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Judgment · Federal Administrative Court

The data subject sent an access request to the service provider (the processor)

decided Jul 8, 2026W254 2314468-1ECLI:AT:BVWG:2026:W254.2314468.1.00gdprhub.eu ↗

Holding

First, the court distinguished between a controller and a processor by focusing on who actually decided the purposes and essential means of the processing. A processor could not freely determine those elements because it processed personal data on behalf of the controller. Second, the court found that the processor had been commissioned by N-GmbH to handle payment processing, including payment reminders and the handling of legal cases. The payment demands and reminder sent to the data subject therefore formed part of the tasks assigned to the processor and were covered by the processing agreement. The court found no evidence that it had exceeded the authority given to it under that agreement. The court therefore concluded that N-GmbH, as controller, was responsible for responding to the data subject's access request and the processor did not have a separate obligation to provide the requested information beyond its processor role. The court upheld the DPA's decision and dismissed the data subject's complaint as unfounded.

From GDPRhub’s case note — a summary of the decision, not its own words.

Full text

13 paragraphs
Heading: parties, composition and procedure

Date of Decision July 8, 2026 Legal Provision B-VG Art. 133, para. 4 GDPR Art. 15 GDPR Art. 28 GDPR Art. 28, para. 3 GDPR Art. 29 GDPR Art. 4(7) GDPR Art. 4(8) B-VG Art. 133 (current version); B-VG Art. 133 effective from January 1, 2019, through May 24, 2018; last amended by Federal Law Gazette I No. 138/2017 Federal Constitutional Law (B-VG) Art. 133 effective as of January 1, 2019, last amended by Federal Law Gazette (BGBl.) I No. 22/2018 Federal Constitutional Law (B-VG) Art. 133 effective from May 25,May 2018 through December 31, 2018; last amended by Federal Law Gazette I No. 22/2018; B-VG Art. 133; effective from August 1, 2014, through May 24,2018, last amended by Federal Law Gazette I No. 164/2013, Art. 133 of the Federal Constitutional Law (B-VG), effective from Jan. 1, 2014, through July 31, 2014, last amended by Federal Law Gazette I No. 51/2012 Federal Constitutional Law (B-VG) Art. 133, effective from January 1, 2004, through December 31, 2013, last amended by Federal Law Gazette I No. 100/2003 B-VG Art. 133 effective from Jan. 1, 1975, through Dec. 31, 2003, last amended by Federal Law Gazette No. 444/1974 B-VG Art. 133, effective from December 25, 1946, through December 31, 1974; last amended by Federal Law Gazette No. 211/1946 B-VG Art. 133, effective from December 19,12, 1945, through December 24, 1946; last amended by State Law Gazette No. 4/1945; B-VG Art. 133; in effect from January 3, 1930, through June 30, 1934 Decision , W254 2314468-1/15E IN THE NAME OF THE REPUBLIC! The Federal Administrative Court, presided over by Judge Dr. Tatjana CARDONA and with expert lay judge Mag. Viktoria HAIDIGER and the expert lay judge Mag. Thomas GSCHAAR as associate judges: ruled on the complaint filed by XXXX against the decision of the Data Protection Authority dated April 16, 2025, Ref. No. D124.1162/23, 2025-0.250.396, (intervening party: XXXX, represented by Baker McKenzie Rechtsanwälte LLP & Co KG) concerning a data protection matter, and has lawfully ruled as follows in a closed session:The Federal Administrative Court, with Judge Dr. Tatjana CARDONA presiding, along with lay judges Mag. Viktoria HAIDIGER and Mag. Thomas GSCHAAR serving as associate judges:on the complaint filed by Roman numeral 40 against the decision of the Data Protection Authority dated April 16, 2025, Ref. No. D124.1162/23, 2025-0.250.396, (co-party: Roman 40, represented by Baker McKenzie Rechtsanwälte LLP & Co KG) concerning a data protection matter, in a closed session: A) The complaint is dismissed as unfounded. B) The appeal is not admissible pursuant to Article 133, paragraph 4, B-VG. The appeal is not admissible pursuant to Article 133, paragraph 4, B-VG. Text Reasons for the Decision: I. Course of Proceedings: I. Course of Proceedings:

1

In the data protection complaint at issue dated February 26, 2023, the complainant alleged a violation of the right of access under Article 15 of the GDPR by the party now joined in the proceedings, an energy supplier. 1 In the data protection complaint at issue dated February 26, 2023, the complainant alleged a violation of the right of access under article 15 of the GDPR by the party now joined in the proceedings, an energy supplier. The complainant also requested the initiation of an ex officio investigation and administrative penalty proceedings against the co-respondent and filed a motion to join the proceedings as a private party, offering a lump-sum payment of EUR 15,000.00. 2 By decision of the respondent authority dated December 14, 2023, the complainant’s data protection complaint was dismissed as unfounded (Decision Point 1) and the complainant’s motions to initiate an ex officio investigation and administrative penalty proceedings against the co-party, to determine compensation for the damage he had suffered, and to award him damages were rejected (Points 2–4 of the decision). 3 The complainant filed an appeal against this decision with the Federal Administrative Court pursuant to Art. 130(1)(1) of the Federal Constitutional Law (B-VG), in which he argued that the processing activities carried out by the co-party (engaging a debt collection agency and a lawyer to file a civil lawsuit, and conducting proceedings before the civil court) had not been taken into account by the responding authority, nor had any findings been made in this regard. 3 The complainant filed an appeal against this decision pursuant to Article 130, paragraph 1, subparagraph 1, of the Federal Constitutional Law (B-VG) with the Federal Administrative Court, in which it was argued that the processing activities carried out by the co-party (commissioning a debt collection agency and a lawyer to file a civil lawsuit and conduct proceedings before the civil court) had not been taken into account by the respondent authority, nor had any findings been made in this regard. 4 In its decision of January 7, 2025, Ref. No. W108 2286042-1/10E, the Federal Administrative Court set aside the contested decision with respect to point 1 and remanded the matter to the respondent authority for the issuance of a new decision. The complaint against points 2 through 4 was dismissed as unfounded. In its reasoning, the Federal Administrative Court essentially stated that the respondent authority had failed to conduct any appropriate investigation into the data processing activities alleged by the complainant—namely, those carried out by the co-party through the engagement of a debt collection agency and a lawyer to file a civil lawsuit against the complainant and conduct proceedings before the civil court. No investigative steps were taken to determine whether the data processing activities pointed out by the complainant had taken place within the scope of the data processing agreement between the co-party and N-GmbH or were covered by it. 5 In the decision of April 16, 2025, which is the subject of this appeal, the respondent authority (once again) dismissed the complainant’s data protection complaint as unfounded. The respondent authority determined that the co-party and N-GmbH belong to the same group of undertakings. In a letter dated February 20, 2022, the complainant submitted a—cited—access request to the co-party, and the co-party responded with the—cited letter dated March 10, 2022, that, as the controller, it had not stored any data regarding the complainant and further informed him that it was acting as a service provider on behalf of N-GmbH and, in this capacity, was acting as a data processor. In 2020 and 2021, the complainant was sent payment demands from a collection agency on which the co-party appeared as the client. Furthermore, in 2020 and 2024, the complainant received demand letters from a law firm acting on behalf of the co-party as its client. A civil lawsuit filed by the co-party, represented by another law firm, against the complainant seeking payment of a specified amount was dismissed by the Court for lack of standing, as no contractual relationship existed between the complainant and the co-party. The co-party had entered into a data processing agreement with N-GmbH—excerpts of which were cited—based on a framework service agreement—excerpts of which were also cited. There is no contractual relationship between the complainant and the co-respondent, and the complainant is not a customer of the co-respondent nor has he made use of any services provided by the co-respondent. From a legal perspective, the respondent authority essentially argued that, pursuant to the data processing agreement with N-GmbH, the co-respondent was tasked, among other things, with processing personal data in connection with payment and collection procedures. It is quite common to commission collection agencies to perform the agreed-upon services, which is why it is not implausible that the co-respondent acts in this regard as a data processor for N-GmbH, the data controller. There is no contractual relationship between the co-respondent and the complainant, nor has the complainant alleged that he had utilized any other services provided by the co-respondent. Consequently, the co-respondent should not be classified as a controller within the meaning of the GDPR, and no obligation to provide information—beyond the provision of a negative credit report—should be assumed. The complaint should therefore be dismissed. 6 In the 38-page complaint filed on May 20, 2025, the complainant essentially argues that the co-party acted in its own name and thus as a controller rather than as a data processor. In its statement dated July 21, 2025, the co-party explained that, as a service provider for N-GmbH’s payment transactions, it was merely the company’s processor. Since the co-party did not process the complainant’s personal data as a controller, the negative response dated March 10, 2022, did not constitute a violation of Article 15 of the GDPR. The fact that XXXX Law Firm, LLC had erroneously filed a lawsuit against the complainant on behalf of the co-respondent did not alter the fact that the co-respondent was merely a processor and not a controller with respect to the complainant’s personal data in question. In a statement dated July 21, 2025, the co-party explained that, as a service provider for N-GmbH’s payment transactions, it was merely the latter’s processor. Since the co-respondent did not process the complainant’s personal data in its capacity as a controller, the negative response dated March 10, 2022, did not constitute a violation of article 15 of the GDPR. The fact that the law firm Römisch 40 Rechtsanwaltskanzlei GmbH had erroneously filed a lawsuit against the complainant on behalf of the co-respondent does not alter the fact that the co-respondent was merely a processor and not the controller with respect to the complainant’s personal data at issue. II. The Federal Administrative Court considered: Roman numeral two. The Federal Administrative Court considered: 1 Findings:

applies Art. 15

1.1

Regarding the timeliness of the complaint: The complainant was notified in writing on April 18, 2025, that the decision had been filed. The start of the period for picking up the decision was specified as April 22, 2025. The complaint was filed on May 20, 2025.

1.2

On the merits: The complainant submitted a request for information to the respondent [co-party], to which the respondent replied by letter dated March 10, 2022, as follows (formatting not reproduced exactly; excerpts provided as relevant to the proceedings): The co-party may, in principle, act as an independent controller. It is a data processor for N-GmbH (formatting not reproduced exactly; excerpts provided where relevant to the proceedings): The purpose of this engagement is to perform the tasks arising from the service agreement. As part of these assigned tasks, payment demands were sent by a debt collection enterprise in 2020 and 2021. The co-party is listed as the client. A pre-litigation demand was sent by a law firm (Anwälte GmbH) on behalf of the co-party’s clients. A lawsuit filed by the co-party against the complainant was dismissed by the Labor Court (BG) in Neusiedl am See on the grounds of lack of standing to sue and the assertion that no contractual relationship existed. These activities are carried out on the basis of the service agreement and data processing agreement concluded between the co-party and N-GmbH. The complainant is not a customer of the co-party. The complainant and the co-party are not in a contractual relationship. The co-party does not make the decision on the purposes and means of data processing but merely acts on behalf of and in accordance with the instructions of N-GmbH.

2

Assessment of Evidence:

2.1

The findings regarding the timeliness of the complaint are based on the proof of delivery provided by the DPA (OZ 8) and the complaint on file dated May 20, 2025. The other findings are based on the administrative and court records. The fact that the co-party acts solely on behalf of the principal is evident from the submitted service agreement and data processing agreement. Furthermore, it is also clear from the judgement of the Neusiedl District Court that no contractual relationship exists between the co-party and the complainant. The findings are essentially undisputed. Ultimately, the issue at hand is whether the demand for payment and the reminder sent on behalf of the co-party result in the co-party becoming the controller (see, however, the legal assessment below). However, the co-respondent’s assertion in its statement must be accepted, namely that these letters were erroneously issued in its own name, as the co-respondent assumes that it is acting as a processor. Re A)

3.1

Timeliness of the complaint: Documents deposited are deemed served on the first day of the pickup period pursuant to para 17(3) of the Service of Process Act. The pickup period for the deposited document began on April 22, 2025. The four-week period for filing a complaint therefore ended on May 20, 2025. Since the complaint was filed on May 20, 2025, it is deemed to have been filed in a timely manner. Documents placed on file are deemed to have been served on the first day of the pickup period pursuant to paragraph 17(3) of the Service of Process Act. The pickup period for the document placed on file began on April 22, 2025. The four-week deadline for filing a complaint therefore ended on May 20, 2025. Since the complaint was filed on May 20, 2025, it is deemed to have been filed in a timely manner.

3.2

Legal Basis Art. 4 – GDPR – DefinitionsArticle 4 – GDPR – Definitions For the purposes of this Regulation, the following terms shall have the following meanings: […] 7. “Controller” means the natural or legal person, public authority, agency, or other body that, alone or jointly with others, makes the decision on the purposes and means of the processing of personal data; if the purposes and means of such processing are determined by Union law or the law of the Member States, the controller or the specific criteria for its designation may be provided for by Union law or the law of the Member States; 8. “Processor” means a natural or legal person, public authority, agency, or other body that performs personal data processing on behalf of the controller; Art. 28 – GDPR – Processor Article 28 – GDPR – Processor (1) Where processing is carried out on behalf of a controller, the controller shall engage only processors providing sufficient guarantees that appropriate technical and organizational measures will be implemented to ensure that the processing is carried out in accordance with the requirements of this Regulation and ensures the protection of the data subject’s rights. (2) The processor shall not engage another processor without the prior specific or general written authorization of the controller. In the case of general written authorization, the processor shall always inform the controller of any intended change regarding the engagement or replacement of other processors, thereby giving the controller the opportunity to object to such changes. (3) Processing by a processor shall be based on a contract or other legal instrument under Union law or the law of the Member States that is binding on the processor with respect to the controller and that specifies the subject matter and duration of the processing, the nature and purpose of the processing, the nature of the personal data, the categories of data subjects, and the obligations and rights of the controller. That contract or other legal instrument shall, in particular, provide that the processor (a) processes the personal data only on documented instructions from the controller—including with respect to the transfer of personal data to a third country or an international organisation—unless required to do so by Union or Member State law to which the processor is subject; in such a case, the processor shall inform the controller of those legal requirements prior to processing, unless such notification is prohibited by the applicable law on grounds of an important public interest; (b) ensures that persons authorized to process personal data have committed to confidentiality or are subject to an appropriate statutory duty of confidentiality; (c) takes all measures required under article 32; (d) complies with the conditions set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4 regarding the use of the services of another processor; e) given the nature of the processing, assists the controller, to the extent possible, with appropriate technical and organizational measures in fulfilling its obligation to respond to requests to exercise the data subject’s rights referred to in Chapter III;e) given the Art of the processing, assists the controller, to the extent possible, with appropriate technical and organizational measures to enable the controller to fulfill its obligation to respond to requests for the exercise of the data subject’s rights referred to in Chapter III; f) taking into account the nature of the processing and the information available to it, assists the controller in complying with the obligations set forth in articles 32 through 36; g) upon completion of the provision of processing services, either erases or returns all personal data, at the controller’s discretion, unless there is an obligation under Union law or the law of the Member States for the storage of personal data; (h) provide the controller with all necessary information to demonstrate compliance with the obligations set forth in this article and facilitate and cooperate with audits—including inspections—conducted by the controller or another auditor commissioned by the controller; With regard to subparagraph 1(h), the processor shall inform the controller without delay if it considers that an instruction infringes this Regulation or other data protection provisions of the Union or the Member States. (4) If the processor engages the services of another processor to carry out specific processing activities on behalf of the controller, the same data protection obligations shall be imposed on that other processor by means of a contract or other legal instrument under Union law or the law of the relevant Member State, as set out in the contract or other legal instrument between the controller and the processor pursuant to paragraph 3, and in particular, sufficient safeguards must be provided to ensure that appropriate technical and organizational measures are implemented so that the processing is carried out in accordance with the requirements of this Regulation. If the subprocessor fails to fulfill its data protection obligations, the first processor shall be liable to the controller for the compliance of that subprocessor with its obligations. A processor’s compliance with approved codes of conduct pursuant to Article 40 or an approved certification mechanism pursuant to Article 42 may be taken into account as a factor in demonstrating sufficient safeguards within the meaning of paragraphs 1 and 4 of this article. (6) Without prejudice to any individual contract between the controller and the processor, the contract or other legal instrument referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this article may be based, in whole or in part, on the SCCs referred to in paragraphs 7 and 8 of this article, even if they form part of a certification granted to the controller or the processor pursuant to Articles 42 and 43 (7) The Commission may, in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 87(2), adopt SCCs to address the matters referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this article. (8) A supervisory authority may, in accordance with the consistency procedure referred to in Article 63, adopt SCCs to address the matters referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this article. (9) The contract or other legal instrument referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 shall be in writing, which may also be in electronic form. (10) Without prejudice to Articles 82, 83, and 84, a processor who, in violation of this Regulation, determines the purposes and means of processing shall be considered a controller with respect to such processing. Art. 29 – GDPR – Processing under the supervision of the controller or the processorArticle 29 – GDPR – Processing under the supervision of the controller or the processor The processor and any person acting under the authority of the controller or the processor who has access to personal data shall process such data only on instructions from the controller, unless required to do so by Union or Member State law.

applies Art. 43(7), Art. 4, Art. 28, Art. 29, Art. 32, Art. 40, Art. 42, Art. 63, Art. 82, Art. 83, Art. 84, Art. 87

3.3

On the Division of Roles Between the Controller and the Processor The terms “controller” and “processor” play a crucial role in the application of the General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR), as they make the decision on who is the controller responsible for compliance with the various data protection regulations and, in the present case, who is obligated to provide information. Article 28(3) of the GDPR provides that controllers may engage processors. The decision on whether to engage a processor rests solely with the controller, who is also responsible for carefully selecting the processor and entering into a contract with the processor that specifies certain terms. Article 28(3) of the GDPR provides that controllers may engage processors. The decision on whether to engage a processor rests solely with the controller, who is also responsible for carefully selecting the processor and entering into a contract with the processor that specifies certain terms. One acts as a processor only if the processing of personal data is carried out on behalf of a controller and the service provider does not itself make the decisions regarding the purposes and essential means of the processing. The decisive factor is therefore the division of roles: The processor acts for the benefit of another and at the direction of the controller. According to Article 28(3) of the GDPR, this requires a contractual or other legal relationship with the controller. One acts as a processor only if the processing of personal data is carried out on behalf of a controller and the service provider does not itself make the decisions regarding the purposes and essential means of the processing. The key factor is therefore the division of roles: The processor acts for the benefit of another and at the direction of the controller. This requires, pursuant to article 28(3) of the GDPR, a contractual or other legal relationship with the controller The term “instruction” within the meaning of Article 28(3)(a) of the GDPR and Article 29 of the GDPR encompasses “any order addressed to the addressee of the provision that relates to the subject matter and the manner of handling personal data […].” Whether the instruction is given in an individual case or through a general directive—e.g., through a code of conduct—is irrelevant, because “instructions may […] also be manifested, in particular, in process descriptions, flowcharts, works agreements, general service instructions, operational documentation, and manuals” (Martini in Paal/Pauly, General Data Protection Regulation, Art. 29, para. 18 with further references, see also Bertermann in Ehmann/Selmayr, GDPR, article 29, para. 4). The term “instruction” within the meaning of article 28(3)(a) of the GDPR and article 29, GDPR, “any instruction addressed to the addressees of the provision that relates to the subject matter and the Art of handling personal data […].” Whether the instruction was therefore issued in an individual case or through a general directive—e.g., through a code of conduct—is irrelevant, because “instructions may […] also be manifested, in particular, in process descriptions, flowcharts, works agreements, general service instructions, operational documentation, and manuals” (Martini in Paal/Pauly, General Data Protection Regulation, Article 29, para. 18 with further references; see also Bertermann in Ehmann/Selmayr, GDPR, Article 29, para. 4). The decisive factor for classification as a controller is who makes independent and self-responsible decisions regarding essential aspects of the means of processing; conversely, it follows that a processor is precisely not permitted to make free decisions on these essential elements.

applies Art. 28(3), Art. 28(3)(a), Art. 29

3.4

Against this background, the following applies to the present case:

3.4.1

First, it should be noted that, according to the established case law of the Administrative Court, the “subject matter” of the contested decision constitutes the outer limits of the Administrative Court’s authority to review (see VwGH Sept. 9, 2015, Ra 2015/04/0012). The “subject matter” of the appeal proceedings before the Administrative Court is thus—regardless of the scope of review prescribed by § 27 VwGVG—only that matter which constituted the content of the decision issued by the administrative authority against which the appeal was filed before the Administrative Court (see, for example, VwGH Dec. 17, 2014, Ra 2014/03/0049; VwGH Jan. 22, 2015, Ra 2014/06/0055; VwGH March 26, 2015, Ra 2014/07/0077). The Administrative Court must therefore decide (only) on the decision that was made by the administrative authority. 3.4.1 First, it should be noted that, according to the settled case law of the Administrative Court, the “subject matter” of the contested decision constitutes the outer limits of the Administrative Court’s power of review—see VwGH September 9, 2015, Ra 2015/04/0012). The “subject matter” of the appeal proceedings before the Administrative Court is thus—notwithstanding the scope of review prescribed by Section 27 of VwGVG—only those matters that constituted the content of the decision issued by the administrative authority against which the action was brought before the Administrative Court (see, for example, VwGH Dec. 17, 2014, Ra 2014/03/0049; VwGH Jan. 22, 2015, Ra 2014/06/0055; VwGH Mar. 26, 2015, Ra 2014/07/0077). The Administrative Court is therefore (only) required to rule on the matter that was the subject of a decision by the administrative authority. In the present case, the respondent authority, in the contested decision, ruled (merely) on the violation of the right to access information under Art. 15 of the GDPR asserted by the second complainant (see decision, p. 7). Consequently, in this specific case, the Federal Administrative Court—due to its power of review being limited to the “merits” of the appeal proceeding—is precluded from ruling on any additional alleged violations of Articles 5 and 6 of the GDPR; otherwise, its decision would be rendered unlawful due to lack of jurisdiction (see, most recently, Federal Administrative Court, June 25, 2024, Ra 2022/04/0167). In the present case, the respondent authority, in the contested decision, ruled (only) on the violation of the right of access under article 15 of the GDPR asserted by the second complainant (see decision, p. 7). Consequently, given that the Federal Administrative Court’s power of review is limited to the “merits” of the appeal proceedings, it is precluded from ruling on the violations of Articles 5 and 6 of the GDPR asserted by the appellant beyond this scope; otherwise, its decision would be rendered unlawful due to lack of jurisdiction (see, most recently, Federal Administrative Court, June 25, 2024, Case No. 2022/04/0167). If an administrative authority, in its decision-form response to an application, fails to fully address the application, it is generally not the role of the Administrative Court, in the appeal proceedings against the decision, to remedy the potentially unlawful conduct of the authority—which may have resulted from this—by fully addressing the application. Rather, the default appeal proceedings pursuant to Art. 130(1)(3) of the Federal Constitutional Law (B-VG) are available for such situations (see again VwGH 25.06.2024, Ra 2022/04/0167).If an administrative authority’s decision on an application falls short of the application’s requirements, it is generally not the role of the Administrative Court, in administrative appeal proceedings, to remedy any resulting unlawful conduct by the authority through a full and comprehensive resolution of the application. Rather, in such situations, the default appeal procedure under article 130(1)(3) of the Federal Constitutional Law (B-VG) is available (see again VwGH, June 25, 2024, Ra 2022/04/0167).

applies Art. 5, Art. 6, Art. 15

3.4.2

In the present proceedings, the question to be clarified is whether the co-party acted as a processor or as a controller with respect to the complainant. If it acted solely as a processor, the information provided—that no data is available—is accurate. As evidenced by the co-party’s documents, which formed the basis for the findings, the co-party was commissioned to handle payment transactions for N-GmbH. In the context of payment transactions, the co-party is involved by N-GmbH in, among other things, payment and dunning procedures, as well as in the handling of legal cases. The payment request and dunning notice were therefore issued in the course of these assigned tasks and are covered by the data processing agreement. No exceeding of authority was identified during the proceedings. Given that the assessment of a role is primarily factual in nature, an incorrect designation—such as the one that occurred in error—does not transform a processor into a controller. A mere misnomer—as the co-party itself acknowledges—does not alter the fact that the co-party is merely a processor and not the controller with respect to the complainant’s personal data in question. The judgement of the Neusiedl Regional Court is also an indication that the co-respondent acted solely on behalf of another party, even though civil law findings cannot necessarily be applied to the allocation of roles in data protection. However, it emerged during the proceedings that the co-party acted solely on behalf of another party and not to pursue its own claims. Therefore, N-GmbH, as the controller, is the competent authority obligated to provide information, not the processor; consequently, the complaint must be dismissed as unfounded.

3.5

On the Waiver of an Oral Hearing: Pursuant to § 24(1) VwGVG, the Administrative Court must conduct a public oral hearing upon request or, if it deems it necessary, on its own initiative. Pursuant to § 24(4) VwGVG—unless otherwise provided by federal or state law—the administrative court may, regardless of a party’s request, refrain from holding a hearing if the case file indicates that an oral hearing is unlikely to lead to further clarification of the matter, and neither Article 6(1) of the ECHR nor Article 47 of the CFR precludes the omission of a hearing. Pursuant to paragraph 24(1) of the VwGVG, the administrative court must conduct a public oral hearing upon request or, if it deems it necessary, on its own initiative. Pursuant to paragraph 24(4) of the VwGVG, unless otherwise provided by federal or state law, — the Administrative Court may, regardless of a party’s request, dispense with a hearing if the case file indicates that an oral hearing is unlikely to provide further clarification of the matter, and neither article 6, paragraph 1, of the ECHR nor article 47 of the CFR preclude the omission of the hearing. The relevant facts of the case could be considered sufficiently clarified by the record. The complaint did not raise any factual issues requiring further clarification in a concrete and substantiated manner, nor was there any complex legal issue to be resolved in this case (VwGH, July 31, 2007, Ref. No. 2005/05/0080). Consequently, it was possible to dispense with a oral hearing. In this case, the decision not to hold a hearing is not precluded by Article 6(1) of the ECHR or Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The relevant facts of the case were deemed to have been sufficiently clarified by the case file. The complaint did not raise any factual issues requiring further clarification in a concrete and substantiated manner, nor was there any complex legal issue to be resolved in this case (VwGH, July 31, 2007, Ref. No. 2005/05/0080). Consequently, it was possible to dispense with an oral hearing. In this case, neither Article 6, paragraph 1, of the ECHR nor Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights precludes dispensing with the hearing. Re B) Inadmissibility of the Appeal: The appeal is inadmissible pursuant to Article 133(4) of the Federal Constitutional Law (B-VG) because the decision does not depend on the resolution of a legal issue of fundamental importance. Neither does the decision at issue deviate from the Administrative Court’s existing case law, nor is there a lack of case law; furthermore, the Administrative Court’s existing case law cannot be deemed inconsistent. Nor are there any other indications that the legal issue at hand is of fundamental importance. The appeal is not admissible pursuant to article 133, paragraph 4, of the Federal Constitutional Law (B-VG) because the decision does not depend on the resolution of a legal issue of fundamental importance. The decision in question neither deviates from the Administrative Court’s previous case law nor is there a lack of case law on the matter; furthermore, the Administrative Court’s existing case law cannot be considered inconsistent. Nor are there any other indications that the legal issue at hand is of fundamental significance.

applies ECHR Art. 6(1), ECHR Art. 47, ECHR Art. 6