditions of knowledge and control are to be understood as alternative and mutually independent requirements. Consequently, the operator of an information society service who controls the stored information is excluded from the privilege under Article 14(1) of the E-Commerce Directive, even if he does not become aware of this information due to the automation of its processing (CJEU, NJW 2026, 2311, para. 109 et seq. – Webgroup and Coyote, with further references). Such control over the stored information may be exercised, among other things, by means of an algorithm. As long as the operator has predetermined, by means of this algorithm, the conditions for the dissemination or non-dissemination of such information, it is irrelevant that the operator does not itself take any additional actions that promote, modify, or delete the dissemination of stored information (see CJEU, NJW 2026, 2311, para. 111 – Webgroup and Coyote, with further references).

In this context, control is to be presumed in particular if the algorithm used goes beyond mere categorization and indexing of the information and, in the interest of the operator or its service, determines under what conditions, in what manner, and in what order this information is disseminated or not. If the operator exercises this Art of control, the service it offers cannot be classified as an “information society service consisting in the storage of information provided by a user,” within the meaning of Art. 14(1) of the E-Commerce Directive (see CJEU, NJW 2026, 2311, para. 112 – Webgroup and Coyote, with further references). This decision is applicable to Art. 6 of the DSA (see Mantz, NJW 2026, 2535, para. 20), which stands to reason, since Article 14(1) of the E-Commerce Directive is the predecessor provision to Article 6 of the DSA (see OLG Frankfurt a.M., MMR 2025, 898, 901). In application of these principles, the defendant exercises control over the content at issue.

The CJEU—as it itself notes in Webgroup and Coyote (see CJEU, NJW 2026, 2311, para. 109 – Webgroup and Coyote) – already emphasized the element of control in the YouTube and Cyando decision (CJEU NJW 2021, 2571, para. 106 – YouTube and Cyando) that the element of control is central to the liability exemption under Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive. In this regard, the CJEU’s decision does not represent a break with the previous development of liability, e.g., in the case law of the Federal Court of Justice (BGH). This is because the liability of service providers has, in the past, been developed primarily with regard to service providers who—unlike the defendant in this case—did not algorithmically intervene in the display of content and, in that sense, did not exercise control, e.g., file-hosting services (see BGH, GRUR 2013, 1030 – File-Hosting-Dienst; BGH, GRUR 2013, 370 – Alone in the Dark), on auction platforms (BGH, GRUR 2004, 860 – Internet Auction I), or—as in the case of search engines (see CJEU, GRUR 2010, 445 – Google)— —have primarily indexed and categorized data to facilitate discoverability (see CJEU, NJW 2026, 2311, para. 112 – Webgroup and Coyote).

Since then, the business models of service providers under review have fundamentally changed; they now rely more heavily on advertising and interaction and use algorithms to strongly retain users on their own platforms. The use of such algorithms thus serves, in particular, the service provider’s own economic interests (see CJEU, NJW 2026, 2311, para. 112 – Webgroup and Coyote). Nor does the CJEU’s interpretation generally exclude social media services from the liability exemption. This is because, according to the CJEU’s case law, “control” is exercised only through algorithmic models that, based on criteria established by the service provider, make a decision on which information is displayed to which User. In contrast, there are still service providers that essentially leave the selection of displayed content up to their Users. This applies to traditional online forums, but is likely also true for purely chronological user feeds—such as those originally used by Twitter and, today, by services like Mastodon or BlueSky—where users make a decision about which other users to follow and then see those users’ posts in chronological order.

However, the CJEU has expressly held that knowledge and control are two independent elements, each of which is capable in itself of precluding the liability exemption. The same applies to the defendant’s view that the CJEU linked control solely to whether the service provider makes a decision “whether” to disseminate information. This is already contradicted by para. 112 of the Webgroup and Coyote decision, in which the CJEU does not focus on the “whether,” but rather on “under what conditions, in what manner, and in what order this information is disseminated or not” (CJEU, NJW 2026, 2311, para. 112—Webgroup and Coyote). Furthermore, as outlined above, the defendant also makes a decision regarding “whether.” In the Chamber’s view, this should not be understood as purely binary in the sense of deciding whether a piece of information is displayed at all—that is, to anyone—or not. Rather, the defendant uses its algorithms to determine to whom information is displayed—that is, it decides the “whether” with respect to individual Users.

However, even if the defendant could invoke Art. 6 of the DSA, it would be liable as an indirect infringer, since, in any case, with regard to the content submitted as Exhibits K22 and K29, it has failed to fulfill its obligation to act promptly upon becoming aware of or having knowledge of unlawful content or activities in order to block access to the unlawful content or to remove it. Under Article 6(1) of the DSA, a service provider is not liable for information stored on behalf of a user when providing an information society service consisting of the storage of information provided by a user, provided that the service provider a) has no actual knowledge of any unlawful activity or unlawful content and, with respect to claims for damages, is also unaware of any facts or circumstances from which an unlawful activity or unlawful content is clearly apparent, or b) as soon as it gains such knowledge or awareness, acts promptly to block access to the unlawful content or to remove it.

Even under the DSA, the provider of a social media service may be obligated, as an indirect contributor to the infringement, to refrain—after the affected party has lodged a complaint with the provider in an appropriate manner—from allowing a user to continue operating such “fake accounts.” Based on such an obligation to refrain from certain actions, the relevant social media enterprise may then be required not only to promptly block or remove the profiles or accounts complained of by the affected party in accordance with Article 6(b) of the DSA. Rather, this obligation—without requiring a further prior complaint from the affected party—also applies to future fake accounts disseminated via the social media service in question under a different web address that are identical or at least substantially similar (Munich Higher Regional Court, judgment of Jan. 20, 2026 – 18 U 2360/25, GRUR-Prax 2026, 224 – Fake Profile; see also Frankfurt am Main Higher Regional Court, MMR 2025, 898; Higher Regional Court of Nuremberg, MMR 2025, 147, para. 19). a. These requirements are met in this case.

The nature and scope of the required information depend on the state of the art and the technology used by the service provider to block the content. The rights holder must therefore generally provide all information necessary for the technical identification of a work by the service provider’s filtering software. In the absence of other established standards, this will generally be a reference file from which the service provider can extract the necessary information. If the rights holder provides no information, insufficient information, or information in unsuitable file formats, the obligation to block is limited to the content that the service provider can technically block using the information available to it. This is because, as a general rule, it is unreasonable to expect the service provider to independently assess the legality of content; the unlawfulness of an upload must therefore be readily apparent from the information provided by the rights holders and must not require any further assessment of its context (CJEU, GRUR 2022, 820, para. 90 – Poland v. Parliament and Council).

Furthermore, the information regarding the content to be blocked must be sufficiently specific to enable the service provider to block the content using “automated techniques and means” (CJEU, GRUR 2019, 1208, para. 45 et seq. – Glawischnig-Piesczek; see Dreier/Schulze/Raue, UrhG, 8th ed. 2025, § 7 UrhDaG, para. 18, with further references). Plaintiff No. 1 has fulfilled these requirements—and even the stricter requirements of the UrhDaG—by submitting reference files, stating that she herself does not place advertisements on the platform, and demonstrating that all profiles or posts contain images of Plaintiff No. 2 as well as the “F” label, are not profiles or posts authorized by her. First, in the lawsuit against the Defendant, Plaintiff No. 1 had previously submitted reference images to the Defendant (Exhibit K7) and reported over 200 violations (see Exhibit K18). To the extent that the defendant argues that the reported violations are not identifiable from the overview (Exhibit K18), its denial to that effect is unsubstantiated.

In the overview, each violation is identified by date, time, the report ID assigned by the defendant, type of content (e.g., “Profile” or “Ad”), and the description of the infringed right (e.g., “Impersonation” or “Trademark”). The reports previously submitted to the defendant are therefore readily traceable by the defendant. Furthermore, Plaintiff No. 1 explicitly informed the defendant in a letter dated October 1, 2024, under what circumstances and when which information is used that a fake profile or fake posts should be assumed. Based on these reports, it was clear to the defendant that the matters at issue constituted further infringements in the form of fake profiles using the trademark of Plaintiff No. 1). Furthermore, the information provided by Plaintiff No. 1 was formulated in such a way that, due to the almost algorithmic description of infringement cases, it readily enabled the Defendant to technically implement this description and thereby automatically detect potential further infringements. b. Ultimately, the question of whether the plaintiffs’ reports met the requirements of Art. 16(2) of the DSA was irrelevant.

In this regard, the defendant correctly points out that the injured party is required, inter alia, under Article 16(2), para. 2, subparagraph (b) of the DSA, to provide a clear indication of the exact electronic location of this information, such as the precise URL address or addresses, or, where necessary, additional information relevant to the Art of the content and the specific type of hosting service, in order to enable the service provider to verify the unlawful content. In the present case, however, it remains undisputed that the defendant deleted the relevant posts and profiles in response to multiple notices. It is therefore also established that the defendant was aware of the posts in question. Pursuant to Article 16(3) of the DSA, reports that meet the requirements of Article 16 of the DSA result in a presumption, for the purposes of Article 6 of the DSA, of actual knowledge or awareness regarding the specific piece of information in question, if they enable a hosting service provider acting with due diligence to determine, without an in-depth legal review, that the relevant activity or information is unlawful.

Since the reports “give rise to” a presumption of knowledge within the meaning of Article 6(1) of the DSA, it does not follow, by implication, that the service provider’s knowledge depends on the requirements being met. Pursuant to Art. 6(1) DSA, the service provider is not liable if, among other things, it has “no actual knowledge” of the unlawful content. How the service provider acquires this knowledge is irrelevant in this regard. For the obligation under Article 6(1)(b) of the DSA to apply, any form of acquiring such knowledge is sufficient (Hofmann/Raue/F. Hofmann, DSA, 2023, Art. 6, para. 53; Janal, GRUR 2022, 211, 218). Since the defendant was made aware of a large number of infringements and had evidently also located and deleted them, it was incumbent upon the defendant—who bore the burden of presentation and proof regarding the prerequisite for the liability exemption under Article 6(1) of the DSA— specify when it became aware of the infringements and what measures it subsequently took and when, thereby demonstrating that it acted “promptly” within the meaning of Art. 6(1)(b) of the DSA.

The defendant failed to do so with respect to the exemplary infringements at issue here (Exhibits K22, K24, K28, K29, and K33). c. However, even if the timing of the reports submitted by Plaintiff No. 1 were taken into account in this specific case, the Defendant would in any event have failed to delete two of the contested posts in a timely manner. According to the undisputed report on May 30, 2025, regarding the unlawful content shown in Exhibit K22 (A Profile “[Plaintiff No. 2]” containing the company identifier / graphic element of Plaintiff No. 1’s trademark) 20 days later. The plaintiff reported the unlawful content shown in Exhibit K29 (A profile “...” containing images of Plaintiff 2) to the defendant on June 5, 2025, as evident from Exhibits K27 and K29. The deletion period was 14 days. In any event, even in these two specific cases, the defendant did not enter into every reasonable effort to block the content in question.

A deletion period of 14 or 20 days in the case of such clear violations no longer constitutes prompt action. III. Plaintiff No. 1 is also entitled to the injunctive relief asserted in Suit 1c) under Section 15(4) of the German Trademark Act (MarkenG) due to infringement of Plaintiff No. 1’s business identifier “F.” Under Section 15(2) of the German Trademark Act (MarkenG), third parties are prohibited from using the business designation in commercial transactions without authorization in a manner likely to cause confusion with the protected designation. As with trademarks, the degree of similarity between the signs in terms of sound, visual appearance (including typography), and meaning or connotation must also be determined in the case of business designations (BGH, GRUR 2008, 803, para. 21 – HEITEC; Ingerl/Rohnke/Nordemann/Bröcker, MarkenG, 4th ed. 2023, § 15, para. 87). Where a business identifier is the earlier right, the likelihood of confusion must be assessed by taking into account all relevant circumstances of the individual case (BGH, GRUR 2016, 705, para. 23 – ConText; Ingerl/Rohnke/Nordemann/Bröcker, loc. cit., § 15, n. 70 with further references).

Factors to be considered here include the similarity of the signs, the distinctiveness of the protected designation, and the economic distance between the parties’ respective fields of activity (so-called “industry proximity”), whereby these factors interact with one another in such a way that a higher degree of one factor may lead to a finding of likelihood of confusion even if another factor is present to a lesser degree (see BGH, GRUR 2016, 705, para. 23 – ConText; Ingerl/Rohnke/Nordemann/Bröcker, op. cit., § 15, para. 71, with further references). Plaintiff No. 1 is the owner of the business identifier “F” pursuant to § 5(2) of the German Trademark Act (MarkenG). The defendant did not dispute this until the conclusion of the oral hearing. Plaintiff No. 1 also argued, uncontested until the conclusion of the oral proceedings, that her business identifier was used in the posts she objected to—in which the business identifier “F” was used in this form or in a slightly modified form— what was used by third parties without the consent of Plaintiff No. 1, specifically for identical services offered by Plaintiff No. 1.

The signs are identical or highly similar. Although the distinctiveness of the business mark “F” may initially be considered somewhat below average, as it has strongly descriptive connotations for the service “information in the field of finance,” However, due to its widespread use in the relevant market, it has attained at least average distinctiveness, so that, given the identity of the services and the identity of the marks or a high degree of similarity between them, a likelihood of confusion must be assumed overall. The defendant is also directly liable for these infringements, as it cannot invoke the limitation of liability under Art. 6 DSA. Reference is made to the above statements. However, even if the defendant could invoke this provision, it would have violated its duty to investigate. This is because Plaintiff No. 1 had already reported similar infringements to the defendant on multiple previous occasions (see Exhibit K18, “Trademark”) and had again pointed out such infringements in a letter dated October 1, 2024.

The infringement was apparent from the posts even without a detailed review. Nevertheless, the defendant did not delete the post shown in Exhibit K29 until 14 days later and thus, at least in this case, failed to act promptly. Therefore, the issue of whether the defendant had infringed the trademark rights of Plaintiff 1)—on which the plaintiff bases its claim in the alternative—was no longer relevant. IV. Plaintiff No. 2 has a claim for injunctive relief against the defendant for infringement of his right of personality under §§ 1004(1) BGB by analogy, 823 para 1, 2 BGB in conjunction with §§ 22, 23 KUG (Claim 2.a) A social media profile or account that, without the consent of the person concerned, falsely represents—by using that person’s name and/or photos depicting them— that it is a profile or account belonging to the data subject, may infringe upon the data subject’s personality rights, name rights, and right to one’s own image (OLG Munich, Judgment of Jan. 20, 2026 – 18 U 2360/25, GRUR-RS 2026, 241).

The permissibility of publishing images must be assessed in accordance with the graduated protection concept set forth in Sections 22 and 23 of the German Artistic Copyright Act (KUG) (Federal Court of Justice [BGH], GRUR 2007, 527 – Winterurlaub; BGH, GRUR 2019, 866, para. 8 – A Mother for the Orphan; each with further references). Accordingly, images of a person may, as a general rule, be disseminated only with that person’s consent (Section 22, sentence 1, KUG). However, pursuant to Section 23(1)(1) KUG, an exception applies if the images pertain to contemporary history. This exception, however, does not apply to dissemination that infringes upon the legitimate interests of the person depicted pursuant to § 23(2) KUG (Federal Court of Justice [BGH], GRUR 2013, 1065, para. 10 – Ice Princess Alexandra). All of the contested profiles and posts (Exhibits K22, K24, K26, K28 through K31, and K33) indisputably contain images of Plaintiff No. 2.

Nor are these images from the field of contemporary history. Plaintiff No. 2 has also not given consent to the dissemination of these images. None of this is in dispute between the parties. The dissemination of these images constitutes an unlawful infringement of Plaintiff No. 2’s right of publicity. The defendant is also directly liable for these violations and cannot invoke the limited liability provision of Art. 6 of the DSA. Even if it could invoke the liability exemption under Article 6 of the DSA, it failed to delete the content from the profiles in a timely manner based on the reports submitted in 2024 and the letter dated October 1, 2024. Reference is made to the above statements. Even if the timing of the reports regarding the individual posts at issue were taken into account, the plaintiff would not have promptly deleted the content in question in accordance with Exhibit K 22 (deletion period: 20 days), Exhibit K 29 (deletion period: 14 days), and Annex K30 (deletion period: 62 days).

The present case involves an unauthorized assumption of a name. Such a case requires that a third party use the same name without authorization, thereby causing confusion as to attribution and infringing upon the name holder’s interests worthy of protection (BGH, GRUR 2016, 1093, para. 13 – grit-lehmann.de, with further references). These requirements are met. 1. The plaintiff is the bearer of the civil name [Plaintiff No. 2]. This is not in dispute between the parties. The name is also used by users of the defendant’s “A” platform (see Exhibits K22, K26). 2. The use of a name is authorized within the meaning of § 12, sentence 1, BGB if the user has independent rights to that name. In addition, the bearer of a name may authorize another person to use that name, although such authorization may be limited to a specific purpose and is not permissible without restriction (BGH, GRUR 2016, 1093, para. 17 – grit-lehmann.de, with further references).

Conversely, confusion regarding attribution in the broader sense exists when the user modifies the name, but the public assumes that organizational, familial, or other connections exist between the two bearers of the name (see BeckOGK/Niebel, Aug. 1, 2023, § 12 BGB, para. 158 et seq., with further references). In the present case, there is confusion regarding attribution in the narrower sense. Due to the identical name, the public assumes that the profiles at issue are those of Plaintiff No. 2). 4. The unauthorized use of the name also infringes upon the legitimate interests of Plaintiff No. 2). Neither the respective Users acting with fraudulent intent nor the Defendant have any interest worthy of consideration in using the Plaintiff’s name without his consent. 5. The defendant is also directly liable for these violations and cannot invoke the limited liability provision of Art. 6 of the DSA.

Even if it could invoke the liability exemption under Article 6 of the DSA, it would not have deleted the content from the profiles in a timely manner based on the reports filed in 2024 and the letter dated October 1, 2024. Reference is made to the above statements. Even if the timing of the reports regarding the individual posts at issue were taken as the basis, the plaintiff would not have deleted the content in a timely manner pursuant to Exhibit K 22 (deletion period: 20 days) and Exhibit K 26 (deletion period: 14 days), the plaintiff would not have deleted the content promptly within the meaning of Art. 6 DSA. Reference is made to the above statements. 6. The data protection claims further asserted by the plaintiff in support of his lawsuit Claim 2.b) were therefore no longer relevant. These are not rights within the meaning of the BGH’s TÜV case law described above. Rather, the subject matter of the dispute consists of the same claim and the same facts, which the second plaintiff merely substantiates with different legal bases.

This applies in the present case even if one were to assume that a claim under the GDPR and a national claim constitute different subjects of dispute. This is because Plaintiff No. 2 cannot invoke a claim for injunctive relief derived directly from the GDPR. This is because Article 17(1) of the GDPR itself does not constitute a legal basis for a claim for injunctive relief. However, it does not preclude a corresponding national claim for injunctive relief (see CJEU, NJW 2025, 3137, para. 52 – IP/Quirin Privatbank AG). In the event of a violation of Article 6 of the GDPR, claims for injunctive relief may therefore arise under Section 1004(1), second sentence, § 823(1) of the German Civil Code (BGB) in conjunction with Art. 1(1) and Art. 2(1) of the German Basic Law (GG) for infringement of the general right of personality, or, by analogy, pursuant to § 1004(1), second sentence, § 823(2) of the German Civil Code (BGB) in conjunction with Art. 6 of the GDPR (see Federal Court of Justice (BGH), judgment of June 23, 2026 – VI ZR 97/22, GRUR-RS 2026, 16576, para. 26—accidental sending of a messaging message during the job application process; see also Regional Court of Frankfurt am Main, ZD 2021, 46).

Consequently, Plaintiff No. 2 bases his claim solely on two legal grounds for a single infringement of his general right of personality: first, the infringement resulting from the use of personal data in the form of his name, and second, the infringement resulting from the use of his name. However, the right to one’s name under § 12 BGB constitutes merely a specific manifestation of the general right of personality (see BGH, NJW 2000, 2196, 2197 – Marlene Dietrich; Korte/Mensching, PresseR, 3rd ed. 2026, § 2, para. 270). VI. The risk of repetition required for the respective claims for injunctive relief is present in each case. As a general rule, the initial infringement indicates a risk of repetition (established case law of the BGH, GRUR 1997, 379, 380 – Wegfall der Wiederholungsgefahr II). Generally, the risk of repetition can be rebutted by submitting a cease-and-desist declaration subject to a penalty clause; however, the defendant refused to do so.

Since the defendant is liable as the perpetrator and not merely as an interferer, a claim for damages is also not precluded. IX. Plaintiff No. 2) is further entitled to a declaration, as sought in lawsuit 4.b), of a right to compensation under § 823(1) of the German Civil Code (BGB) in conjunction with Art. 2(1) of the German Basic Law (GG), Art. 1(1) of the Basic Law, Sections 22 and 23 of the Artistic Freedom Act (KUG), and Section 249(1) of the German Civil Code (BGB). A culpable violation of the general right of personality gives rise to a claim for monetary compensation if the infringement is serious and the harm cannot be satisfactorily remedied in any other way. Whether a violation of the right of personality is so serious as to require the payment of monetary compensation can only be assessed on the basis of the totality of the circumstances of the individual case. In this regard, particular consideration must be given to the significance and scope of the infringement—that is, the extent of the publication’s dissemination, the lasting nature and duration of the harm to the injured party’s interests or reputation—as well as the perpetrator’s motive and the degree of his or her fault (BGH, NJW 2014, 2029, 2034, para. 38, with further references).

The award of monetary compensation in the case of a serious infringement of personality rights is objectively justified by the notion that, without such a claim, violations of human dignity and honor would often go unpunished, with the result that legal protection of personality rights would be undermined (see BGH, judgment of May 24, 2016 – VI ZR 496/15, BeckRS 2016, 11843, para. 9, with further references). Monetary compensation for an infringement of the general right of personality serves, on the one hand, to provide satisfaction to the victim and, on the other hand, to act as a deterrent (BGH, NJW 1996, 985, 987 – the principle of cumulation). However, in the context of this balancing test, the right to freedom of expression (Art. 5 GG) must also be taken into account. As a general rule, the claim is granted only when the very foundation of one’s personality is compromised—for example, in cases of serious intrusions into one’s intimate and privacy sphere, false allegations of particular significance to one’s personality, or serious public defamation (OLG Cologne, Judgement of July 30, 2020 – 15 U 313/19, GRUR-RS 2020, 56319, para. 26).

Of the total value in dispute, lawsuits 1.a) through 2.b) each account for a value in dispute of EUR 50,000.00, claim 3 accounts for a value in dispute of EUR 10,000.00, and claims 4.a) and 4.b) each account for a value in dispute of EUR 20,000.00. For better readability, typos have been corrected and formatting adjusted where necessary. Meta 2-06 O 234/25 September 16, 2026 Frankfurt am Main Regional Court, 6th Civil Chamber Judgement Subject Area: O § 7 UrhDaG, § 97 UrhG, § 14 MarkenG, §§ 22, 23 KunstUrhG, Art. 6 DSA Suggested citation: Regional Court of Frankfurt am Main, Judgement of September 16, 2026, Case No. 2-06 O 234/25 (REWIS RS 2026, 8634) Print references: REWIS RS 2026, 8634