TSJ PV: Accidental Teams recordings after meetings ended cannot justify trust-based

Roj: STSJ PV 1713/2026 - ECLI:ES:TSJPV:2026:1713 Id Cendoj: 48020340012026101131 Organ: Superior Court of Justice. Social Chamber Headquarters: Bilbao Section: 1 Date: 11/05/2026 Appeal No.: 738/2026 Resolution No.: 1094/2026 Procedure: Appeal Rapporteur: JOSE FELIX LAJO GONZALEZ Type of Resolution: Judgment APPEAL NO.: Appeal, 0000738/2026 NIG PV 4802044420250004408 NIG CGPJ 4802044420250004408 JUDGMENT NO.: 001094/2026 SOCIAL CHAMBER OF THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE AUTONOMOUS COMMUNITY OF THE BASQUE COUNTRY In the City of Bilbao, on the 11 May 2026. The Social Chamber of the High Court of Justice of the Basque Country, composed of The Honorable Judges Ms. Garbiñe Biurrun Mancisidor, President, Ms. Nuria Perchín Benito, and Mr. José Felix Lajo González, Judges, has rendered IN THE NAME OF THE KING the following JUDGMENT In the Appeal filed by Asunción against the judgment of the Social Court No. 9 of Bilbao, dated December 2, 2025, issued in proceedings concerning the termination of a temporary contract, and filed by Asunción against FINECO SOCIEDAD DE VALORES, SA, GIIC FINECO SOCIEDAD GESTORA DE INSTITUCIONES DE INVERSIÓN COLECTIVA, SAU. The presiding judge is the Honorable Mr. Justice José Félix Lajo González, who expresses the opinion of the Court. BACKGROUND FACTS FIRST.- The sole instance of the ongoing proceedings was initiated by a claim and concluded by a judgment, the statement of proven facts of which is as follows: "FIRST. Ms. Asunción, with National Identity Document No. NUM000, has been providing services for the co-defendants FINECO SOCIEDAD DE VALORES, S.A. (hereinafter, FINECO SV) and GIIC FINECO SOCIEDAD GESTORA DE INSTITUCIONES DE INVERSIÓN COLECTIVA, S.A.U. (hereinafter, GIIC FINECO), since September 6, 2004, appearing on their payroll as a "senior graduate" professional. SECOND. The plaintiff was formally registered with GIIC FINECO, and it is undisputed that FINECO SV and GIIC FINECO constitute a group of companies for labor purposes. THIRD. According to document 10-T, which appears as No. 109 of the index Electronically, the plaintiff's remuneration in 2024 was €166,288.40. FOURTH. According to items 94 to 97 of the index, Ms. Asunción remained on sick leave due to an illness between January 30, 2025, and February 17, 2025, with a diagnosis of "unspecified anxiety disorder." 1 CASE LAW On April 7, 2025, she went on sick leave again due to an illness with the same diagnosis, continuing in that situation at the time of the hearing. FIFTH. Mr. Ceferino was the CEO of FINECO GIIC until July 10, 2024, the date of his dismissal, and was replaced by Mr. Hermenegildo. SIXTH. While Mr. Ceferino was CEO, the plaintiff presented herself to the media as the head of fixed income at FINECO. (No. 128 of the index), a condition that also appeared in the teaching field or in corporate presentations (documents No. 129 and 132). SEVENTH. According to the testimonies of Mr. Ceferino, Mr. Baldomero—a board member of FINECO GICC until the change in management—and Mr. Pedro Francisco, the current finance and administration director, the fixed income department manages capital of no less than 2 billion euros, both before and after the change in management. EIGHTH. Given its length, the document submitted by both parties and entitled "Compensation Policy Framework" (Nos. 46 and 136 of the index) of December 2022, in which Ms. Asunción is listed as head of the Analysis and Management Unit (page 60), is considered reproduced in its entirety. On page 64 of the same document, the plaintiff is assigned "under the mention of "function art 5 a RD 2021/93") the functions of "human resources" and "development and application of remuneration policy", citing the Analysis and Management unit as the "Unit of responsibility". The same powers are stated in the document submitted by the plaintiff entitled "Report on the identified group" (no. 47 of the index) dated 12/22/23, which is also incorporated herein by reference due to its length. NINTH. On November 27, 2024, the CEO sent, among other things, an email to the plaintiff (document no. 79 of the index), with the following partial content: "Therefore, I am writing to answer you: I am fully aware of the commitments made regarding the aforementioned Popular Legislative Initiative (ILP) to/with you and I apologize for the delay in the preparation and presentation of the plan. In this regard, I would like to inform you that since our arrival, and more specifically, since Mauricio joined us, we have conveyed the urgent and non-negotiable need to finalize this matter. Furthermore, I would like to point out that Apolonio was already working on this issue, fully committed as one of his priorities, and we have been collaborating intensively with the Kutxabank Human Resources team for over two months to be able to present you with an ILP proposal that fulfills what was discussed. We have encountered several complications, some of a regulatory nature and others of a more conceptual nature, which we believe we have now largely resolved. In fact, many of the absences of both Mauricio and My own efforts are being motivated by holding meetings at KB to work on and finalize this issue. In this context, I want to let you know that the ILP proposal is almost ready for presentation. It will, of course, take effect on January 1, 2024, and I hope to share it with you in the coming days (next week or the week after). TENTH. Given its length, document no. 120 of the index is hereby incorporated by reference in its entirety. This document consists of a certificate issued on September 11, 2025, by the secretary of the board of directors of FINECO SV. While not exhaustive, and for the purposes of this matter, it states that on March 24, 2025, the Board of Directors was informed that the Appointments and Remuneration Committee was submitting for its approval a long-term incentive plan, along with the general conditions for accessing it and other associated documentation. It is worth noting that the plaintiff was identified as one of the 18 beneficiaries, and that an enrollment procedure and accrual period were stipulated between January 1, 2025, and December 31, 2027, the date on which payments would begin provided the requirements set forth in the minutes were met. ELEVENTH. As item number 127 of the index, there is a communication from the plaintiff dated October 21, 2025, in which she admits her signature on the letter of adherence to the incentive plan indicated in the previous Fact, stating that she does so "without prejudice to the claim I have filed in relation to it before the Social Court No. 9 of Bilbao." TWELFTH. The files provided by the companies and attached as items 14 to 18 of the electronic index, consisting of recordings made on May 14, 2024, and June 7, 2024, by Ms. Asunción, Mr. Ceferino, and Mr. Baldomero, are considered reproduced in their entirety. TWELFTH. These recordings were made using the aforementioned employees' Microsoft Teams platform, which, according to the computer forensics report available in entry 157 of the index (which is also incorporated herein by reference), determines that when a meeting is recorded, all participants can access the recording, the link to which appears in the chat associated with the meeting and in the "recordings" folder of the work computer, and is added to the directory. THIRTEENTH. Mr. Ceferino did not deactivate Microsoft Teams after the morning work meetings on May 14, 2024, and June 7, 2024, so the system continued recording, a fact also unknown to Ms. Asunción and Mr. Baldomero. FOURTEENTH. This document, number 51 in the index of the conservation transcript maintained on May 14, 2024, between the plaintiff, Mr. Ceferino, and the advisor of FINECO GIIC, Mr. Baldomero, corresponding to file NUM001, is considered reproduced in its entirety, given its length. However, for the purposes of current interest, it contains the following particulars: "- Asunción (Asunción): But if they fire you, you have severance pay. - Baldomero (Baldomero): They're not going to fire me, how could they fire me? - (Asunción): Because of a substantial change in working conditions. That avenue could be explored. (...) - (Asunción): But I think someone has to explore that avenue. So, leaving and saying: I consider it a substantial change in working conditions, depending on what they tell Ceferino on Wednesday, which could be as soon as possible. That's starting to explore another via. - Ceferino: Well, it depends on what they say and what they do afterward. - (Asunción): Which was the one I had in mind for Ángel Jesús. - (Baldomero): Well, not Ceferino's, what they offered me. Listen, I'm leaving, I don't want that. (...) - (Asunción): Yes, but you still have your same job as before. Nothing changes for you. I mean, it's a purely financial matter, but it's true that if..., which was the one I thought Ángel Jesús might explore, but it could be Ángel Jesús or it could be anyone. Because, imagine if they tell you: hey look, okay, yes, here, severance pay. That opens a path for everyone. And besides, financially, it's a dream come true. Because you have unemployment benefits, you have net severance pay, you have... everything. - (Baldomero): Yes, it's perfect. But if not, I think that you just run away... -(Asunción): But I think we have justification for that, Baldomero, because..." (...) Ceferino: The easiest way I see is to buy an asset management company, right? Asunción: Buy one? Ceferino: Yes, and in fact, I've arranged to meet with two in Madrid... okay? Baldomero: So, based on what you were saying, I can buy it. Ceferino: 100, a hundred and something, or 200 million, which won't be easy, okay? And we'll have to see, but... Baldomero: (...) Ceferino: When you buy an asset management company, you either compete or you don't. Or you just say: hey, look, I've bought an asset management company in Madrid, it has 200 million euros in clients, and I'm going to dedicate myself to managing those clients. Then it's tough if they try to impose a non-compete clause on you, right? Baldomero: You're not competing there." FIFTEENTH. On 25/03/25 the employee sent an email to the CEO, Mr. Hermenegildo, with the following content: "Regarding the verbal request I have received again to appear in the monthly video, I would like to reiterate my disagreement due to reasons related to my right to my own image."To avoid any possible confusion, I would appreciate it if you could expressly confirm in writing whether it is necessary for me to make said video. SIXTEENTH. On 7/01/25, the CEO, Mr. Hermenegildo, and the general manager, Mauricio, met with the plaintiff. Given its length, the transcript included in entry number 85 of the index is considered fully reproduced herein, although, for the purposes of current interest, it contains the following particulars: 3 CASE LAW "Hermenegildo: (...) This is an extract that will last between 5 and 6 minutes from recordings of conversations that lasted, I believe, more than 10 or 15 hours. And what they do is define a very clear strategy, which, moreover, has been fulfilled by the facts. (...) (Hermenegildo): It was a real blow, a massive one, because I naively had the idea, I knew that things weren't easy, but I understood it from a business perspective, or that I was going to be involved in a project. This part is what has deeply affected me, and because you may have noticed a change in attitude with all of that. With all of this. Here you have references to Ángel Jesús's departure to create a foundation. And while I'm jumping to Baldomero and when he's going to do the... So many things. I'm going to put it gently. At the very least, it makes you question trust. But it would make anyone question it. With all of this, I don't know if it's because I'm very naive or just plain stupid, but I wanted to... I have no doubt about your ability in the world of management. I'd be an idiot or a moron if you questioned it. I'm absolutely certain of that. Obviously, to rest decisions and resource and personnel matters with this background would be shooting myself in the foot and a breach of my fiduciary duty. I have no doubt about it. In that sense, I'm absolutely clear. Even so, and pay attention to what I'm saying, even so, if I regained trust, I would continue rotating with you. I'm that clear about it. I'm that clear about it. I'm that naive, and I think the possibility is practically nil. But I would have to see a gesture, and I'm telling you this openly. This is a tsunami that has swept over us. Well, it's forced us to open our eyes, which were already half-covered or half-closed, and that's how we are. But it's undeniable. I have nothing to say. Well, I have nothing to say. There are more than 10 hours of conversation here, and there are, well, all kinds of statements about everything. Absolutely everything. Personal barbs... Personal issues. This is what we've... Of course, it's clearly a reference. They've focused on the relevant part, which is the people who came out, which is you, Baldomero and you, well, sorry, it's Baldomero and Ceferino and you because you're involved in this. Mauricio (Mauricio): I mean, but there's much more. (Hermenegildo): There's much more. Asunción (Asunción): But these recordings, this isn't legal, is it? I have no doubt that I will not assess its legality or not." SEVENTEENTH. The profit and loss accounts of the co-defendants are hereby incorporated by reference, showing, in relation to the 2024 financial year, a profit of €2,506,429.55 in FINECO SV (No. 38, page 17) and €6,884,991.55 in FINECO GIIC (No. 43, page 23). EIGHTEENTH. A motion was filed on March 18, 2025, and the hearing was held without agreement on April 2, 2025." SECOND.- The operative part of the lower court's judgment states: "That, dismissing the claim filed by Ms. Asunción against GIIC FINECO SOCIEDAD GESTORA DE INSTITUCIONES DE INVERSIÓN COLECTIVA, SAU, and FINECO SOCIEDAD DE VALORES, SA, with the Public Prosecutor's Office as an interested party, I must acquit the co-defendants of the claims brought against them. The plaintiff is ordered to pay a fine of 4,500 euros once this ruling becomes final, for having acted in bad faith and recklessly." THIRD.- An appeal was filed against this ruling, which was contested by the opposing party. LEGAL GROUNDS FIRST.- APPEAL FILED. The plaintiff appeals against the judgment issued by the Social Court No. 9 of Bilbao, dated December 2, 2025, which dismissed her claim for voluntary termination of her employment contract, attributing to the companies breaches that, in her opinion, justify it and which, in summary, would consist of: a) a substantial modification affecting her dignity, specifically a progressive reduction of her duties starting in August 2024, coinciding with the restructuring of the company's management shortly before; b) the failure to pay the long-term incentive (LTI) for 2024, amounting to 89,953.45 euros; and c) the violation of the fundamental rights to dignity (Article 10 of the Spanish Constitution). psychological and moral integrity (Article 15 CE) and the right to privacy and the secrecy of communications (Article 18.1 and 3 CE), for which violation it claims cumulative compensation of 100,000 euros. The judgment, in addition to dismissing the claim, orders the plaintiff to pay a fine of 4,500 euros once this ruling becomes final, for having acted in bad faith and recklessly. The appeal contains one ground for annulment, one ground for review of proven facts, and four grounds of legal censure; and concludes by requesting that, with the revocation of the appealed ruling, a judgment be issued upholding the grounds alleged in accordance with the requests made in each of them. The co-defendant companies are GIIC FINECO SOCIEDAD GESTORA DE INSTITUCIONES DE INVERSIÓN COLECTIVA, SAU, and FINECO SOCIEDAD DE VALORES, SA. They have challenged the appeal, rejecting the violation of fundamental rights, and presenting the arguments contained in the case file in defense of the appealed judgment. SECOND.- NULLITY OF THE JUDGMENT. In the first ground of appeal, pursuant to Article 193 a) of the LRJS, the violation of Articles is alleged. 11.1 LOPJ, 90.2 LRJS and 18 and 24 CE, because an illicit piece of evidence was admitted and assessed in the proceedings and obtained in violation of fundamental rights -an accidental video recording provided by the company of a conversation between the worker and third parties, made without the knowledge or consent of the participants, of a private nature, without prior information to the participants that the company could access said recording, and without a legal basis that legitimizes the interference-, with the return of the case file to the moment immediately prior to the admission of the illicit evidence so that a new judgment may be issued in which the existing procedural irregularities are remedied; alleging that the company does not have, as has been stated, any policy on the use of corporate computer equipment or programs, nor has it ever provided the plaintiff with any prior information about the possibility of being recorded in Microsoft Teams telematics sessions or outside of them, nor about the potential company access to and processing of personal data in the files and content generated by the Microsoft Teams platform. Therefore: The legal requirement that Article 87.3 of Organic Law 3/2018 demands as a condition for the access of Article 87.2 of the same Law to be considered lawful is lacking. The attendees of the Microsoft Teams telematics meeting, during the course of the meeting, acted in accordance with a reasonable expectation of privacy, without feeling compelled to make any type of personal comment, given the conviction that they would be heard by the company (Constitutional Court Judgment 98/2000, of April 10). And all the more so, those who, like the plaintiff employee, were mistakenly recorded by a third party after the Teams meetings had ended, without their consent and knowledge, acted in accordance with that reasonable expectation of privacy and confidentiality. The company has violated the plaintiff employee's fundamental rights to privacy and the secrecy of communications (Article 18 of the Spanish Constitution and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights). The admission as evidence of eleven hours of private, face-to-face conversations, accidentally recorded by someone else's computer after a work meeting, without the plaintiff's consent, without prior notice, without a legal basis, and without judicial authorization, violates the fundamental rights to privacy (Article 18.1 of the Spanish Constitution)—a right that "not only protects individuals from the unlawful acquisition of data from their private sphere by third parties, but also from the unauthorized disclosure, dissemination, or publicity of that data" (Constitutional Court Judgment 83/2002, of April 22)—and to the secrecy of communications (Article 18.3 of the Spanish Constitution); and that the judgment bases its reasoning on an oversight by Mr. Ceferino, but the holder of the fundamental right is Ms. Asunción, who did not commit any oversight, was not using any computer equipment, and acted in accordance with a reasonable expectation of privacy. Constitutional doctrine does not allow for the interpretation of another's negligence as a waiver of the fundamental right of the person who neither caused nor could have prevented it. Recording, once the work meeting had concluded, is by definition irregular, according to the Supreme Court ruling of December 30, 2020. Its admission and assessment tainted the entire judicial reasoning. This first ground of appeal must be upheld, for the following reasons: A.- Proven facts (relating to this first ground of appeal). FOURTH.- The employee was on sick leave due to chronic illness between January 30, 2025, and February 17, 2025, with a diagnosis of "unspecified anxiety disorder." On April 7, 2025, she went on sick leave again due to chronic illness with the same diagnosis, remaining in this situation at the time of the hearing. TWELFTH. The files provided by the companies and attached as numbers 14 to 18 of the electronic index, consisting of recordings made on May 14, 2024, and June 7, 2024, by Ms. Asunción, Mr. Ceferino, and Mr. Baldomero, are hereby incorporated into the record. 5. CASE LAW TWELFTH. These recordings were made using the aforementioned employees' Microsoft Teams platform, which, according to the computer forensics report available in number 157 of the index (which is also incorporated herein), determines that when a meeting is recorded, all participants can access the recording, the link to which appears in the chat associated with the meeting and in the "recordings" folder of the workstation, and is added to the directory.THIRTEENTH. Mr. Ceferino did not deactivate Microsoft Teams after the morning work meetings on May 14, 2024, and June 7, 2024, so the system continued recording, which was also ignored by Ms. Asunción and Mr. Baldomero. FOURTEENTH. The transcript of the meeting held on May 14, 2024, between the plaintiff, Mr. Ceferino, and the FINECO GIIC advisor, Mr. Baldomero, corresponding to file NUM001, is included as item number 51 in the index. Given its length, it is considered reproduced in its entirety... SIXTEENTH. On 7/01/25, the CEO, Mr. Hermenegildo, and the general manager, Mauricio, met with the plaintiff. Given its length, the transcript included in entry no. 85 of the index is considered fully reproduced herein, although, for the purposes of current interest, it contains the following particulars: "Hermenegildo ( Hermenegildo): (...) This is an extract that will last between 5 and 6 minutes from conversation recordings that lasted, I believe, more than 10 or 15 hours. And what they do is define a very clear strategy, which moreover, well, has been fulfilled by the facts. (...) (Hermenegildo): It was a real blow to me, because I naively had the idea, I knew things weren't easy, but I understood it from the point of view of the business, or that I would go to a project. This part is what has left me deeply shaken touched, and because you may have noticed a change in attitude despite all of this. Despite all of this. Here are references to Ángel Jesús's departure to create a foundation. And while I'm jumping in with Baldomero and when he's going to do the... So many things. I'm going to put it gently. The less said about it, the more it makes you question trust. But it would make me question it, and anyone else too. Despite all of this, I don't know if it's because I'm very naive or a fool, but I wanted to... I have no doubt about your ability in the world of management. I would be an idiot or a cretin if you questioned it. I'm absolutely clear on that. Obviously, entrusting decisions and matters of resources and personnel to you with this history would be shooting myself in the foot and would violate my fiduciary duty. I have no doubt. In that sense, I'm absolutely clear on it. Even so, and pay attention to what I'm saying, even so, if I regained trust, I would continue rotating with you. I'm that clear on that. I'm that clear on that. I am So, naive, and I think the possibility is practically nil. But I'd have to see a gesture, and I'm telling you this openly. This is a tsunami that has swept over us. Well, it's forced us to open our eyes, those of us who already had them half-covered or half-closed, and that's how we are now. But it's undeniable. I have nothing to say. Well, I have nothing to say. There are more than 10 hours of conversation here, and there are, well, all kinds of statements about everything. Absolutely everything. Personal barbs... Personal matters. This has... Of course, it clearly refers to it. They've focused it on the relevant part, which is the people who have come out, which is you and Baldomero, well, sorry, it's Baldomero and Ceferino and you because you're involved in this issue. Mauricio (Mauricio): I mean, but there's much more. (Hermenegildo): There's much more. Asunción (Asunción): But these recordings, this isn't legal, is it? I I have no doubt that I will not be assessing its legality. B. Decision reached in the sole instance. The appealed judgment rejects the violation of the employee's fundamental right to privacy, reasoning as follows: "In the case examined, the determining factor is that one of the participants in the recorded conversations (the former CEO, Mr. Ceferino) failed to activate basic mechanisms made available to him to preserve the privacy and confidentiality that are now allegedly violated, leaving his camera and microphone activated for hours. And it includes on page 10 the computer forensics report (no. 157 in the index) regarding the platform used (MICROSOFT TEAMS) "(...) when a team meeting is recorded (either automatically, that is, because a policy so establishes, or manually because it is initiated by an administrator), all internal users of the organization who participated in it can access said recording, the link to which appears in the chat associated with the meeting and also in the "Recordings" folder associated with the work team." Ultimately, it was not the company but its then-CEO who caused the files to be automatically generated by Microsoft Teams, incorporating them into the company directory for free access by the department's employees, without their mere securing by the co-defendants violating either privacy or the confidentiality of communications. Furthermore, the case law criteria developed regarding the need for prior notification to legally record are not applicable, as they were developed in relation to a completely different set of facts (installation of cameras in workplaces). However, in this case, no participant could be unaware that the meetings were only possible because they themselves had activated the platform and, therefore, consented to its use, and that, 6 CASE LAW once such activation occurred, the recording continued until the corresponding mechanism on their own work equipment was activated. And this case has little to do with the one resolved in the Supreme Court ruling (Third Chamber). 30/12/20 (appeal no. 320/19), mentioned by the employee in her closing arguments, with two key differentiating factors: - the obligation to record was imposed by a legal provision (Article 147 of the Spanish Civil Procedure Law), which mandates the documentation and recording of oral proceedings in hearings, court appearances, and other judicial proceedings, but only these, not the judge's activity once they have concluded. Consequently, the legislator himself, through a mandatory legal provision, defines the objective and temporal scope of the recording (oral proceedings in hearings, court appearances, and other judicial proceedings), without permitting any other recordings unrelated to the sole purpose that justifies them (recording and documenting the judicial proceedings), which, therefore, lack any legal basis. - in that case, it was not the person accidentally recorded who, having control over the recording, caused it to continue beyond the In other words, it was not within his power to supervise or terminate it, tasks that, by legal mandate, fall to the Judicial Assistance officials (Article 487 f) of the Organic Law of the Judiciary). Consequently, and unlike what is happening now, the affected party did not have the means to prevent the recording and, therefore, it was not an omission personally attributable to him that facilitated access to the audio or images. For all the reasons stated above, the evidence examined does not infringe fundamental rights, and its admissibility is concluded. This ruling, in accordance with elementary principles of consistency, entails the dismissal of the claim regarding the existence of a breach by the company of Article 50.1 c) of the Workers' Statute due to a violation of paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 18 of the Spanish Constitution. C. Fundamental Rights. Applicable Legislation. Our Constitution, in Article 18.1, establishes: The right to honor, personal and family privacy, and one's own image is guaranteed. 2. The home is inviolable. No entry or search may be made therein without the consent of the occupant or a court order, except in cases of flagrant offense. 3. The secrecy of communications, and in particular postal, telegraphic, and telephone communications, is guaranteed, except by court order. 4. The law shall limit the use of information technology to guarantee the honor and personal and family privacy of citizens and the full exercise of their rights. Organic Law 3/2018 on the Protection of Personal Data: Article 22. Processing for Video Surveillance Purposes. 1. Natural or legal persons, public or private, may process images through camera or video camera systems for the purpose of preserving the security of persons and property, as well as their facilities. 2. Images of public roads may only be captured to the extent that it is essential for the purpose mentioned in the previous section. However, it will be possible to capture images of a larger area of public roads when necessary to guarantee the security of strategic assets or facilities, or infrastructure related to transport, provided that in no case may this involve capturing images of the interior of a private residence. 3. The data will be deleted within a maximum period of one month from its capture, except when it must be retained to prove the commission of acts that threaten the integrity of persons, property, or facilities. In such cases, the images must be made available to the competent authority within a maximum period of seventy-two hours from the time the existence of the recording becomes known. The blocking obligation provided for in Article 32 of this Organic Law will not apply to this processing. 4. The duty to provide information set out in Article 12 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 shall be deemed fulfilled by placing an information notice in a sufficiently visible location, identifying at least the existence of the processing, the identity of the controller, and the possibility of exercising the rights provided for in Articles 15 to 22 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679. A connection code or internet address to this information may also be included on the information notice. In any case, the controller shall keep the information referred to in the aforementioned Regulation available to the data subjects. 5. Pursuant to Article 2.2(c) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, the processing by a natural person of images that only capture the interior of their own home is considered excluded from its scope. This exclusion does not cover processing carried out by a private security entity contracted to monitor a residence and which has access to the images. 6. The processing of personal data derived from images and sounds obtained through the use of cameras and video cameras by the Security Forces and Corps and by the competent bodies for surveillance and control in penitentiary centers and for the control, regulation, monitoring, and enforcement of traffic, shall be governed by the legislation transposing Directive (EU) 2016/680, when the processing has the purpose of preventing, investigating, detecting, or prosecuting criminal offenses or executing criminal penalties, including protection and prevention against threats to public safety. Outside of these cases, such processing shall be governed by its specific legislation and, supplementarily, by Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and this Organic Law. 7. The provisions of this article are without prejudice to the provisions of 7 CASE LAW in Law 5/2014, of April 4, on Private Security and its implementing regulations. 8. The processing by the employer of data obtained through camera or video camera systems is subject to the provisions of Article 89 of this Organic Law.Article 87. Right to Privacy and Use of Digital Devices in the Workplace. 1. Workers and public employees shall have the right to the protection of their privacy in the use of digital devices provided to them by their employer. 2. The employer may access the content derived from the use of digital devices provided to workers solely for the purpose of monitoring compliance with employment or statutory obligations and ensuring the integrity of said devices. 3. Employers shall establish criteria for the use of digital devices, respecting in all cases the minimum standards for the protection of privacy in accordance with social norms and constitutionally and legally recognized rights. Workers' representatives shall participate in their development. Employer access to the content of digital devices for which the employer has authorized use for private purposes will require that the authorized uses be precisely specified and safeguards be established to protect the privacy of employees, such as, where applicable, the determination of the periods during which the devices may be used for private purposes. Employees must be informed of the usage criteria referred to in this section. Article 88. Right to digital disconnection in the workplace. 1. Employees and public servants shall have the right to digital disconnection in order to guarantee, outside of legally or conventionally established working hours, respect for their rest periods, leave, and vacations, as well as their personal and family privacy. 2. The procedures for exercising this right will take into account the nature and purpose of the employment relationship, will promote the right to reconcile work and personal and family life, and will be subject to the provisions of collective bargaining agreements or, failing that, to agreements between the company and the workers' representatives. 3. The employer, after consulting with the workers' representatives, will develop an internal policy for all employees, including those in management positions, defining the procedures for exercising the right to disconnect and the training and awareness-raising activities for staff on the reasonable use of technological tools to avoid the risk of digital fatigue. In particular, the right to digital disconnection will be protected in cases of full or partial remote work, as well as when the employee's home is used for work purposes using technological tools. Article 89. Right to privacy regarding the use of video surveillance and sound recording devices in the workplace. 1. Employers may process images obtained through camera or video camera systems for the purpose of monitoring workers or public employees, as provided for in Article 20.3 of the Workers' Statute and in public service legislation, respectively, provided that these functions are exercised within their legal framework and with the inherent limitations thereof. Employers must inform workers or public employees, and, where applicable, their representatives, of this measure in advance, expressly, clearly, and concisely. If the commission of an unlawful act by workers or public employees has been captured, the duty to inform will be considered fulfilled when at least the device referred to in Article 22.4 of this Organic Law is in place. 2. Under no circumstances will the installation of sound recording or video surveillance systems be permitted in areas designated for the rest or recreation of workers or public employees, such as changing rooms, restrooms, cafeterias, and similar areas. 3. The use of systems similar to those referred to in the preceding sections for sound recording in the workplace will only be permitted when the risks to the safety of facilities, property, and persons arising from the activity carried out at the workplace are relevant, and always respecting the principle of proportionality, the principle of minimum intervention, and the guarantees provided for in the preceding sections. The deletion of sounds recorded by these systems will be carried out in accordance with the provisions of section 3 of Article 22 of this law. Article 20 bis. ET Workers' rights to privacy in relation to the digital environment and to disconnect. 8 CASE LAW Workers have the right to privacy in the use of digital devices provided to them by their employer, the right to digital disconnection, and the right to privacy regarding the use of video surveillance and geolocation devices, in accordance with current legislation on the protection of personal data and the guarantee of digital rights. D. Community and national case law on this matter. The ECtHR judgment of 9 January 2018, López Ribalda v. Spain, states the following: 69. Consequently, this Court cannot share the opinion of the national courts regarding the proportionality of the measures taken by the employer with the legitimate aim of protecting its interests with respect to its property rights. The Court notes that the video surveillance carried out by the employer, which took place over a prolonged period, did not comply with the requirements set out in Article 5 of the Personal Data Protection Act, in particular the obligation to provide prior, explicit, precise, and unambiguous information to the data subjects regarding the existence and specific characteristics of a personal data collection system. The Court notes that the employer's rights could have been safeguarded, at least to some extent, by other means, in particular by informing the applicants beforehand, even in general terms, about the installation of a video surveillance system and providing them with the information required by the Personal Data Protection Act. The judgment of the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR of 17 October 2019 (López Ribalda II) overturned the previous ECtHR judgment of 9 January 2018 (López Ribalda I): It reiterates the doctrine established in the Barbulescu case and addresses the compatibility of covert surveillance with Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, done at Rome on 4 November 1950: “while it cannot accept that the slightest suspicion of theft or other irregularities committed by employees can justify the installation of a covert video surveillance system by the employer, the existence of reasonable suspicions that serious irregularities had been committed, and the extent of the thefts found in the present case, may appear to be a serious justification.” The aforementioned ECtHR judgment of October 17, 2019 (López Ribalda II) analyzes the argument that Spanish legislation already required prior warning or information to the employee regarding video surveillance. Despite this, the ECtHR considers the measure justified by the legitimate suspicion of serious irregularities and losses and because no other measure would have allowed the legitimate objective to be achieved. Only the imperative protection of important public or private interests can justify the absence of prior information. The ECtHR "takes into careful consideration that the applicants had other remedies available to them, provided for by Spanish data protection legislation, specifically designed to sanction non-compliance with the law, such as filing a complaint with the Spanish Data Protection Agency regarding the employer's failure to comply with the requirement of prior information. Furthermore, the ECtHR notes that they could have brought actions before the ordinary courts seeking compensation for the alleged violation of their rights under that domestic data protection legislation." Constitutional Court Judgment of March 3, 2016, Appeal No. 7222/2013: "3. With regard, firstly, to the violation of Article 18.4 of the Spanish Constitution, the right to data protection, we must recall that an image is considered personal data, pursuant to Article 3 of Organic Law 15/1999, of December 13, on the Protection of Personal Data, which considers personal data to be 'any information concerning identified or identifiable natural persons,' and Article 5.1 f) of Royal Decree 1720/2007, of December 21, which approves the Implementing Regulation of Organic Law 15/1999, which considers graphic or photographic information to be personal data. As stated in Constitutional Court Judgment 292/2000, of November 30 , FJ 7, "the content of the fundamental right to data protection consists of a power of disposition and control over personal data that empowers the individual to decide which of that data to provide to a third party, whether the State or a private individual, or which data that third party may collect, and which also allows the individual to know who possesses that personal data and for what purpose, being able to object to that possession or use. These powers of disposition and control over personal data, which constitute part of the content of the fundamental right to data protection, are legally specified in the power to consent to the collection, obtaining, and access to personal data, its subsequent storage and processing, as well as its use or possible uses, by a third party, whether the State or a private individual." "" And that right to consent to the knowledge and processing, whether electronic or not, of personal data requires, as indispensable complements, on the one hand, the ability to know at all times who has that personal data and to what use they are subjecting it, and, on the other hand, the power to oppose that possession and use."9 CASE LAW Thus, the following are characteristic elements of the constitutional definition of the fundamental right to the protection of personal data: "the rights of the data subject to consent to the collection and use of their personal data and to know about it. And essential to making this content effective is the recognition of the right to be informed of who possesses their personal data and for what purpose, and the right to object to such possession and use by requesting the appropriate party to cease the possession and use of the data. That is, requiring the data controller to inform them what data they hold about them, accessing the relevant records and entries, and what purpose that data has served, which also extends to possible recipients; and, where appropriate, requesting that the data be rectified or erased" (Constitutional Court Judgment 292/2000, of November 30, Legal Ground 7). The data subject's consent is, therefore, the defining element of the personal data protection system. The Organic Law on the Protection of Personal Data (LOPD) establishes the general principle that the processing of personal data will only be possible with the consent of its owners, unless there is legal authorization for the data to be processed without such consent. In this regard, we cannot forget that, as stated in Constitutional Court Judgment 292/2000, of November 30, Legal Ground 16, "it is the legislator who must determine when that good or right exists that justifies the restriction of the right to the protection of personal data and in what circumstances it may be limited, and, moreover, it is the legislator who must do so through precise rules that make the imposition of such limitation and its consequences foreseeable to the interested party." Supreme Court Judgment of January 28, 2026, appeal 1947/24: The literal application of Article 89.1, invoked by the appellant in this ground of appeal, in relation to Article Article 22.4 of the LOPD, to which the aforementioned refers, in accordance with the undisputed case law cited above, compels the conclusion that, given that the flagrant commission of an unlawful act by the plaintiff was captured by video surveillance; given that an information device, known to the employee, was installed; given that the measure was justified, suitable, necessary, and proportionate because there was sufficient circumstantial evidence of irregular conduct by the employee that needed to be verified; given that the measure was aimed at ascertaining the potential unlawfulness of the conduct, which was confirmed precisely through viewing the images; given that the measure was necessary, since no other less invasive and equally effective measure could be adopted to prove the labor infraction; and given that the measure can also be considered proportionate; the inadmissibility of this evidence by the High Court of Justice does not imply that its application in this process means that the disciplinary dismissal carried out by the company must be deemed null and void. Supreme Court Judgment 23/2025, of January 14 (appeal no. 5248/2023), addressed a case in which the video surveillance cameras were visible and the employees were aware of their installation. The workers' representatives had been informed. The plaintiff had purchased several items of clothing, paid for them by bank card, and subsequently, without returning them, refunded the amount to her bank card. The review of the checkout cameras corroborated this action. This Court argued that it was a known video surveillance measure that verified the plaintiff's irregular conduct. The Court cited Constitutional Court Judgment 119/2022, of September 29, regarding the installation of video surveillance systems and the use of images for workplace monitoring purposes: "the processing of this data does not require the express consent of the worker, because it is understood to be implicit in the mere contractual relationship." But, in any case, the employer's duty to inform remains, as an essential guarantee of the aforementioned fundamental right. In principle, this duty must be fulfilled in advance, expressly, clearly, and concisely. However, the law allows that, in cases of flagrant illegal conduct, the duty to inform may be considered fulfilled by placing a sign in a visible location warning of the existence of the system, its operator, and the rights derived from the processing of the data. The basis for this exception seems easily deducible: it would not make sense for the installation of a security system in the company to be useful for verifying the commission of infractions by third parties and yet not be usable for the detection and punishment of illegal conduct committed within the company itself. If any person is aware that the video surveillance system can be used against them, any employee must be aware of the same. Supreme Court Judgment, Fourth Chamber, April 26, 2023, Appeal 801/2020: "Furthermore, as this Chamber has stated, "with respect to the duty to inform, the employee was aware that a video surveillance system had been installed in the company, without it being necessary to specify, beyond mere surveillance, the exact purpose assigned to that monitoring. The important thing will be to determine whether the data obtained has been used for the purpose of monitoring the employment relationship or for a purpose unrelated to the fulfillment of the contract, because only if the purpose of the data processing is not directly related to the maintenance, development, or control of the contractual relationship would the employer be obliged to request the consent of the affected employees," which, in the present case, had already been obtained." Supreme Court Judgment of July 22, 2022, Fourth Chamber, Appeal 701/2021: 10 CASE LAW Considering the circumstances, especially the provision of services of The domestic worker in the family home, in the present case, was hardly practical to place the sign or informational device required by Instruction 1/2006 of the Spanish Data Protection Agency, since such placement would have most likely thwarted the possibility of proving the serious breach, about which there were very well-founded suspicions, as well as the possibility of proving the perpetrator of said breach. It should be understood that, for these purposes, there are significant differences between a permanent video surveillance system and a video surveillance system installed ad hoc due to well-founded suspicions. In the first case, compliance with the information obligations of Article 89.1 of Organic Law 3/2018 will be unavoidable. However, in the second, such obligations may exceptionally be modified in cases as special as this one, in which, moreover, a permanent video surveillance system, about which the aforementioned prior information would certainly have to be provided, could be difficult to justify and result disproportionate. It should be recalled that, in accordance with the ECtHR judgment of October 17, 2019 (López Ribalda II), a compelling protection of private interests—which can be understood as concurrent here—can justify the absence of prior information. And that, according to Constitutional Court Judgment 39/2016 of March 3, 2016, the assessment of the proportionality of the measure adopted may preclude the failure to comply with the duty to provide prior information from constituting a violation of the fundamental right to data protection under Article 18.4 of the Spanish Constitution. And, in the present case, given the circumstances, it can be understood that the video surveillance measure was proportionate. 5. However, it must be emphasized that we are examining an exceptional and unique case, so that only exceptionally—and if circumstances similar to those present here exist—can the aforementioned informational sign be dispensed with. And we must also emphasize, especially, that The issue at hand is examining the evidentiary validity of video surveillance footage used in a dismissal trial, considering the burden of proof that rests with the employer and the consequent need to be able to provide relevant evidence, and not other consequences that the company's conduct may have from the broader perspective of data protection legislation as a whole. Indeed, it is one thing that, in a case with the unique characteristics of the one we are examining, the lack of information should not necessarily lead to the nullity of the video surveillance evidence necessary to prove the breach and its perpetrator, and quite another that the company cannot be declared responsible for a possible breach of data protection legislation with the possible administrative, civil, or other consequences that this may entail. Supreme Court Judgment 285/2022, of March 30 (appeal no. 1288/2020), declared the admissibility of the video surveillance evidence video surveillance because "the cameras were marked with adhesive signs that made everyone present in the cafeteria, both employees and customers, aware of their presence, and the workers' representatives had been informed. It is necessary to weigh the conflicting constitutional rights and interests: the employee's right to data protection and the employer's managerial authority. The plaintiff was a senior sales clerk, working in an airport cafeteria. The installation of these surveillance cameras was a measure justified by broad security reasons, in order to prevent theft, given the existence of shrinkage in retail; suitable for achieving these ends, as it allows for the identification of potential offenders and the punishment of their conduct, with a deterrent effect; necessary, due to the lack of other less intrusive means to achieve the aforementioned purpose; and proportionate to the ends pursued, the data obtained having been used for the purpose of monitoring the employment relationship and not for a a purpose unrelated to the fulfillment of the contract. Consequently, the evidence of the reproduction of the recordings made by the video surveillance cameras was a justified, suitable, necessary and proportionate measure to the end pursued, and therefore satisfied the requirements of proportionality. In the opinion of this Court, the limitation of the fundamental rights at stake was justified." STS 503/2022, of July 1 (rcud. (1993/2020), reiterated that doctrine. E. Application to the specific case. Existence of a violation of fundamental rights. The recording of images and sounds that we are examining (personal data of the plaintiff), carried out through the camera of the plaintiff's colleague's laptop, Mr. Ceferino, does not comply with the obligation to inform the employee beforehand, legally established in Articles 22.4 and 89.1 of the Spanish Data Protection Act (LOPD), nor does it respect the right to privacy in the use of digital means provided by the employer - Article 20 bis of the Spanish Workers' Statute (ET). As the appellant employee states, the plaintiff was never aware that her voice and her image were being recorded through Mr. Ceferino's computer equipment, and he did not close the Microsoft Teams application after ending a virtual work meeting. The recording captured by the camera on Mr. Ceferino's device was a private conversation between him and the plaintiff employee, 11 CASE LAW which the defendant company cannot appropriate, nor can it be recorded, without the express consent of the employee, whose privacy is at stake. It must be borne in mind that the duty to inform the employee is an essential requirement for her image to be lawfully captured by the employer - Constitutional Court Judgment 119/2022, of September 29 - except in cases of well-founded suspicion of flagrant wrongdoing, which is not the case here - European Court of Human Rights Judgment October 17, 2019 (López Ribalda II). The plaintiff employee had no information about the recording of her voice and image through a colleague's device camera, nor could she have given any consent in this regard. It is clear that the employee had a legitimate expectation of privacy in her conversation with Mr. Ceferino, which was violated by the recording made without her consent by the employer, infringing upon her right to privacy and the secrecy of communications (Article 18 of the Spanish Constitution). There was no error in the actions of the plaintiff employee. The fact that Mr. Ceferino kept the recording system running after the meeting ended is not attributable to the plaintiff in any way, nor does it allow her to disregard her fundamental right to privacy. It is not Mr. Ceferino's right to privacy that is at stake here. Once the meeting concluded, it was the company that should have closed the recording system to guarantee the privacy of employees in the use of digital terminals (Article 20 bis of the Spanish Workers' Statute). It is not respectful of the right to privacy to keep a recording system operational after a work meeting has concluded, since private conversations and images, protected by the right to privacy, are captured without any information being provided to the employees. See in this regard the Supreme Court ruling, Third Chamber, of December 30, 2020, appeal 320/2019, concerning the improper continuation of a recording after the conclusion of the meeting that was supposed to be the subject of the recording. The defendant employer has failed to comply with the provisions of Article 87.3 of the Spanish Data Protection Act (LOPD), which requires that "employers must establish criteria for the use of digital devices, respecting in all cases the minimum standards for the protection of privacy in accordance with social norms and constitutionally and legally recognized rights. Workers' representatives must participate in their development. Access by the employer to the content of digital devices for which it has authorized use for private purposes will require that the authorized uses be precisely specified and safeguards be established to preserve the privacy of workers, such as, where applicable, the determination of the periods during which the devices may be used for private purposes. Workers must be informed of the usage criteria referred to in this section." The plaintiff employee received no information whatsoever, nor could she have foreseen in any way that a colleague's digital device could be used to capture her image and private conversations. Therefore, the company's actions, using a colleague's computer camera without informing the plaintiff, constitute an unlawful exercise of corporate control and a violation of the plaintiff's right to privacy and image – Article 18 of the Spanish Constitution. As stated in the Constitutional Court ruling of May 9, 2019, appeal for protection of fundamental rights 3442/2018: The right to privacy is protected by Article 18.1 of the Spanish Constitution and enshrined in Articles 16.1 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and 4.1 of Organic Law 1/1996. The right to privacy, as reiterated by Constitutional Court Judgment 58/2018, of June 4, "aims to 'guarantee individuals a private sphere of their lives, linked to respect for their dignity as persons (Article 10.1 of the Spanish Constitution), against the actions and knowledge of others, whether they are public authorities or private individuals. Thus, the right to privacy grants its holder the power to protect this private sphere, not only personal but also familial (Constitutional Court Judgments 231/1988, of December 2, and 197/1991, of October 17), against its disclosure by third parties and unwanted publicity' (among others, Constitutional Court Judgment 176/2013, of October 21, Legal Ground 7)" (Legal Ground 5). Therefore, the images and conversations captured violated the right to the protection of personal data and infringed upon the guarantees for its protection provided by Organic Law 3/2018 on Data Protection. In conclusion, the violation of fundamental rights alleged by the plaintiff did occur, and the recordings should not have been admitted as evidence (Article 90 of the Labor Procedure Law), as argued in the appeal brief. However, it is not necessary to overturn the appealed judgment or order the proceedings to be restarted, since the established violation of the right to privacy and the secrecy of communications entails granting the request for termination of the contract filed in the lawsuit, and the Court may decide accordingly (Article 202.3 of the Labor Procedure Law). 12 CASE LAW THIRD.- REVIEW OF PROVEN FACTS. In the second ground of appeal, and pursuant to Article 193 b) of the LRJS (Law Regulating the Social Jurisdiction), the appellant seeks to modify the factual account. It is important to bear in mind that the review of proven facts is restricted in our labor procedural law, given the extraordinary nature of the appeal for review. This nature means that the appeal for review is not a second instance and that the assessment of evidence is the responsibility of the Labor Judge, who presides over the trial and the taking of evidence in accordance with the principles of orality and immediacy (Article 74 of the LRJS). Consequently, the modification of the account of proven facts is only possible when documentary or expert evidence—never testimonial evidence—establishes a clear and evident error on the part of the judge. It is also worth recalling the basic rules compiled by the Supreme Court's jurisprudence (Supreme Court Judgments of September 16, 2014, Appeal No. 251/2013, May 14, 2013, Appeal No. 285/2011, and June 5, 2011, Appeal No. 158/2010, among others) regarding how the factual review must be carried out, namely: a) That the facts to be added, rectified, or deleted be indicated, without in any case including legal norms or their interpretation under this factual conceptual delimitation. b) That the documentary evidence that, by itself, demonstrates the judge's error be specifically cited, in a manifest, evident, and clear manner. c) That the terms in which the proven facts must be drafted and their influence on the change in the outcome be specified. d) That such variation has the significance to modify the lower court's ruling (among the most recent, Supreme Court Judgments of 17/01/11 - appeal no. 75/10; 18/01/11 - appeal no. 98/09; and 20/01/11 - appeal no. 93/10). Insisting on the second requirement, it is maintained that the documents on which the appellant relies to justify the alleged factual review must have a radically exclusionary, compelling, and unquestionable effect, such that the alleged error arises clearly, directly, and patently from the evidence invoked, and in any case without the need for arguments, deductions, conjectures, or evaluative interpretations, to the point of asserting that the certainty of the error is incompatible with the existence of a doubtful situation (see, for example, Supreme Court Judgments of May 22, 2006 - Appeal No. 79/05; and June 20, 2006 - Appeal No. 189/04). B.- In our case, the factual review must be dismissed for the following reasons: The appellant requests the modification of the fourth proven fact to state that "Ms. Asunción suffers from a severe Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder characterized by episodes of Generalized Anxiety and Distress. This disorder is reactive to a situation of profound job instability," invoking the expert report. We must reject this factual alteration as unnecessary. The appealed judgment already establishes the proven existence of a situation of Temporary Incapacity, and the eleventh legal ground infers that it is related to a work-related problem. FOURTH.- LEGAL CENSORED. In the third ground of appeal, and pursuant to Article 193 c) of the LRJS (Law Regulating Social Jurisdiction), this party expresses disagreement with the judicial decision to dismiss the request for termination of the employment contract pursuant to the provisions of Article 193 c) of the LRJS. 50.1 c) ET, for violation of the fundamental rights of the plaintiff worker to respect for her personal privacy (art. 18.1 CE) and secrecy of communications (art. 18.3 CE), as well as her dignity as a person and as a worker (art. 10 CE), linked to privacy, and to respect for her psychological and moral integrity (art. 15 CE), due to the serious harmful consequences suffered, specifically 225 days of sick leave until the date of the trial, with a diagnosis that was assessed in said act of severe post-traumatic stress disorder, which has changed her life and has decisively and detrimentally affected the mental health of a person who, as the expert stated, until the events that are the subject of the process occurred led a normal, stable life, without emotional problems (expert report contained in file 98).In the fourth ground of appeal, and pursuant to Article 193 c) of the LRJS (Law Regulating Social Jurisdiction), this party objects to the judicial decision to dismiss the request for termination of the employment contract pursuant to Article 50.1 a) of the Workers' Statute, due to a substantial modification of working conditions that, in this case, is detrimental to the dignity of the plaintiff worker. In the fifth ground of appeal, and pursuant to Article 193 c) of the LRJS, it is argued that the termination of the employment relationship for either of the two preceding reasons—violation of the rights to privacy and confidentiality of communications or degradation—should, in addition to the consequences of Article 50.1 a) of the Workers' Statute, result in the following: 50.2 ET, the payment to the plaintiff worker of compensatory damages for the harm caused by the violation of her fundamental rights, taking into account not only the seriousness of the events and the compensatory, deterrent, and preventive function of this type of compensation, but also, and especially, the accumulated damage caused to her health, with prolonged sick leave of 225 days at the date of trial, and therefore with an additional violation of the worker's fundamental right to respect for her mental and moral integrity (Article 15 CE in relation to Article 4.2 d) ET), which recognizes the right of workers "to their physical integrity and to an adequate occupational risk prevention policy." Alleging that Articles 183 LJS, 15 CE and 1902 and 1101 CC, and 40.1 c) of Royal Legislative Decree 5/2000, of August 4, which approves the consolidated text of the Law on Infringements and Sanctions in the Social Order; and that, in light of all this, we understand that the amount claimed in the lawsuit of €100,000 objectively conforms to the parameters indicated in the LISOS and is therefore correct and appropriate for the compensation of the moral damage caused, also fulfilling the preventive purpose referred to in Article 183 LJS, 15 CE and 1902 and 1101 CC, and 40.1 c) of Royal Legislative Decree 5/2000, of August 4, which approves the consolidated text of the Law on Infringements and Sanctions in the Social Order; and that, in view of all this, we understand that the amount claimed in the lawsuit of €100,000 is objectively in accordance with the parameters indicated in the LISOS and is therefore correct and adequate for the compensation of the moral damage caused, also fulfilling the preventive purpose referred to in Article 183 LJS, 15 CE and 1902 CC, and 40.1 c) of Royal Legislative Decree 5/2000, of August 4, which approves the consolidated text of the Law on Infringements and Sanctions in the Social Order. 183.2 LJS, In the sixth ground of appeal, and pursuant to Article 193 c) of the LRJS, this party objects to the imposition in the judgment of a fine of €4,500 for bad faith and recklessness, alleging a violation of Article 97.3 of the LJS. The co-defendant companies challenged the appeal, opposing the termination and the violation of fundamental rights. FIFTH.- REASONING AND DECISION OF THE COURT. Based on the unaltered account of the proven facts, the appeal must be partially upheld for the following legal and factual reasons: A.- Applicable regulations. Article 50. Termination at the employee's request. 1. The following shall be just causes for the employee to request termination of the contract: a) Substantial modifications to working conditions carried out without respecting the provisions of Article 41 and which result in a detriment to the employee's dignity. b) Non-payment or continued delays in the payment of the agreed salary. c) Any other serious breach of obligations by the employer, except in cases of force majeure, as well as the employer's refusal to reinstate the employee to their previous working conditions in the cases provided for in Articles 40 and 41, when a court ruling has declared them unjustified. B. Termination of the contractual relationship. As we explained when analyzing the grounds for annulment of the judgment, the company violated the plaintiff employee's right to privacy. Therefore, her claim for termination of contract should be upheld, pursuant to Article 50.1 c) of the Workers' Statute, as requested in the third ground of appeal, thus rendering the examination of the fourth ground unnecessary. The corresponding compensation, pursuant to Article 50.2 of the Workers' Statute, taking into account the undisputed seniority (September 6, 2004) up to the date of this judgment (April 28, 2026), and the salary established in the ninth legal ground of the judgment (€166,527 annually), amounts to €328,491.62. C. Right to compensation for violation of the right to privacy. The violation of the right to privacy declared in the judgment entitles the plaintiff employee to compensation – Article 183 of the LRJS (Law Regulating the Social Jurisdiction). Considering the specific circumstances of this case, it is appropriate to apply the minimum level of the LISOS (Law on Infringements and Sanctions in the Social Order) for very serious offenses. In the opinion of this Court, the compensation amount of €7,501 is appropriate. The employee is entitled to compensation for moral damages, automatically linked to the violation of her fundamental right to privacy. The company's actions, which violated the right to privacy, constitute a very serious infringement under the LISOS (Law on Infringements and Sanctions in the Social Order) – Article 8.11 – for which a minimum penalty ranges from €7,501 to €30,000, a medium penalty from €30,001 to €120,005, and a maximum penalty from €120,006 to €225,018 – Article 40.1 c). 14. CASE LAW We consider it equitable to adhere to the minimum penalty range and set the compensation at €7,501. As stated in the Supreme Court ruling of April 20, 2022, appeal 2391/2019: "FIFTH.- 1.- On the other hand, as recently recalled by our Supreme Court rulings of February 22, 2022, Appeal No. 4322/2019 and of March 9, 2022, Appeal No. 2269/2019, the Supreme Court ruling of October 5, 2017, Appeal No. 2497/2015, contains a summary of the Court's current doctrine on the matter, citing previous rulings of the Court in which we have stated that moral damages are inextricably linked to the violation of the fundamental right, and since their detailed estimation is especially difficult, the normal requirements for determining compensation must be made more flexible. Reiterating this doctrine, compensation for moral damages opens the possibility for the judicial body to determine the amount. the one that prudently establishes its amount, without being able to require the claimant to provide more exact and precise bases for its determination, since in this matter there is "the absence of parameters that allow accurately translating into economic terms the suffering in which such [moral] damage essentially consists ... [which] leads, on the one hand, to a greater margin of discretion in the assessment ... and, on the other hand, "it dilutes to some extent the relevance for the calculation of the amount of compensation" of the application of objective parameters, since "the sufferings, afflictions or impairments experienced "do not have a direct or sequential economic translation" [SSTS/Iª 27/07/06 Ar. 6548; and SSTS/4ª 28/02/08 -rec. 110/01 -]" (SSTS 21/09/09 -rcud 2738/08 -; and 11/06/12 -rcud 3336/11), so that "in light of the new regulations that have arisen in this matter following the LRJS, it is considered that the required identification of "circumstances relevant to the determination of the compensation requested" must be waived in the case of moral damages linked to the violation of the fundamental right when their detailed estimation proves difficult." 2. Likewise, we have stated that the use of the guiding criterion of the pecuniary sanctions provided for by the Law on Infringements and Sanctions of Public Order for the infringements committed in this case has been admitted by Constitutional Court jurisprudence (STC 247/2006, of July 24), as well as being considered suitable and reasonable in previous decisions of this Court (SSTS of February 15, 2012, Rcud. 6701; of August July 2014, Appeal No. 282/13; February 2, 2015, Appeal No. 279/13; December 19, 2017, Appeal No. 624/2016; and December 13, 2018; among many others). By using the elements provided by the quantification of the sanctions under the LISOS (Law on Infringements and Sanctions in the Social Order), we are not applying it systematically and directly, but rather adhering to the reasonableness that some of these figures offer for resolving the case, given the seriousness of the violation of the fundamental right. In this way, the Court's most recent doctrine has moved further away—in line with the aforementioned LRJS (Law Regulating the Social Jurisdiction)—from the purely compensatory objective, to a position that does not neglect the preventive aspect that compensation must have in cases such as this one. 3. However, on numerous occasions, the appeal to The use of the elements offered by the LISOS sanctions quantification is not, in itself, sufficient to fulfill with relative precision the dual function of compensating for the damage and serving as a deterrent to prevent future violations of the fundamental right. This is because the range of sanctions in the LISOS for the same type of offense (minor, serious, very serious) is excessively broad. Consider that, currently, the penalty for committing a very serious labor offense can be set between €7,501 and €225,018, according to Article 40 of the LISOS; and, at the time the events occurred, the range of such penalties was between €6,251 and €187,515. Therefore, recourse to the sanctions of the LISOS must be accompanied by an assessment of the circumstances of the specific case. Aspects such as the employee's seniority in the The company, the temporal persistence of the violation of the fundamental right, the intensity of the breach of the right, the consequences caused in the personal or social situation of the worker or the subject holding the infringed right, the possible recidivism in infringing conduct, the multi-offense nature of the injury, the context in which the conduct may have occurred, or an attitude tending to prevent the defense and protection of the transgressed right, among others that may be assessed according to the circumstances of each case, must constitute elements to be taken into account in order to quantify the compensation.SIXTH.- 1.- Applying the aforementioned criteria to the case at hand leads to the understanding that the appealed judgment should have upheld the claim for compensation for moral damages in favor of the worker. Therefore, in accordance with the Public Prosecutor's Office, we must partially set aside and annul the appealed judgment and resolve the appeal by upholding the appeal filed by the plaintiff in this respect, recognizing his right to receive compensation for the moral damages caused by the company's actions that violated fundamental rights, specifically his guarantee of protection against retaliation, while maintaining the remainder of the judgment in all its pronouncements. 15 CASE LAW 2.- Regarding its quantification, the Court opts, as we did in our recent Supreme Court Judgments of February 22, 2022, Rcud. 4322/2019 and of March 9, 2022, Rcud. 2269/2019, for prudently setting said compensation, and not for returning the proceedings to the originating Chamber so that they may be set there, which would significantly delay the full satisfaction of the violated fundamental right. To that end, it must be noted that the appellant had been requesting compensation of €150,000 and, in his appeal, he requested, as a subsidiary measure, the amount of €76,087.80, corresponding to two and a half times his annual salary, which falls within the scope of sanctions for very serious offenses, in accordance with Article 40 of the LISOS. In this regard, the Court, taking into account the duration of the relationship between the parties (around 18 years), as well as the other circumstances of the case, especially the fact that the worker was in a situation of Temporary Incapacity whose origin was related to the aspects that, ultimately, led to the violation of his fundamental right, considers the amount of €60,000 appropriate, which represents around two years of his salary and is in the middle range of the aforementioned sanctions of the current text of the LISOS and of the one in force at the time the events occurred and which is more proportionate and adjusted to the circumstances of the case to fairly compensate for the harm resulting from the moral damage inflicted on the worker, while also serving as a deterrent to future possible attacks on the fundamental rights of workers." The compensation amount of 7,501 euros is balanced, considering all the circumstances present, especially the company's conduct. There are circumstances that require tempering this worker's right to compensation. There is evidence that allows us to rule out the existence of a manifestly rebellious or non-compliant attitude on the part of the company. The company did not install a recording or registration system to the detriment of the plaintiff's right; rather, this right arose from the actions of the worker, Mr. Ceferino, who did not close the teleworking meeting and facilitated the company's improper access to private communications, which were shown by the employer in its meeting with the worker on January 7, 2025. HP 16th. The company did not carry out any reprisals related to the illegal wiretapping; rather, it was the employee who, in her legitimate right, requested the termination of her contract due to the violation of her privacy. In this context, no particular severity of the breach of the plaintiff's fundamental right is apparent, leading us to consider the minimum compensation, in the aforementioned amount of 7,501 euros. The foregoing is sufficient to partially uphold the employee's appeal and reverse the appealed judgment, partially granting her claim for termination of the employment contract; without costs - Article 235 of the LRJS. Having considered the aforementioned articles and other applicable provisions, we rule: We partially uphold the appeal filed by the representative of Ms. Asunción, and reverse the judgment dated December 2, 2025, issued by the Social Court. No. 9 of Bilbao, in case 372/2025, and, partially upholding the claim, we declare the employment relationship between the plaintiff and the co-defendants, GIIC FINECO SOCIEDAD GESTORA DE INSTITUCIONES DE INVERSIÓN COLECTIVA, SAU, and FINECO SOCIEDAD DE VALORES, SA, terminated, jointly and severally ordering the latter to pay the plaintiff the sum of €328,491.62 as compensation, plus an additional €7,501 for the violation of her fundamental rights; without costs. This judgment shall be served on the parties and the Public Prosecutor's Office, informing them that it is not final, and that they may file an appeal for the unification of case law under the terms and with the requirements detailed in the attached legal notices. Once this decision becomes final, the case file shall be returned to the Court of The Social Court of origin for timely compliance. Thus, by this our Judgment, definitively judged, we pronounce, order, and sign it. The dissemination of the text of this resolution to parties not involved in the proceedings in which it was issued may only be carried out after the removal of any personal data it contains and with full respect for the right to privacy, the rights of persons requiring special protection, or the guarantee of anonymity for victims or those harmed, where applicable. The personal data included in this resolution may not be transferred or communicated for purposes contrary to the law. 16 JURISPRUDENCE PUBLICATION.- The foregoing judgment was read and published on the same day by the Honorable Judge/President who signs it, in the Courtroom of this Tribunal. I attest. WARNINGS LEGAL MATTERS.- This judgment may be appealed by way of cassation for the unification of case law before the Social Chamber of the Supreme Court. Such appeal must be prepared in writing, signed by a lawyer, addressed to this Social Chamber, and filed within 10 business days following notification of the judgment. Furthermore, if the appellant was convicted in the judgment, they must attach, when preparing the appeal, proof of having paid the amount of the judgment to this Chamber; or a bank guarantee expressly stating the joint and several liability of the guarantor. If the judgment consists of establishing the capital cost of a Social Security pension, this payment must be made to the General Treasury of the Social Security System once the amount has been determined by the Treasury, which will be communicated to the appellant by this Chamber. Likewise, and in all cases except those specifically exempted, the appellant must provide proof of payment to the clerk of this Social Chamber when preparing the appeal. deposit of 600 euros. The payments referred to in the preceding paragraphs must be made either at a Banco Santander branch, or by transfer or electronic means as follows: A) If made at a Banco Santander branch, the payment must be made to the Deposits and Consignments Account of said group, number 4699000066073826. B) If made by transfer or electronic means, the payment must be made to account number ES55 0049 3569 9200 0500 1274, stating in the beneficiary field the name of this Social Chamber of the High Court of Justice of the Basque Country, and in the description field the account number 4699000066073826. Public entities are exempt from making these payments. whether they have expressly been granted legal aid or are litigating due to their status as a worker or beneficiary of the public Social Security system (or as their successors), although if the appellant is a managing entity and has been ordered to pay a periodic Social Security benefit, when announcing the appeal, it must include certification proving that it has begun making the payment and will continue to do so punctually throughout the proceedings. 17