CJEU: Expert comment authorship is personal data even if professional and publicly

Personal data: The information as to which expert is the author of each comment made by the external experts constitutes personal data even where the information is provided as part of a professional activity. Personal data is not the same as private data and, therefore, claiming (i) information does not fall within the scope of private life; or (ii) information has been publish on the internet is irrelevant. The characterization of information as personal data does not depend on whether the person objects to the disclosure of that information. (¶¶ 29–33)

In so far as that information would make it possible to connect to one particular expert or another a particular comment, it concerns identified natural persons and, accordingly, constitutes a set of personal data, within the meaning of Article 2(a) of Regulation No 45/2001.

As the General Court correctly held, in paragraphs 44 to 46 of the judgment under appeal, the fact that information is provided as part of a professional activity does not mean that it cannot be characterised as a set of personal data (see, to that effect, the judgments in Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others, C‑465/00, C‑138/01 and C‑139/01, EU:C:2003:294, paragraph 64; Commission v Bavarian Lager, C‑28/08 P, EU:C:2010:378, paragraphs 66 to 70; and Worten, C‑342/12, EU:C:2013:355, paragraphs 19 and 22).

Likewise, the fact that both the identity of the experts concerned and the comments submitted on the draft guidance document were made public on the EFSA website does not mean that the information at issue could no longer be so characterised (see, to that effect, the judgment in Satakunnan Markkinapörssi and Satamedia, C‑73/07, EU:C:2008:727, paragraph 49).

Further, as contended by EFSA, the Commission and EDPS, the concepts of ‘personal data’, within the meaning of Article 2(a) of Regulation No 45/2001, and of ‘data relating to private life’ are not to be confused. Consequently, the claim made by ClientEarth and PAN Europe in this case that the information at issue does not fall within the scope of the private life of the experts concerned is ineffective.

Last, since the question of whether the person concerned objects to the disclosure of the information at issue is not a constituent part of the concept of ‘personal data’, within the meaning of Article 2(a) of Regulation No 45/2001, the General Court was correct to hold, in paragraph 58 of the judgment under appeal, that the characterisation of an item of information relating to a person as being personal data does not depend on whether there is such an objection.